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The current Afro-communitarianism (AC) articulation and analysis of botho is characterised by two main 
approaches. First it treats botho as if it is a universal concept that can be expounded independently in a 
theoretical manner devoid of any specific cultural perspective that give it meaning and authority. Second 
it abstracts the Sesotho proverb “motho ke motho ka batho” (MKKB) from the rest of Sesotho narrative 
elevating it as foundational to the definition and meaning of the concept, where a particular reading of this 
proverb has come to be taken as the quintessential articulation of the meaning of this concept. 
This thesis problematizes this account within the context of Sesotho culture from which the proverb 
derives. Firstly, it rejects the abstraction and exceptionalism of MKKB as poor scholarship and a deficiency 
in the knowledge of the ethical significance of narratives in Sesotho culture, arguing that this is an 
unjustified abstraction of MKKB from Sesotho narratives inconsistent with how proverbs are interpreted 
and used. It asserts that MKKB is best understood not in isolation, but within the context of the unity of 
African narratives and their meaning and unique role as the chief means of moral education into botho. 
Secondly, the thesis questions the dominance of one specific reading of Ubuntu in the current botho 
discourse and the privileged status this reading has enjoyed over other, equally justified, interpretations. 
It argues for a definition of botho (moral personhood ) based on the definition of this term as a moral 
statement describing good admirable moral qualities of character of motho. The study thus starts from the 
premise that talk about botho turns out to be talk about character of motho because botho cannot be fully 
realised independently of the characters of individuals who make it a reality.  
The study recommends a character centric definition of botho as a fresh alternative, where an 
understanding of the possession of botho by motho, entails inculcation of makhabane or virtues of botho, 
many of which are found narratives especially proverbs. Its attractiveness is that it is consistent with the 
nature of African ethics as character-based ethic, but also underscores important assumptions behind 
botho including the primacy of character and the existence of a particular social order as a prerequisite for 
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CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY  
 
“In the context of the activities of the moral life—in our decisions to obey 
moral rules, in the struggle to do the right thing and to avoid the wrong 
conduct, in one's intention to carry out a moral duty, the quality of a 




The supremacy of character to moral conduct summed up in this quotation shows the intrinsic 
connection of our character as moral agents and who we are as persons. Character in this 
study will be used to mean the Sesotho word makhabane, virtues, specifically of the moral 
kind which entail inculcation of a combination of values and qualities that make a person a 
motho meaning a morally and ethically admirable person. It therefore denotes not just natural 
traits of a person’s personality but moral growth in terms of inculcation of good moral qualities 
as part of who one is, and this achieved through moral formation where moral beauty and 
goodness combine (Ikuenobe 2016: 129). It is in this sense that character is connected to 
botho because the latter stand for all moral beauty and goodness, which is never fully realised 
in any one person. In Sesotho culture it is the accumulation of these good moral qualities over 
all in a person that are considered first to reflect the person’s character, and second, a sign of 
the person making satisfactory progress in achieving botho i.e., becoming a motho (person) 
hence the connection with personhood. In this study botho is therefore understood in terms of 
inculcation of morally good and admirable qualities of character (van Niekerk 2007: 366).  This 
is based on the definition of botho  in Sesotho culture which is described as “se bakang hore 
diketso tse ntle di bonahale ho motho” Chitja n.d: 59). This can loosely be translated as “that 
which makes visible good actions of a person”, in other words that which reveals the good 
qualities of character of a person, that’s botho.  
This understanding is intrinsically liked to setho another important moral term in Sesotho 
culture. It is defined in terms of “boitshoaro bo botle ba motho; tloaelo e ntle ya boitshoaro ba 
motho (good moral behaviour and habits of a person) or as “tumelo le diketso tsa morabe o 
itseng ha o bapisoa le merabe e meng. Tsela eo sehlopha sa sechaba kapa morabe o 
itshoarang ka yona le ho etsa mekgoa le meetlo ya sona” (beliefs and manners of a particular 
people, and the way they do their things in terms of their customs and culture) (Chitja. n.d. 
698). Here setho links being human with (1) good behaviour (boitśoaro) of a person and in 
terms of ‘tloaelo’ (habits/manners) and (2) the person’s cultural origins (meetlo) and customary 
ways of conduct (mekgoa). This is the definition of the term that also inform this study and its 
understanding of botho. This understanding of ethical conduct is how traditional Basotho 
understood ethics. It is an understanding that is based on the centrality of character to motho 
(person) as a moral agent and his or her conduct. This understanding is currently not much 
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emphasised in the current discourse and one finds not much theorisation and analysis of botho 
in terms of moral character.  
This study’s bold appraisal of character therefore is a reminder of the dominance of Afro-
communitarian understanding of botho, at the expense of other equally justifiable 
interpretations of this concept. This has resulted in the ambiguities surrounding botho and that 
ambiguities questions about which plausible elaboration of botho is the proper remaining 
unresolved and in turn impoverishing existing knowledge (van Niekerk 2013: 7). The neglect 
of character to ethical living, including in current botho discourse, is one of the criticisms today 
about modern Western ethics chief among which is the forgetfulness of motho i.e., the human 
person (Shutte 2008: 22) and their character as the centre of ethics. It is for this reason that 
focus of the study and critique of current botho discourse and ethics will place emphasis on 
this. This should however come as no surprised as the discourse like much of African ethics 
is not immune to the globalising uncompromising influence of Western ethics1. 
The character-centric understanding of botho characteristic of Sesotho culture and the 
underlying spirituality of this concept is a perspective that has attracted little interest so far in 
the current botho discourse although Basotho are one of the people from whose culture this 
concept applied and is widely known and perpetuated. I reiterate the underlying spirituality 
here as an essential part of the Basotho understanding of botho to denote the religious 
dimension of botho. This is to emphasis the understanding of ethics in Sesotho culture where 
morality is not just secular but is underpinned by traditional religious belief and religion. 
According to this the consciousness of the sacred Sesotho culture respect the unity of life 
where the natural and social realms of life is inextricably bound with the supernatural (spirits) 
and spiritual realm of Balimo (ancestors) and Molimo (deity/divinity) as the guardian of culture 
(see Molefe 2015:64, Manda 2009: 2, Setiloane 1978: 32-34). This religious dimension of 
ethics or spirituality of botho is discussed in detail in chapter five, where I discussed the 
conditions in traditional Basotho society that supported the practice of botho and made botho 
as ethic possible.  
The examination of experience of botho from the moral particularity and experience of it in 
Sesotho culture, which is covered in detail in Chapter four offers current discourse with a 
valuable case study wherein lessons can be learned for today’s context and “the conditions 
that make botho possible”.  This ethical approach can lay a legitimate claim to rival current 
 
1 The term Western ethics is used to refer to Western morality and moral traditions found in European culture. It 
will used interchangeably with modern Western ethics to describe secular global morality of Western Europe and 
North America (Prozesky 2009:4). It is used in this study to contrast with African ethics, which here refers to moral 
traditions embedded in the many and various cultures of the people whose roots of origin come from sub-Saharan 
Africa and predominantly in southern Africa. As such it is differentiated from Christian ethics and Western ethics 
both of which are still wield considerable influence in southern Africa (Nicolson 2008: 7, Prozesky 2009: 4). Ethics 
in this study will predominantly be used in its non-academic sense, to be describe a lived experience and, and to 
wrong and evil (Prozesky 2009: 4; Prozesky 2007: 19-20). 
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ethical approaches in articulating the values of botho afresh and contributing immensely to 
African ethics as an African response to the inadequacies of enlightenment ethics or modern 
Western ethics underpinning much of present-day moral predicaments (MacIntyre 1981:63; 
Shutte 2001:1, 164- 174, Richardson 2009: 138).  
This thesis will explore this approach to ethical conduct as practiced among traditional 
Basotho and make a case for an account of botho grounded in the moral character of motho 
(person). I use the term botho in this thesis as opposed to the common combination in the 
literature of botho-ubuntu or ubuntu to emphasise the Basotho perspective in the approach of 
the subject (Broodryk 2006:23) and understanding of the term as found in their culture. This 
is to differentiate the starting point and perspective of this study from the prevalent view in 
current discourse where the Zulu term Ubuntu has assumed other meanings over time (cf. 
Mphetolang 2009: 12). This is in sharp contrast to Sesotho culture where botho is understood 
as moral concept preoccupied with the moral evaluation of the character of motho thus locating 
the terms squarely within the school of thought the described botho as a moral statement 
about personhood. I will show that the purpose of ethics among Basotho, while it was both 
personal and communal, in their society the moral character of its members was the fulcrum 
upon which ethics revolved and the glue that made botho a reality. It is in this sense that their 
approach shares many similarities with ethical approaches in the moral traditions of the 
virtues, or inculcation of makhabane. This ethical approach is traditionally associated with 
virtue ethics in the West hence reference to virtue and virtues ethics that will made often in 
this study, without directly making that comparison itself, except as part of recommendation 
for further research. As such for Basotho the purpose of ethics was to form individuals into 
persons with good moral characters and good people and in turn good members of the 
community (Casalis 1861; 267, Bereng 1987: 40, Sekese 1994: 9). This is what in Sesotho it 
means to be a motho (person) i.e., habitual display of qualities and virtues of botho by motho 
as a matter of one’s general behaviour and conduct, or character. This view I will argue is a 
preeminent account of botho, that can add valuable insight to the current discourse and the 
quest to make botho a reality in addressing today’s ethical and moral challenges. Using the 
moral particularity of Sesotho Speaking culture, I will make a critique of current Afro-
communitarian account of botho in the discourse (Metz 2007) through the analysis of botho 
as key moral concept in the moral thought and language of Basotho. I will further examine 
some of the traditional moral values of Basotho, their norms and ideas about moral formation 
and education in virtue, or inculcation of makhabane, (virtues). This will enrich existing 
knowledge by contributing to the present project in African ethics of helping contemporary 
moral agents to address the challenge of living morally commendable lives. 
I therefore aim to bring to the fore an articulation of botho ethics, as a contender for an 
alternative ethical approach for addressing these concerns. The research will thus endorse a 
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well understood approach to botho in Sesotho culture which is that this concept cannot be 
separated from the definition of what is “motho” (person)” (Gaie 2002: 277) and his or her 
moral character (Mphetolang 2009:13). This is because to say one is a motho (person), 
embodies ethical presuppositions and denotes where moral goodness understood primarily in 
terms of good moral character. The aim of the study will be to show that as an ethical ideal, 
botho cannot be abstracted from the characters of individuals members of the community who 
are supposed to make it a reality. Neither can this concept be made intelligible independently 
of reference to character formation and development i.e., inculcation of inner qualities of 
regarded as morally admirable. The study will also look to show that this approach is an 
endorsement of a view, not emphasised much in the literature namely that botho is a variant 
of virtue ethics and is suited to addressing some of the concerns raised with current ethical 
approaches about the significance of character.  
The study will, therefore, explore how the approach to botho and ethics in Sesotho culture can 
offer lessons on how to interpret afresh the meaning of botho in the light of character formation. 
It will examine and how this relates to the communal imperatives and values of traditional 
morality implied in the well-respected doctrine of Basotho, the doctrine of motho ke motho ka 
batho (MKKB) (a human being is a human being because of other human beings, (Mokitimi 
1997: 21, Sekese  1994: 54) or ‘re batho ka ba bang’ (Sekese 1994:54) which is the plural 
form. The immediate background and context of this study is the current botho discourse 
including the ongoing debates around personhood in the literature (Metz 2014, Matolino and 
Kwindingwi 2013, Menkiti 2004, Gyekye 2010). However, because African ethics does not 
occur in the vacuum, the study is also located in the context contemporary moral environment 
where there are concerns with western ethical traditions which has for a long time dominated 
sub-Saharan society.” Among these concerns brought by Western ethical approaches and its 
domination of ethics are the contemporary moral attitudes where the neglect of character as 
morally relevant to ethics is a feature of ethics (Richardson 1994: 91-92, Richardson 2009: 
129-130). This study thus joins others in recent years that acknowledge that Western ethics 
is “merely a particular way of understanding ethics” and it is time for Africa2 and its moral 
traditions to be considered as well (Murove 2009: xiv).  
1.2  Aims and Objectives 
 
 
2 The term Africa will be used here in its narrow nongeographic sense to differentiate Africa as continent. It will be 
used to describe the people and culture of black people of Sub Saharan Africa as distinct from inhabitants of the 
continents and surrounding islands including those of Arabic decent in the northern part of continent. It will not 
mean Africa is a monolith of static practices and traditions. Rather it is a recognition that Africa has a culture unique 
to it that is African, not Western or Asian. The use of the phrases ‘African culture’ and African moral traditions 
therefore will be used to contract with Western culture and Western ethics respectively where they denote some 
enduring and dominant common themes or ideas in many African traditions which this study advances as a critique 
of Western culture in Africa and a response of Western ethics (Ikuenobe 2016: 125-126). 
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The aim and goal of the study are therefore to proof that the tenets of botho ethics as found 
in traditional Basotho culture played a significant role among Basotho in fostering the 
development of good character and a basis for creating good community members.  
Secondly it will be to promote the values and virtues associated with botho as essential basis 
for promoting development of good moral character among citizens today.  
Finally, the aim will be to argue that botho principles presuppose a certain social order which 
makes the habitual practice of botho possible and workable way of life. 
1.3  Framing the Research Problem  
 
The ethical ideal of botho continues to enjoy unparalleled prestige in recent years as a subject 
of research on traditional African morality, attracting much interest from a wide range of 
scholars and contexts. It is therefore a term that is now en vogue and as with all such terms it 
can be used or misused (Eliastam 2015). Alongside this enthusiasm, some have raised 
concern that concept means anything one chooses (Lutz 2009: 2; Munyaka and Motlhabi 
2009) and that it risks becoming meaningless (Shutte 2001:14). Other have even suggested 
that “the project of ubuntu ought to reach its end” (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013: 198). These 
views reveal not only the diversity of interpretations and the debatable nature of this concept 
(Khoza 2012: 2; Metz 2014) but also its currency (Kamwangamalu 2007: 35) in African ethics 
and ethics in general. 
In spite much research on the concept, debates around what exactly this concept mean refuse 
to go away (Gade 2013: 487) and increasingly the concept seems to exist more in theory than 
reality. Although widely theorized the notion of ubuntu/botho does not appear to be translating 
into actual lived experience in society and communities (Eliastam 2015: 4; Letseka 2013A :337- 
338). It is within this context that the study of this concept continues to be of interest and 
relevance. The interest is also because of the potential botho must provide communities and 
individuals with ethical resources to address current ethical challenges agents are facing today 
(Ntibagiriwa 2001: 66). It is also because of the ethical approach it promotes, which is the 
endorsement of the value of moral traditions of Africa for so long ignored as a workable 
resource in ethics (Murove 2009:  xiv). In view of the latter thus one finds in recent years a 
strong movement in African ethics, where scholars are revisiting traditional moralities of 
African cultures with the view to uncovering and recovering some of its essential elements as 
moral resources that can be of value today alongside other moral systems (Bujo 2001: 1 -2).  
This study shares in this view and explores the Basotho culture as one of the moral tradition 
worth consideration and attention of scholars. It deepens the understanding of this concept by 
analysing its meaning from the perspective of Sesotho speaking culture and challenging the 
dominance of one specific understanding of this concept over other equally justifiable. One of 
the interesting observations about the way botho is interpreted in the current botho discourse 
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is how much of it is based on the meaning of the word botho itself.  As I will argue in this study 
this basic definition of the word is important, with respect to the perspective of the Sesotho 
speaking culture. This is because there botho as moral term is defined in terms of character 
using key words like ‘boitsoaro’ (behaviour, comportment) ‘diketso tse ntle’ (beautiful actions 
which means morally beautiful i.e., good admirable conduct or good manners (Chitja. n.d; 59, 
Otlogetswe 2015: par 2, Paroz 1974: 390). It is for this reason that in this study I contend that 
botho is intrinsically connected to good behaviour of a person understood fundamentally in 
terms good character and that this is should be the basis of its definition. This is quite different 
form how this concept is theorised in the current botho discourse. 
Normally with words like this a basic dictionary meaning is first evoked, and then further 
interpretation and more nuanced application developed from them. With the botho, as found 
in Sesotho language this does not appear to be the case in the current discourse, and I will 
argue this in part explains the direction that the discourse on this subject took. If we look at 
the basic dictionary meaning of this word in Sesotho culture one finds that is described using 
key word like ‘boitsoaro’ (behaviour, comportment) ‘diketso tse ntle’ (beautiful actions which 
means morally beautiful i.e., good admirable conduct (Chitja. n.d; 59). So, in Sesotho speaking 
culture “botho refers to a composite of manners that are considered desirable and includes 
phatic communion acts such as saying Hello to people you meet, (litumeliso), or being polite 
and helpful (Otlogetswe 2015: par 2). As it can be seen this is a description of good behaviour 
understood in Sesotho culture in terms of ‘boitśoaro’ which means character.  The best way 
to explain the relation of this word to character is to say in Sesotho language it would be 
inconceivable for a person regarded as of bad character to have botho, similarly it would be 
unintelligible for a person regarded as having the roundness of character i.e., accumulation of 
makhabane (virtues) that makes one a morally outstanding person, to be at the same be 
lacking in botho. So only a motho with good character can have botho and no motho with good 
qualities of character can have no botho. The difference is botho is a totality and summation 
of all moral goodness as such it is always approximate, and character is a pathway to botho 
understood as personhood. It is this interpretation of botho that argue needs to be 
incorporated into the mainstream discourses on botho. 
To appreciate the relevance and significance of this formulation of botho, it is necessary to 
outline the background and larger context of the reinstatement of character in ethics in general, 
within which this study is being undertaken and is a part of. The reasons behind this relate to 
the displacement of character in ethics as whole in modern Western ethics and lack of interest 
on character as a moral concept, at least in the English-speaking world (Richardson 1994: 
91). The problems with this, has cogently been argued by MacIntyre (1981) in his seminal 
work After virtue in which the source of this problems can be traced to the enlightenment 
project on ethics (MacIntyre 1984: 4). One of the consequences of this displacement of 
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character, is a distortion of morality that has led to “forgetfulness of the human person” where 
there is less and less concerned with people themselves and their characters in favour of 
actions of individuals (Shutte 1994: 25). This distinction is important because it focuses on the 
latter which is seen as what is wrong with modern ethics and the cause for abandoning the 
development of good moral character, which is the whole point of ethics and moral life 
(Richardson 1994: 89). It will not therefore have escaped the notice of observant practitioners 
that one of the characteristic features of modern ethics as understood ordinarily today is the 
notion of the individual as the moral sovereign. The implications of this conception of the self 
and its impact to morality is best summed by MacIntyre (1982: 295) when he argues that:  
“At the beginning of the modern” [era] “the moral agent as traditionally 
understood almost, if not quite, disappeared from view. The moral agent's 
character, the structure of his desires and dispositions, became at best a 
peripheral rather than a central topic for moral philosophy [or ethics]. …. 
What replaced and still too often replaces the concept of moral character 
at the core of philosophical thinking about morality was and is a conception 
of choice of particular kind as central to moral agency”). 
 
So not only has modern ethics displaced character as an important moral concept in our moral 
language, it has ensured that the way we think of ourselves as moral agents also disregards 
the significance of character to ethical conduct and much of the public’s moral life. This whole 
scale displacement of character thus means that for most people today, especially those living 
in societies that have fully embraced modern Western ethics, ethics essentially conceived in 
terms of “actions” of the individual, specifically the individual’s choices about those actions or 
particular moral decisions at particular moments, when “doing the right” thing is required.  In 
other words, the modern approach seems to be that there are times during the moral agent’s 
life or occasions when ethics is called for and that there are other times when it is not. In this 
view, rules are “the primary concept of the moral life”, as opposed to “qualities of character” 
(MacIntyre 1981:119). In contemporary moral culture and in much of moral attitudes today 
considerations of the character of motho as a moral agent which deals with questions of “what 
sort of person am I to become” (MacIntyre 1981:118) or “what is worthy of me” (Richardson 
1994: 92) are not only at the periphery of ethical discourses, but they are also not central part 
of the primary considerations of ethical decision making at a personal individual level.  
But as it will be argued here, as moral agents we cannot envision ourselves in this way, without 
great cost to who we are a person. This is because it is our moral character that defines who 
we are morally or as moral agents and that by which we qualify our self-agency in the world 
in terms of having “certain intentions (and beliefs) rather than others” (Richardson 1994: 92). 
This means that without references to the moral character of the whole person i.e., taking into 
consideration his or her intentions, beliefs, motives and purposes (MacIntyre 1981: 208), 
characterising our moral behaviour as agents become unintelligible. It is for this reason that 
when a person behaves in a way which is inconsistent with what is understood as one’s aims, 
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intentions, or long terms goals or objectives, “we are both intellectually and practically baffled” 
(Ibid. 209).  It is from such bafflement that  colloquially we describe such behaviour as “out of 
character” and traces of this requirement for intelligibility of human in terms of consistency 
with our character i.e., who we are can be traced in common expressions often found in daily 
use like, “it’s unlike him or her to do such and such”, or “it makes no sense”.  
The preoccupation with principles and rules of right actions that we find in modern ethics has 
led to a loss of sight of the primary focus and goal of ethics by ethical reflection, and that 
focuses as we have alluded to already is motho i.e., the human person (Shutte 1994:25). The 
implication of this is that the “rightness of actions” has now become the focal point of ethics 
not the character of motho as the person making these decisions. In terms of this moral priority 
in ethics is focused on considerations of doing the right things, as opposed to concerns with 
aiming to be a good person. This is a very different approach to moral conduct and from the 
traditional conception of the purpose and function of ethics as found in many pre-modern 
cultures such as that of the Basotho people, in which botho was not only the common moral 
frame of reference but a lynchpin of personal conduct.  
This is dissatisfaction underlying the call for the reinstatement of character, which applies to 
the current botho discourse. This is because, for all their appeal and innate resonance with 
our nature as human beings, traditional values associated with botho, e.g., good moral 
character or moral uprightness, concern with one’s neighbor and their welfare, no longer seem 
to form part of moral ideals that shape and influence personal conduct in the way they used 
to in the past. This is both the predicament of contemporary moral culture and the tragedy of 
modern ethics. One only must look at most of our public life to how rarely if ever does one 
ever hear of policymakers and politicians announcing a policy because they think it will make 
people morally better. Never. What this shows is that contemporary moral culture has failed 
to inspire society with the moral ideals that prizes character as central to moral goodness and 
personal conduct, and as something to animate society.  Modern ethics as well as liberalism 
and its individualistic ethic, which it promotes as its core value (Giddy 2014) is therefore 
complicit in the eclipse of “character”. It has done very little to stop the notion of being a “good 
person” not only being peripheral to our moral vocabulary and ethical goals, but also from this 
becoming the moral goal that shapes personal conduct.  
Instead, modern ethics and its moral culture have made possible the rejection of the old ethical 
traditions. It is a key player in forcing their aspiration to the periphery of public life in general 
as non- mainstream counter-cultural position (Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012: 87). In this moral 
universe, aspiration to be a “good person” with good moral character, which is the task of 
ethics (Richardson 1994: 89) or desire thereof is matter of choice. It “is no longer, as it was 
for the ancients” where ethical living was understood metaphorically speaking in terms of “an 
arrow capable of hitting or missing its mark” for which one strives for in life and accountable 
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to others for it. In modern societies being moral understood in terms of being good, is now a 
bare logical fact, guiltless and inerrant and is applied within a social context where there is no 
intrinsically desirable life, only a range of desired lifestyles (Skidelsky and Skidelsky 2012: 89). 
This is the quintessential expression of what MacIntyre (1981: 32) characterized as the 
modern self whose moral life is governed by criterionless choice.  
But as it will be seen human life is not just a form of individual existence that is not open to 
moral praise or blame or moral evaluation. Personal conduct as part of life is governed and 
lived in the light of certain aims, intentions and goals in life, and it is these that constitute our 
telos, i.e., our sense of what we understand to be our purpose and reason for being as agents. 
And central to how we evaluate the progress one makes in this regard, i.e., how well one lives 
their life it is in part assessing the kind of person we become; what characters we have. This 
displacement of character from the centre stage of ethics in the manner that modern moral 
culture and modern ethics has looked to do is in effect also the displacement of another 
important aspect of morality inseparable from character, namely conscience. The two 
concepts are not only fundamental in ethics, nor are they are inextricably bound together, they 
are the core of personal morality and often moral judgement they are interchangeable. They 
constitute that “the inner voice of ethics, of right and wrong, of good and evil” and the “personal 
sense of right and wrong that we have as individuals …. which defines our characters 
(Prozesky 2007: 22). It is in this sense that character is central to personal conduct because  
“it is from a person's character that all his or her actions—good or bad—
radiate [and that] the performance of good or bad acts depends on the state 
of [a person’s] character” (Gyekye 2011: par.14).  
 
The implications of this to the current botho discourse, if it is to offer solutions to the myriad of 
ethical and moral challenges and moral decay that we see around us today (Prozesky 2007: 
7-8) entails a change in thinking, not least in the direction of reinstatement of character. This 
means among other things revisiting current interpretations of botho represented in Afro-
communitarian. It means replacing the current governing metaphor in current botho discourse 
where self-realisation through communal relationships is the overriding formulation of botho, 
with essentially more personal metaphors based of the significance of character (Richardson 
1994: 92) where emphasis and priority are on “moral ways of being” and “specific dispositions 
of character” (van Niekerk 2013: 89). This is because as it will be argued here, the current 
dominant “harmonious relationships” formulation and understanding of botho (Metz 2007:  van 
Niekerk 2013: 99, Mboti 2015) is unlikely to morally resonate or catch traction with 
contemporary moral agents, many of whom live lives in the context of modern urban existence 
where individualism is dominant. In this moral environment, individualism has infected society 
to the core and there is a widespread sense of the loss of community (Richardson 1994: 97). 
By contrast, the reimagined character-centric account of botho that will be outlined here places 
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significance on reinstatement or rehabilitation of character as a vital moral concept in ethics. 
In doing so this shifting focus of ethical reflection on botho from the external outward looking 
considerations of “good action implied in Afro communitarianism to an inward oriented internal 
focused agent centred focus on one’s moral character as the aspiration of the agent and 
intention to be a “good person”. In other words, the focus goes to the personal lives of people 
and the moral quality of those lives (Ibid. 89). This interest on the moral quality of people’s 
lives, not their actions as such, is the understanding and application of botho that we find in 
the moral practice and thought of Sesotho speaking culture, where this is a way of judging 
and evaluating the moral goodness of a motho. It is this interest in the moral quality of people’s 
lives as the essence of botho ethics that in this study will be examined with reference to 
Sesotho speaking culture where this is expressed in terms of the significance and primacy of 
character in the moral practice and culture of the Basotho and that which constitutes the centre 
of ethics.  
It is against this background that we see in ethics, in general, a noticeable and growing 
countermovement for the reinstatement of character as a response to the current dominant 
approaches to ethics and the trajectory of modern ethics. That movement is tilting strongly in 
the direction of the reinstatement of character, the lack of which is one of the reasons behind 
much dissatisfaction with the state of the contemporary moral environment which is discussed 
in detail in chapter two.  
 
1.3.1  Botho Ethics as a Responses to the Inadequacies of Modern Western Ethics  
 
From what has been said it is clear the study is not happening in the vacuum. It is conducted 
within an existing broader ethical context in which modern Western ethics has considerable 
influence on individuals and communities. This means that the current botho discourse, which 
is part of African ethics, is not only a part of this context, but that is influenced by it. The 
discourse is thus a part of African ethics’ response to this context to address the negative 
effect of modern ethics (McIntyre 1981: 1-5, Bujo 2001: xiv).  It is part of new voices in the 
arena of global ethics, concerned with the euro-centric bias of current ways of doing ethics in 
African (Murove 2009:15) and in turn calling for an alternative approach. One of the 
characteristic ways in which modern Western ethics does this is the impression given that the 
way ethics is done today gives the impression that ethics is an activity to be brought into play 
only when problems of a particular kind emerge and when a decision of a kind needs to be 
made and that for  the rest of the time we don’t have to worry about being ethical (Richardson 
1994: 91). In other words, it is the focus on rules of right action. This is can be seen in the 
various ethical approaches in the literature on ethics that focuses on principles and rule 
including those that try to develop principles or theories of right action grounded on botho 
(Metz 2007). In this study, I will advance an interpretation of botho found in Sesotho speaking 
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culture that challenge this way of doing ethics with a different approach to ethical reflection, 
one where the focus is on motho (person) and the moral quality of his and her character. This 
approach shifts the focus of ethical reflection from focus on actions of people to people 
themselves. In terms of this approach botho is then understood primarily as a moral statement 
expressing an assessment of the moral character of motho i.e., the “moral quality of a person 
(Gade 2012: 484). This formulation and interpretation are necessarily not interested with 
“doing” i.e., a person’s actions per se. Rather its immediate interest is “being” where the 
primary questions informing conduct is “what kind of persons am I? Am I the sort of person 
the behaves that way?  When this concept is analysed in this way, its inextricable link to 
character of motho (person) and possession of a good qualities of character, that make one 
to be a motho become clear, as I will show later when examining its practice in Sesotho 
culture, in Chapter four.  It will also be clear how this understating i.e., of botho in terms of 
good moral character is at the heart of the assessment of moral personhood. In Sesotho 
culture this is seen in the negative descriptions of botho that Basotho use expressed in the 
statement ‘ha se motho” (s/he is a person) or the moral term ‘bophoofolo” which refers to total 
lack of botho in a person3 (Khoza 1994: 8, Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 71, Otlogetswe 2015: 
par 4). This is where a description of lack of botho is explicitly defined in terms of personhood. 
In other words, the positive description of botho always implies awareness of its opposite and 
that is potential for an agent to fail to become a motho i.e., acquire the qualities of botho. It is 
important to realise that ‘ha se motho’ is actually a shortened form of the sentence ‘ha se 
motho ea nang le botho,(s/he is not a person that possess qualities of botho) which is the 
opposite of ‘ke motho ea nang le botho, (s/he is a person that possess qualities of botho). 
Both statement places emphasis on accumulation of certain qualities which in turn become 
part of the person person’s moral character, hence their private and public moral identity.  
For current botho discourse, this interpretation requires reframing the questions in the 
discourse about botho from “what does botho mean?” to what does botho say about motho.  
And the answer to latter will always point to questions about to “who am I am” as a moral 
agent, to what botho is about and not so much what the right thing is to do (Richardson 
1994:100). This is because it is to the character of the person that we refer to when we say of 
a person ‘ke motho ea nang le botho’, when describing a person who shows excellence in 
botho i.e., in inculcating and accumulating qualities associated with botho, which makes a 
 
3 Although ‘ha se motho’ and ‘bophoofolo’ both express moral failure of a person, the seriousness of the failing is 
not the same. The former relates to failure specifically in acquiring botho i.e., moral personhood, the latter relates 
to this failure not only of total lack and disregard of botho but one that display absence of any semblance of 
humanity or setho (humanness) in the conduct of a person. It is in this sense that to have no ‘setho’ is much more 
serious that to have no ‘botho’ since a lack of ‘setho signals the lack of characteristic human qualities, hence the 
term bophoofolo (beastly) strictly speaking refers to lack of setho. The reference to phoofolo is to express how 
antithetical to a behaviour expected of a motho (person) the conduct is that the only way to describe it is that it is 
only befitting of a beast.  It is thus the strongest moral rebuke to an individual who fails to meet the expected 
standards of botho by live up to the standards of one who is a person, motho especially in the character that one 
has.  
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person a motho.  It is for this reason that in this I will argue that botho must be analysed 
together with ‘ha se motho’, which is a short form of ‘ha se motho ea nang le botho’ (they are 
a not a person who possess botho) and bophoofolo as the quintessential expression of lack 
of botho. This begs the question what exactly does the word botho mean?  
As a moral term, therefore, the question that botho is addressing in a person is “what sort of 
conduct befits me in view of the kind of person I am and ought to be” and this is answered in 
terms of one’s moral upbringing and culture. And in African culture we know that personal 
identity is intricately linked with upbringing, or kholiso in Sesotho. As such the answer to the 
question “what sort of person am I” will always imply reference to where one comes from in 
terms of family and the community upbringing morally, both of which the individual is regarded 
as a representative of. It is in this sense that there is no escaping our social identity as moral 
agents, hence the communal elements in the understanding of botho. In other words, it is not 
just about the moral agent doing good things or doing the right thing but more importantly, the 
moral agent himself or herself being a good person in line with how one was brought up.  
I will also argue that the challenges and moral problems Africa faces today (Shutte 2001:1; 
Dolamo 2013:1), to which botho is invoked as a response, are the backdrop of current botho 
debates. Here too I will argue that the relevance of botho is that these are because of the 
obliteration of the moral agent as understood in traditional societies in Africa. And central to 
this is the relegation of the moral agent’s character and disposition to the periphery of ethical 
discourse and the moral life (Hauerwas 2007: 6). In other words, contemporary challenges 
many communities in southern Africa are facing today is because of the internalisation of 
ethical approaches that emphasise what moral agents do rather than who they are and ought 
to be. These problems are thus not about changes within Africa that undermined and disrupted 
traditional ethos (Kasenene 1994:138). Neither are about dilemmas about traditional and 
Western ethical traditions (Kinoti 1992:73) or indeed about urbanisation and modernisation 
that eroded values and norms of botho (Dolamo 2013: 2). They are instead problems that 
arise because of the whole-hearted and unquestioning embrace of modern western values 
systems and a First World culture ethical approach to ethics, especially individualism and the 
individualistic character of Western values frameworks, which is one the defining features 
ethics from the West.  
I will prove in this study that this is not only a conflict with the traditional morality of the Basotho 
and indeed most African societies, but that it is also the opposite of the values and virtues 
encapsulated and implied in botho as a normative concept. The manifestation of many of 
these problems in society today therefore reflects the failure of current ethical approaches, but 
also of the pervasive and lingering effects of the enlightenment ethics and the conception of 
the individual it promotes, which gave birth to modern ethics as we know it (Richardson  2013: 
153). It can therefore be argued that the fundamental ethical and moral problems in Africa 
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today, have to do with notions of individual autonomy, and an individualistic mantra of ethics 
of enlightenment that came with Western Christianity and westernisation. The joint effect of 
these is the elimination of the centrality of moral character in ethics and this as we shall see 
was the main feature of traditional African morality. This together with the relegation of the 
moral significance of character as irrelevant and to the periphery of moral discourse, are some 
of the reasons there is a growing dissatisfaction with current approaches to ethics, which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2.  
As well as this the role of Christianity and westernisation as the catalyst for the emergence of 
an individualistic conception of personal conduct in African culture cannot be underestimated 
This in turn has entrenched a now commonly accepted notion that personal conduct is the 
private matter for the individual and the rejection of mutual accountability in the moral sphere.  
Western Christianity thus further entrenched the privatisation of conduct by placing emphasis 
on personal and private atonement for wrongdoing. I am thinking here of Western Christianity 
which places emphasis on a personal relationship with God as seen in the catholic practice of 
confession for example. This private notion of conduct introduced a different approach to ethic 
compared to that of traditional morality of many communities in Africa. Now, ethical conduct 
was understood as no longer social and accountability for the moral life communal and social. 
Instead it was now private and individual.  
From the perspective of African ethics, I will content that the autonomy of the self as articulated 
by the enlightenment ethics, (MacIntyre 1981: 60) together with its corresponding moral 
attitudes, both of which are now entrenched in modern ethics, is problematic to doing ethics. 
But more significantly that modern Western ethics fundamentally incompatible with botho, and 
what it means to be motho (Gaie 2002: 278; Murove 2009: 29). This notion of the self is now 
well entrenched in Western ethics where moral life is regarded as no one’s business but 
except the moral agent alone. Its unaccountable character is foreign to African way of thinking 
about moral life where asking for and giving of accounts is essential part of who we are as 
moral agent. This self as presented in today’s moral culture is irreconcilable with the African 
ideal that puts premium on welfare of all through mutual caring as codified in the doctrine of 
motho ke motho ka batho (Metz and Gaie 2010: 274). The prophetic imperatives of this 
proverb, I will argue entail not just social mutual care but also giving and asking for account 
where motho is “not only accountable” but “can always ask others for an account” and put 
them to question because as a moral “ I am part of their story, as they are part of mine” 
(McIntyre 1981: 216-218).  This I will argue is the radical dimension of botho underpinning 
MKM and many similar proverbs and narratives, and that it manifests itself in the narrative 
conception of motho we find in Sesotho speaking cultures in the grand narratives i.e., “the 
narrative of our individual and social lives.  
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I will contend that in today’s context of privatisation of moral life and extreme individualism, a 
rereading of the ethical significance of the expression “motho ke motho ka batho” (MKKB) 
(Metz 2007) for our times, should not be restricted to its critique of individualism in favour of 
the community. Rather it should be expanded where its central moral teaching is understood 
equally in terms of encouraging moral co-responsibility and accountability to others 
(Mokolatsie 1997: 63). That the interdependency it is renowned for should be reframed to 
focus on shared responsibility on how one conducts themselves in line with what is regarded 
as acceptable for a motho (Gaie 2002: 278). I will argue, therefore that it is the relegation of 
personal conduct to the private sphere in modern ethics, that is at the heart of moral 
challenges Africa is facing and reasons for the growing moral disquiet (Shutte 2001:1; Bereng 
1987: 91). This proverb I will argue should therefore be interpreted afresh, to go beyond just 
friendly, harmonious social relationships (Metz 2007:334) or narrow application to only social 
and communal mutual aid and solidarity. It should be understood in terms of a formulation of 
botho that puts a premium on the specific type of relationship, where the essential moral link 
individuals have to one another is the relationship (Richardson 2009, 141). Such an 
interdependent relationship i.e., of mutual moral accountability is one where individual 
personal conduct, public or private, including what a person thinks deep inside, matter to the 
community (Bujo 2009: 116), and a cause for one to be morally called to account, as much as 
they can hold others to account. 
 
1.3.2  Towards a Character-Centric Account of Botho In Current Botho Discourse 
 
 
One of the most interesting and curious observation about botho is how the current debates 
and discourse have chosen to approach this concept. The tendency is often to not to give a 
direct meaning of the term itself but rather to describe a constellation of traditional African 
values it represents but without actually defining the term itself (Prozesky 2916: 14; Metz 2007: 
323; van Niekerk 2013” vii). Scholar appears to have too easily accepted the claim that botho 
is difficult to explain. I shall challenge this using the experience of Sesotho speaking culture. I 
will show that as moral concept botho can be explained although not fully and that available 
Sesotho dictionaries one finds a reliable working definition from which the discussion about 
what the term means can be based. This I will argue should be adequate as a starting basis 
of how botho as moral concept should be understood and theorised further.  
So, in Sesotho culture we see that botho is defined simply as ‘state of being a person, a human 
being’ (Paroz 1971: 390). It is also described as  “boemo ba motho ha a phedisana le batho 
ba bang, se bakang hore diketso tse ntle di bonahale ho motho, and  boitshoaro bo botle ba 
ntho e phelang (The manner in which a person lives with others, that which makes public/ 
visible the good actions of a person, and good behaviour/conduct of a living being” (Chitja n.d: 
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59). According to this we see that to have qualities of botho, which are never acquired in their 
totality because human beings are not perfect, is connected to Basotho loosely may regard 
as good manners but it is more than that. It is about conduct and behaviour that one displays 
and is this is described using words like ‘boitsoaro bo botle’ (good admirable behaviour, 
comportment) ‘diketso tse ntle’ (beautiful actions) which means morally beautiful i.e., good 
admirable conduct. These are description of good behaviour which in Sesotho culture are 
always understood in terms of moral character. This is the same definition we find Otlogetswe 
(2015: par 2) describes botho as  
“a composite of manners that are considered desirable by members of the 
community. This includes phatic communion acts such as saying Hello to the 
people you meet, being polite or being helpful in the community or at home. 
Ke botho” 
 
There is another important insight we learn about botho in Sesotho speaking culture from 
these descriptions, and that is the connection of the botho to setho, which is itself is a difficult 
word to translated and this will be done later. Without reference to setho I will argue that botho 
is unintelligible and that this in part explains some of the ambiguities of botho that results in 
the stalled language-game where there is seeming no further elaboration (van Niekerk 2013: 
7). What the introduction of setho to the list of key moral terms by which botho must be 
interpreted with is that ‘motho must have setho to have botho’.  
So, here we have a basic understanding of botho as a basis for scholars to further theorisation 
about the deeper and more nuance meaning of botho. In other words, with a word like botho, 
which is rooted in ordinary people’s lives one would have one would have expected that the 
first steps towards any analysis and theorisation upon such a word would be the basic and 
ordinary meaning of the term as found in the language it originates from. But as shown current 
this ordinary used meaning of the term is not reflected in the current discourse, nor is it the 
basis of discussion. Instead what one finds is fixation of botho discourse with motho ke motho 
ka batho as the primary understanding of botho. From here the approach of current botho 
discourse is to them emphasises the characteristic values associated with botho. For this 
reason, one of the of the characteristic features of the current botho discourses is its emphasis 
on the harmonious relationships with others that botho implies.  I will challenge this, arguing 
that in addition to the above criticism, that just as much as there is recognition that the 
individual has a personal and social identity (Richardson 2009: 148), and that the individual 
and community complement each other (Bujo 2009:116), the imperatives of botho likewise 
have both a communal and personal or individual dimensions (Metz 2015). This is because at 
its most basic understanding possession of botho i.e., good manners and behaviour that a 
person displays are connected to person’s integrity and dignity” (Dolamo 2013: 1; Casalis 
1861: 303). This personal dimension of botho is not emphasised most in the literature, yet it 
is the most suited formulation for engaging the contemporary moral agent. This is because it 
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is a dimension that has to do with self-expression (Metz 2015) of motho as a moral agent and 
individual. Shutte (2009: 98) has described this as that which has to do with our relationship 
with ourselves. I will contend that this is best understood in terms of an account of botho that 
places a moral premium on the character of the individual. This understanding of botho which 
has strong similarities with virtue ethical approaches have so far and surprising attracted little 
attention in current discourses. 
I will thus make a case for an appraisal of botho as a superior alternative for the right way of 
doing ethics in Africa. This is an approach that is consistent with African moral traditions and 
true to its ethical heritage. It is an approach better positioned to resonate with moral intuitions 
of most African and indeed contemporary moral agent. I will do this by outlining the tendencies 
and personal character and dispositions encouraged by the ethical approach implied in botho 
and juxtapose this with tendencies and personal attitudes espoused by its opposite, namely 
contemporary moral approaches as seen in modern-day moral attitudes. Like most agent 
centred ethical approaches, the character centric account of botho that is proposed here has 
corrective effect to the current botho discourse and its over emphasis of the communal 
dimension of botho at the expense of its personal dimension. 
In this study I will therefore contend that botho as a form of virtuous ethics, is relevant to 
today’s context, as a representative ideal of traditional African ethics. That it has a unique 
contribution to make to African ethics an ethics in general (Ntibagirirwa 2001: 66). Its 
understanding as an ethic of character as found in Sesotho speaking culture, can claim a 
legitimate and superior role to rival current botho approaches in influencing in practical ways 
the hearts of contemporary moral agents and influencing individuals as the primary ethical 
frame of reference for personal conduct. The reference to the heart is emphasise the 
difference with morality of the mind i.e., its over reliance of reason, principles, and rules in 
Western ethics in contrast to the morality of the heart underpinning the orientation of African 
ethics (Bujo 1990: 95-98). Therefore, I will hold that in spite of some concerns about the value 
of this concept (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, Mboti 2015,  van Binsbergen 2001) there is 
within key tenets of botho, eternal truths from which we can learn lessons and are applicable 
and relevant to today’s context and its ethical problems (Shutte 2001, Tschaepe 2013).  
This study thus will explore how these values can be rediscovered and calibrated for today’s 
context as useful moral resources for individuals and character development, who are 
essential for the experience of botho in communities. I will argue that what is needed to 
address the sense of moral decline as a concern, to use the analogy of a game, is a change 
of players i.e., focusing on the character of players. According to this analogy, there is a 
consensus about the status of the game i.e., decline in moral standard and failure of current 
ethical approaches (Ntibagirirwa 1999:8) as represented in modern ethics. I argue here that 
the best strategy and tactic for achieving this goal is by paying special attention to the 
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character of players i.e., the moral agents who play a vital role as they are the embodiment of 
the virtues of botho in society. Without a determined focus on changing the character of motho, 
the job of African ethics and current botho discourses is made that much harder. This may 
explain the perceived absence of the spirit of botho in modern-day African societies in general 
today.  
The contention of this study therefore is that this is best done through the adoption a 
formulation of botho that focuses on character of people, similar that found in Sesotho culture 
and the Basotho understanding of what it means to be motho. This is based on the observation 
that, in spite of the all-pervading influences of Western values systems in many African 
communities; in most of these societies there is now growing recognition that there are 
inherent weaknesses within central tenets Western ethics with individualistic approach 
(Richardson 2009: 138) and some element of traditional morality are worth rediscovering. This 
includes a sense in many of these communities that there is still a powerful sense of a common 
approach to values and conduct and belief, that matters of morals and ethics are not just 
personal matters where one is accountable to only themselves.  
It is within this context that calls for botho are being made and the current botho discourse 
must be found. I will therefore concur with those views in the discourse that say there is merit 
in revisiting the values of botho (Metz 2014: 1; Dolamo 2013: 1; Letseka 2011) but for different 
reasons. Instead of the communitarian ethical imperatives of botho, i.e., emphasising the 
communal relationships as the definitive way to described and articulate values of botho, this 
study adopts a different approach. It advocates an articulation and an understanding of botho 
first in terms of qualities of character of motho. It will underline the view that the habituation 
and internalisation of such qualities by motho as a way of life, does not only lead to valuing of 
communal relationships as important but also sustains them. This understanding emphasis 
moral development of the agents as the focus of ethical reflection and prerequisite for 
everything else that Afro-communitarianism advances about ethics in African culture. It is thus 
a more promising approach to effect the kind of influence on the moral behaviour of individuals 
to bring about the realisation and achievement of the Afro-communitarian aims goals of botho. 
In this study, I will thus submit that a character-based account of botho offers a better 
interpretation of botho for consideration. It provides society today with a framework and as the 
basis for the development a shared moral framework and ethical point of reference because 
it is character development and formation that there is a role for the individual and the 
community alike.  
  
1.3.3  Redefining Botho in terms of the Moral Character of Motho (person)  
 
This study will further explore botho as a moral virtue inextricably linked to “motho” (individual 
person) and the formation and development of character-oriented towards the common good 
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(Metz and Gaie 2010: 276; Lutz 2009: 3). I will show that traditionally the primary context in 
which the term botho was invoked in Sesotho culture was as a moral assessment of a person 
hence its proper object of focus is “motho” (person) (Gaie 2012: 277) and what kind of 
character they ought to have. I will therefore that the approach of current discourses and its 
articulation of this concept in terms of self-realisation as the moral obligation for motho, is 
problematic. This is because we cannot define botho without first understanding and knowing 
what “motho” is first (Tschaepe 2013:51). I will show that being called motho which is a human 
being that possess botho i.e., personhood, is not a self-determined evaluation by the 
individual. But that it is always connected to an external assessment of one moral goodness, 
and as such it is something conferred upon motho by a community (Menkiti 1984; Gyekye 
2011 par.18-19). The Basotho character centric formulation of botho, understood as 
personhood, therefore, offers a unique insight into this question of what is motho. It offers a 
persuasive argument to criticisms about the relevance and desirability of ethics of botho for 
today’s context (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, Mboti 2015), as it stresses character 
development as the essence of botho and moral development both of which are relevant to 
contemporary moral environment.  
I will contend that the relational communitarian understanding of botho is therefore 
unintelligible without first recognising that botho is first a moral statement about “motho” 
(person), plural “batho” (persons). This means that at its heart botho cannot be abstracted 
from the character of motho i.e., individual agent. This is because it is the individual motho, 
through their upbringing and personal moral development, in the community, supported by 
their community, that botho becomes a tangible reality. It is for this reason that in Sesotho 
culture the upbringing in the moral sense is always described in connection with being 
“ngoan’a Mosotho” (a child of a Mosotho). This is the concept of botho that I will try to introduce 
to current discourses highlighting its value as found in the moral life and practice of Basotho, 
their language, norms, customs, and beliefs.  
Since African ethics does not only speak of virtues of botho but its vices as well, I will also 
analyse the Basotho understanding of lack of botho. Here I take the controversial statement 
ha se motho (he/she is not a person) (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 71) as the entry point into 
the discourse. This is because this statement features prominently in discussions about botho 
and its meaning has been subject of many debates. I will show that this expression describes 
the failure to live up to the expected standards of botho, also referred to bophoofolo (Casalis 
(1861: 303) meaning beastly or to behave like an animal. This must not be construed as saying 
anything materially significant about the person’s humanity. It is a moral assessment by 
Basotho denote complete loss and disregard of botho (Khoza 1994: 8) or morals (boitśoaro) 
in the way one behaves and conducts themselves. The expression is therefore the negative 
formulation of botho and therefore is always a statement about the moral character of the 
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person since “it is from a person’s character that all his or her actions, good or bad” (Gyekye 
2011: par 14) come from.    
I will show in this study that the correct meaning of this statement can only make sense within 
the above-described conception and understanding of botho and that without it, this statement 
becomes incomprehensible. I will therefore submit that there is a need to re-evaluate current 
botho orthodoxy in the light of auto-centric account of botho, to enable a rediscovery of a fuller 
conceptualisation of botho that pertains to motho and his or her relationship with himself or 
herself, and his and her moral self-identity (van Niekerk 2007:367; Lutz 2009:3). Such a 
reconceptualization will bring forth an account botho that signifies the moral ideal of being 
human that denotes certain wholeness of character or well-roundedness of character (Shutte 
2009: 98, Mphetolang 2009: 12). It is a formulation that reflect botho as the highest attainment 
of virtue and totality of qualities of good character or makhabane (virtues) such as mosa 
(kindness), mohua (mercifulness), ho fana (generosity), boitlhompho (self-respect) and 
integrity (Dolamo 2013: 4) to mention a few.  
I will put forward an argument for the centrality of character of the agent, as an essential part 
of being a good community member, and that is one of the weaknesses of the current 
discourse. It seems that in an effort to steer away from the individualistic ethics of the 
enlightenment as espoused by modern Western ethics, and Western notions of individual 
autonomy, the current botho discourse over have tended to emphasise the communal 
relational dimensions of botho most, perhaps because the community is so central to African 
ethics (Richardson 2009: 134), and individuality is often so closely associated with selfishness 
and individualism. As such the articulation and interpretation of botho in explicitly personal 
individual terms i.e., in terms of character of motho; the inner core of an individual (Dolamo 
2013: 2); a formulation that emphasis cultivation of those inner admirable personal moral 
qualities, has not been sufficiently attended to, if not almost ignored in current discourse.  
I will argue in this study that this personal dimension and formulation of botho is the heart of 
ethical imperatives of botho; that as a normative concept it is a description of moral quality 
and character of the individual in terms of values and ideals of the African community values 
which include communion with others. I will maintain that it is in the character of individuals so 
formed i.e., relationally constitute (Murove 2009: 29) that the ethical dispositions of botho are, 
internalised, lived and experienced in daily conduct in the community and this will necessarily 
manifest itself in the way a motho relates to others and the quality of those relationships 
(Mphetolang 2009: 19).  As Richardson (1994: 93) puts it while “the community shapes my 
character”, … “reciprocally, my character contributes to’ and shapes “the kind of community 
of which I am a member”. The challenge I want to put forward therefore is that current botho 
discourses have failed to articulate an essential and highly relevant meaning of botho, namely 
that it is an encapsulation of virtues that a real proper motho or ideal person has. As such this 
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concept as applied in the moral practice and language of those cultures from which it derives, 
it is an evaluation of conduct, in terms of progress towards this ideal i.e., how well or poor that 
progress of a motho is. In this sense botho is the criterion by which moral statement about 
motho is made; an ethical standard against which a person’s moral worthiness is measured 
(Kamwangamalu 2007: 27) both by oneself and others.  
I will therefore submit that this definition allows for a clear connection between botho and the 
character of motho, as so formed by his or her community and the virtues that motho should 
inculcate and inhabit (Richardson 2009:142). This is what is lacking in current discourse. I will 
show that this is consistent with ancient Basotho conception of botho, whereby the concept is 
first and foremost an evaluation of moral quality of the person (Gade 2011:313) assessing the 
moral agent’s personhood or “human being hood” (Gaie 2002: 277) It is in this sense that I 
submit that the intelligibility of concept i.e., the appreciation of its full meaning, cannot be found 
independently of the analysis of the normative conception of personhood as articulated in the 
moral statement “ha se motho ke phoofolo” (they are not a person, they are an animal) which 
expresses a life lived with uttermost disregard and contempt of virtues of botho.  
One of the interesting paradoxes of the social and moral environment of the modern-day 
African individual is that in spite of generally adopting influences of Western ethics and 
modernity and effects of urbanisation; some of the social bonds that provided botho with 
traction in traditional societies have not totally be eradicated in his or her life. By modernity 
here it is meant philosophical, social, and political ideas of rationality, objectivity, truth, 
equality, freedom, and the overcoming of the domination of tradition…. ideas that came to 
birth in the philosophical revolution of the Enlightenment (Petersen 1994:103). One such 
paradox which reveals the strength of this is what has now come to be known as “going home” 
for many urbanites including Africans in the diaspora, referring to the family home where 
parents and leloko (extended family) still live or place of origin. In other words, despite the 
prevalent modern often individualistic tendencies, that have put communal ties under duress, 
there remains for many today elements of a fragmented traditional morality and spirituality in 
their lives (Mokolatsie 1997: 5) that seems to still hold value to them, including normative 
value. These include an intense sense of respect for the ancestors, a wavering but 
nonetheless enduring sense of community and belonging in the form of identification with the 
family and extended family. These elements of belonging, although not as strong today and 
not the same sense of community experience as in traditional communities, are nevertheless 
valuable social resources still available for cultivating values of botho.  
So even though today people may not live in small and undifferentiated communities, where 
everybody knew everyone, as the requisite condition for “botho living” (Matolino and 
Kwindingwi 2013: 202), the majority keep strong bonds of kinship and communion with a range 
of people. For instance, these would include being a son to my parents, a nephew to some 
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people, a brother to my siblings and an uncle. I am a husband to my wife, a son in law and 
brother in law to some people, and indeed I still identify with a place and country, namely 
Thaba-tseka and Lesotho, respectively. In addition to these ties, I am a friend, a colleague to 
others, a member of an ethnic group, a national of a country, and indeed a member of a race 
group, and so on and so forth. All these ties regulate conduct and shape what I can and cannot 
do and are therefore an essential part of my identity. These are the types of bonds that exist 
and means a lot to individuals even today and have normative influence in their lives, thus 
providing us with a minimum and basic, “ethically viable and supportive context” (Prozesky 
2016: 14) for contemporary social settings necessary to tap into in order to reawaken the 
ethical imperatives and dictates of botho in individuals. They are the primary social institutions 
that are available even in today’s context, within which individuals can practice and all the 
values associated with the ethical ideal of botho and develop as a result character forming 
habits conforming to botho principles. 
This study will therefore probe the significance of a botho informed approach to ethics in 
relation to the contemporary African moral agent and his and her moral environment, which 
according to Richardson (2009: 137-143) bears the hallmarks of enlightenment ethics. This 
environment calls into question the value of botho as it is at such odds with it. In view of this, 
it could be argued that the current discourses about botho has thus failed to take advantage 
of existing resources as moral capital for individuals and their current settings to capture 
people’s moral imaginations and intuitions. By continuing to frame the discourses 
predominantly in communitarian terms e.g. harmonious community relations, in a context 
where the traditional sense of community belonging for most people is non-existent, the 
discourse fails to speak to the modern individual directly where she or he is at, and to adopt 
more personal approaches that would nudge individuals towards a position whereby botho 
becomes a realistic primary moral framework and an intuitive primary point of reference. The 
interpretation of botho advanced here is one where it is understood in essence as a moral 
standard by which personal conduct is measured (Gade 2012: 487), and an ideal that 
becomes an ethical reference point for an individual and their moral aspiration to become 
“motho ea nang le botho” (a person with botho) or “motho ea lokileng” (a person with good 
moral character).  
I will maintain that the interpretation of botho in terms of the character of the moral agent, is 
more suited for today’s context where the individual is the cornerstone of modern life and its 
political and policy instruments around which much of modern today societies and life are 
organised and arranged. Here I am referring to the modern socio-political and policy 
environment which is which is presupposes the primacy of the individual’s rights and use the 
language that speak first of the rights of the individual. This account of botho has utility value 
because today’s individuals psychologically define themselves in individualistic terms 
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(Mokolatsie 1997: 78) and as quasi-free self-choosing moral agents for whom the community 
and other moral agents do not have any substantive moral relevance to their ethical conduct 
and reasoning (Richardson 2009:140).  
I will argue that there is a need to revisit botho in terms of ethics of character and spirituality 
of Sesotho culture that botho presupposes. Spirituality is used here to refer to the religious 
dimension of African ethics which implies a profound consciousness of the sacred and keeps 
the unity of the profane and sacred. It does not define human person and experience in purely 
secular or purely religious terms, because life is both at once (Bujo 2001: 95). The relevance 
of this approach is that it will enable the uncovering of and bringing to the heart of the 
discourses, a systematic account of the personal dimension of botho, i.e., defined in terms of 
moral character of motho in relation to herself or himself and others as well. First, because the 
contemporary moral agent occupies a strategic position in modern-day society due to 
weakening family and social bonds and the absence of a keen sense of community and 
belonging. In such contexts, the most practical social resources left as the seedbed for botho 
values is the institution of the individual i.e., motho. Many of these individuals despite their 
exterior urbanised Western way of life still hold dear some links with some of these traditional 
social institutions like the ancestors, family, extended families, “bo-malome” (uncles) “bo-
rakhali” (aunts) etc. etc. Hence the growing new phenomenon among these urbanites of 
“going home” or pha-balimo (thanksgiving to ancestors) (Setiloane 1978:33) after important 
personal achievements or any significant life event. These individual moral agents today are 
the primary social unit with the potential to provide the best chance of the successful cultivation 
of the values of botho through personal moral development and formation (Dolamo 2013: 5) 
in their own lives leading to its realisation in the larger community.  
Second, the significance of the personal or auto-centric account of botho (van Niekerk 2013) 
is that it highlights the truth that the tangible experience of botho, even when spoken of in 
terms of its communal relations, is concretely felt in the direct personal encounter of motho 
specifically their character. In other words, it is the individual persons, in concrete community 
settings that make botho exist, not in an abstract way, floating somewhere in the community. 
This is because the communal and relational prescriptions implied in botho, exist and radiates 
from the personal lives and character of individuals. I will argue in this study that it is the famine 
of “batho ba nang le botho”, i.e., individuals who have botho as the essential character of who 
they are, that explains why, despite much talk and discussion about botho in recent years 
(Gade 2012:486) there is still no real evidence of its existence in reality. The frequent reports 
in the public media of all sorts of morally reprehensible conduct in interpersonal relationships 
(Letseka 2013A: 338) bear witness to this. 
I will show that the personal, self-regarding account of botho (Metz 2015: 339) i.e., in terms 
development of good character through the inculcation of virtues of botho, is relevant for 
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today’s individuals and the moral challenges they face. It introduces a unique formulation of 
botho in the discourse, that can appeal to individuals to be good persons, because it is framed 
at a personal individual level, not communal. It has the potential to succeed in influencing 
individuals where the current discourses have failed because it speaks directly to the moral 
inclinations and consciousness of the contemporary moral agent as an individual. First, it 
makes the individual’s moral character the focus of botho discourses and this is something 
practical that can be understood easily by the ordinary person because it tangible and not 
abstract and as such it is a moral goal that realisable. Second, individuals can easily identify 
with this way of conversing about ethics and in turn, this is more likely to lead to the eventual 
realisation of the spirit of botho in communities, something that appears elusive in modern-
day communities, hence the doubts some have expressed about its relevance (Matolino and 
Kwindingwi 2013). Third, such an understanding provides a justifiable grounding for the role 
of the community in the personal moral life of the individual (Mokolatsie 1997: 2), something 
which current discourse has struggled to resolve satisfactorily as personal conduct becomes 
increasingly regarded as a private matter.  
I will therefore contend that for talk of botho to remain relevant and of value to individuals 
today, there is a need for a change in thinking and a new lingua franca in mainstream botho 
discourses. The discourse needs to go beyond the tired repeated refrain of motho ke motho 
ka batho. Instead it must introduce other narratives and proverbs that illuminate botho, and in 
turn jump start the moral regeneration and creation of a society of “batho bao e leng batho” 
(individuals who are persons). It must emphasis inculcation of qualities of character 
understood as virtues of botho, to have people with good moral character. The significance of 
such a shift underscores in a unique and attractive way, an understanding of botho as self-
expression of one’s inner qualities of character (Metz 2015) through habitual acts of botho in 
community. This is because “motho ea nang le botho” obviously values his or her relations 
with others, which would have been part of one’s upbringing through the process of 
socialisation (Bereng 1987: 40, Sekese 1994: 9). Such a shift is not just semantics, but more 
authentic to the traditional ideal of botho whose goal was fashioning and moulding community 
members into batho ba nang le botho i.e., individuals with characters imbued with dispositions 
and core values of botho. 
I will further submit that only in this way not only does it become possible to make intelligible 
ethically, the much-admired feature of African ethics, the prioritisation of the welfare of all as 
a characteristic feature of African social life. This preoccupation with the mutual concern 
extends to the moral sphere and matters of personal moral conduct vis-à-vis mutual ethical 
accountability. This is because as Richardson (2009: 131) correctly points out unlike in the 
West, morality in African thought “is indistinguishable from the rest of social life”, it follows that 
the mutual accountability implied and required by African communalism, covers not only the 
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social aspect of life but moral sphere as well. I will show this by an appeal to the experience 
of the Basotho, which is the focus of this study, and how it offers enlightening insight in this 
regard. As a form of African ethics, it provides an ethical resource from which lessons can be 
drawn in dealing with some of the lingering effects of ethics of enlightenment and Western 
ethics, which characterises much of what we see today (Ibid. 2009: 143) in the sphere of 
morality and ethics.  
  
1.3.4  Afro-Communitarianism and Motho Ke Motho Ka Batho Exceptionalism  
 
The Sesotho proverb “motho ke motho ka batho” (MKKB) which means “no man is an island” 
(Mokitimi 1997: 21) features prominently in the debates and discourses of botho (Gade 2012: 
492; Metz 2007:323; Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 63). As such it calls for closer analysis as 
it is regarded as the quintessential embodiment of African communalism. I will try to debunk 
this and the tendency in the literature that exclusively views this expression as the summation 
of the meaning of botho. Using selected similar proverbs in the Sesotho and Basotho 
experience I will problematise the current casual often unexplained association of MKKB with 
botho. I will argue that this is an arbitrary and unjustified abstraction of one among many 
Sesotho proverbs that expound botho as feature of Sesotho culture. This is because this 
proverb, as part of Sesotho narratives is but one of the many such proverbs. As Khoza 
(1994:3) rightly points out, one useful gateway to appreciating the depth of meaning of the 
concept of botho is through age-old wisdom resident in African idiomatic expressions and 
proverbs. This is true of MKKB and I will argue that its significance for today’s context is not 
only that it can be employed as basis for the formulation of an account of botho that emphasis 
mutual accountability. But that as an expression of mutual caring as the essence of African 
ethics, MKKB is not unique. There are several of these idiomatic expressions and proverbs 
among the Basotho that reveal the essence of the Basotho moral values and ideals. Each of 
these contributes a unique shade of meaning specific to itself, and in turn sheds further light 
on botho, as the moral ideal. But it more importantly their joint meaning and interpretation, 
through experience and familiarity with their use in the language and in specific social context, 
that proverbs supply a far deeper understanding and insight into the meaning of botho. And 
not least with regards elucidating practical ways that leads to one reaching the status of being 
of ‘motho.’ I will thus challenge the tendency in the literature (Metz 2012) to reduce the depth 
of the meaning of the ethical ideal of botho to this one proverb out of a rich heritage of such 
narratives in the moral language of a people, such as that found among the Basotho.  
I will also argue that the consequent tendency of treating this proverb as a principle analysed 
in abstract and independently of its socio-cultural context and reference to the lived experience 
that gave it meaning, risks misunderstanding this proverb and losing the essence of its 
meaning altogether (O’Neil 2001: 123;). This is amounts to a manipulation of both this proverb 
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and botho as a concept by being treated as defying contextualisation (Richardson 2008: 65). 
While not denying that as a normative statement the ethical prescripts and values 
encapsulated in this expression e.g. communalism can resonate mutatis mutandis on moral 
terrains of other communities (Gyekye 2011: par 5) and societies, its abstraction from a range 
of rich adages expressing patterns of social and moral life unique to a specific people and its 
culture is problematic. 
To a Sesotho speaking person, knowledgeable with its idioms and proverbs, the currency and 
exceptionalism of MKKB in the current botho discourses and literature is thus puzzling and 
unjustifiable. This is because as I will prove, this expression is one among many such proverbs 
that encapsulate traditional thought and wisdom on mutual care and according to traditional 
wisdom, their social and ethical significance is best understood when they are considered in 
unity, not in isolation from one another. In other words, there is fundamental unity within 
traditional African wisdom and oral literature resident in these idioms and proverbs which 
refuses a dismembering approach. This is because in terms of traditional wisdom and thought 
each proverb adds a shade of meaning unique to itself to the main idea being communicated. 
By way of an example the following three Sesotho proverbs are instructive here. A well-known 
proverb among the Basotho is “ha ho ntloana ngoe” (there is no home that is by itself, which 
expresses the same idea of the interdependency of people only that here the analogy used is 
that of a home. Another one is “ha le fete khomo le je motho” loosely translates; “It (death) 
does not pass cattle and eat the person.” This can be interpreted as a moral obligation of what 
“ought” to happen, which is that in times of need those with resources (cattle4), are supposed 
to make these available to others. The reference to “motho” in general denotes that those to 
be supported need not necessarily be close family. In other words, any member of the 
community can make this claim. This is the most radical and profound expression of 
interdependency we find among Basotho. The third proverb “nonyana e haela ka tsíba tsa e 
ngoe” (a bird builds its nest with the feathers of another) likewise expresses the same idea as 
the other two but now the analogy is of birds, and with this one we also find a much stronger 
basis for the common afro-communitarian reading of MKKB that often includes the notion of 
self-realisation understood in terms of success or excellence (Mokitimi 1997: 56, no 488) than 
in the other two. 
 
4 The significance of cattle among Basotho must not be lost sight of. Livestock and cattle in particular were the 
most valuable asset a family or individual could have, and it occupied almost the similar status as money in people 
lives today in importance in social life. So, the prescript that the most prized asset or resource one has, must be 
made available, when necessary to other members of the community reveal the depth of Basotho understanding 
of not only interdependency and communal solidarity but more importantly of moral obligation (Tschaepe 2013) 
and its implications which has relevance for today’s context. In this sense it is correct that according to traditional 
African ethic the moral obligation with regard to ownership of resources is that this while individual ownership is 
not discouraged, resources “ought” to be made available for common use when necessary, something that is 
foreign in today’s context. See also Mokitimi (1997: 3, proverb 18. 
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Two things can be learned from this. First, that these proverbs equally embody the ideal of 
mutual caring and communal solidarity, and that the impression portrayed in the literature that 
this a unique function of MKKB is incorrect. Second, that in terms of the unity of African 
traditional wisdom, these proverbs communicate a much deeper meaning in unity as opposed 
to in isolation from one another. It is therefore important to recognize that MKKB is part of a 
group of proverbs and according to Mokitimi (1997: 13-21) they relate to matters that society 
hold to be good or bad and are connected to virtues and vices. In Sesotho when these 
proverbs are invoked usually in conversation, there is a sub text implicitly known by all involved 
namely that you cannot speak on one without reference to the other. In other words both the 
speaker and the listener expect each other to know, based on their knowledge and experience 
of the culture, that in addition to the immediate message of the proverb in question, they are 
at the same time implicitly referring to other similar proverbs within the culture which are 
regarded as reinforcing the same message (Mokolatsie 1997: 48).  
It is therefore important to be careful how we use MKKB in the discourse, lest we fall into the 
mistake of abstracting this expression from its proper context and usage, which exists in the 
unity of the corpus of old age wisdom of traditional African thought resident in African idiomatic 
expressions and proverbs (Khoza 1994).  As van Binsbergen (2001: 59) warns it is unwise to 
analyse such proverbs as this and a concept like botho in isolation of the “sociology of 
knowledge by which” these “came into being”. The failure of botho discourse in this regard to 
respect the internal unity of proverbs as a body of knowledge, is in danger of what Okot p’Bitek, 
in O’Neil (2001: 123) describes as hubris of trimming or mimicking “African wisdom to fit 
Western scholarly” frameworks. Therefore, the impression made in the discourse where the 
significance and currency of this proverb is elevated as unique is problematic. This is because 
in the absence of any evidence supporting this, e.g. in the form of the contextual 
circumstances for its utterances in daily life, which is how the meaning of proverbs is 
determined, this status of MKM is academic invention founded on “doubtful” and ‘illogical 
interpretations of this proverb (Mboti 2015: 125). This is because proverbs as explication of 
required standards of conduct, embody certain values. And just as “the sense or meaning of 
ethical behaviour is never given tout court but derives from the complex patterns of belief 
encoded in cultural practices” O’Neil’s 2001: 123) so too is the meaning of proverbs and other 
narratives. The predominant reading of MKKB, which is lacking in this, is thus no different from 
another plausible reading of MKKB, one that simply expresses a human being as social. Thus, 
if read as motho, ke motho ka batho, one gets a slightly different nuance of meaning, which is 
less about self-realisation but merely denoting the nature of “man” i.e., people as human 
beings. Khoza (1994: 8) explaining this has thus correctly points out that that the axiom is 
“more than just a wise saying”, but “a hallowed axiom fraught with a great deal of explanatory 
and definitional significance vis-à-vis the existential question all cultures face: what is a man”? 
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To this question, according to this interpretation, a traditional Mosotho moral philosopher’s 
answer is “motho, ke motho, ka batho ba bang” “(a person, is a person because of other 
people) which simply means as a human being, motho is social by nature, similar in meaning 
to Aristotle’s “man is a political animal”.   
The point made here is to simply highlight that just like the above reading of MKKB is not 
improbable and a case can certainly be made for it, the same is true with Afro-
communitarianism’s reading of MKKB since the introduction of this proverb into the current 
botho discourse somewhere around the early 1990’s (Gade 2011:313).  Anecdotal evidence 
and familiarity with Sesotho narratives and proverbs, suggest that the unique rendering of 
MKM in current botho discourse is a later development and reading, that it is not supported 
by evidence from traditional contextual use of MKKB in its proper social setting. 
The understanding of MKKB is no different to how similar proverbs in Sesotho language are 
understood and interpreted. The meaning of such adages is always decided by the contextual 
and intentions of the speaker, which in turn was informed by the customary and traditional 
usage of such expressions in the community, as handed down from generation to generation 
through tradition. This case for this reading and interpretation of MKKB advanced in this study 
is coherent with how similar proverbs5 and expressions are regarded in the Sesotho language; 
namely that they are either descriptive statements, adages of contemplative insights of African 
traditional thought on the nature of reality, or prescriptive statement to inform conduct. To get 
the correct intended meaning one would often then have to understand the conversational 
context in which the expression was used. The same is true of this proverb, but often does not 
occur in the current discourses, as the used “in isolation –in vitro- without constant reference 
to the particular sociology of knowledge by which it came into being and was perpetuated” 
(van Binsbergen 2001: 59). This is problematic because the meaning of proverbs is best 
understood when they are studied in the context of their actual use, where   
“The social factors surrounding the application of a particular proverb may 
also clarify its meaning which, often, is metaphorical or figurative. An 
outsider’s initial understanding of a proverb might not be the meaning 
intended by the Mosotho” (Mokitimi 2004: 756) 
 
The social factors here include the tone of the voice of a “speaker,” the circumstances that 
evoked its use and the response therefore by the “audience” hearing such a proverb uttered. 
The current use and interpretation of this proverb as found in the discourse as a description 
of an articulation of botho appears lacking in this. This leads to the conclusion that this reading 
 
5 The underlying priority of the ‘welfare of all” found in Sesotho culture which is the context of this proverb and can 
be found in other similar proverbs such sejo senyane ha se fete molomo (no matter how little the food is, it can still 
be shared) or bana ba monna ba arolena hlooana ea tsie, (children in a family share the head of grasshopper). 
The central meaning of both proverbs is sharing where the moral obligation is that the quantity of scarcity or small 
quantity of something is no justification not to share, a fact confirmed by Casalis observation as well (1861: 207). 
In other words, sharing is the governing principle in order to safeguard the welfare of all, where even the little that 
there is ought to be shared if needed (Bereng 1987: 88) on sharing and generosity among the Basotho. 
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is driven more by the authorial ideologies of botho scholars specifically the considerations of 
nation building and reconciliation especially in the case of case of South Africa6 (van 
Binsbergen 2001: 64).  This is plausible in view of the desire of engendering the spirit of botho 
understood in terms nation building, hence the prominence of the common humanity and 
harmonious relationships theme found always going with current rendering of MKKB in botho 
discourse.  
However, I will contend that that the abstraction and exceptionalism of MKKB that we see in 
the discourse, requires correction and that the meaning imputed on this proverb as having 
important normative connotation about personhood and the individualistic connotations of self-
realisation idea, is unjustified (Metz and Gaie 2010: 274-275). First because at the heart of 
MKKB and many similar expressions is an exhortation for prioritisation of the welfare of the 
tribe or community i.e., communal welfare and brotherhood or mutual aid. Second, because 
within the cultural heritage that botho stems from, there is a rich repository of these idiomatic 
expressions and proverbs, including other metaphors in folk tales, that “cast light on botho 
and its orientation (Khoza 1994: 3) in equally vivid ways that should be brought into the 
discourse. Embedded in the variety these proverbs as part of the corpus of African narratives, 
are ready made ethical resources available for scholarship excavation by scholars of botho to 
develop a rich understanding of botho and corresponding practical ways of living that 
engender the spirit of botho relevant for today’s context. One such understanding that I think 
is a much more attractive reading of this proverb which the discourse could explore, is the 
notion of mutual moral accountability. This rendition of MKKB is not only relevant to for today’s 
context but also consistent with the overall theme of welfare of all and mutual care found at 
the heart of African culture. I will argue that today the significance of MKKB, where communal 
relations are weak, seems to me to be not so much what it says about individuals about self-
realisation through and only through the community (Metz 2007: 337). On the contrary, I will 
contend that its attractiveness is on what it says as a statement about ethical mutual 
accountability of individuals to others. This is because it is in the nature of the African 
conception of personhood which this proverb presupposes i.e., narrative self, that as a person 
and moral agent I am not only accountable to others, but I can also always ask others for an 
account (McIntyre 1981: 218, 126). This accountability is the given of my live as a motho by 
virtue of being born into a network of pre-existing relationships and loyalties, each with its own 
unique moral obligations and expectations. These loyalties and relationships are what 
 
6 The phrase authorial ideology is borrowed from Selepe (1999) in which it refers to the “specific material conditions” 
that influence “the author's” thinking and find their way in the author’s literary work. In this entry the concept is 
applied with reference to early scholars of botho mainly in South Africa and the context of nation building (van 
Niekerk 2013: 3) and reconciliation (van Binsbergen 2001: 64) in post -Apartheid South Africa which the concept 
being applied with particular reference scholars like Shutte and Tutu botho of whom are regarded as prominent 
voice behind botho and nation building and reconciliation in post-apartheid South Africa.  
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regulates and decide how we ought to relate to other. In the context of current botho discourse 
where moral life is regarded as a personal and private matter for the individual as the moral 
sovereign, I will argue that this is the most attractive and compelling way to interpret this 
proverb. The discourse should be championing this as a way of articulating the insight 
underpinning botho. 
Another way in which MKKB is relevant that I want to highlight, because it is currently not 
being emphasised in the discourse is that it points to the significance of African proverbs as 
whole not just MKKB as a way of expounding the insights of botho. This in turn is a validation 
of the need for mainstreaming of the narrative dimension of African culture into current botho 
discourse, the role of proverbs and folktales and how narratives are ideal as vehicles for 
illuminating botho. This is especially the case in the case of folk tales and proverbs because 
of the unique role they can play in education into virtue by cautioning people about “their 
behaviour, their character, … [and] the imperfect world in which we live” (Mokitimi 1997: xiii). 
In other words, the benefit of integrating more proverbs and other narratives in current 
theorisation of botho is their ability to covey advice, console and act as social commentary “on 
socially accepted norms” (Mokitimi 2004: 756) and behaviour vis-à-vis ethical imperatives 
required of botho required in daily living. Narratives capture the polysemic nature of botho as 
moral ideal and I will thus argue that the neglect of the narrative dimension of virtue as 
expressed in narratives, is one weakness of currently botho discourse. This is because 
narratives are a chief form of moral education in those cultures traditionally associated with 
botho of education about botho. This entry it is hoped to contribute towards addressing from 
the perspective of Sesotho speaking culture. 
1.4  Hypothesis 
 
The current state of the ethical value of botho for modern society is not only increasingly being 
acknowledged as welcome development for African ethics. However, the whole universalised 
and decontextualised approach characterising current botho discourses and its theorisation 
of botho needs to be revisited (Richardson 2008: 65–83). This study aims to introduce into the 
discourse such a contextual appraisal of botho by examining its significance and social-
cultural meaning from the moral particularity of the Basotho, as one of the traditional settings 
and a cultural milieu in which botho was a way of life. Such an account of botho is a study 
area in African ethics in need of research because of the contribution it can make to current 
studies about the nature of botho. As one of the Sesotho speaking communities with a long 
and intimate cultural heritage and affinity with the term botho, and whose cultural and historical 
experiences this concept stems from (van Niekerk 2013: x), the Basotho are one of the natural 
study areas relevant to botho and its current interpretation and application.  
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Basotho have a strong cultural heritage and traditions with intimate experience of botho as 
one of the indigenous African people of Sub Saharan Africa from which the concept derives. 
For them, their understanding of personhood i.e., what it means to possess botho is 
indissolubly linked with having a good moral character which is regarded as essential to be a 
good member of the community. Just as MacIntyre (1981: 206) argues that settings have 
significant standing to individuals, likewise the significance of the perspective of moral 
traditions of communities from which botho derives, such as that of the Basotho is 
indispensable to debates about botho in the current discourse. This is because without such 
perspectives, the value of current botho discourse and the broad scope of local and universal 
application of botho as a unique African ethic will be significantly impoverished (Eliastam 2015: 
2, Nicolson 2008: 3). Besides this, the word “botho” and the proverb “motho ke motho ka 
batho,” which feature prominently in the literature derive from the Sesotho group of languages 
i.e., Sepedi, Setswana and (Southern) Sesotho (Dolamo 2013: 1), the latter being spoken by 
the Basotho.  
The experience of the Basotho, and the analysis of their moral traditions as reflected in their 
social-cultural milieu including language, customs, and practices, has not found much 
attention in literature (Prozesky 2016: 6). This is relevant to the current botho discourse 
because it is the setting from which the term botho and proverb MKKB stem from. This is 
relevant because language is not only a carrier of the culture of a people but is also a 
repository of their moral values. It is one of “a number of ways” by which a society express its 
“values” which in turn reflects what it “holds dear” and “as people come to value certain things 
and do them in a certain way, they use their language in ways that reflect what they value and 
what they do (Kamwangamalu 2007: 32). According to this the moral language of a people is 
a gate way into the moral thinking and moral views and ideas of that society. This is true of 
the Basotho and the language. 
This study will therefore analyse botho and the MKKB motho in the moral language of the 
Basotho as entry point to the current discourse and a validation of ethics of botho in the 
evolving project of African ethics and its contribution to ethics. The study will appraise 
traditional moral traditions of Basotho as my moral starting point, to evaluate the dominant 
approaches to ethics which tends to ignore traditional African ethical systems and are biased 
to Western and Christian ethics (Murove 2009: xv). It will thus be a critique of the status of 
current discourses, advocating for the elevation of moral character to the discourse, drawing 
lessons from the Basotho culture.  
This research will thus contribute to current discourses in South Africa and beyond by bringing 
the Basotho understanding of botho to the table of the botho dialogue, itself a part of the 
greater project of African ethics of recovering values of traditional African ethics for today’s 
context.  
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The value of this research therefore is that it will give an insight into the Basotho conception 
of botho as the basis of a shared moral framework that held their communities together and 
stressed the primacy of moral character and moral accountability of members within that 
framework. This will open to the current botho discourse access to hitherto inaccessible insight 
of the moral language of Basotho and in turn a richer understanding of the meaning of botho, 
and of this proverb and similar adages. It is in this respect that this study is to my knowledge 
new and has not been done. The study will be of value to African ethics and the study of botho 
first, to uncover any shades of meaning and interpretation, or the shape and form of botho 
unique to their context and experience. Second to compare the extent to which their 
conception of botho differs or is like that depicted in the literature and third how it can be of 
value and practical relevance and applicability to an African moral landscape today and other 
places elsewhere with similar ethical contexts.  
The study thus will a endorse a contextual approach and analysis of botho, as a first-order 
category experience as opposed to a second order category (Inglis and Thorpe 2012: 90). It 
will contextualise this within the cultural and moral particularity of the Basotho which is the 
entry point of this study into the discourse. This is necessary to compliment prevalent 
approaches and perspectives in the study of this concept which has been from the outside 
looking in. A contextual approach for the study of the nature of botho allows a perspective and 
experiences of the primary communities, as representative ideals and from whose moral 
traditions and heritage this concept derives; to articulate their understanding and experience 
of botho as African themselves, as opposed to an understanding and interpretation of an 
African experience by non-Africans (Gade 2012: 486). The significance of this is that to date 
early and leading proponents of botho such as Shuttle, Metz others are of European descent 
(Gade 2011: 313-315). This disproportionately in the influence of leading voices articulating 
the experience of botho has set the tone of the discourse and the way botho is understood 
(Metz 2012: 102; Gade 2011: 304; Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013: 198). This is no clearer 
than in the arbitrary abstraction connecting the proverb “motho ke motho ka batho” to botho 
(Gade 2011: 313-315) to the exclusion of other similar proverbs. 
This study therefore aims to challenge such established view in the discourse with a critical 
appraisal of those perspectives from within, and in turn make accessible a new insight in the 
discourse of the traditional conception of botho understood in terms of the moral status of a 
person (Gade: 2012: 487, Metz 2011) specifically the moral character of motho. It will thus 
contribute significantly to the appraisal of the relevance of botho, not so much as a rejection 
of critical engagement with dominant global culture (Shutte 2008: 16) of our connected global 
village (Nicolson 2008: 2). But as a critique of the dominant ethos of modern societies 
embodied among others in liberal individualism (MacIntyre 1981: xvi), and relativisation and 
privatisation of personal conduct (Shutte 2001:1) itself a by-product of the ethics of 
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enlightenment. It will shed light on the use and meaning of MKKB and other Sesotho proverbs 
with the same or similar meaning. It will shed light of the proper context and in turn deepen 
understanding and knowledge of their usage and appropriateness, as resources that can be 
used to communicate the depth of meaning of the ethical ideal of botho for today’s context. 
The study will thus refine the understanding of “motho ke motho ka batho” and similar other 
African idioms, by applying it to the personal moral life of the individual as opposed to the 
social and communal life, which is the dominant interpretation (Metz 2011: 391). By 
reinterpreting these African adages afresh in this manner, a new avenue for living moral life 
as a public, not a private matter, one in which mutual accountability is valued and where others 
do not only contribute but have a stake and interest becomes possible. This is currently not 
possible and is something not immensely popular in the understanding of ethics. As 
Richardson’s (2009: 140) observation of undergraduate students shows, the common view 
they hold about ethics, found in the statement “in the end it’s up to the person to decide what 
is right for themselves” reflects a widely held view in society these days. The study will 
contribute to the discourse a new appreciation of narratives as vehicles for illuminating the 
ethical imperatives implied in botho embed in such idioms by understanding how they were 
used in their proper context. This makes it easier to uncover the social meaning of such 
imperatives and how to extrapolate their relevance into today’s moral landscape. The study 
will recast MKKB and similar idioms as readily available ethical resources with great utility 
value, which can be used to counter negative impact of the privatisation of personal conduct 
and the moral life espoused by modern Western Ethics. This is one of the ethical challenges 
in today’s context, and a basis upon which this study has argued for a shared moral 
framework.  
1.5  Methodology of the Study and Limitations 
 
From what has been said, it should be clear as native Sesotho speaker my 
investigation will thus not be that of a neutral academic observer, but as brought up in 
Sesotho culture. The analysis I therefore embark upon here will reflect shared ideas 
and views about botho articulated from the standpoint of an expert by experience of 
one who grew up immersed in the social milieu of Sesotho culture, and knowledgeable 
with the moral traditions of Basotho. As an African my engagement with the notion of 
botho as one of the key moral term in Sesotho culture is therefore grounded in the 
understanding of traditional Basotho culture where my formative moral development 
was honed (Letseka 2013B: 355). In other words, I will rely on my native knowledge of 
Basotho and their moral practice as my starting point for approaching this topic. I have thus 
restricted the topic to the experience of Basotho because my knowledge and familiarity with 
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the culture, will be a valuable research tool and asset to capitalise on the advantages of my 
status as a researcher with authentic native experience and fully understanding the cultural 
milieu of Sesotho Culture in which this concept emerged, and which informs the interpretation 
of key principles associated with it (van Niekerk 2013: x). 
This means as an investigator I enter the arena of this discourses as one who inherited the 
moral tradition of the Basotho, and not as a free-floating researcher without any specified 
starting point (Richardson 2009: 142- 144, MacIntyre 1981: 220). I will use this native 
knowledge to analyse selected cultural practices from the Basotho culture and experience, 
including those marking key stages in the process of socialisation from childhood, to validate 
the centrality of good moral character to the Basotho concept of botho and what it means to 
be “a real and proper motho” (Mphetolang 2009: 18).  In addition, as a native of the Sesotho 
speaking culture which is one of the cultures in which botho applies, I am in a privileged 
position to make a unique contribution to current discourse from knowledge of the “sociology 
of knowledge” of the Basotho culture (van Binsbergen 2001: 57) derived from a “personal 
experience” as an “authentic cultural milieu” theorist (van Niekerk 2013: X). This will enable 
me to articulate myself on the subject uninhibited and capitalise on the advantages of an 
authentic native experience and full understanding of the cultural milieu of Sesotho culture. 
For it is this, which informs the interpretation of botho and other key related moral terms in 
Sesotho culture that support the principles encapsulated in botho. 
The research topic of this study intersects with other of areas of interest in African ethics and 
ethics in general. This includes the debate between radical communitarianism and moderate 
communitarianism (Menkiti 2004, Gyekye 2010) and character ethics as found in traditional 
virtue ethical approaches to ethics. Equally relevant is the inclusion of added reflections on 
Ubuntu from the perspective of other cultures beyond the borders of South African north of 
the Limpopo river from communities in places like Zimbabwe, Zambia and or Malawi. 
However, it will not be possible to cover and give a thorough treatment of all these within the 
limitations of this study. This means that it will not be possible to give these and other essential 
topics of debates that have a bearing on this topic and would nourish this study the detailed 
analysis they deserve. This study therefore does not intend to cover all the topics that the 
investigation of this topic raises that would be of interest and enrich the study.  
So, although the context of the study is an investigation of botho in the context of current 
discourse and ethics in general, the primary focus of the study is the experience of botho its 
manifestation in the moral thought and practice of Basotho. This means that the approach and 
method that this study uses has comparative elements because it looks to cast light on the 
Basotho experience of botho in contrast to the how the concept is analysed and theorised in 
current botho discourse.  
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The qualitative nature of this study also means the methodology of the study is typically 
documentary analysis where the all the sources of information that the study uses are all 
written materials; namely books and electronic material published on the internet and relevant 
to subject under discussion. The study thus analysed a wide range of written and published 
material locally and internationally mainly covering the disciplines of ethics and philosophy 
and African ethics and African theology.  
The study also makes use of seminal literature and written documents on Sesotho culture. Of 
importance here are works of early missionaries and historians in Lesotho as well as key 
Sesotho novels and other books in Sesotho by early Basotho scholars and authors. Although 
some of these sources may be considered old the scarcity the historical perspective and 
approach of the investigation of the topic in Sesotho culture makes relevant historical 
documents as source of traditional life of Basotho. To my knowledge, although there is a lot 
of material produce on this topic, to date there is little published material on this topic from the 
perspective of the moral particularity of Sesotho speaking culture. For this study these 
sources, especially early writings of missionaries in Lesotho are an important deposit of the 
Basotho understanding of what it means for one to possess botho as character trait, which is 
an important dimension of botho currently missing in the current discourse. The study also 
relies on other works in Sesotho language including a collection of Sesotho proverbs and other 
forms of Sesotho narratives. The choice of these sources is that, although often not prominent 
in current botho discourse as useful sources, within Sesotho cultures, these works by early 
Basotho authors offer valuable insight in the social life of Basotho and the context within which 
botho applied and found its meaning and interpretation. The insight of Basotho understanding 
of botho they convey is therefore relevant to the topic of this research.  
As the topic of this study is a subject of ongoing research, with vast amounts of new material 
mainly in the form of articles continuously being produced, the study has analysed a huge 
amount of articles on botho that could be accessed at the time of writing on the topic and a 
wide variety of relevant literature available with the limited time of the study.  Most of these 
materials analysed are in the form of electronic sources accessed through a variety of online 
resources including the University’s online library sources and other academic online sources 
available to the researcher. This includes analysis of as much as possible newly published 
material searched from e-journals and other e-sources from the University online resources. 
The study analysed many published articles covering as many of the topic on botho related to 
theology, ethics, and philosophy as is possible within the set limits of the scope of the topic at 
the time of writing. Here too particular interest was on those articles on botho that in the main 
fall within the broad outlines of the disciplines of theology, ethics, and philosophy. 
The method of this study also means that the study uses phenomenology as the primary study 
design, where the phenomena that the study looks to unpack is the concept botho, as found 
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in daily lives of Basotho. The choice of the qualitative approach to the study is that this enables 
a one to conduct a systematic inquiry and at the same time build a holistic, narrative, 
description of botho as the cultural phenomenon under study to inform and deepen existing 
knowledge and understanding of the concept. This approach also allows the necessary kind 
of flexibility and sensitivity to social context of botho necessary for is full understanding (Astalin 
2013: 118). As such this design is suited to examining the topic as it applies the specific 
context which is Sesotho speaking culture. 
The rationale for the choice of this approach is that it allows for a compressive overview of the 
topic and to observe trends in the debates around Ubuntu/botho, and common themes. This 
approach allows the identification of nuance of meanings and analysis of common trends in 
usage of the concept to highlight common threads from a variety of voices and debates around 
the subject as the ideal background to the subject of the research. This allows the researcher 
to pull together evidence from a wide range of material to gain as broad a view of the meaning 
and understanding of this topic in the current literature as possible. This is important as a 
foregrounding of this study and its context as the study proposes to introduce a perspective 
and approach to the topic not common in the current discourse.  Key consideration here is the 
observation of the general approach of current analysis of the research topic where often this 
is approached from a universal point of view and not from a specific identified context, and the 
significance of narratives in African ethics. This is one of the weakness in current approaches 
to this topic.  
 
 
1.5.1  Motivation for the Study 
 
This study is motivated by the observation that despite much research on the topic the nature 
of botho is very much a contested topic and this field of study is far from being exhausted 
(Metz 2014). The conviction behind this study is that a character-centric interpretation of botho 
i.e., moral quality of a person (Gade 2011: 306-309), as found among the Basotho, is a more 
authentic and applicable interpretation of the traditional ethical ideal of botho for today’s 
society. In particular, the study is driven by the need for a motho centred talk of botho, as a 
more useful way of communicating the values of botho to modern-day moral agents. This 
aspect of theorising about botho is currently missing in the literature. Its significance is that 
the focus on moral character allows botho discourses to speak to individuals where they are 
and as they are, in terms of their social-psychological identity and sense of who they are, as 
opposed to who they are supposed to be i.e., members of communities of botho. Thus, the 
character-centric definition of botho I am proposing is a better way to converse about ethics 
of botho. Its emphasis which on character contributes in a concrete way to developing in 
alternative ethical approaches to the current Western and Christian ethical approach 
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(Richardson 2009:130); which underpin much of contemporary moral attitudes and public 
discourse.  
The earnestness of this study also emanates from an observation that current discourses have 
not yet developed a link between traditional African values associated with botho, and 
proverbs denoting interdependence, as an ideal ethical resource for introducing into botho 
discourse the notion of mutual accountability to others (Richardson 2009, 141). There is little 
in the literature about what these key tenets mean for an understanding of the social nature 
of ethics as implied in botho, as an expression of the traditional morality. I therefore intended 
to explore how these values are to be understood as they pertain to the personal conduct of 
contemporary moral agent (motho), which is at the heart of botho ethics. In turn, I will make a 
case for accountable personal conduct grounded on a shared moral framework based on 
botho, where ethical accountability of the moral agent, is the relationship at the core of botho 
ethics as a lived reality rather than a theory.  
I will use this analysis to build a case for a character-centric conception of botho. First, to show 
that this is the most attractive approach of making botho relevant to today’s society. In doing 
so I will confirm the centrality and primacy of character for discussions on botho, but also in 
recognition of the moral culture of most individuals in society today (Richardson 2009:140). 
Second, to endorse the view that botho is when considered as following in footsteps of the 
ethical tradition of virtues ethics, with a unique African contribution, qualifying it as African.  
From this, I will articulate the significance of botho as a character-centric ethic that places a 
premium on good moral character as the marker of being a good person. This is because 
even though morality is always the story of a particular people and a particular community, at 
a particular time in their history, there is sufficient evidence indicating that the values, beliefs, 
and principles encapsulated in the ideal of botho can resonate “mutatis mutandis on the moral 
terrains of other” communities (Gyekye 2011; par 5) and societies.  
Having located botho within the framework of ethical approaches that emphasis inculcation of 
virtues, makhabane  ethics, I will attempt to show that this rendering of botho offers an 
attractive alternative approach of doing ethics in Africa, and a model and basis for 
development of shared moral frame of reference and a communal enterprise, where the 
formation and development of the moral character of the individual into a good person is key. 
Given that the current botho discourse has without justification regularly evoked the proverb 
“motho ke motho ka batho” as encapsulating botho (van Niekerk 2013:4) and that no thorough 
analysis has been done specifically on the Sesotho concept of “botho” as it relates to “motho”, 
my analysis of this will provide a greater understanding and insight into how they were 
understood in their original settings. As such a large part of this study will be a response to 
the shortcomings of current discourse. This will include the tendency to interpret botho in terms 
of African values concerned with community maintenance and communal solidarity.  
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I will use selected proverbs from the Sesotho language to show that the proverb “motho ke 
motho ka batho,” as an example of this tendency, is part of a large body of traditional wisdom 
of such expressions, orally transmitted from generation to generation. I will show that the 
currency that this proverb therefore enjoys is an abstraction is not only unjustified but 
undermines the unity of African narratives especially their function in unity as vehicles of moral 
education. But more important that the exceptionalism is detrimental to an understanding of 
botho in which different proverbs articulate its imperatives. As moral ideal botho is an 
expression of “utopian and prophetic” aspirations and its function are, as much to offer 
practical guidance as it is to “muse” and to exhort” (van Binsbergen 2001: 59) motho towards 
the ideal of being motho. These utopian character of botho expressed here reflects Karenga’s 
notion of the moral ideal (2004). I will argue this is the more suitable conceptualisation botho. 
The potential application of such an analysis will be an increased awareness and appreciation 
in current botho discourses, that “the sense or meaning” of botho as moral ideal “is never 
given tout court but derives from the complex patterns of belief encoded” (O’Neil 2001: 123)  
in the moral tradition particularity of the culture and “sociology of knowledge by which it” (van 
Binsbergen 2001: 59) is interpreted and given meaning.  
The appraisal botho in Sesotho culture in this study is part of the growing interest in African 
ethics of investigating moral traditions of Africa. This renewed interest in African culture is itself 
as part of the growing latter dissatisfaction with Modern Western ethics and efforts to find 
alternatives. That means to fully recognise the significance and value of the ethical approach 
that botho presupposes, it is important to see this against the backdrop of contemporary 
experience and impact of Western ethics to many communities in whose moral traditions 
botho is key. 
 
1.5.2  Plan of the Study  
 
The analysis of botho in Sesotho culture and in current botho discourse in this study can be 
divided into two focus areas. The first part is an overview of the state of morality and ethics 
today focusing on modern Western ethics both in its secular and religious forms. The second 
analyses traditional African morality focusing on traditional morality of the Basotho. The study 
covers this in five chapters of this study. Chapter one, which is introduction and background 
of the study, sets the general context or background of the study, and frame the research 
problem and central hypothesis. Chapter two is detailed macro level account of the problem, 
and overview of contemporary moral environment which set the larger context of this study in 
ethics in general. The chapter is a quick appraisal of the influence of Western and Christian 
ethical approaches as the predominant ethical approaches influencing conduct today. It 
highlights the growing concern with the basic approach found in Western Ethics with specific 
focus on the moral disquiet in Africa. The chapter looks at some elements of African culture 
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as the essential social context for the revival of botho ethics, now being revisited as possible 
ethical resources for addressing current moral problems. 
Chapter three of the study can be regarded as the  literature review of the study analysing 
available material locally and internationally. This is a broad overview of current botho 
discourse and analysis the main debates and common approaches and including a detailed 
analysis of connection of motho ke motho ka batho to botho. Chapter four and five focus on 
the experience of botho in Sesotho speaking culture and the significance of Basotho institution 
to the practice of botho ethics. In the context of the study these two chapters act as the findings 
of the study. As such chapter four is a detailed analysis Sesotho culture focusing on the 
primacy of character in the moral language and thought of Basotho as a central part of their 
understanding of ethics. Chapter five is a further examination of the Sesotho culture but here 
focus is the larger context of the social order found in Sesotho culture which is presupposed 
by botho.  Specific focus here is on the key institutions of Basotho that provide their 
communities with an enabling environment which sustained and made possible the practice 
of botho possible. The chapter highlight the necessity of certain social conditions necessary 
for botho to thrive and be possible in a community. Chapter six is the conclusion of the study 
and recommendation for further research. 
In terms of a simpler format the sequence of the chapter in this study can be divided into the 
introduction and background, which is chapter. This chapter is also the framing of the research 
problem and hypothesis. Chapter two, which is the detail elaboration of the research problem, 
gives an overview of current moral environment and influence of modern ethics and resultant 
moral disquiet including in African culture. The literature review of the study, which is in 
Chapter three, looks at a wide variety of available relevant literature locally and internationally 
relevant to the current discourse on botho ethics is given. This is followed by chapter four 
which in the context of this study functions as the findings of the study as it proposes a 
revisiting of botho in the light of character. Chapter five which looks at the social conditions 
necessary for botho. The chapter’s discussion on social support structures necessary for 
ethics of botho to foreshadows a more detail discussion in chapter six. The final chapter of the 
study is the discussion and conclusion of some of the finding of the study and 













CHAPTER TWO:  OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY MORAL ENVIRONMENT AND 




This chapter will give a brief overview and critique of modern Western ethics as the 
predominant influence behind moral attitudes seen in contemporary modern societies in sub-
Saharan Africa. The first part of the chapter will discuss the influence of Western ethics as 
found in secular morality of the West and modernity as its cultural expression. It will highlight 
key aspects these as antithetical to botho and values of traditional morality of Basotho and 
African culture in general. This will also include Christian ethics as the religious expression of 
modern ethics in Sesotho culture. The missionary enterprise among traditional Basotho 
communities played an instrumental role in the displacement of traditional morality of Basotho 
and the establishment of modern western ethical approaches in Sesotho culture. The last part 
of the chapter will contextualise this within contemporary African culture. It will highlight the 
growing moral disquiet about what is seen as the decay in the moral fibre of many African 
communities. It will also focus on calls for revisiting of elements of traditional morality to 
address some of the problems African is facing.   
Modern Western ethics in its current form, whether in Europe or elsewhere can be described 
as the morality of the Western and European culture and carried it wherever this culture went7. 
It is now the most dominant moral culture of modern societies both in the developing and 
developed world (Shutte 2008:17). It is an ethical approach that emerged as a result of the 
Enlightenment when traditional Western morality was rejected and, in its place, secular 
morality emerged. This gained fullest expression from the end of fifteenth century to the 
beginning of nineteenth century onwards (Shutte 2008: 19-24; MacIntyre 1981: 37, 39).  Since 
these early days modern Western ethics has remained true to its central tenets: devotion to 
individualism and choice, focus on questions of principles and rules to follow or apply and in 
what situations. These ideas have since become part the dominant global moral culture of 
contemporary society influencing ways of conduct and personal ethics in many places 
including in southern Africa and present-day Basotho culture. This is a moral culture in which 
ethical reflection on moral precepts have little to do with considerations and questions of 
characters of individuals. Questions of ‘who I am’, and what is worthy of me’, or ‘what kind of 
person ought I to be as so formed by my community’. This is an ethical approach that is 
increasingly less concerned with qualities of character of persons. Instead, modern ethical 
approaches give an impression whereby  
 
7 By the West here it is meant European ethical approaches found in modern Western ethics 
which will include Christian ethics. 
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“ethics is an activity to be brought into play only when problems of a 
particular kind emerge and when the decision of a particular kind needs to 
be made. For the rest of life, apart from isolated moral episodes, ethics is 
something kept in a drawer, like a nutcracker” (Richardson 1994: 91).  
 
Many in Africa are now beginning to raise concerns with Western ethical approaches 
especially with effects of enlightenment ethics MacIntyre (1984: 4) which has left ethics in an 
impoverished state with its reliance on reason as a foundation for morality. Western ethics’ 
over emphasis of the “thinking faculty of the individual and quest of rational principles and 
rules for right action, has led to the huge forgetfulness of the “person” in ethics, (Richardson 
1994: 91, Shutte 2008: 4, 22). Ethics is accused of losing sight of its key function, of creating 
‘batho ba o leng batho’ meaning good citizens, or helping individuals “answer the question: 
what sort of person am I to become?” (MacIntyre 1981: 118). It is this effect of enlightenment 
thinking on ethics entrenched in modern Western thinking that for many is its main weakness 
(Statman 1997: 6). This representation of ethics, which is concerned with ambiguous 
situations and hard decisions, and attentiveness to "quandaries" obscures the fact that ethics 
makes sense only within the context of a life preoccupied with answering “what the kind of 
person I am and ought to be” (Hauerwas 1983: 4). When ethics is left as the sole as the 
responsibility of the individual, as modern ethics does, it is no wonder that it will not focus on 
creating individuals who value and prioritises shared values. Such an approach will pay little 
regard to the common good and commitment to the goodness of life, i.e., the good life, where 
as individuals, we join one another making the best of our togetherness for the benefit of all 
“hobane ke botho i.e., because that is what it means to be a person (Prozesky 2007: 6)”  
This orientation of Western value systems embodied in modern Western ethics and now 
transported as part of First World culture’s uncompromising overvaluation of the individual and 
subjective notion of the good continues to affect African communities both socially and morally 
(Waldstein 2017: 1). The introduction of the notion of the autonomous and a moral sovereign 
individual has left individuals morally adrift, with no clear moral anchor as they lose even more 
so that sense of belonging, while adhering to values without reference points other than 
themselves (Sandel 1984: 170). Taught to believe that one is morally autonomous the 
contemporary moral agents are confused beings.  Unlike their counterparts in post traditional 
societies and pre-modern cultures like that of traditional Basotho, contemporary agents lack 
moral certainty. not only of the moral choice they make, but of what criteria to use in making 
those choices. This is because their moral life lived based on criterionless choice “is informed 
by different concepts, incompatible attitudes” and “rival premises” (MacIntyre 1981: 
31,40,202).  
It is this general state of confusion of values that many familiar with moral traditions of Africa 
are worried of the direction of modern ethics and its ability to provide individuals and 
communities with a sound common ethical frame of reference for today’s context. This, in part 
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explains the interest in recent years with calls to revisit elements of tradition morality with 
botho, which is discussed in detail in the next chapter, as one of the rallying points. To 
understand where these concerns emanate from and how botho ethics is seen as a part the 
solution, it is important to understand what the character and nature modern ethics and the 
nature of concerns being raised which I now turn to.  
 
2.2  Concerns with Western Ethics and its Characteristic Features  
 
We have already intimated that one of the distinctive features of modern ethics, which 
distinguish it as different from other ethical approaches wherever it takes root, is how much of 
it bears the imprint of Western or European culture whose moral and social presuppositions it 
espouses. The account that follow here will be but a broad description and appraisal of this 
connection between the two.  It will highlight characteristics features of modern ethics that 
typifies its character and orientation but also best capture its differences with ethics of botho. 
This will be used to illustrative the respective approaches of both, with modern ethics also 
serving as the background to the current botho discourse and this study as well. The intention 
therefore is present current botho discourse together with this overview of modern approaches 
to ethics as the contrast to the context in which botho ethics as practiced in Sesotho speaking 
cultures applied and thrived.   
This intrinsic connection and indebtedness of modern Western ethics to European culture and 
its moral tradition thus must not be underestimated, as this explains how bound up modern 
ethics is with values and social ideals of Western culture and mode of thinking (Bujo 2001: 3). 
As a result, we see that wherever European culture has embedded itself and influence outside 
Europe, so has liberal Western values systems and ethics. This should not be a surprise 
because cultures are the social transporters of values which that culture promotes and 
encourages. In the case of modern ethics, that culture is not only Western and European, but 
also distinctively modern, secular, and liberal and of increasing globalising in approach to 
other moral traditions and cultures. It is an individualist culture, market-driven, and now 
dominates large parts of the world today. This is the culture of the First World with its first 
world value systems, embodied most profoundly in its liberal ethics and individualism. It an 
ethical approach whose manifestation is the diminishing of the sense of objective moral 
authority, democratisation of moral agency and dilution of a sense of shared values (MacIntyre 
1981: 32). The consequence of this is a moral culture and moral attitude where society and 
ethics are viewed as just a matter of convention, purely subjective. As Nicolson (2008: 5) 
explains:  
“far from consciously sharing a global ethic, our global village seems to be 
controlled by certain dominant cultures......[but] none of these granted much 
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value to other worldviews or to other concepts of right and wrong; [instead] 
all assumed that they were the whole and only truth  
 
Society i.e., our relationships with another is therefore merely a setting for application of 
practical set of rules to enable a society composed of people with very different values to 
function smoothly (Richardson 2009: 141). It is against this background and culture and in 
response to this that many concerns about modern ethics are being raised.  
The reason for concerns is because modern Western ethics is now the predominant moral 
point of reference globally because of its close connection with First World culture, so its 
influence cannot be ignored. This is more so when despite its global reach, modern ethics has 
not changed its character and in turn, the values it espouses (Shutte 2008: 16) together with 
corresponding social and moral assumptions and attitudes. As Prozesky (2009 : 12) explains 
even as the world movers towards development of a “global ethic” that  provides ethics with 
an inclusive moral frame of reference, “that can be accepted by people of any and every 
culture”, the stranglehold of Western ethics with its rights-based liberal individualism remain 
intact.  The primacy of the individual as the moral sovereign is the corner stone of ethical 
focus. The inherent individualism of modern ethics, supported by liberalism and its idolisation 
of personal freedom has thus been described as a risk that easily degenerate into selfishness, 
irresponsibility, greed, and a society which no longer cares if left unchecked (Prozesky 2009: 
12). It is against this background and growing moral individualism of Western ethics as a global 
culture and its ethos that modern ethics must be found and interpreted.  
As a predominant ethics for last decade influencing many cultures, this ethic inspired by the 
intellectual agenda of the West driven by science and secularisation (Shutte 2008: 20-22; 
Shutte 2001: 43) has proved itself inadequate to address moral challenges. For many 
communities in sub-Saharan Africa the signs of moral meltdown and decay that we see all 
around us (Prozesky 2007: 7) are in part the result of the failure of modern ethics as moral 
frame of reference to provide communities with a practical shared value system and common 
frame of reference. regulate conduct and inform society. The complacent acceptance of 
modern Western values framework along with its liberal rights-based ethic (Sandal 1984: 171) 
has produced an ethical approach that has left societies with an impoverished conception of 
moral life, where this is increasingly treated as a private concern relating to the good of the 
individual. Thus, from the perspective of African ethics and culture, with its communal oriented 
ethos, the rejection of community-oriented character of moral behaviour (Bujo 2009: 116) that 
is inherent in modern ethics, is the single most worrying failing of modern ethics (Shutte 2008: 
16). Reiterating this concern Mkhize (2008: 36) points out that “ethics is not a matter of 
individual” private moral life of the moral agent alone, as the post-enlightenment ethics 
teaches. It is by contrast a matter of life lived by and following a common set of moral values 
and shared frame of reference. In addition to what is perceived as the privatisation of ethics, 
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other deficiencies of modern ethics that are cited as raising concerns is the failure of modern 
ethics to pay attention to questions of character, the moral quality of individuals and their lives 
today and the corresponding relationship individuals have towards one another as moral 
agents (Richardson 1994: 89). It is within generalized dissatisfaction with modern ethics that 
scholars like Kinoti (1992: 73) have noted that there is “grumbling and lamentation” about the 
state of morality and the infection of secular liberal ethics in modern societies and in particular 
the worship of liberal individualism.  
In society like that of Basotho and many African societies this means that while there is no 
way of escaping the modern world, there is at the same time the danger of adopting everything 
without selection” and losing “sight of the values of family and community and clan solidarity 
which cover all material and moral needs” Bujo (1990: 49, 52).  It is agreed that the arrival of 
modernity in many traditional societies like that of the Basotho has fundamentally damaged 
and seriously eroded those pillars of traditional moral culture, which provided individuals in 
those communities with common and shared moral values. These gave the individual moral 
agent the confidence and certainty to speak authoritatively on matters moral.  The experience 
of modernity and modern ethics in African culture, where shared values are constitutive of the 
self, has thus been one huge predicament and disconnect, due to lack proper dialogue 
between traditional African ethics and modern ethics. (Sandal 1984: 167; Shutte 2001: 23). 
 One of the defining features of this predicament, now characterizing contemporary moral 
universe many today inhabit, is a constant inner conflict of values and contradictions in 
everyday life and the double life by so many modern urban Africans (Richardson 2008:79). To 
understand the nature of this predicament is necessary to give a brief account of some key 
features of Western ethics that are a catalyst of this, which is the focus of the following section.  
 
2.2.1  The Moral Predicament of Contemporary Society Facing Individuals 
 
The critique of modernity and modern Western ethics in this chapter must not be construed 
as ignoring the vast moral and social achievements made possible by constellation of 
developments of the modern world (Berger 1984:156, Giddy 2014: 25; Prozesky 2007: 31; 
Shutte 2001: 34, 42, Richardson 2009: 138). It is to echo the sentiment which recognise this 
but also acknowledges there are worrying concerns with it. This is capture in the lament by 
Bereng (1987: 94) who argues that it is because modernity has “done so much that in societies 
like that of Basotho that many Basotho have accepted even to do away with their own 
traditions which stressed the unity of the nation. This is the predicament of moral culture of 
modernity not only unique to Basotho culture but many in sub-Saharan Africa. We are all part 
of modern society and we cannot avoid engaging with it (Shuttle (2008:16).  
This is also an acknowledgement that the critique in this chapter is therefore not from a neutral 
outsider’s perspective. But is one done from within looking out from one belonging to a culture 
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experiencing this crisis of values, but with knowledge of a different culture that once existed, 
in the early days of one’s formative years as ‘ngoan’a mosotho (a child of mosotho). It is a 
recognition of the complexity of the present and scale of the moral predicament facing many 
Basotho today, that took root ever since the dawn of modernity and introduction of western 
value systems and frameworks in their culture. This super imposition of modern values 
systems on African cultures, has caused moral confusion and uncertainty for individuals and 
their communities. It is therefore important that contemporary Basotho and indeed Africans in 
general engage with this reality critically and not finding security in the cave of traditionalism8 
or uncritical embrace of this reality and consumption of its cultural products. This experience 
i.e., of modern ethics as a moral predicament which itself must be understood as in inherent 
feature of feature of modernity, is summed succinctly by (MacIntyre 1981: xi) who confirms 
the same point that many in the world today are not only “inescapably inhabitants of advanced 
modernity’, bearing its social and cultural marks. But even more troubling is MacIntyre’s telling 
observation that we are also ardent living embodiments of modernity and its constitutive moral 
attitudes. I say inherent because some would argue that the values frameworks of Western 
culture framed around the individual encourage lack of shared values which in turn result in 
competing notion of what is good. Many of the liberal values of modern societies often mirrored 
by predominant ethical approaches, are in part the cause of this moral predicament and it can 
be argued in some ways encourage it. Values such as tolerance, pluralism, primacy of 
freedom of choice and many other, when applied to the moral sphere without many of the 
traditional communitarian values and ideal, can lead to the moral predicament and crisis of 
values many are now lamenting about.  It is to this danger that some scholars have warned of 
leaving modernity unchecked, because it has serious implications to the society most notably 
the proliferation of extreme individualism, which is contrary to social order that botho 
presupposes (Giddy 2014:19 - 21, Prozesky 2009: 12).  
It is to this reality current botho discourse is entering a new player and that ethics of botho is 
cast as a unique ethical approach immune to some of these challenges. This is ana recognition 
that, although there is no way of escaping the modern world, what is not inevitable is the way 
we can respond to it. This is especially so in the way moral life is lived, and we conduct 
ourselves collectively and as individuals. It is up to us whether as member of our societies we 
chose to promote a way of life that is premised on old traditional ways of thinking about ethics 
which engenders common values, supremacy of the common good and intense commitment 
to the welfare of al (Lutz 2009:1). It is equally in the power of contemporary moral agents to 
choose a way of life premised on modern values of pluralism, autonomy and tolerance both 
of which emphasise more what makes us different and divides us hence the primacy of the 
 
8 The is used to described beliefs of those opposed to modernism, liberalism, or radicalism based on irrational 
reasons to resist and or reject changes regarded as being detrimental to perceived notions of culture and tradition 
that must protected which must protected.  
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individual autonomy in today’s society, is up to us. What is clear though is that a society in 
which the supremacy of the individual is the ideal for which all others are order to, is a society 
that is incompatible with traditional values and ideal presupposed by ethics of botho ethics 
where the common good or shared values are priority. Many critics now agree that the latter 
is not only what is needed in ethics today but without this, the transition into modernity is going 
to be constantly something that for many must be resisted.  
What we get here is that modernity, in particular, its worship of the individual, has not only 
damaged traditional morality along with its value systems and culture, but that it also 
represents a culture that is in conflict with many of the values traditionally associated with such 
moralities including that from which botho derives. The primacy of the individual in modern 
moral culture of modernity and its devotion to the protection of the individual as the moral 
sovereign one of the central features underpinning modern ethics, that it requires close 
attention, to which I turn to next.  
 
2.2.2  Individualism and the Primacy Choice in Modern Ethics  
 
The centrality of individual autonomy or Western individualist conception of a person is one of 
the features of western ethical approaches that it can be regarded as the governing principle 
behind all other aspects of the individual’s life including the relationship with society in Western 
culture. The different way in which to analyse liberal individualism and how it manifests itself 
in ethics and society in general. One way is in terms of how modernity, which is reflected in 
western values systems, puts emphasis on what differentiates individuals as moral agents by 
prioritizing freedom of choice. The primacy of choice in ethics in Western culture and the 
supremacy of the individual are thus the underlying assumptions upon which modern Western 
ethics as well. The primacy of choice thus entrenches separateness and places this at the 
foreground of ethical reflection in turn reinforcing extreme individualism, where it becomes 
increasingly difficult to shared values and common moral frame of reference which ethics of 
botho presupposes. It is not difficult to see how this tendency i.e., to emphasise the 
separateness of various aspects of the life of the individual, would inform the individualistic 
concept of self. This in turn further consolidated the notion unique in modern ethics of the 
defining the individual as morally autonomous.  This points to another peculiar feature of 
Western ethics, namely its individualistic character, the extreme form of this in twentieth 
century Christian ethics being situation ethics (Bujo 2001: 112-117; Richardson 2009: 142). 
For this reason, the character of modern ethics whether secular or religious, whether in Europe 
or in Africa is fundamentally individualistic in orientation. Its purpose and function are designed 
around individual autonomy and the interpretation of this bears a large imprint of Western 
culture (Bujo 2001:76). It is in this respect that modern ethics is different from African ethics. 
The emergence of this new social institution in the form of the morally sovereign autonomous 
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individual is the single most far-reaching development that defines modern ethics, from its 
start during the enlightenment till today (MacIntyre 1981: 228). The significance of this is not 
often fully appreciate in the rush and enthusiasm to articulate its positive aspects. What is not 
given adequate attention, and I will argue makes individualism possible is the primacy of 
choice in modern ethics as central to moral agency and in turn the privatization of moral life 
as a necessity. The freedom of choice together with individual rights, the twin concept that 
mutually support this conception of moral agency, are the central pillars of individualism 
essential for the autonomous self in both the secular and moral sphere, respectively.  
This transformation of the self from its traditional understanding and social roles meant among 
other that things, that the distinctively modern individual, is no longer bound by bonds and 
obligations of belonging and social roles the self-inhabits. Nor is individual identified by 
loyalties and duties inherent in social roles the individual inhabits (MacIntyre 1981: 60-62; 
Sandel 1984:170). The consequence of this transformation and introduction of choice into the 
moral lexicon is that it became no longer clear what is the criterion that individuals rely upon 
to make moral claims and hence the loss of moral confidence of agents in public life. This is 
implied in the attitude characteristic of most moral discussions and debates today, where it is 
now common to hear people saying, “it’s all a matter of opinion” or “who am I to judge what is 
wrong.”  What informs this view is an understanding implicit in modern ethics which is 
individual “choice” has now replaced more traditional objective considerations for making 
moral claims, these include an understanding of ethics where character is the defining feature 
of moral agency. The primacy of “choice unguided by criteria” or criterionless choice of which 
no rational justification can be given, is thus the centre piece of modern ethics supporting the 
welfare of the morally sovereign individual. It reinforces individualism as the governing 
principle and is presupposed by individualism itself.  
The problem with this is that the reliance on choice as the basis for moral conduct reveals how 
modern ethics and its weddedness to individualism implies a certain element of arbitrariness 
now established as part of the moral culture of modernity (MacIntyre 1981: 20, 39).  This 
privatisation of personal conduct in this way is implied and inherent in extreme individualism 
of Western ethics along with transformation of the self in the manner that modern ethics 
requires. This has many implications for ethics. First it means that it is no longer possible to 
make moral judgements by appealing to a moral criterion in a way that had been possible 
before (Ibid.: xvii, 8). This is because now such judgements are subordinate to the priority of 
criterionless choice of the individual where “each individual implicitly or explicitly” adopts ‘his 
or her own first principles on the basis of such choice” (MacIntyre 1981:  20).  Second, this 
also means it is no longer possible for moral terms to keep that reason-giving character and 
force they enjoyed because of the loss of the indispensable theoretical and social context in 
terms of which they were originally understood, elaborated, and rationally defended. In turn 
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this means that there is no longer certainty about the meaning of evaluative terms, which 
results in uncertainty and confusion hence the moral culture of modernity in the West and in 
Africa is increasingly experience as of moral vacuum and predicament.  
When central principle guiding the moral life is that ethics is all a matter of individual choice it 
is no surprise that modern ethical approaches are not providing society with a sense of shared 
values. It is in this sense that modern ethics is accused of being emotivist because moral 
judgements are in the end regarded as expressions of an individual will and masks for 
expressions of personal preferences (MacIntyre 1981: 19). But as this study will show this 
promotion of choice in modern ethical approaches to conduct and thinking is incorrect is a 
distortion our moral life as agents with a social identity which we cannot escape. This will be 
become clearer as it is discussed in more detail in chapter five when we discuss the normative 
influence of social roles and social institutions.  For now, it is important to stress that ethics 
moral life cannot be premised on the priority of choice and autonomy of the individual. This is 
because ethics i.e., moral ideas and views of a society within which individual ethics function 
and is a part of  
“is embedded in the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is a 
good or bad character; [and] …. conceptions of satisfactory social relations 
and attitudes held by the members of the society; it is embedded, furthermore, 
in the forms or patterns of behavior that are considered by the members of the 
society to bring about social harmony and cooperative living, justice, and 
fairness” (Gyekye 2011: par 1)  
 
It is in this sense that the primacy of choice in modern ethics is a distortion ethics and is recipe 
for conflict of ideas what is good and bad because ethics is not just a matter of choices or 
mere matter of one’s preferences, yet contemporary agents are taught to believe the opposite. 
The fundamental problem with the elevation of choice in ethics, is that it ignores the fact that 
ethics is social. At its most basic level ethics is a moral story of a particular people or 
community, of which the individual moral agent is only but a part of the narration of that story, 
not the author. Moral conduct is fundamentally an intelligible human action, intelligible not only 
to others but even more importantly to us, as historical individual beings with a specific moral 
particularity. This leads me to the next characteristic feature of modern Western ethics and its 
approach to ethics namely universalism  
 
2.2.3  Universalism and Rejection of Particularity in Modern Ethics 
 
Another distinctive characteristic feature of modern Western ethics, besides individualism and 
its corresponding conception of individuality, is universalism. This is based an approach to 
ethics based an assumption that there is a discoverable ethic shared by all rational beings 
through common humanity (Richardson 2009: 138). This is view of morality that rejects validity 
of moral particularities in pursuit of universal principles often understood in terms of objectivity. 
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It is important to recall how this has come to be a central feature of modern ethics.  It shall be 
remembered that that the leading figures of the enlightenment, from which modern ethics 
originates, shared certain central beliefs, which are important to their thinking on several 
issues imprints of which can be seen in modern ethics (MacIntyre 1981: 51).  The 
presupposition held by the architects of the enlightenment is the fundamental belief 
“that human nature is the same in all times and places; that universal human goals, 
true ends and effective means, are at least in principle discoverable; that methods 
similar to those of Newtonian science, …., should be discovered and applied in 
the field of morals, politics, economics, and in the sphere of human relationships 
in general” (Depu 2014: 168). 
 
As a result of this shared belief, we see in modern ethics a dogmatic adherence to universality 
and objectivity alongside the devotion to the individual. And now both universality and 
objectivity have become the central pillars of modern ethical discourse. In other words, there 
is a basic assumption that there is a discoverable ethic shared by all through our common 
humanness, to which different cultures, religious, and historical experiences do not matter. 
From here we can see how according to the enlightenment thinking it was not that difficult to 
reject particularity and to relegate historical experiences to the realm of incidental and 
irrelevant contingencies (Richardson 2009: 138). According to this thinking, we approach 
ethical judgement and situations from the perspective of disinterested observers i.e., from 
anyone’s perspective. It is for this reason that modern ethics is so wedded to the idea of moral 
principles and rules because they give us an appearance of ensuring objectivity and 
rationality, and avoidance of moral relativism. 
But universality has been shown to be fraught with problems. Few would argue that while often 
there is consensus on principles at the abstract theoretical level, as soon as these are applied 
to concrete situations differences abound because these are often understood in the light of 
different and sometimes conflicting moral particularities (Richardson 2009: 139, Bujo 2001: 
8). As Bujo (2001: 82) echoing Thomas Aquinas points out, the validity of general principles 
presupposed by universality, does not always find the same expression in praxis. The reason 
is because the more concretely one must act, the more difficult does it become to translate 
general principles into action. Thus, we find that even with Kant’s universal law, that what was 
taken 
“to be the principles and presuppositions of morality as such turned out to 
be the principles and presuppositions of one highly specific morality, a 
secularized version of Protestantism which furnished modern liberal 
individualism with one of its founding charters” (MacIntyre 1981: 266). 
 
Kasenene (1994:139) is therefore correct to point out that the universal ethics suggested by 
Kantian ethics simply does not exist because ethical systems do not evolve in a moral and 
social vacuum. In other words, what universalism promises as “universal principles” instead 
turns out to “be principles specific to particular times, places and stages of human activity and 
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enquiry” (MacIntyre 1981: 266). In other words, even though there are principles that are 
regarded as universal, such as charity, honesty, and justice even these too are influenced by 
context for their application and meaning. It is in this sense the MacIntyre (Ibid.; 268) is correct 
to point out that what advocates of universality appear to ignore or miss is that in the end, all 
morality is always particular which means that ethical reflection or ethics in turn is always a 
reflection “of some particular social and cultural standpoint” It is for this reason that Bujo (2001: 
8) argues that African ethics is premised on context sensitive universalism or reiterative 
universalism.  It is clear from the above that modern Western ethics cannot therefore talk 
about universality in the manner that it does without reference and acknowledgement of 
particularity. This is because as MacIntyre (1981: 126, 268) explains, “aspirations of the 
morality of modernity to a universality freed from all particularity is an illusion” because “all 
morality is always to some degree tied to the socially local and particular”.  
Another difficult with claims of universality is that often the argument for objectivity turns out 
to an argument for the predominance of the status quo. It also is a distorted image of 
subjectivism which schools us to be reluctant to speak the language of morality. As a result, 
we assume we can, and always should respond to any immoral action with “who am I to say 
this is wrong”.  
This interplay between universality and particularity in modern ethics is an important area for 
ethics because as most critics point out it is one thing to agree on a set of universal principles 
and another to agree on their concrete application and meaning, because these are influenced 
by context in their application and the moral system in which a person operates (Kasenene 
1993: 4). It is in this sense that universal principles “must be brought down to earth by 
particular practices” and “expose themselves” to “questioning” (Bujo 2001: 23) by the 
particularity of each context. Furthermore, assumptions of objectivity are problematic as they 
pretend that it is possible to have an ethical reflection that is not done from a particular social 
standpoint. This is because  
“moral philosophies, however, they may aspire to achieve more than this, 
always do articulate the morality of some particular social and cultural 
standpoint: Aristotle is the spokesman for one class of fourth century 
Athenians, Kant, ….provides a rational voice for the emerging social forces 
of liberal individualism....... Moral philosophies are, before they are anything 
else, the explicit articulations of the claims of particular moralities to rational 
allegiance” (MacIntyre 1981: 268) 
 
In other words, these principles are applied from one’s sense of moral identity as starting point.  
So, universalism is problematic because it engrains an abstract decontextualised way of doing 
ethics that is now so entrenched in Western ethics. This approach where ethical reflection and 
discourse is divorced from concrete contexts is a distortion of ethics. This is because ethics 
or morality is an account and narration of the moral story of a particular people, as such it is 
preceded by the lived experience, hence the relevance of the this as the relevant context for 
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ethics. Ethics is a second order activity and as such, it is preceded by events and life 
experiences. So “no matter how universal an ethic maybe it still has to be applied in a particular 
time and place” Shutte (2001: 14). As (Bujo 1990: 29) explains, no society can be expected 
to formulate its norms and values in a universal fashion especially when cultures still are 
different in time and place. The predominant notion now well entrenched in modern Western 
culture is that the primary task of ethics is to show how morality is grounded in unchangeable 
principles and convictions thus misconstrues what is ethics.  
So, the ethical approaches such that underpinning current botho discourse is a recognition of 
moral particularity. Its introduction introduced to ethical reflection by approaches such as that 
implied by botho ethics, thus must be understood in terms of context sensitive universalism. 
It is an assertion that stresses that the starting point of ethical reflection should not lie in 
abstract principles but in concrete moral context whether inside or outside one’s own group 
(Bujo 2001: 8). Moral particularity here is not to be confused with moral relativism, becomes 
the moral starting or entry point is that by which I enter and join the discourse9. This is the 
case with this study where moral tradition of “botho” in Sesotho speaking culture is such a 
starting point and particularity. Without this moral particularity to begin from there is no-where 
to begin or move forward from. It is for this reason that  
“the notion of escaping from it into a realm of entirely universal maxims which 
belong to man as such, whether in its eighteenth-century Kantian form or in 
the presentation of some modem analytical moral philosophies, is an illusion 
and an illusion with painful consequences” (MacIntyre 1981: 221) 
 
The acknowledgement of particularity is therefore important as it recognises the validity of a 
moral starting point (MacIntyre 1981: 220) of the moral agent as a historical individual 
(Murdoch 1970: 26). Thus, I shall argue that an authentic ethical reflection is one grounded 
on concrete moral tradition within which the moral agent is situated. Thus, being aware of this 
and acknowledging it, is a prerequisite for doing ethics in an objective way. The significance 
of this is that it avoids the ethical deception of doing ethics from a neutral dispassionate 
perspective, when in fact one is simply articulating moral views and ideal of or from some 
particular social and cultural standpoint (MacIntyre 1981: 268). Ethical reflection done from 
anyone is and everyone’s perspective is therefore an illusion. Only when we can recognise 
that our own moral particularity as moral agents i.e., social embeddedness, are we able to 
speak locally while at the same time taking a universal point of view. This way we can 
authentically keep an eye to express something obligatory for others outside our own context 
as well without however expecting that ethical judgement must be universally applicable (Bujo 
2001; 8, Mokolatsie 1997: 39).  
 
9 Moral relativism refers to a view that holds regards moral difference as so deep and widespread across different 
societies that there can be no rational standards of justification for resolving these differences.  
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The characteristics of modern ethics that we have so far looked can be regarded as the secular 
manifestation of Western ethics. But as I have intimated modern Western ethics is both secular 
and religious, at least in terms of its heritage. As such an account of modern Western ethics 
and its characteristic features will be incomplete if it that does not include Christian ethics 
which is discussed next. 
 
2.3   The Significance of Christian Ethics on Ethics in African Culture    
 
The term Western ethics is ordinarily understood as a description of ethical approaches 
influenced by European moral tradition and Western or European culture and often Christian 
ethics is implied but not explicitly mentioned. But as this study argues the influence of modern 
Western ethics in Africa today is through both its the secular and religious expression. This 
means I will assume, without arguing the case that both Christian ethics and Western Ethics 
share the same moral tradition and hence share a common basic approach now characteristic 
of modern Western Ethics. The two can thus be just a different formulation of the same moral 
outlook, which is European; one secular and the other religious. The foregoing section focused 
of the secular expression of this moral outlook in the form of Western ethics. In this section 
the focus is on Christian ethics as its religious expression with specific interest on the influence 
of missionaries in Sesotho culture. But before focusing on the impact on Christian ethics on 
Basotho culture, I want to make a few remarks about the impact of Christian ethics in general 
on moral traditions of other culture especially in Southern Africa.  
Just as modern Western ethics can thus be differentiated from other ethical traditions for 
example moral traditions of traditional societies such as that of the Sesotho speaking culture, 
so too can Christian ethics. It is the moral teaching of Christianity from the West that bear the 
hallmarks of Western culture, even as the it is practice beyond the border of Europe. It is the 
moral teaching and views of the Christian faith articulated within the European moral 
framework, in contrast to traditional African ethics of African Christians who follow traditional 
African religions (Manyeli 1992: 28). It is the morality imported by Christian missions in 
partnership and often support of the European colonial powers (Richardson 2009: 130). While 
it is possible to speak of Western ethics and Christian ethics as distinct, it can be argued that 
because of their shared and common heritage, they are not that different in orientation and 
the values systems they presuppose. This is because the ethical approaches they have 
originate within the same European culture and both have been transported as one package 
to other parts of the world through colonisation and missionaries wherever the two went 
(Shutte 2008: 16-17). As a result, Western and Christian values have played a key role not 
only in changing the moral culture of other cultures but also in creating the conditions that 
made it possible for modern ethics or Western ethics as we know it to flourish globally. In other 
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words, European moral values cannot be disassociated from the moral imperialism of 
European cultural and Christian ethics that first came with colonialism and missionary project.  
Christian ethics is traditionally defined in terms of its two primary sources i.e., theology and 
the Christian church itself. Its analysis here will not be in terms of its theological foundations 
and interpretation of moral behaviour. Interest will be on its social-political and historical impact 
on moral traditions of other cultures it met with and how it was experienced by the host cultures 
in which it was imported to. Traditionally missionary ethics i.e., the role played by missionaries 
and their interpretation of the day to practical dictates of the Christian faith has not been 
subject of much ethical reflection in ethical discourses or given much scrutiny from current 
botho discourse. But as I will argue here, with the missionary project not only did the moral 
teaching drawn from the Christian faith take a different tone and character in the missions than 
it did in mainland Europe, but it also had strong colonial cultural and moral imperialism 
undertones. It will be recalled that the missionaries were products of their cultures which was 
Europeans and as such they carried with them moral and cultural assumptions of their 
societies. It is thus complicit in the concerted efforts and attempts to erase local cultures 
including their moral traditions. Here too must be added education was one of the key 
instruments used to prohibit coverts from having anything to do with their culture and customs 
(Gill 1992B: 13).  The significance of this is first that it was Christian ethics articulated in this 
way that has had a devastating effect on the moral cultures of African people and African 
culture. The results of its legacy thus have lasted long after the missionary project has ended, 
and its effects are still presently felt today. Second the significance of Christian ethics as 
presented by European missionary project is often too easily “excused” in contemporary 
ethical discourse as either ill-informed unfortunate, “Christ against culture campaign” (Ibid) 
that is not true to the gospel, or it is often overshadowed by the cultural considerations of the 
impact of colonial interventions that came with it instead. Whether the missionaries’ 
understanding of Christian faith was correct or not, the reality is it was its moral teachings 
presented and articulated by the missionaries that had a lasting impact about the role of 
Western approaches to ethics in Africa. I will argue therefore that missionary ethics provides 
us with a good insight of otherwise a less emphasised aspect of Christian ethics compared to 
the more traditional view of its idealised positive account encapsulated in Jesus’ ethic reflected 
in the New Testament law of love (Bujo 1990: 28).  
As already intimated there existed a symbiotic relationship between colonial and missionary 
enterprise. In sub-Saharan Africa both had the same effect in the moral sphere in terms of 
their attitude about moral values of other cultures. It is in this sense that Christian ethics is 
relevant to the subject current botho discourse as modern Western ethics is. Both had the 
same effect and impact, and their agenda was the same vis-à-vis rejection of moral traditions 
of Africans and their value systems. Thus, the joint effect of both laid the foundations for the 
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current conditions now characterising much of the contemporary moral culture in places like 
Lesotho. As Gill (1992A: 26) puts it “the missionaries deplored a great deal of the traditional 
culture and its institutions, making certain European cultural norms was an integral part of 
Christian faith and practice”.  Now that I have given these brief remarks about Christian ethics 
I can focus on missionaries in Lesotho. 
The first missionaries in Lesotho were the French missionaries in 1833 and it can be assumed 
theirs was Christian ethics in practice, bringing a new way of life to locals. It follows then that 
much of their work of setting up the Christian faith among the Basotho naturally required an 
articulation of certain moral values and views, and ways of life befitting one who is to be a 
Christian. There are many ways in the account of this can be approached. The most common 
one is examining existing literature usually in the form of books written about missionary work, 
correspondence of the time, archive material about their arrival and life in Lesotho etc. etc. In 
short analysis of historical documents. There is however another way which so far has 
received little attention among scholars, not least those interested in Christian ethics in the 
mission areas of Southern Africa.  This is Christian ethics as reflected in the written works of 
recent converts into Christianity in Lesotho specifically the novels by Basotho coverts in early 
nineteen century Basotho society. This avenue which I turn to next, offers a new uncharted 
un sanitized account of “Christian ethics’ different from the standard missiology accounts of 
academic theological departments and texts.  
 
2.3.1  Influence of Christian Ethics and Missionaries in Lesotho  
 
Shortly after the missionaries arrived in Lesotho in 1833 and their enterprise of evangelisation 
through education began to take root, there began to appear a range of Sesotho literature, or 
novels by local Basotho converts. These were the first graduates of missionary education 
systems who were trained as teachers to lead exemplary Christian lives and to teach their 
students to do likewise (Gill 1992B: 13). These novels which are written in Sesotho are not just 
novels, but narratives. And like all narratives they are vehicles for moral education and in them 
are embedded values and beliefs. It is in this sense that these novels must be regarded as 
authentic formulation of “Christian ethics” among Basotho approved by the missionaries and 
understood and passed on by locals for local audience. As such these were not just a reflection 
of views of perspective of new converts. In most cased these were in line with the missionary 
ideas but were also written in the way they did at the behest and encouragement of the 
missionaries themselves. In other words, the values promoted in these novels were consistent 
with Christian ethics and promoting it. It is this formulation of Christian ethics that I would like 
first to emphasise when speaking about how Christianity is the catalyst that made possible the 
conditions necessary for modern ethics in Lesotho. It is out of missionary influence that the 
present-day Christian church in Lesotho and its strong moral authority it enjoys to this day 
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owes its origin. In other words, whatever understanding of Christian ethics we have today it 
cannot be divorced from this early formulation in the teaching of missionaries in explaining the 
contribution of Christian ethics to some of the concerns about the state of moral standards 
and views about ethics today.  
It will not be possible to analyse all the published literary works of the time from as text for 
ethical analysis here not a detail account of these possible that would do justice to these 
works. This is one area that will be an interesting topic for future studies, for even with this in 
mind, there are insights of traditional culture found in these works that cast light on botho and 
its meaning among Basotho worth serious consideration.  
Among the early novels by local Basotho worth mentioning are Thomas Mofolo's Moeti oa 
bochabela (1907), Pitseng (1910), and Chaka (1925); and Everitt Lechesa Segoete’s, Monono 
ke moholi ke ‘mooane (1910/62) (Selepe 1999: 91-134). These novels while they were at once 
literary works they must also be seen within the context of the aims and intentions of the 
missionaries and fulfilment of the aim of Christianising the Basotho. An observation we can 
make at this early stage is that with its emphasis on the individual and their salvation, and 
dualistic conception of life where the body was separated from the soul, sacred from the 
profane, missionary ethics thus stressed individual salvation to the exclusion of the community 
and entrenched the dualistic dichotomy of life of the West among its new converts and their 
societies (Kasenene 1994: 142). Thus, we find that in their content these novels were 
designed to induce, via the portrayal of the main characters, the unquestioning faith in 
Christianity and its value systems among the Basotho (Selepe 1999: 95) and a strong belief 
in the progress of the West, i.e., through its commerce, technology and government (Gill 
1992B: 13), an attitude that is still the case today.  
One way of framing my argument is that in places like Lesotho just as much as literacy was 
necessary for the Christian institution to take root and to continue to exist (Selepe 1999: 89), 
Western Christian education made possible the conditions necessary for modern Western 
moral ideas to take root among the Basotho, the lasting effects of which can still be seen 
today. To understand the significance of these early Sesotho novels and their relevance to 
Christian ethics, it is important to understand the larger missionary context within which they 
emerged and out of whose influence they were to a larger extent written. As it will be clear 
their publication was related to missionary project and the entrenchment of Western 
Christianity and values in Sesotho culture. This is because the distinction between education 
and Christian teaching was negligible and  
“the Christian schools inculcated what was seen to be a new and better way 
of life, founded upon a blend of Christian Protestant teachings, a strong 
belief in the progress of the West” (Gill 1992B: 13).  
 
In other words, the main aim of the proliferation of Sesotho novels must be understood as part 
of the bigger mission of the Christianisation of Basotho, i.e., adoption of Western Christian 
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values. It is these values and the Western ethical approach they implied that these many of 
these early Sesotho novels promoted (Selepe 1999: 19). In many of them we can see already 
early signs of how the current attitudes that often regard Western culture as “better and 
progress” emerging and how Christianity played a role in changing not only the culture of the 
people but also their moral values. For our purposes here a brief analysis of a few prominent 
works will suffice. 
If we take Mofolo's Moeti oa bochabela for example, it will be discovered that the underlying 
message of the novel conveyed via the portrayal of Fekisi the hero of the book is “designed 
to induce the unquestioning faith in Christianity among the Basotho” together with the value 
framework that came with it (Selepe 1999:95). This underlying message is found in other 
novels published around the same time for instance Pitseng, another of Mofolo’s works. The 
second chapter of the book sums up the messaging characteristic of these novels that I will 
quote it at length here. The opening paragraph of the chapter reads:  
“Nako ea re ngolang ditaba tsa Pitseng ka yona, Lesotho e ne e le mehla ya 
tswelopele, Pitseng e sa ntsane e le mehla ya lefifi le letsho, la Sesotho sa 
kgale;.....Lesotho e le mehla ya dikolo, Pitseng e sa ntsane e le mehla ya 
mabollo le ho tsamaela majwala; ke hore mehleng ya lesedi, bona ba ntse 
ba le lefifing la bothoto “(p.9). 
(At the time of writing about what happened in Pitseng, Lesotho was in an 
era of civilisation and development (enlightenment), while Pitseng was still 
in the era of the darkness of traditional (old) ways;...Lesotho was an era of 
school, Pitseng still in the era of initiation schools and drinking sprees; that 
is to say the times of light when they were still in the darkness of ignorance)  
 
The implicit appraisal here of the ways of the West is that being Christian is portrayed as 
equivalent to “enlightenment” and “being civilised” the latter understood as “progress.” This 
leave no doubt as to what the view of local culture and its values was. So, it is not surprising 
that the theme of these books is always juxtaposing traditional beliefs and values of Sesotho 
culture with Christian values and beliefs, by implication suggesting that where the latter is 
always portrayed as better. The difference between Pitseng and Moeti oa bochabela is that in 
the former is that the cultural and moral imperialism are explicit. The civilising agenda that was 
always lurking at the background of both colonialism and the missionary enterprise in many 
of these novels, in Pitseng it is no longer subtle and implicit. It is direct and explicit. Thus, we 
find in Pitseng a direct contrast being drawn between the village of Pitseng and its people and 
practice, and a civilized Lesotho marked by progress and development understood in terms 
of what the missionaries are introducing must not be underestimated. Here Mofolo uses the 
village of Pitseng is as metaphor of traditional value systems of Basotho, that must be left 
behind for a better higher framework of values of Christianity.  
In many of these novels the role of education is key to the civilising project of missionary 
enterprise and in entrenching the moral superiority of Christian ethics and by implication of 
Western culture and its values. Thus, we find that “education and religion function together to 
 56 
promote this idea”. But as we have already noted often this was not only civilisation in terms 
of development i.e., schools, literacy, and other skills. It also included social and moral 
transformation of the culture of Basotho away from adherence to traditional Basotho moral 
traditions of Sesotho culture now cast a bad, to embracing the moral traditions embedded in 
Christianity and Western culture which were good and better. 
The central theme running through many of these early writings is the establishment of the 
Christian faith in Sesotho culture along with its values. In other words, introduction of Western 
Christian ethics and its values among Basotho, and displacement of traditional morality 
system of Basotho.  Through the portrayal of the main characters in these works, traditional 
culture is portrayed as backward hence portrayed as “darkness” while Christianity is equated 
with progress whether social, moral, or otherwise and thus it is often symbolised by “light.” In 
other words, the Christian way of life or Christina ethics as the new life that converts were to 
aspire to, is the ideal way to lead a good life. By contrast the traditional Basotho way of life 
along with its values is something that is to be left behind and renounced as bad. In these 
novels what we have is not just literature but also the propagation of certain values and moral 
ideals, all of which were presented as Christian. These books reflect Christian ethics in 
practice, where the right way to conduct oneself is described in individualistic terms of an 
individual spiritual journey by the individual to reach ultimate peace is with God. The emphasis 
on this individual pursuit of a relationship with good coupled with missionary requirement that 
converts renounced their traditional culture, which was the vehicle for many values of Basotho, 
began the process of eroding many of the moral ideal of Basotho. 
It is therefore important to realise that the articulation of Christian ethics is painted in these 
novels in manner that makes no distinction between Western values and Western culture as 
such and the Christian faith.  So, in addition to the overt moral imperialism underlying these 
novels, as literary works they also played a part in undermining key social and moral ideals of 
the Basotho. One of these ideals is that which is codified in the Basotho doctrine of motho ke 
motho ka batho, which requires “moral support” in all its various manifestation in social life. 
This ideal which for Basotho defined the core of communal life is summum bonum, and a way 
of life where people live for one another and the welfare of all is a priority in one’s life. This is 
reflected in many of their proverbs and other narratives (Selepe 1999: 156, Mokitimi 1997: 13-
22).   
So, what is beginning to emerge is that with introduction of Western culture in Sesotho culture 
as portrayed in these novels, traditional values such as this begin to be eroded and 
undermined. This can be seen in portrayal of the hero whose depiction often presupposes the 
liberal view of individual existence. So, whether it is Fekisi in the case of Moeti oa bochabela, 
and Mr. Katse and Aria Sebaka and Alfred Phakoe in Pitseng, the individualistic character of 
the hero of these novels and imprint of western individualism is unmistakable. This portrayal 
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of the individual is quite different from the traditional conception understanding of what is a 
proper motho, which among the Basotho is governed by a concern with the other and their 
wellbeing (Mphetolang 2009: 13-18). The role played by these Christianity through the 
medium of education and early Sesotho literature cannot be underestimated. It is therefore an 
important aspect when analysing the roots of contemporary moral attitudes including and the 
prevalence of individualistic moral attitudes and declining concern with communal welfare. 
This contrast sharply with the relationship of individuals to ancestors in traditional religion and 
culture of Basotho, which was equally important for the individual but was understood in terms 
of seeking good relationships with the living as well as the ancestors. With Christianity the 
emphasis is not only other worldly but individualistic. It is personal relationship with God that 
transcends all else and concern with the “other” life that become to priority of the individual. In 
terms of this the individual’s “search for authentic values” and meaning in life and the best way 
to live, all get realised by dedicating oneself to having a personal relationship with God, and 
Christianity is only way of achieving this. The cardinal message of the novels is “that despite 
the price one has to pay” i.e., renouncing one’s culture, “the reward is the eternal peace an 
individual will find with God” (Selepe 1999: 102-6). This is in sharp contrast to the traditional 
religion of Basotho and its moral scheme where the purpose of motho in life is doing the best 
one can do to ensure the welfare of their community and make this one’s life priority that is 
always respected. The relevance therefore of these novels is an important one as they are 
dominated by religious considerations where Christianity is portrayed not only as acceptable 
ideology but also that which is “good” and a way of life one “ought” to aspire in opposition to 
traditional Basotho way of life and culture. The common aim of these novels was to convince 
the Basotho “to believe that their traditional practices; whether social, religious, and moral 
were evil and that their religion was pagan”, and in turn makes them easily turn to Christianity 
(Selepe 1999: 103).   
According to many of these novels Christian ethics as articulated by the missionaries brought 
with it the “perception of reality” that the missionaries and these early Basotho converts 
preached among the Basotho through the medium of these novels. And that reality was that 
the “Christian way of life” was “good” “better” and as “progress–tsoelopele.” In Sesotho, 
tsoelopele denotes the English equivalents of development, progress, civilisation, 
enlightenment, or modern. The effect of Christianity thus was the same as Western ethics had 
on the moral culture of the Basotho as a nation. Both played a pivotal role in setting up the 
necessary social and ethical conditions for the onset of contemporary moral attitudes and 
emotivist tendencies which are not only different but also inconsistent with traditional value 
systems of Basotho. It is in this sense that the introduction of education in the model of the 
West by missionaries was not only to facilitate literacy but was seen first as a method of 
instilling Christian values and attitudes i.e., Christian ethics. Here there is no distinction 
 58 
between Christian ethics and European culture, which are presented as Christian. And this is 
important, as today there is a tendency to want to separate the two. Western Christianity and 
education thus I will argue was among the most potent instruments through which Western 
moral values were promoted in Sesotho culture. So now we can see how the missionaries 
presented Christian ethics i.e., the Christian way to conduct one’s life contributed to what we 
have referred to as European moral imperialism. The significance of this is that here we see 
how European values, norms and culture were intertwined with Christian values from early on 
and steadily chipped away the traditional moral foundation of Sesotho speaking cultures, with 
the end result that Basotho culture and moral systems were significantly and eternally 
transformed and would never be the same ever since.  As a result of this, there appeared “a 
new generation of Basotho” not only “with different social outlook” but also with different social 
values. The consequence of this is that it is the descendants of this generation that are now 
the ardent consumer of and practitioners of modern Western ethics, with all its advantages 
and disadvantages.  
The significance of this is not so much in the different social reactions to Christianity, i.e., those 
that were for it and those that were against. It is rather, that the introduction of western values 
among the Basotho brings about the emergence of a new consciousness and social classes. 
This in turn meant that the whole Basotho nation and society is ultimately transformed and 
with this a new society is formed.  What relevant here to modern ethics is that it this new 
modern society does not take the character of either of the formerly opposing classes, but it 
is in many ways a completely different society is formed. That society is one that is neither 
African nor European and because it has nothing that is of “its own” it looks up to the dominant 
moral value framework of the day as its base and source of moral guidance” (Selepe 
1999:111).  Initially, this was the vision of life as presented by the missionary and colonial era. 
Post-independence, this role has been taken over by influences of First World culture, where 
the default attitude is epitomised in the common view of “whatever comes from the West is 
best” which is applied to the moral values and attitudes associated with the Western culture.  
 
2.3.4  Moral Neo-Colonialism of Western Ethics and Western Culture  
 
In the earlier sections, we have seen how the influence of enlightenment thinking has 
transformed the orientation of modern ethics and in turn shaped the moral culture of modernity. 
We also saw how modernity, is itself the consequences of enlightenment thought, or 
conversely how enlightenment thought reflects the fundamental features of modernity (Depu 
2014: 162). We also pointed out the relationship between colonial and missionary projects 
and the significance of this relationship to European ethical approaches in general and their 
approaches to ethics and interaction with other moral traditions. It is the combination of all 
these that modern ethics has the character that it has today. In other words, while the earlier 
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section was an analysis of inadequacies of modern Western ethics in general, this section 
analyses the impact of modern ethics particularly as found within the context of other moral 
cultures in sub-Saharan African, and more specifically Basotho culture. It will be recalled that 
symbiotic relationship of Western ethics and Christian ethics meant that “many elements 
labelled as Christian were merely aspects of Western culture and for the was nothing positive 
that the African culture can contribute (Bujo 2009:113). This explains the nature of the 
relationship that characterized the encounter between them and African culture wherever the 
two met.  
What has become clear about this interface is that it is typically accompanied by strong 
modernising undertones and zeal, overt notions of moral superiority and civilising of local 
cultures by representatives of Western culture. This should not come as a surprise because 
the so-called modern ideas that came to fore during the enlightenment were understood in 
terms of progress and seen by thinkers of the enlightenment as modern. But even more 
important is that these ideas did not only transform European society at the time, but 
historically these have also been associated with Western culture. It is out of this culture that 
Western ethics and Christian ethics evolved. As a result of this, we find that post-
enlightenment European culture was often regarded as synonymous with “progress”, it was 
what it is to be part of the “modern world” as the influence of science and secularisation 
becomes the defining features of European culture from this period onwards (MacIntyre 1981: 
81; Shutte 2001:43). This equating of progress with Western culture we see happening with 
Western ethics as well. This can be seen in Africa where among the early colonialists and 
missionaries there was a fervent belief that the African culture was not endowed with any 
moral character (Murove 2009: 24, 19). Thus, for lengthy periods many of these newcomers 
whether Christian or secular regarded African culture and its moral traditions as greatly inferior 
with nothing to offer the higher morality of the West they brought with them, nor even capable 
of enriching them ethically (Prozesky 2009:7).  This attitude was justified under the twin banner 
of the “gospel” and “modernity” where both colonisation and Christianity were presented as 
modern, and equivalent to progress and development. Local cultures were thus expected to 
adapt and accommodated these if not adopt them altogether if they are to develop and avoid 
being left behind the times (Murove 2009: 24). This attitude has not changed that much since 
then about African culture and the moral traditions of its people, although now it is not as overt 
as it was in the past.  
Today this is now taken over by the dominance of Western culture where we can see 
similarities in modern-day views underpinning much of the so-called “technological 
development” led by the West. As the dominant feature of the modern culture, the 
technological culture we are experiencing is skewed heavily by blind faith in the monoculture 
of First World culture under the guise of modern technology. With all its positive development 
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modern technology is not value neutral, and like most features of modern society it is 
dominated by the values of First World culture, which is Western and European character. It 
is in this sense that Bujo (2001: xi) correctly points out that despite its positive aspects modern 
culture should not blind us to the ambivalence of “modern technology”, particularly the 
“monoculture” that technology “creates” and the effects on “cultures of the non-Western world, 
which can scarcely assert themselves technologically and make their voices heard in the 
process of globalisation”. 
 It is in this sense that I will argue that a full understanding of impact of modern ethics in Africa, 
both in its secular and religious manifestation and their respective approaches is not complete 
without an acknowledgement of the association of ‘modernity’ and ‘civilisation’ with Western 
culture and its value systems. As Murove (Murove 2009: 24) points out this is necessary 
because there is a view that holds the assumption that transition into modernity for African 
societies means acceptance of Western morality, economics, and religion, and that unless 
Africans accept Western ways, they will not escape the net of primitiveness and under 
development. In other words, the role of “modernity” in enabling Western ethical 
presuppositions to remain unquestioned is crucial to an understanding of how in the moral 
sphere this perpetuates a form of moral neo-colonialism where Western value frameworks are 
covertly being imposed on other cultures such as that of the Basotho. 
With modernity “unlike moral colonialism of the past, western values are not presented as 
superior, but as universal and developmental progress, requiring not conversion to an 
alternative (presumably better) value system” and way of life, “but recognition” and acceptance 
“of universal values” (Widdows 2007: 306) which are presented as not of any particular culture. 
This claim to universality in part explains how modernity has paved the way for modern 
Western ethics to become the dominant global ethical frame of reference including in many 
African communities. It helps in understanding the consequences of the condemnation by 
colonialism and Christianity of African values and modes of living as bastions of traditionalism 
with concomitant reluctance to embrace modernity (Murove 2009: 17). It also helps in 
understanding how the legacy of this has been continued to sustain the hegemony of Western 
culture as a symbol of social progress and development. It also explains the underlying 
character of ethics in modern societies especially post-traditional societies of Southern Africa 
which can be traced back to the emergence of Western ethics and modernity as its cultural 
express and their uncompromising disastrous interaction with ethical traditions of other 
cultures including in sub-Saharan Africa (Richardson 2009: 130, Prozesky 2009: 3). This leads 
to the next section which looks at the concerns now being raised as the result of this disastrous 
history of the encounter between the ways of the West and African culture and its underlying 
ethic of botho.  
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2.4  Concerns about Declining Moral Standards in Contemporary Africa Culture  
 
The uncompromising displacement of traditional morality by modern Western ethics, in most 
African communities has left moral traditions of many in villages and towns in tatters. It has 
left individuals as rudderless ships with no moral anchors in a sea of moral uncertainty and 
confusion. This is what some have called the predicament of moral culture of modernity, and 
a moral vacuum of contemporary moral environment, where something has gone and nothing 
has replaced it (MacIntyre 1981: x, Shute 2001: 1). For many especially in Africa, but not 
exclusively, this form of moral neo-colonialism10 found in the prevailing moral prism of modern 
ethics has led to an intolerable moral environment in many communities. Moral life is 
experienced as like living in a society where everything is allowed in the name of individual 
freedom. This freedom enshrined in secular liberal individualism of Western cultures and 
Western ethics, is often abused, and appears to seldom be balanced by acknowledgement 
and recognition of individual responsibility (Ntibagirirwa 1999: 4).  We find therefore that today 
most people in many African communities live moral lives informed by a heterogeneous 
combination of modern influences and values on the one hand and elements and fragments 
of traditional culture and old morality rooted in moral traditions of people of Africa on the other. 
The result is deep moral confusion, uncertainty, and social problems. Individuals are no longer 
certain about what to value anymore or what values to keep and uphold, as they double in an 
out of both traditional and modern culture. This is the moral predicament of the moral culture 
of today’s Africa and the moral universe many Africans inhabit. This confusion is typically 
represented by the figure of that moderately globalised Southern African “who submit publicly 
to the pressures of displaying a globalised modern culture, while in the more hidden niches of 
life, village forms are allowed to play some part” (van Binsbergen 2001: 63). Further describing 
this moral predicament of and the dilemma of many Mwikamba (1992: 86) explains that today 
“Africans are becoming more and more ego-centred and as a result, they 
“are caught up in a moral contradiction. Should one be faithful and loyal to 
herself/himself, [or] to the community, the religious group, nation.... or to their 
wealth”?  
 
The confusion about the way the individual sees themselves which is implied here is revealing 
because it is one where there is uncertainty about the relationship of the individual to the 
community. In traditional the question of split loyalty between the self and the community does 
not arise. This uncertainty where the good of the individual is perceived as somehow 
incompatible with the common or loyalty to the community contrast sharply with the traditional 
communal solidarity that is a feature of African culture. The crisis of values now a feature of 
much of contemporary African communities means that individualistic tendencies creeping in 
 
10 This is borrowed from Widdows (2007) 
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these communities have left individuals feeling like loyalty to the community amounts to 
sacrificing what is good for the individual. This is further confirmation of the depth of this 
predicament and crisis of values now the subject of much talk and debates. It is to this 
transformation of the self, from the traditional African understanding to the modern one, that 
former President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki alludes to. Describing the situation in South 
Africa in Richardson (2003: 5) Mbeki says the problem is that  
“There was a collapse of an acceptable level of morality in our society which 
resulted in the elevation of the self, and the serving of the interests of the 
self to the point that the self becomes a religion. The self, became the god 
we must all worship... In the vacuum individuals had to decide for 
themselves what was good and what was bad, and the good was defined as 
what would serve my interests”  
 
This sums up the contemporary state of moral uncertainty individual now are confronted with 
where they had to decide for themselves what was good and was bad. And because many 
lacked those cultural and societal ethical resource that support the making of such decision, 
the default position is the individual and their interest. Thus, we see here again the 
reappearance of the same manifestation of individualism we discussed earlier expressed in 
modern ethics in the form the criterionless choice of the autonomous self we discussed earlier. 
It is this and all other perceived moral ills of contemporary African societies that is seen as 
signaling no stop to the moral decay eating away at the very core of the moral fibre of society, 
as those who know Africa well are concerned at the continuing decline of the values ubuntu 
embodies and it is no consolation that this occurring even as there is growing awareness of, 
and sympathy with, the principles of ubuntu beyond the borders of Africa (Hailey 2008: 19).  
What worries many is the growing indifference seen all around, the lack of generosity and 
compassion to fellow human beings, and leadership with no conscience and any regard for 
honour, the little or no regard for botho, and the loss of traditional understanding of moral 
responsibility as a corporate affair (Gaie 2002: 227) and a catalogue of other immoral 
behaviours are all a sign of the absence of a moral sense (Shutte 2001: 1) and moral meltdown 
surrounding us today (Prozesky 2007:7-8).  
All this has brought into sharper focus the debilitating effects of the moral decay now affecting 
communities. It has also shown the difficult this environment poses for the practice of some of 
the traditional African values associated with botho. The pervasive prevalence of morally 
disturbing actions and omissions where it is becoming common for “giving and receiving of 
bribes, parents neglecting their children, adult “children” abandoning their ageing 
parents….[and] failure to show respect for one another” (Kinoti 1992: 76), all point to the moral 
malaise in society. In Sesotho culture this discontent is towards what can simply be summed 
up as the lack of respect of basic ethical fundamentals for one who is a motho which “no one 
who considered himself decently brought up” could ill afford (Ellenberger (1912: 292). It is 
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these fundamentals that underpin much of traditional social norms and rules of etiquette found 
in their culture.  
According to Kinoti (1992: 73) the situation in Africa today has brought much grumbling and 
lamentation because “because they possess some knowledge of traditional morality”, now no 
longer there “which ensured the well-being of communities and individuals alike”. In other the 
concern here with contemporary moral culture of modern African is its implied failure to ensure 
the well-being of communities and individuals alike which as we saw earlier is the 
consequence of the over emphasis in modern ethics of autonomy.  
The displacement of traditional culture and its value stems together with this unquestioning 
embracing of modern ethics as represented by the West, has led to the crisis of values in 
many communities in Southern African and most African societies today. This can be seen in 
prevailing moral attitudes of that autonomous urbanised “young man and a young woman who 
has been socialised in church and at school” (Bereng 1987: 94) who is embracing without 
questioning the dominant Western value systems and everything Western as progress and 
good. 
Thus, one finds that there is now in many of these post-traditional societies a growing attitude 
where individuals assert the right to question just about everything and to decide the basic 
issues of their lives for themselves without any significant consideration for others11  (Prozesky 
2007: 7, Ntibagirirwa 1999: 8).  Consequently, it is fair to say that the contemporary moral 
agents live profoundly confused and inconsistent moral life. They are uncertain about how to 
respond to fundamental moral questions of who they are and who they should be, and how 
they were yesterday affects the decision they make today and, in the future, (Richardson 2009: 
141). Due to lack of certainty about answers to these fundamental moral questions, deciding 
what to do on a day-to-day basis and making moral judgements for the moral agent becomes 
more difficult and more arbitrary and inconsistent (Mokolatsie 1997:13).  It is in recognition of 
this change and the societal moral challenges it brings in Africa that Mugambi and Nasimiyu-
Wasike (1992: 1) argue that many of these are not necessarily new,  
“but they have taken on new forms and amplitudes of our time. Moral issues 
have become very difficult and complex, particularly in the African context 
where structures and forms are changing so fast that African society seems 
to be in a permanent transitional stage of history.”  
 
 
11 The term post-traditional is borrowed from Giddy (2014) and is used here to differentiate contemporary societies 
as we have them now in mostly developing countries with specific reference to Africa and modern societies as 
found in the first world. I shall therefore reserve post-traditional societies to describe third world context and modern 
societies for the first world context. This distinction is necessary because even though both have been affected by 
modernity, its incarnation in both is different. In contrast to the first world distinctively post-traditional societies, like 
in Africa aspects of old traditions have not only somehow “survived into some sort of coexistence with 
modernity”(MacIntyre 1981:71) they have demonstrated a kind of resilience and strength that qualifies it as a true 
survivor (Prozesky 2009: 11;) and as such the traditional ethos of African culture has survived (Kasenene 1994: 
138). 
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In other words, at the heart of the concerns currently being raised with modern ethics is the 
concept of the self as an autonomous individual that is the governing principle now embodied 
by modern ethics. What we are seeing therefore in these concerns is first, that traditional 
African morality as it used to be, has been lost and permanently damaged. Second, that 
whatever semblance or fragments of it are there and left, have been significantly changed and 
its understanding transformed, such that they no longer wield any moral authority12. It is this 
reality together with declining morals standards and general absence of a moral sense that 
for some constitutes the moral vacuum that is found in many communities. It is against this 
background that the disquiet and much talk about the state of ethics by public figures, religious 
and community leaders must be understood. (Shutte 2001: 1). In view of this some are thus 
calling out what they as the erosion of traditional values and the impoverishing effect to ethics 
of displacement of character (Bereng 1987: 96-98, Richardson 1994: 91) with growing for a 
different ethical paradigm one that would be based on renaissance of conscience (Prozesky 
2007: x) or revival of Aristotelian ethics (Ntibagirirwa 1999).  
Many of the issues that are now of concern with contemporary African moral universe; lack of 
moral certainty, moral confusion, self-doubt of the moral agent in terms of one’s social and 
moral identity, can already be seen raised in similar disquiet about the displacement of 
traditional values by Western values in Sesotho speaking culture at the turn of the twentieth 
century. This is often depicted in many of the early novels of Sesotho literature referred to 
earlier. In these novels, one of the noticeable features of the hero is much talked about inner 
conflict or crisis of values in individual and communities alike about what is good and for whom 
and what value system to follow. This moral dilemma and predicament caused by the clash of 
value systems is narrated no better than in the famous Sesotho novel, Mosali a Nkhola (A 
woman lends into trouble) by B.M. Khaketla (Selepe 2009). The novel is “set in the heyday of 
British colonial rule in Lesotho” with a young Mosito about to assume his reign as chief after 
successful Western college education at Lovedale College. The dilemma facing the young 
chief is whether his Western education and the values is espouses i.e., of annihilation and 
alienation, will benefit him and his people or whether the traditional value system embedded 
in traditional social institutions and social roles he was brought up with should be his lere -
walking stick both morally and politically as he governs and leads his people. The novel 
explores “whether it is Mosito’s education and civilisation or the Basotho culture” and its 
traditional institutions and culture “that will provide answers to the problems facing him” in his 
role as a chief. This dilemma is amplified in the novel by the portrayal of the young Mosito 
marrying an “uneducated” Mosotho woman,” Sibonelo, who in contrast to her husband who is 
 
12 The term fragments and implied sense of loss of moral authority of traditional African values are used here in 
the same way that MacIntrye (1981: 1-2) describes similar fundamental change and transformation that occurred 




unsure of who he is, she “is steeped in her cultural beliefs and value systems.”  The same 
clash of values is reflected in “Mosito’s lekgotla (council)” which “is divided into two camps: 
the former advisors of his late father who are “uneducated”, and his own peer advisors who 
are educated in the Western sense (Selepe 2009: 143-145). Mosito’s dilemma is a microcosm 
of the political and cultural dispute prevailing  
“between what is considered to be right for the Basotho in general, not just 
for Mosito; vis-à-vis what is considered to be right for the Basotho, by the 
British colonial regime” (Selepe 2009: 141). 
 
By extension, the conflict of values portrayed in the novel i.e., about what is good morally for 
Basotho vis-à-vis Western influences in the form of British colonial rule is a mirror image of 
the moral uncertainty and predicament now characterising contemporary Basotho. This moral 
dilemma, the confusing mixture of African and Western values, represent the moral 
uncertainty many are experience of being unsure of which way to turn. (Richardson 2009: 
129). This I will argue is quintessential crisis of values many contemporary Southern Africans 
are experiencing today in particular the majority of urban and semi-rural folk and metropolitan 
urbanite elites including contemporary Basotho.  
This concern with the impact of Western culture on African cultures, dramatised in the life of 
Mosito, is symbolic of the underlying concerns with contemporary moral environment in many 
communities in Africa today. It is a reality that can be seen in other parts of sub-Saharan 
African vis-à-vis modern ethics and influence of the West. This moral predicament stands for 
the ultimate choice between the two ways of life as far as Africa ethics and Western ethics is 
concerned. This is also the concern expressed by African scholars worried about the moral 
culture of their communities. This concern often in discussions about ethics expressed in 
typical African fashion in the medium of storytelling. Among African scholar familiar with the 
culture and its use of narratives as resources for ethical reflection and moral education, none 
captures the essence of the reality of the present African moral predicament in a story better 
than Hanna Kinoti in story in Richardson (2009: 129). Like in the story of Mosito, according to 
this story, the Hyena was following the smell of roasted meat until it came to where the path 
forked. Not knowing which path to take it decided to straddle both and as the paths drifted 
further and further apart the Hyena ends up splitting in the middle. Like the character of young 
Mosito to paraphrase Larson in Selepe (2009: 143) most Africans in sub-Saharan Africa 
indeed have become trapped individuals, who have “been assimilated, and then found it 
impossible to accept” the full abandonment of their own traditional African moral values and 
culture. It is in this sense that today Africa is at a crossroads,” because “in terms of everyday 
conduct for individuals and communities, there is uncertainty, disillusionment and even 
despair” (Kinoti 1992: 73).Both stories are thus a metaphor and social commentary that help 
to articulate the grave state in which moral life in Africa is and the moral crisis individual and 
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many communities in Africa are facing today. They are a microcosm of the contemporary crisis 
of values of modern societies in Africa today.  
It is against this background that there is a growing disquiet, “grumbling and lamentation” 
about the displacement of “traditional African morality, and it being  superimposed by other 
influences of the day and age in which we find ourselves” (Kinoti 1992: 73.  In the case of 
Mosito, I will also argue that the story shows that the crisis is not new. That this crisis has been 
the subject of concern for a long time by different generations of Africans and therefore 
accusations often levelled at criticism of modern culture as nostalgia13 for the past, -because 
it is assumed this is a recent fascination- is false. That means the moral contradictions, 
incoherencies and inconsistencies we are seeing today in Africa resulting from the dilemma 
just described, is a manifestation of moral decay in the foundation of the fabric of moral life 
whose origin can be traced back to the beginnings of the interface of African culture with the 
West.  
The displacement of traditional African value systems especially the centrality of the growth 
of personal character to ethical conduct, by the ways of the West together with the 
corresponding individualistic concept of the self as its cornerstone, has thus left the African as 
a moral agent at a precipice of moral uncertainty and confusion. It has created a moral 
environment that at best is a crisis of values and moral uncertainty and at worst is a moral 
vacuum. In other words, there is a general discontent with the state of a contemporary moral 
culture among many in Africa. There is a worry with the change in moral attitudes along with 
the quality of the moral life of individuals today which has resulted in the decline in moral 
standards but has also created a moral crisis too (Ntibagirirwa 1999: 108). 
These concerns being raised which are at the philosophical and theoretical levels, where 
ethics is understood and done in Africa still largely modelled on the West with little or no 
recognition of the contribution that Africa can make (Nicolson 2008: 1-12, Murove 2009: xv, 
Richardson 2009: 144). At a practical level i.e., day to day conduct, it is not only moral 
uncertainty but also inconsistency due to the absence of an overriding shared values and 
common moral frame of reference as well as disillusionment and even despair (Kinoti 1992: 
73). This has led to growing concerns with declining moral standards (Dolamo 2013; Shutte 
2001:1) which is seen as behind the increases in various acts of moral indiscretions 
(Richardson 2003: 5, Eliastam 2015: 3, Letseka 2013A). Confronted with such reports a 
morally discerning person is forced not only to ask about the moral character of one who 
 
13 Such accusations mainly from some quarters within African philosophy circles, especially with reference to botho 
discourse (see Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013) are symptomatic of the failures of modern academic training where 
ethical reflection fails to go beyond the limits of traditional disciplines of mainly moral philosophy and moral 
theology, to embrace other disciplines in this case African narratives or stories whose moral value in  education in 
to virtue transcends time and cultural boundaries and  as such can enrich current ethical reflection and discourse, 
especially on ethical concepts such as botho which originate in cultures with strong oral tradition where stories 
were the primary medium of education by which social values and ideals were taught and learned.  
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conducts themselves in such a manner, but to conclude that the traditional African values and 
virtues of botho, such as respect for elders, charity, honesty, hospitality and communal 
solidarity, which gave ethics a tangible social content are not only in decline (Mwikamba 1992: 
84-86) but in danger of extinction and no longer wield any moral authority on individuals.  All 
this has intensified the experience many have of contemporary moral life today as being like 
a “moral vacuum” where “something” used to be there but is now “gone, and nothing has 
replaced it” (Shutte 2001). For many concerned with this poor state of moral standards, African 
society is in a state of near chaos in the realm of morality and the “the emergent new African-
Western educated” and new Christianised moral agent is something of a caricature, least 
pleasing to himself (Kinoti 1992: 80).   
For many the growing influence of Western culture and its dominance seeming with no stop 
to it can only mean more damage to even those remaining fragments of traditional morality. It 
means even more uncritical acceptance and embracing of many of the western values that 
are the very source of some of the problems. This will lead to even more confusion and 
uncertainty about values leaving many more unsure and uncertain. This is because although 
many will increasingly be influenced by western values, they are still a product of traditional 
culture and not fully able to renounce the dictates of traditional values espoused by African 
value systems, which have survived the onslaught of modernity. This can be seen in the 
current modernised African moral agent who are truly faced with an existential moral dilemma 
foreshadowed in the character of young Mosito in Khaketla’s Mosali a Nkhola and Kinoti’s 
story of the Hyena. Therefore, in many African communities, there is a general concern with 
what many see as badly deteriorating values of botho and moral standards, as society 
witnesses with dismay morally horrifying incidents and disturbing social behaviour in their 
communities.  
It is against this background that there is a growing outcry about contemporary moral culture 
and influence of modern ethics in Africa.  The suitability of modern ethics or Western Christian 
ethics to animate society toward creation good citizens and individuals with qualities of botho, 
is being asked with even lounder voices. The legitimacy of claims this moral culture as a 
workable value system and the effectiveness of relying on it for moral guidance including its 
idolisation of the individual autonomy is no longer convincing for many. This and other 
distinctive characteristics of modern Western ethics are highlighted among some of the 
noticeable inadequacies, now regarded as no longer acceptable. As a result, we are seeing a 
ground swell of concerns, calling ethics to look elsewhere for solution in the direction of other 
moral traditions. The Sesotho speaking cultures which is presented here is one such a 
response presented here as better suited for articulating ideas for creating “batho bao e leng 
batho”, - individuals who are persons. i.e., who have “botho,” which is the purpose of ethics. 
Among these are those calling for a new emphasis in ethics specifically one that is committed 
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to the reinstatement of moral goal of growth in personal moral character as the new ethical 
approach instead of (Richardson 2009: 139). 
This concern with modern Western ethics and crisis of values in Africa it has caused is being 
amplified by many scholars, now also questioning not only the inadequacies of modern ethics 
but hegemony of Western value frameworks as a whole as the basis for creation of global 
ethics but also the wisdom of continuing to do ethics solely through the lens of Western 
Christian traditions (Murove 2009: 15) while ignoring indigenous ethical traditions more 
relevant to people in this region and their moral outlook (Shutte 2008: 17). This movement is 
driven by perspectives inspired by moral traditions from the developing world like Africa and 
the east, and worth mentioning here is the ethics of “botho” from the moral tradition of Sesotho 
speaking cultures in Southern Africa, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
In recent years the social and moral challenges briefly discussed here have led to a growing 
interest in the moral traditions of African people in particular the rival of botho ethics (Letseka 
2011, Metz 2014) and a growing consciousness about the importance of indigenous African 
ethical traditions to ethics in general but in particular to African ethics led by the likes of Shutte 
(2001) Murove (2009), Nicolson (2008) and Prozesky (2007, 2009). These scholars and 
others not mentioned here all share the common sentiment about botho ethics in relation to 
the contemporary moral environment and modern ethics. It is summed up by Shutte (2001: 9) 
who argues that there is a need to find a way of applying to ethics the insight at the heart of 
the ethical ideal of botho because it is something the dominant moral culture “in our own time 
and society has forgotten” but, which is desperately needed. The significance of botho and 
debates around it follow in next chapter which focuses on current debates.  
2.5  Summary 
 
This chapter gave an overview of the nature and character of modern Western ethics and 
modernity as its cultural expression highlighting concerns from the perspective of African 
ethics as the background to current botho discourse. It analysed contemporary moral 
environment and presented a critical appraisal and evaluation of modern Western ethics. It 
showed that the latter is currently the predominant ethical frame of reference informing 
contemporary moral attitudes and view about ethics as such still has considerable influence 
in the ways of conduct in places like sub-Saharan Africa including among many Basotho.  
The chapter highlighted the significance of the symbiotic relationship between colonial and 
missionary projects in Africa with reference to Basotho culture. It showed that in the moral 
sphere both adopted the same uncompromising “civilizing” attitude towards the moral system 
and values of indigenous cultures in Africa with devastating consequences on the 
communities of those cultures including those of Basotho. This means that the religious 
expression of modern Western ethics and its influence when it comes to the displacement of 
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traditional morality in Sesotho speaking culture cannot be underestimated. Thus, from the 
perspective of moral traditions of Africa, specifically those of Basotho, modern ethics, whether 
in its secular or religious manifestation has the same detrimental effect of which concerns 
about it are now being raised. 
The chapter thus discussed this presence of modern ethics today in both its secular and 
religious expression in the form of Western ethics and Christian ethics respectively. Here we 
saw that the character and orientation of the modern Western ethics as found today has 
remained true to its characteristic features it has always had from its origins in Enlightenment 
Ethics in Europe. In other words, even though modern ethics is now found in many parts of 
the world outside its European cultural origins it still bears the hallmarks of its European 
culture. In other words, it is still largely Western, Christian, and individualistic and is still part 
of the globalising thrust of Western culture.  The chapter examined the implications of Western 
ethics and modernity as its cultural expression in many post traditional societies, that are now 
the feature of many communities in Southern Africa including those of Sesotho speaking 
culture and the Basotho people.   Here the chapter showed how Western ethics along with 
the values of First World culture embodied most profoundly in its liberal ethics and 
individualism, is increasingly experienced by many of these communities as a catalyst to the 
sense of moral vacuum and decay, and that is a concern for many. The chapter showed the 
general dissatisfaction with ethics and state of morality in these cultures highlighting the 
contemporary moral environment experienced as crisis of values. It showed that this has 
resulted in a state of ongoing moral predicament, where individuals and communities alike 
feel morally uncertain and confused, and unsure of what values to hold. This together with 
dilution of a sense of shared values that modern Western ethics has engendered all have a 
joint effect of diminished sense of objective moral authority.  The introduction of the morally 
autonomous moral sovereign idea in ethics has further added to the growing concern with 
modern ethics and modernity as its cultural expression, where moral attitudes and ethics are 
increasingly viewed as just a matter of convention, purely subjective, and merely a practical 
set of rules to enable a society composed of people with vastly different values to function 
smoothly.  
The chapter showed the challenges faced by many traditional societies like that of Basotho. 
Many of these cultures and their communities are a part of modernity and there is no way of 
escaping, yet at the same time in some key areas of life this is experienced as a negative 
development for which solutions must be found. It is in view of the latter that there are now 
concerns of the real danger that many African societies face of adopting everything Western 
without selection and losing “sight of the traditional values of family and communal solidarity 
which cover all material and moral needs of people. 
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The analysis examined characteristic and representative features of Western ethics which 
capture its different approach to that of botho ethics. It illustrated the implication of such an 
approach to conduct in the light of that found in botho ethics in the light of how the latter is 
understood and applies in Sesotho speaking culture. The chapter analysed the phenomenon 
of the autonomous self-choosing moral individual as one of these features. It showed this 
notion of a moral sovereign now so well embedded in modern Western ethical approach to 
ethics how this diminishes the sense of shared values central to botho ethics and common 
moral frame of reference as the basis for morality in society. This expressed the inherent 
individualism of Western ethics and its orientation. The chapter highlighted specifically the 
over emphasis on what differentiates us as moral agents in society promote by the primacy of 
choice in western ethical approaches and implied by modern Western ethics. This the chapter 
argued showed that Western ethics’ adherence to individual autonomy and freedom of choice 
of the individual as a moral sovereign, has the undesirable consequences of placing 
separateness of individuals in society at the foreground of ethical reflection. Such an approach 
to ethics is detrimental to a shared set of values which is presupposed by botho ethics. For 
current botho discourse this moral environment thus poses problems as it is encouraging and 
reinforces individualism this ethics which as just pointed out conflicts with botho ethics which 
the discourse is promoting as an alternative in society.  
The chapter also explored another feature of the moral culture of modernity as presented in 
modern ethics. This is the rejection of moral particularity of Western ethics which is in favour 
of universalism. The latter is often understood in terms of objectivity of moral principles. The 
chapter discussed this as another area of concern with approach of modern ethics today and 
another reason for the growing disquiet and dissatisfaction many are having against modern 
ethics. This dogmatic adherence to universality and objectivity alongside the devotion to the 
individual, the chapter showed are what sets Western ethics apart from botho ethics, which is 
communal in orientation, and the main sources of worry about growing influence of modern 
ethics. The chapter showed that at the heart of modern ethics as presented through modernity 
is the assumption and impression given that it is possible to have an ethical reflection that is 
not done from a particular social standpoint, which botho ethics implies. The analysis showed 
that universalism promises universal principles as modern ethics does instead it turns out to 
be principles specific to particular times, places and stages of human activity and enquiry. The 
chapter showed that the assumptions about universality which underpin modern ethics are 
therefore incorrect. It important therefore for ethical reflection to recognise and acknowledge 
that however it may be defined, and articulated ethics will always be an expression of the 
morality of some particular social and cultural standpoint. This is more important now with the 
growing movement towards developing a global ethics, as such recognition makes for the kind 
of dialogue that this will require easier and possible.  
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 The chapter also analysed western ethics in terms of its religious expression in the form of 
Christian ethics with reference to its presence in Sesotho speaking culture.  It showed that 
although Christian ethics presents itself often as distinct from modern Western ethics, it 
nevertheless shares the same common origin and cultural heritage with Western ethics. Both 
also come from the same moral tradition and bear the same characteristic features. The 
relevance of approaching the analysis and impact of modern ethics from this religious 
perspective is that among the Basotho it was the missionary enterprise or missionary ethics 
more than the secular morality of the west, that entrenched western value systems and paved 
the way for modern ethics to take took root as a feature of modern Basotho nation.  For this 
reason, the chapter analysis Christian ethics with particular focus on missionary activity in 
Lesotho. Here the chapter focuses on early Basotho authors and the novels they produced as 
a reflection the idea and values propagated by Christian ethics. Using a literary analysis of a 
few selected novels in Sesotho language the chapter showed how Western values were 
promote to Basotho through the message of many of these novels. With the encouragement 
of missionaries many of these were designed to induce the unquestioning faith in Christianity 
among the Basotho and a strong belief in the progress of the West and renouncing of 
traditional culture and its moral values as “unchristian”.  The common theme found is these 
works is one where being Christian which is not distinguishable from western culture and its 
values. Christian way of life is presented always as a good while many of the traditional 
Basotho cultural ways and values are portrayed as bad. The development of these novels 
thus contributed to the part of the missionary project which endorsed the entrenchment of 
western value through Christianity and its moral teachings in Sesotho culture. The chapter 
showed that these novels are just not literature but also serve to as vehicles of propagating 
certain values and moral ideals, all of which were presented as Christian which is not 
separable from western value. It was the success of this process in Lesotho that we saw the 
entrenchment Western values system in Sesotho culture and in turn the emergence of a new 
society and culture among Basotho. This society was neither African in the traditional sense 
of its predecessor culture nor European or western and because it has nothing that is of “its 
own” it looks up to the dominant moral value framework of the day as its base and source of 
moral guidance. This is indeed the moral predicament of modernity in post traditional societies 
in Southern Africa with contemporary Basotho culture today as the representative microcosm 
of this predicament. It is in response to this moral predicament that this study is revisiting the 
experience of botho as found in traditional Sesotho culture for lesson to be learned for today’s 
context.  
The discussion of this chapter on the moral disquiet about modern ethics and concerns with 
the inadequacies of modern Western ethics and moral culture of modernity underscores this 
contemporary moral predicament, hence the interest on botho as a solution to this. The 
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chapter highlights this moral predicament as the basis behind the concerns now being 
expressed by many scholars in African ethics. For many it is the reason for the sense of being 
in moral crisis now being expressed in many African societies. According to these concerns, 
the problem of modern ethics is its progressive move away from considerations of the 
cultivation of good qualities of character, which leads to creation of good people and members 
of community, to obsession and fascination with universal moral principle. These concerns 
include those that see in modern ethics the reduction of ethics to an activity that comes into 
play when certain difficult moral decision must be made. Thus, making ethics into being a 
business of moral decisions about what is right and what is wrong at particular moments.  
The chapter also showed that according to some the heart of the problem with modern ethics 
is its whole structure of ethics, which premised narrow understanding of human autonomy and 
freedom of the individual  and the flawed conception of who we are as individuals and moral 
agents (Richardson 2009: 137).  The elevation of the status of the individual in relation to the 
community which has become the primary conception of moral identity that many people now 
hold is the most worrying and problematic from about modern ethics from the perspective of 
the ethics among Basotho and indeed many southern African communities. Not only because 
it runs counter to the traditional African approach to ethics where communal life is a priority, 
but because it has led to views and moral attitude where moral behaviour is privatised and 
treated as “no one’s business” but the individual moral agent alone. From the perspective of 
African ethics, this poses problems because moral life is a joint responsibility, with the 
community responsible for the conduct of its individual members and members responsible 
for the moral life of the community. This concept of ethical accountability that is the sole 
preserve of the individual alone conflicts with the traditional ethical ideal of botho, argued here 
as a workable alternative but is also harmful to current efforts to engender a global ethic that 
focuses on human flourishing and the idea of a global community. For friends of botho this 
conception of ethics is thus not compatible with its central tenets of botho, where mutual 
responsibility in community for the moral life is one of the necessary conditions required for 
the realisation of botho. For this reason in this chapter the significance of the community as 
one of the key social institutions underpinning of African ethics is given particular emphasis, 
pointing out that the kind of moral individualism that is now pervasive in modern ethics is one 
of the challenges of an ethic that places such premium as the ethics of botho does ongoing 
inter-subjectivity of persons as envisioned by the African community.   
It is against this background that the chapter discussed the growing movement in ethics in 
general but also from within African ethics for a change in thinking in the understanding of 
ethics. There is now a recognition gaining in momentum that ethic needs transcend 
considerations focusing primarily on rules and principles of right and wrong actions of 
individuals. Instead ethical reflection should focus on people and their character. In other 
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words, a change from the current impersonal goals of ethics to ensure objectivity and 
universality of moral principles. What the advocate of this new movement are calling for is 
focus of ethical reflection centred on personal goals of growth in personal moral character. 
For this school of thought, which resonates deeply with many of the current voices emanating 
from African ethics and sub-Saharan African, this means attention of ethics should be on the 
moral agency and by implication moral identity of agents. This is because that is what ethics 
is all about, i.e., it is rooted in who we are and our character. It is in terms of the persons we 
are as moral agent, now, yesterday and will be in the future that we approach moral decisions 
and answer questions of right and wrong. This is the heart of moral agency. Question about 
what is regarded as “making a moral decision at a particular moment” i.e., should I do this now 
or not, are not necessarily about a decision being made there and then. That decision in the 
strict sense of moral agency and decision making is already made because the person I am 
prevent certain types of conducts and includes certain types of behaviour a priori.  
In other words what happens in those occasions i.e., when moral decisions must be made in 
a case, is that in large part the moral agent has already decided in advance by the type of 
person they are i.e., “what kind of person am I,” “what is worthy of me” and more importantly 
“what may I permit myself to do” (Richardson 1994: 92) what they are more likely to do in this 
situation. In other words, the question being answered is “Am I that sort of person” that would 
do such and such or act in such a way in a situation like this. And the answer to this question 
does not arise for the first time only when confronted with a situation, it simply gets applied to 
the situation considering the unique circumstance of that situation. This is because our 
character which supplies the basis for answers to many of our moral questions, determines 
our actions and informs our behaviour in advance. This is not how a modern ethical approach 
to conduct works and how most people arrive at these decisions. The chapter has thus 
highlighted this as the weakness of current ethical frameworks to which I have suggested we 
can learn lessons from the ethical approach of the ethics of botho, an its approach, which 
although at odds with dominant ethical theories that inform modern society, is nevertheless 
desperately needed. 
The underlying contention therefore behind this chapter is that it is time that mainstream 
ethical reflection especially in Africa to transcends the confines of moral tradition of the West 
because there is every indication that the moral tradition of that culture like all moral cultures 
is not perfect and the signs are in some respect it is ethically impoverished. It is against this 
background that this study argues for reappraisal of botho and traditional African 
understanding of moral life as a joint enterprise, expressed in its classic form in the ethical 
ideal of botho as practised in the moral traditions of a Sesotho speaking culture. Such an 
understanding has the potential to address some of the challenges found with in Western 
ethics and the problems they generate now facing individual moral agents today. It also has 
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potential from which s individuals today can learn lessons and find possible moral resources 
we need to. It is this conviction that ethics can learn from moral traditions of other cultures that 
we now see it playing itself out in African ethics and no more intensely than in the current 































CHAPTER THREE:  CURRENT BOTHO DISCOURSE AND PREDOMINANT 
DEFINITIONS OF BOTHO  
 
  3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter will give a critical appraisal of the current botho discourse outlining the 
different approaches to botho and debates surrounding this concept as found in the 
literature, highlighting the varied formulations and definitions of botho found in the 
discourse. This will include the analysis of the older definition of botho understood as 
a description of moral quality or admirable character of a person as well as the more 
recent interpretations of it as a phenomenon. This former is currently the least 
emphasised in the current discourse. Within the latter groups the chapter will analyse 
Afro communitarianism (AC) as the predominant formulation of botho in the discourse 
around which all other formulations coalesce. Here the chapter will focus on AC’s 
usage of the Sesotho proverb motho ke motho ka batho which is regarded as 
foundational to the theorisation of botho. The chapter will deconstruct this as a 
theorisation of botho and question the over reliance of current discourse on this 
proverb as a gate way to the insight of botho ethics.  It will further analyse this proverb 
as part of Sesotho narratives and part of the indigenous knowledge of Basotho. It will 
highlight the internal rules of interpretation and usage of Sesotho narratives as a way 
of correcting the current usage of the proverb and in turn de-linking botho from motho 
ke motho. The chapter will conclude with a preview of a reimagined formulation of 
botho beyond motho ke motho, as part of the overall appraisal and overview of current 
botho discourse and its interpretation of botho.  
The fundamental question the current botho discourse must address, to properly 
conceptualise ethics of botho within contemporary ethical thought and prevailing ethical 
theories, is ‘what kind of ethics is ethics of botho’? Is it an ethic of right action, primarily 
interested in questions of “what is right and wrong” with focus on actions of individuals 
(Richardson 1994: 91)? Or is it an ethic of virtue, preoccupied with questions of character and 
inculcation of makhabane (virtues) and certain qualities of character? In this study I locate 
botho ethics in the latter, where it is an ethics intend on achieving the more person moral goal 
of growth in personal character of motho using the traditional Basotho culture and its 
understanding and meaning of the term botho, which is discussed in detail in the next chapter 
on the primacy of character. I will therefore argue that, from the perspective of Sesotho 
speaking culture, botho cannot be understood independently to the answer to the question 
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that must first be answered; what is motho?  It cannot be properly conceptualised without 
reference to what sort of person one “ought” to become to be a proper motho (Mphetolang 
2009: 14) and this I will argue is described in Sesotho culture primarily in terms of character. 
This is because it is believed that it is a person's character that reflect who the person really 
is i.e., it is the source from which all his or her actions—good or bad—radiate and the 
performance of good or bad acts depends on the state of one's character (Gyekye 2011: 
par.10-14). Using available literature including sources from the Sesotho speaking culture, 
this chapter will show that, traditionally this concept is connected to character because 
morality in Sesotho culture is understood fundamentally in terms of good morals specifically 
of character. In terms of this understanding the core standards of the moral life by which 
conduct is judged good or bad, and actions regarded as right or wrong, are always understood 
in terms of how character relates to conduct and the behaviour of motho. 
It is from this understanding i.e., of a character centric account of botho, that I contend the 
starting point of analysis of the current botho discourse of this concept must be based. This is 
because it is not only the oldest definition of the concept in southern Africa; but also, the 
common usage in moral language of the people of Southern Africa from the eighteenth century 
until as recently as the twentieth century (Gade 2011: 316). Moreover, I will argue it is also the 
most appropriate for articulating the person dimension of botho which is desperately needed 
today. This interpretation is also congruent with the indigenous understanding of botho as 
found in traditional culture of Basotho from which the term botho originates. I will thus 
problematise the current conventional Afro-communitarian (AC) account of botho, (Metz and 
Gaie 2010: 274) which conceives botho in terms of quality of personal relationship in the 
community. I will argue that this account is inconsistent of botho as primarily a moral term 
used in describing morally admirable character in a person. I will furthermore challenge the 
current reliance in the discourse on motho ke motho ka batho to define this concept question 
this as unjustified abstraction of a proverb from its context as part of a body of knowledge 
found in Sesotho narratives. I will therefore show that Sesotho narratives, especially proverbs, 
are a body of collected wisdom that is best understood in unity and that as such they have 
their own internal rules of interpretation and application. Thus, I will argue that the 
interpretation of MKKB i.e., in terms of relational self-realisation of the self and impression 
given that this proverb alone express the essence of botho, is not an authentic articulation of 
the traditional understanding of botho, as this is not consistent with the traditional usage of 
this proverb and traditional understanding of botho as a description of the character of motho.  
 
3.2 Debates Around Relevance and Significance of Botho 
 
In the earlier chapters, it was pointed out that no aspect of traditional African morality has 
attracted as much interest and currency in recent years as the traditional concept of botho. 
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But the difficulty with botho is the extent of the literature and volume of new material that is 
still being published, makes it difficult to take stock in terms of giving an exhaustive account 
of current debates and views. The accounts of these debates that therefore follows here are 
limited by this. As such they will represent a cross section analysis of the debates aspects of 
which may have already moved by now. It will also be a broad description account of some 
area and topics of discuss in the discourse. So, the aim here will be more illustrative of the 
vibrancy of conversations currently taking place around this concept and to point at the general 
direction of some of the arguments within the current discourse. As such it will also not be the 
intention here to give a detail account of the merits and drawbacks of these. The exception 
here will only be for Afro-communitarianism account of botho. This is because as showed the 
problem with MKKB is the unjustified exceptionalism that the discourse has given this proverb 
which requires closer examination. But it is also because AC is the specific account of botho 
that this study is challenging and a response to. 
 One characteristic feature of the current botho discourse that one notices is the variety of 
views and ideas associated with botho, along with a wide range of formulations and 
descriptions. Aspects of some of these debates that follow here show the popularity and 
currency of this concept in recent years. This general excitement around botho in African 
ethics is based on the conviction that the insights at the heart of botho, are ideal informing 
ethics and conduct that are desperately needed in our times. Here we can mention the 
underlying ideals presupposed by botho as found in Sesotho culture such as shared values, 
common moral frame of reference, and intense sense of accountability and responsibility for 
wellbeing of others. This is something that the dominant moral culture of contemporary 
societies can learn from botho ethics (Nicolson 2008: 5, Shutte 2008: 9,15).  According to this 
then, botho has a worthwhile contribution to make to ethics. It offers immense potential to 
remedy the effects of globalisation, which has seen large-scale destruction of botho based 
institutions and values in many communities. So, the view that botho is a relevant and prompt 
antidote to “the trauma caused by colonisation and the imperialism of Western culture and 
Western values system is widely shared by most critics (van Binsbergen 2001: 63). While this 
points to general enthusiasm around botho, it is the case that the concept is not without critics, 
nor is it immune from criticism (Hailey 2008: 18, Molefe 2014: 161) as it will be clear in the 
next section.  
 
3.2.1  Polysemy of Botho and Concerns with Imprecision. 
 
The currency of botho in society especially in South Africa is one of the noticeable features of 
post-apartheid South Africa. One only has to look at the huge volume of new material on the 
subject for evidence of this but also the variety of applications; the term appears in pop songs, 
and endlessly in advertising campaigns; and also, in ‘a flood of booklets’ on [botho] in this or 
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that sphere of life. This can be seen clearly in how this concept now appear everywhere: in 
the names of a wide range of establishments, from security firms to schools within University 
departments, to open-source computer operating systems. It is against this background that 
others warn that the concept is at risk of meaning anything one chooses (Lutz 2009: 2; while 
other worry that it is almost meaningless. 
But as well as this enthusiasm there are concerns about what exactly this term means and its 
lack of definition. So, one finds that there are recurring criticisms of this concept in the 
literature, one of which is that the concept lacks precision and vagueness. Reiterating this 
Mboti (2015:130) points out that in the discourse there is “the tendency towards generalisation 
in defining botho which renders the concept to be as imprecise as possible.” Other have raised 
concerns that the popularity of this concept leaves botho open to abuse or misuse (Munyaka 
and Motlhabi 2009: 64). Describing this Shutte (2001: 14) points out that every organisation 
has botho in its mission statement and the term begins to mean everything and nothing.  
The perceived impreciseness and vagueness of botho is thus seen as meaning this concept 
can means anything anyone chooses (Lutz 2009: 2, Mboti 2015: 126). All these further 
substantiate the concern that this concept “has become anything to anyone who so wishes to 
deploy it” (Hailey 2008: 2, Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013: 200).  
So, while the concerns of abuse of the term are legitimate and these should be taken seriously, 
I will argue that in this case i.e., the fixation with precision of the meaning of botho is yet 
another manifestation of the consequences of the blind spot of Western modes of thought due 
to the influence of Western training, where African scholars desperately try to apply Western 
intellectual standards and modes of thinking on African concepts and ideas14.  To this it is 
argued there is plenty of evidence to show that the former has a different approach to the 
traditional African mode of thinking (Bujo 2001: 3) especially in ethics within which botho as a 
moral concept function. What is interesting here as well is that it is the academic scholars who 
appear to be worried about the lack of precision of botho, compared to the praxis of botho in 
communities where it is lived and practice. Here the practitioners of botho, and hence its 
experts by experience i.e., communities within which the concept thrived for centuries, appear 
not to encounter this same problem.   
It is in view of this that some argue it is time current botho discourse needs to suspend its bias 
and engage concept like botho from the perspective of those to whom it applied free from 
Western modes of thinking. Instead, it argued here scholars should first approach this concept 
from the perspective of people within whose culture ethics of botho was the dominant ethic. 
The discourse will then discover that that perspective always includes a certain conception of 
traditional African worldview and its corresponding ontological assumptions upon which 
 
14 This is the kind of thinking akin to what MacIntyre (1981:204) describes as “the tendency to think atomistically 
about human” experiences “and to analyse complex” human “actions in terms of simple components”. 
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African ethics is grounded (Mkhize 2008: 2008) where the polysemy of this concept is better 
appreciated. It is within these assumptions and spirituality of African culture that this concept 
is best understood, and its meaning is found. This means it is important when thinking about 
this concept that reference is made to African traditional wisdom and traditional understanding 
of personhood and concept of life in general, which is key the African worldview. Second, the 
current botho discourse should regard the indefinable character of botho or lack of precision 
as a problem. Instead the nature of this concept should be an autocue to scholars of how it 
should be approached. And that is this concept is not like any other concept, because it is best 
understood as a polysemic moral ideal, with many meanings that are inexhaustible. This is 
because as it has been said already botho is a concept with that has many meanings that are 
inexhaustible because this ethic cannot be pinned down to have originated at a particular point 
in time in human history (Murove 2013: 36). Such an approach will then reveal the strong 
unexplored parallels that botho has with the “ancient African (Egyptian) concept of Maat” 
(Mkhize 2008: 36, Karenga 2004: 4,) specifically the polysemic nature of these concepts and 
they are to be analysed. It is in this sense that botho must be approached from the starting 
point that it is a concept with “a very wide and internally richly” meanings and that as such it 
articulates “a vast area of possibilities and implications” (van Binsbergen 2001: 54). Although 
the selection of “shades” of meaning in a concrete context is not an exclusive reserve of those 
native to the culture of botho, it is worth pointing out it is best done by indigenous people 
familiar with such a concept. As Karenga (2004: 5) points out polysemic concepts like botho 
often strikes one unfamiliar with their conceptual elasticity and richness, as lacking categorical 
preciseness and thus, analytical utility which is often the accusation one finds about botho in 
the literature and debates around botho (Lutz 2009: 2). This concept therefore is opposed to 
simplistic reductionist formulations that seek to confine it to any one definition. Thus, we find 
in the praxis of community or village living which is concrete application of botho to a specific 
context it takes on the nuances of meaning derived from “specific selection” of shades of 
meaning “made” (van Binsbergen 2001: 54). 
When approached from this perspective, the lack of precision and efforts to give botho 
precision (Metz 2007, Ramose 2007) can be regarded as a failure of the inability of the current 
discourse to grasp the polysemic nature of botho. This may also explain why, despite the 
general agreement about the value of African moral traditions among critics, we see that when 
it comes to botho and its relevance for today’s context there is no consensus about its 
definition, hence the debates we see. This leads to another aspects of the debate about botho 
which is its place in the political sphere and response to globalisation. 
 
3.2.2  Botho Industry as Political Exhortation and Response to Globalisation   
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Among the reservation thus far discussed many of these relate to botho and its function within 
the sphere of ethics and morality. It is within this context that those criticism of botho project 
seen as not desirable nor workable are being raised (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, Mboti 
2015). The reservations emanating here related to botho industry and the function of botho as 
a political philosophy and a response to globalisation representative of the global south vis-à-
vis the global north. Here, critics like van Binsbergen, who can be taken as representative of 
this view, argue that botho can still be of value in other contexts beyond its traditional cultural 
origins, if rebranded differently. In other words, they are still critical of the current “botho 
industry” and its “academic and managerial codifiers” and in relation to globalisation. But the 
likes of van Binsbergen hold the view that botho should not so much be a push back against 
the effects of globalisation. The revival of botho, which is “not a straight-forward emic 
rendering” of pre-colonial African village practice, it is argued therefore should be 
reconceptualised in terms of its “utopian” and “prophetic” dimensions. Regarding the former 
botho is recast as a source of hope of an “an ideal society which is — as yet —nowhere to be 
found except in the philosopher’s blueprint.” In relation to the latter van Binsbergen informs us 
this function of articulates “the ills, contradictions and aporias of one’s time and age …. 
conditions which one share with many other members of one’s society” (van Binsbergen 2001: 
58). This is a similar approach of this concept adopted by Praeg in Molefe (2014) who 
launches botho directly into the political sphere. Like van Binsbergen, Praeg argues against 
“grossly inadequate” current reductionist approaches that treat botho as “a mere conceptual 
problem.” According to Praeg, botho must be regarded as “primarily a political act” and the 
responsibility of scholarship i.e., current botho discourse in this context “lies precisely in 
recognizing this priority of the political.”  According to Praeg a meaningful talk about botho 
“must examine the political background or space that makes it possible and allows us to” have 
conversations about botho . The reason is because to make sense of “What is ubuntu?” 
requires asking “questions” including asking why “now” and “for whom does this question 
matter” (Molefe 2014: 158).  According to Molefe the most interesting contribution makes to 
the discourse is the first distinction Praeg makes. First it is the notion of botho as “a historical 
practice and activity for producing particular kinds” of persons i.e., those who have botho. 
Second, it is the notion of botho as a “contemporary “philosophical practice. In other words, 
“theories and ideologies that attempt to make sense of the pre-colonial lived experience of the 
African people in the secular, global and contemporary” (Molefe 2014: 158, van Binsbergen 
2001: 72). 
In this regard Praeg’s analysis especially the distinction drawn between “Ubuntu” and “ubuntu” 
finds similar expression in van Binsbergen’s (2001: 62) argument regarding “the identity 
between the academic evocation” [of botho] “in the form of philosophy, and the actual value 
orientation informing pre-colonial Southern African village” experiences. The significance of 
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both Praeg and van Binsbergen contribution to current discourse is that unlike most critics, 
they extend their appraisal and critique of botho beyond the traditional boundaries of the 
current discourse. More specifically both frame their argument within an explicitly and primarily 
political framework and re-conceptualisation of the concept, and not just one limited to the 
moral sphere. Both of these cast botho as something evoked to the make sense of the variety 
of dichotomy between the historical practice of the past relating to botho and contemporary 
philosophical practice, and between its utopian invocation of the ideal and its prophetic 
imperatives to the imperfect reality of the present. The reference of botho in connection with 
attempts to make sense of the pre-colonial lived experience of the African people in the 
secular, global and modern environment find resonance with another debate on botho found 
in the discourse, namely narratives of return, which I turn to next.  
3.2.3   Botho as Another Form of the Failed African Narratives of Return 
 
The revival of element of traditional African culture epitomised by the interest in botho in 
current discourse is seen by some as akin to nostalgia that is no more. The enthusiasm around 
this concept is seen as a repeated of failed narratives of return that romanticise element of 
African culture and its social life. Among the reservation therefore coming from this angle 
include those that regard the current botho project as problematic as it only presents on its 
positive light and selectively leaving out some of the not so positive aspects. Botho it is account 
as articulated in current discourse This amount to a presentation of a romantic view of botho 
which “selectively “present only its “bright side” (Mboti 2015), van Binsbergen 2001: 70). 
Among these are voices within the discourse, casting doubt on relevance of botho and 
question the desirability of the revival of such traditional moral ideals as “botho” as a relevant 
ethical framework suitable for today’s complex mobile communities. Here we can mention the 
views expressed by the likes of Matolino and Kwindingwi (2013) and Mboti (2015), just to 
mention a few, as representative of this school of thought. These scholars argue against botho 
revival saying this amount to another form of the failed African narratives of return. For them, 
the success of botho” “depends on undifferentiated, small and tight-knit communities that are 
relatively undeveloped.” They argue that “without the existence of such communities” botho 
merely “becomes only but an appendage to the political desires, wills and manipulations of 
the elite” (2013: 202).  They further argue that such communities are neither non-existent nor 
suited for today’s “complex, multicultural societies that do not prize communality and” self-
identification that is primarily understood in communal terms. Moreover, these scholars also 
questionable if such communities are in the first-place desirable citing their propensity to 
dislike outsiders and intolerance. In view of this, they argue the botho revival must be 
abandoned and its continued appeal is masked by certain Africanist agendas to suit the elite. 
Thus, they conclude that botho is “not well rooted in the ethical experiences of modern people 
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qua moral beings” and as such the whole project they suggest ought to reach its end (2013: 
198).  
 
3.2.4 The Similarity of Botho and Similar Terms in Other Cultures 
 
One of the observations with current botho discourse that is of interest for this study is the 
reference that one often finds in the literature about what are described as “other cognate 
terms and ideas as botho in other African cultures in sub-Saharan Africa with a similar 
meaning” (van Binsbergen 2001: 54). Although this is not presently an issue of debates in the 
current discourse, in this study it is included because I argue that the claim being made is 
accepted too easily without question in the discourse, and this I suggest is a mistake. Typically, 
this manifest itself in the discourse in statements that claim that botho or the concept is found 
in other culture even if in different names. Thus, we see Kamwangamalu (2007: 25) saying 
the concept of botho is also found in many African languages, though not necessarily under 
the same name. Among these are terms likes “‘umundu’ (in Kikuyu, Kenya), ‘umuntu’ (in 
Kimeru, Kenya), ‘bumuntu’ (in kiSukuma and kiHaya, Tanzania), ‘vumuntu’ (in shiTsonga and 
shiTswa, Mozambique), ‘bomoto’ (in Bobangi, Democratic Republic of Congo), and ‘gimuntu’ 
(in kiKongo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in giKwese, Angola)”. Broodryk (2002: 
14) similarly mentions “Nunhu” in Shona, Zimbabwe and “Utu” in Swahili, Kenya as having the 
same or similar meaning as botho.  
But as (Gade 2013: 487) explains it is not always clear if these terms mean the same thing in 
these other languages because 
“firstly, the precise meaning people de facto ascribe to [them] has not been 
sufficiently investigated. … Secondly there is no agreement on what ‘ubuntu’ 
itself means. Therefore, the meaning that some people ascribe to a term 
such as ‘umundu’ may be like the meaning that some people ascribe to 
‘ubuntu,’ and different from the meaning that others ascribe to this term.” 
 
In other words, the presumed common understanding and meaning in these terms including 
botho as claimed by this tendency is not supported by evidence. As van Niekerk (2013: 2) 
explain  
“in the case of ubuntu, however, uncertainty runs somewhat deeper: its 
ambiguous usage and politicised promulgation across cultures which do not 
share all of the same assumptions entail scepticism about its coherence or 
applicability, even in public discourse”. 
 
It is in view of this persistent ambiguities that persist around botho that I argue that in Sesotho 
speaking cultures there is slight but nevertheless important difference between the Sesotho-
Tswana term “botho” and what is regarded as its Zulu equivalent “ubuntu” (Gaie 2002: 277). 
In the former botho is rarely if ever, understood ordinarily in terms of philosophy or worldview 
but in the latter, this is more common. Moreover, in Sesotho speaking culture botho has not 
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incorporate much more readily many of the new descriptions now commonly found with Zulu 
term ubuntu. This explains the preference of the Sesotho term “botho” in this study, which is 
also shared by Mphetolang (2009: 12). This reflects the situation in Sesotho speaking culture 
as opposed to the common ubuntu-botho terminology.  
What is important to realise here, which is the point being made, is that although these different 
terms like botho are found in diverse cultures, they nevertheless have strong local shades of 
meaning and often develop important local nuances of meaning that must not be ignored in 
pursuit of their supposed common meaning. This in most case reflect the values and virtues 
regarded as important in those cultures or communities (Gade 2013). The same is true of 
botho and its Zulu equivalent ubuntu. This means that a concept like botho, will not only have 
a very wide and internally rich meanings that may be common among diverse cultures but that 
such meanings will be selected and emphasised differently in concrete contexts (van 
Binsbergen 2011: 54).  By way of an example in Lesotho, one of the virtues associated with a 
person who has botho is described in terms of the person being “motho oa khotso” (a person 
of peace). But if one surveys the current botho discourse, peace is not often among the top 
attributes or topics discussed in relation to botho. We are more used to harmonious 
relationships, sharing, solidarity and many other personal attributes. But among the Basotho, 
being a good person, (ke motho ea hantle) which is what botho entails is common described 
similar terms as in relation to peace (ke motho oa khotso). Thus, in addition to many of the 
common attributes linked to botho in in Sesotho culture which informs conduct and community 
living, peace is one of the foundations and governing principle that underpins the Basotho way 
of life. It is in this sense that local nuance and context would have shaded Basotho 
understanding of botho in terms what they regarded as important and a priority. Historically 
Basotho are renowned from their founding as nation to today for their prioritisation of peace, 
in way not comparable with their neighbours in Southern African. It follows then that peace 
and qualities of character associated with peace would necessarily find their way into being 
an integral part of the Basotho understanding of botho. This can be seen in the basic Basotho 
greeting “khotso” peace, which to this day is still the common greeting. This may also explain 
why until today Lesotho is often regarded as one of the most peaceful states in Southern 
Africa. 
In other words, the relevance and significance of particular contexts to the meaning of these 
terms that are seen as having the same meaning cannot be underestimated. This is because 
of  the specific selection of nuance of meaning that gets made from “a very wide and internally 
richly textured semantic field” and “a vast area of possibilities and implications” in response to 
the application of such terms in a particular context (van Binsbergen (2001: 54). 
 
3.2.5 Connection of Botho and African Understanding of motho  
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What these debates reveal which is a dimension of these debates, though not explicitly 
reflected in current botho discourse is the idea that botho cannot be fully conceptualised apart 
from discussion about what is a motho (person). In other words, implied in botho is a 
conception of personhood, and this has been articulated best in what is referred in the 
literature as the African notion of personhood, which specifically refers to descriptions of moral 
quality of a “person in the robust sense” i.e., when one consistently acts or behaves in ways 
that are considered morally acceptable (Ikuenobe 2016: 128). Among African scholars none 
articulated this conception of personhood central to African culture and its moral traditions 
better than Menkiti (2004). Here I will only highlight salient elements of Menkiti central 
argument not a full discourse of his view and thoughts on the subject.  
Menkiti’s personhood has been a subject of intense debates in the literature on Africa ethics 
and philosophy, where the key question is about where the priority lies between the community 
and individual. Nowhere, does this this debate plays itself out than in the debate between the 
so called radical and moderate communitarians represented by Menkiti and Gyekye 
respectively (Molefe 2017c: 49). It is not the intention to go into details of this debate here 
because others elsewhere far than any account here would while doing justice to the 
arguments (Molefe 2017A, Molefe 2017C). The first thing to point out is that personhood for 
Menkiti is connected to the community specifically the priority and primacy of the community. 
The second feature and perhaps the most controversial in some circles, is the idea that 
“personhood is the sort of thing which has to be achieved, the sort of thing at which an 
individual could fail. According to this personhood, is like a journey of becoming persons i.e., 
from individual towards personhood, is for Menkiti, laden with the possibility of triumph and 
failure and therefore it is believed, of necessity it stretches beyond the raw capabilities of the 
isolated individual (Menkiti 2004: 326). To illustrate personhood as process of Menkiti’s use 
the transition of a human child into personhood, where this entails moral maturity that come 
only with lived experience enabling an individual to become a possible moral exemplar (Ibid: 
325).  Of necessity therefore the community plays a vital role as catalyst and prescriber of 
norms, a process that results in the transformation of what initially is a biologically given entity 
into full personhood (Menkiti 2004: 326). This conception of the personhood, which implies 
the primacy of the community Menkiti argues is maximalist and goes beyond the minimalist 
notions of individuality centred around presence of consciousness, memory, will, soul, 
rationality, or mental functioning. This is because according to Menkiti the transition into 
personhood required in an individual, entails transforming the individual into a true person and 
married to the notion of a person is the notion of a moral being and a bearer of norms. This 
process of transformation of the individual into a person, since the individual cannot fully 
undergo this process unassisted is the basis for the conclusion that Menkiti makes which is 
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that ‘personhood is the sort of thing which has to be achieved, the sort of thing at which 
individuals could fail (Ibid.; 326). Menkiti’s thesis can thus be summed up in terms of a 
distinction drawn between the ‘individual’ and “individual person” which he argues are not 
interchangeable in the African understanding of the person (Menkiti 2004: 325). Now that we 
have given a brief narration of Menkiti’s argument we can turn some of the notable response 
to this in the literature. As already indicated Gyekye is one of the scholars who has engaged 
this topic substantively.  One of the aspects of this conception of personhood that Gyekye 
objects to strongly is what he regards as the unacceptable position that personhood is 
something defined or conferred by the community and to be acquired by the individual. This 
together with the “hyperbolic and extreme view of the functional and normative status of the 
community” constitute Gyekye central argument (2010: 301). Starting with the question of the 
soundness of the ontological primacy of community Gyekye asks “if a community crucially 
consists of persons sharing interests and values in some sense, wouldn’t this fact establish 
the priority of the individual rather than that of the community, and that therefore the 
community existentially derives from individuals and the relationships that would exist between 
them?”( 2010: 300).  
From this Gyekye goes on to point out the danger with the ontological primacy of the 
community and the corresponding extreme view of its functional and normative status. This 
includes the risks of arriving at wrong conclusion such as overlooking the logic or relevance 
of attributes that can be delineated as belonging to the human person qua person. For Gyekye 
the primacy of the community in the manner that Menkiti suggests exaggerates the normative 
status and power of the cultural community in relation to those of the person. This in turn 
obfuscates our understanding the real nature of the person (p 301). According to Gyekye 
personhood cannot therefore be understood as Menkiti describes because “a human person 
is a person whatever his/her age or social status” and while personhood may reach its full 
realisation in community, it is not acquired or yet to be achieved as one goes along in society”. 
This is because for Gyekye, “one is a person because of what one is, not because of what 
one has acquired” (p 303).  
On the face of it this argument consists of two diametrically opposed notions of personhood 
with no room reconciliation. But whether the positions advanced can converge, that depends 
on how one views this debate. As Molefe (2017b: 3) explains of which this author agrees it 
would appear that here, these scholars are talking past each as they are employing different 
notions of a ‘person’. This is the point of Menkiti distinction between ‘individual’ and ‘individual 
person’ where the former refers to simply “raw appetite levels” and the latter denotes “the 
dignity of the person” (Menkiti 2004: 323). This distinction appears to often be ignored or lost 
whenever this debate arises, and this one with Gyekye appears to be no different. But for 
Menkiti this is of crucial importance and is therefore a vital differentiation in discussion about 
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the African understanding of a person. The former pertains to a person just as a human being, 
which is the aspect that is the focus of Gyekye’s argument. The latter is about the idea of 
personhood understood in terms of moral achievements one gains in a moral arena i.e., a 
human being that has been able to lead a life characterized by moral excellence (Molefe 
2017b: 7). 
In Sesotho culture we find the same differentiation as it will become clear shortly when 
analysing the word motho in Sesotho language. Here it will suffice to point out that in Sesotho 
culture motho is the robust sense reflects the same notion of the normative notion of 
personhood as found in Menkiti as this expression and its related moral term bophoofolo 
shows. Both are explicitly a statement that says something about personhood. Closer attention 
to the ethical imperatives behind both further underscored the primacy of character as the 
essence of moral evaluation of a motho, thus emphasising the indissoluble link of moral 
judgements and the traditional African normative idea of a person (Menkiti 2004, Molefe 
2017B). If we look at ‘ha se motho’ in Sesotho culture, we find that it features predominantly 
whenever judgements of slightly serious moral nature are made in the moral thought and 
practice of the Basotho and in general in the daily par lance in the Sesotho culture. In the 
current botho discourse the interpretation of this statement can sometimes be controversial 
with concerns that it gives an impression of the denial of a person’s humanity. A fuller analysis 
of this expression will be made later in Chapter four when discussion statements expressing 
of lack of botho in a person in Sesotho culture. Here our interest in it is merely to point its 
connection to botho and personhood, as the two are closely connected. The best way to 
explain this is to analyse traditional Basotho understanding and definition of the word motho 
(person) (Molefe 2017a: 219).  
In Sesotho and Setswana group of languages the word motho -person, plural is batho, is 
composed of the prefix “mo-” and the stem “-tho from which the two related moral terms 
setho and botho discussed later derive. This root as found in the Sesotho expression “batho 
ba reng tho” denotes the state of being be truly, genuinely human, and therefore is closely 
linked to “setho” which denotes human nature and humanness in terms of human manners or 
customs (Paroz 1974:39, Chitja n.d: 698).  Anyone familiar with Sesotho language will know 
how ambiguous and opaque the word motho and that its meaning requires careful 
understanding of what is the intended message behind its uses. The word motho can be used 
in two ways in Sesotho language. (Letseka 2013B; 358, Casalis 1861: 320, Gaie 2007: 277). 
It can mean just a human being in general or it can also mean a person as in the individual 
human being. As can be seen the two notions of ‘motho’ as in ‘man’ are closely related but 
not necessarily the same. In Sesotho culture, there is a moral distinction between motho as a 
metaphysical entity or simply as a being that is human and motho as a moral being (Gaie 
2007: 277, Menkiti 2004: 325) i.e., an agent that has admirable qualities of character. Thus, 
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Basotho makes a distinction between ‘motho’ as just a human being and ‘motho’ as referring 
to moral personhood. As Molefe (2017b: 2) explains, the former simply describes a biological 
reality i.e., of “human parentage”, while the latter expresses  
“a normative notion that refers to human beings who are leading truly human 
lives insofar as their lives radiate with moral virtue or excellence. The idea 
of [motho in the latter sense] is a morally commending term; it says one is 
morally praiseworthy.” 
 
Molefe is right here and this is very much how botho should be understood, i.e., an 
assessment of the whole of a person’s life in terms of possessing or deficiency in qualities of 
botho. This means that motho in this latter sense refers to moral personhood, as opposed to 
a person humanity or humanness. It is in terms this its interpretation i.e., as denoting moral 
personhood that motho is an expression of the moral dimension of being human, codified in 
the moral judgement “ha se motho.” This statement as a moral judgement denotes a strong 
moral sanction about lack of good moral character or botho by a person. Explaining a similar 
sanction in Akan language Gyekye (2011: par. 22) points out that “the reason for the judgment 
that an individual is not a person if he behaves or does not behave in a certain way is that the 
individual's actions and behaviour are considered as falling short of the ideals and standards 
of personhood”.  In other words, only an individual judged to have or making satisfactory 
progress in cultivating a character that displays qualities of botho i.e., as one’s characteristic 
way of living, is given the status of being a motho (person). This means they are regarded as 
being a morally worthy human being. What we find in Sesotho, as is the case with other African 
languages is that moral sanction that an individual is not motho is based on a belief 
“that there are certain fundamental norms and ideals to which the conduct of a 
human being, if he is a person ought to conform, that there are moral virtues that 
an individual has the capacity to display in his conduct and ought to display them 
if he is a person” (Ibid., par 22). 
So, what we see here is that “ha se motho” is a moral judgment about a person’s personhood 
or more correctly lack of it and this as we have seen in Sesotho culture is what is understood 
by botho. This focus of ‘ha se motho’ therefore is to express failure of motho to possess botho, 
more specifically to inculcate and intergrade in their character as a moral agent good moral 
quality. This is because in their morality Basotho like most African cultures, the quality of the 
individual's character is most fundamental in our moral life (Gyekye 2011:  par 12). It is in this 
sense that, when considered within the context of the moral language of the Basotho botho is 
always understood in terms of moral character and the cultivation of virtues that botho 
encapsulates 
It is these virtues that a motho must aspire to have and its vices must be avoided becoming 
part of their character. So, we can see here how the questions of moral judgements are always 
about moral character and how in turn these are always intertwined with notions of personhood 
i.e., botho, as encapsulated in the meaning of motho as a moral person denoting expressing 
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a normative idea of a person i.e., moral personhood or human being hood (Gaie 2002: 277). 
Ha se motho therefore is not a statement whose interest is what elements make up a human 
being, but what constitutes personhood i.e., morally praiseworthy way of being a person in the 
way a person lives their lives i.e., in terms of the development of good characters (Molefe 
2017B: 7). So, as a moral judgement “ha se motho” is a statement saying something about 
acts of botho but also more than that. It is a moral evaluation of a person’s life in terms of their 
character as a person overall, not just at a certain time, or a certain period of their life. It 
expresses and denotes that over time i.e., as shown by their character, one has failed to live 
up to those expected standards considered essential in a person to be considered a motho. It 
is therefore not a statement about a person’s humanity or rejection thereof. Rather it is a 
judgement of motho i.e., a human being and their lack of moral progress in the acquisition of 
the moral qualities expected of one who is a motho. This is a status one is given to one in line 
with the way a person has lived their life and continues to do (Gaie 2002). It is for this reason 
that “ha se motho” would be inappropriate to apply to a child because children here are only 
regarded as person’s potential as they are yet to achieve the required level of moral 
personhood (Gyekye 2011: par.25) because this expression is fundamentally about moral 
character and moral personhood, which does not yet apply to children. This understanding of 
personhood in Sesotho culture will be discussed is more detail in chapter when analysing ‘ha 
se motho’ and ‘bophoofolo” in more detail as statement about botho and personhood.  
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to give a full account of the debate about personhood 
presupposed by current botho discourse in manner that would do this justice. What we can 
say though, is that despite current differences among leading scholars on this issue, 
represented by positions of Menkiti and Gyekye, there is agreement on the importance of the 
relationship that obtains between the community and the individual. This is because as 
Gyekye 2010: 29) correctly points out “an individual human being is born into an existing 
human society and, therefore, into a human culture, the latter being a product of the former”. 
Likewise, Menkiti states that the African conceptualisation of the person recognises that every 
individual is distinct from other individuals in their community, and that this is a given fact, a 
brute biological fact (2004: 324).  
The relevance of this to this study and its character centric account of botho is its validation of 
what MacIntyre (1981: 217-218) calls the narrative conception of the selfhood. This an 
understanding of the individual that supports that as an individual  
“I am what may be justifiably be taken by others to be in the course of living 
out a story that runs from my birth to my death. … [and that] I am not only 
accountable, I am one who can always ask others for an account, who can 




In other words, the concession they both make, which endorse the narrative conception of the 
self is significant for this study in two ways. First, I will argue that this shows that the two 
positions they articulate and represent are not as far apart as it may first appear. Second, that 
the primacy of character and its formation that this study advances underscores the 
relationship mutual presupposition the exits between the individual and it is here too that we 
find convergence. In other words, the focus on the reinstatement of character that this study 
is arguing for in the current discourse, must be seen as providing African ethics with curative 
tool towards reconciling these seeming two opposing views. This is because the development 
and formation of character the study advocates, enjoins both the individual and the community 
together as intrinsically interdependent partners with equal roles to play. It is both an 
acknowledgement of the individuality of the individual and the necessity of the community to 
that individuality to be. 
I will therefore argue using the significance of character and its formation as argued in this 
study that here we have sufficient common ground towards a convergence that reconfigures 
this debate where the good of the community and that of the individual redefined in terms of 
both having equal stake in the moral goal of the growth of personal character of the individual, 
as the common goal. This is because the development of character is something done actively 
by both the individual and the community (Richardson 1994: 93). As the experience of Sesotho 
speaking culture that is discussed in this study shows, both two social institutions are essential 
for the moral life and most importantly for character formation and development and concrete 
experience of botho. The community provides and supports motho (individual person) with 
enabling environment to learn and perfect the virtues of botho. In turn the excellence of motho 
in inculcating the values of botho, which forms part of their character and moral identity, gives 
the community the character that it has i.e., a community characterised by acts of botho. When 
viewed from this perspective the tendency to elucidating individuality and the notion of 
personal identity independently of and in isolation from the notions of narrative, intelligibility 
and accountability embedded in the community are bound to fail (MacIntyre (1981: 218). 
A closer look into these debates just discussed above here thus shows that current 
formulations of botho in the discourse can be divided into two categories. On the one hand, is 
the camp of those scholars critical of the current predominating account of this concept and 
questioning some of the basic assumptions underlying botho discourse. On the other camp 
are those scholars with a positive appraisal of botho. Some of the main proponents of botho 
for today’s context fall in this category. Worth mentioning here is Shutte, Metz and Gaie, who 
are among those who have written extensively on the subject. These are among the leading 
voices behind the development of the conventional or Afro-communitarian account of botho in 
the discourse (Molefe 2017C). As shown, this is the predominant formulation of botho and 
therefore deserves closer attention which follows in the section below.  
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This appraisal of the communitarian account of botho that will follow here is against the 
background and in contrast to what I can be called the traditional account of botho. This is the 
account of botho found in much of pre-modern African culture in Southern African. It is thus 
an n an older understanding of this concept than current and it interpreted botho in terms of 
the moral quality and character of the person (Gade 2013: 488, Gade 2011: 308). This 
account, which is agent centred i.e., auto centric places emphasis on the connection between 
botho and motho and is found in its classical form in the moral thought and practice of Basotho 
and much of Sesotho speaking culture. This is account is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
 
3.3  Afro-Communitarianism as the Predominant Interpretation of Botho 
 
Within African ethics and the current botho discourse, the conventional or afro-communitarian 
account (AC) of botho is still the most predominant account of the concept in the literature on 
botho defining the concept in communal relationship terms. It is an interpretation or 
understanding of botho that is wedded to the proverb motho ke motho ka batho ba bang 
(MKKB) loosely translated “a human being is a human being through other human beings 
(Hailey 2008: 9). It often features together its Zulu variant umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu and 
the phrase “I am because we are” where its primary interpretation is linked to personhood and 
identity and is commonly take to mean “a person is a person through other person”. According 
to AC the phrase also carries an important normative connotation linked to personhood, 
identity and humanness15 (Metz and Gaie 2010: 274). It must be point out from the outset 
although both translations are correct although in the discourse the proverb is translated 
almost exclusively in terms of the latter. It must be stressed that this invention i.e., linking to 
this proverb and botho, has led to a preference for one translation of this proverb where the 
word ‘motho’ in this proverb is translated exclusively as ‘person’ without any evidence 
 
15 It is worth noting that in Sesotho speaking cultures there is no evidence of this usage where botho and the 
proverb motho ke motho have this relationship of mutual presupposition that the current discourse has invented. 
This can be seen among the Basotho where this is traceable, as far back as at the time of first missionaries in 
Lesotho (Casalis 1861: 322) when much of the life and customs of the Basotho began to be committed into writing. 
Likewise, Sekese 1994: 54) writing much later makes no such reference as well. This is important in view of Gade’s 
(2011) observation that the association of the two, at least in South Africa in its written debut is a  recent 
development (van Niekerk 2013:4) and in a context where people were kept apart for decades this con-joining of 
the two appears to be driven more by the unique post 1994 “rainbow nation” desire for  building of one nation, 
hence the emphasis on “common humanity” formulation.  
In evoking this proverb here is also worth noting that the claim by AC that this proverb is “a good starting point for 
understanding sub-Saharan morality or the major strand of it” is arguable (Metz and Gaie 2010: 274). This is 
because it could be equally argued that in fact a good starting point to such an understanding is the primacy of 
love for all human being unconditionally. In Sesotho speaking culture this is expressed in the proverb “motho ha 
se ntja ha a lahloe’ is Sesotho (A person is not a dog that can just be thrown away), In seTswana they say “Motho 
gaa latlhwe” (a human being should never be thrown away). In these proverbs I will argue is an expression of 
profoundly sub-Saharan morality and its intense consciousness of the sacredness of a human being or of humanity 
implied in botho, than ‘motho ke motho ka batho’. This further substantiates the argument of this study for the 
respect of the unity of proverbs in their use not in isolation enrich current understanding of the values and virtues 
enshrined in botho. 
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advanced for such preference. I say invention because from the perspective of Sesotho 
culture there is no evidence that support this connection of botho to this proverb.  
But as anyone familiar with the Sesotho language will know this is not the only translation that 
can be made in view of the opaqueness of the word motho in Sesotho language. The proverb 
can be translated also where motho is translated as human being.  As it is clear the English 
terms ‘human being’ and ‘person’ do not mean the same thing, and I will argue that the choice 
of the latter can be explained in part by the desire of leading proponents of botho to link this 
concept with botho, which denotes personhood. This will be discussed in detail later when 
examining this proverb in detail and its abstraction from other proverbs and Sesotho narratives 
in section 3.5.  For now, it will suffice to point out that the less common translation adds a 
slightly different shade of meaning expressing mere social nature of motho.  
As a definition of botho Afro-communitarian account (AC), is defined primarily in communal 
terms, i.e., harmonious relationships as opposed to individual personal terms about the moral 
agent. AC is an account in which often without any justification proffered, MKKB is advanced 
as integral to the definition and understanding of what is botho and as the encapsulation of 
the totality of what botho entails (van Niekerk 2013: 4). The implication here is that the 
meaning of this proverb is the same as what the concept botho means. This I argue is 
incorrect. Another feature of AC and its interpretation of MKKB is the centrality of the notion 
of self-realisation (Metz and Gaie 2010: 275) and the corresponding indirect claim that this is 
the essence of what botho as central idea of African ethics entails. This can be seen in the 
consensus among many thinkers that regard MKKB as call for self-realisation of the agent to 
develop her personhood” (Metz 2007: 331).  
It must, however, be noted that in Sesotho speaking culture there is no equivalent moral term 
to the notion of self-realisation in their moral language. As such an interpretation of MKKB in 
terms of this idea is not only foreign to traditional thought and wisdom but be would alien to a 
Mosotho person familiar with the ethical imperatives of botho. Thus, it is arguable if, even what 
it denotes, is congruent with traditional African moral thought, which is often concerned with 
being a good person. It would therefore be interesting to understand find what evidence if any, 
is there within African culture to support this interpretation or something like it that is 
associated with botho.  
It will be realised that although as a moral concept botho has been the subject of much 
research (Letseka 2013A: 337, Mboti 2015:127) theorising of this concept has remained firmed 
tied to various formulations of AC and its interpretations of MKKB. So, despite the huge body 
of work on botho the settled definition of choice always boils down to this account and does 
not seem to go beyond the conventional parameters set around “motho ke motho ka batho.” 
Along with this one also sees in the discourse an appeal to other communally oriented 
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statements or variations of other similar phrases like “I am because we are” (Mboti 2015: 125), 
as further evidence of the validity of AC-MKKB definition of botho.  
This exceptionalism and over-reliance on MKKB are puzzling considering the renewed and 
deeper understanding and awareness of the African culture and the vast collection of proverbs 
and adages with similar meaning to MKKB. This rich treasure embedded in African oral 
literature and African indigenous knowledge and wisdom offers botho scholars a rich deposit 
of sources and material with which to articulate and depict the depth of insights and truths 
contained in botho. Yet ethical reflection on this concept is still stubbornly wedded to this 
doubtful account.  
A closer analysis of the usage of the term botho in Sesotho culture and other cultures of 
communities in Southern African however show that AC is recent development, which the 
context of South Africa, its appearance can be traced to the period between 1993 and 1995. 
According to Gade (2011: 313) it is around this time that various scholars begin to all link 
botho explicitly with MKKB and various versions its English translation. In other words, within 
a just a few years, MKKB became the dominant explanation offered to describe botho. As a 
result of this, we see a rapid development in the discourse where the way botho is deployed 
i.e., as a tool for advancing reconciliation (van Binsbergen 2001: 64) becomes inseparable 
with a particular interpretation of MKKB,  with an important new emphasis on harmonious 
relationships between people and sharing of common humanity as key to its definition. We 
can thus see here how the relational communitarian leanings of MKKB become the central 
thrust of AC from here onwards. Thus, we find during this period an articulation of botho, which 
is increasingly relational in character and tone. Explaining this development in South Africa 
van Niekerk (2013: 3) says the rich set of connotations associated with botho,  
“came to prominence in the post-apartheid moment…[where] ubuntu 
emerged as an increasingly common politicised term associated with the 
multi-racial “nation-building” project16 in South Africa, gaining both attention 
and (to some extent) elaboration in a multi-cultural context beyond its 
cultural origins”. 
 
The refence to ‘cultural origins” of botho and its elaboration to support nation building agenda 
made here is revealing. This further supports the view that the botho-MKKB connection may 
be explained in terms of the authorial ideology of early proponents of botho in South Africa, 
many of whom would have been supporters of the nation building and reconciliation agenda 
of their time. Either way what is clear is that, not only is the prevailing understanding that 
 
16 The idea of a nation building project appears to be the most plausible explanation behind two key developments 
around botho which are characteristic of the conventional account and discourse particularly as it unfolded in South 
Africa. First it would seem to offer an explanation of (a) how and why a connection between the proverb motho ke 
motho ka batho and botho became necessary (Gade 2011) and (b) why a particular rendering of botho denoting 
humanity as opposed to moral quality of a person for example became the preferred formulation and predominant 
one with a strong emphasis on “common humanity”. This background makes intelligible a view expressed by Praeg 
in Molefe (2014:158) that talk of botho is never just a conceptual issue but also a way of conducting politics.   
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MKKB de facto is the encapsulation of botho reinforced and popularised, it now becomes the 
standard description of botho in the discourse. This results in MKKB getting a new star status 
among African proverbs, a status which in Sesotho speaking culture it does not have. In the 
literature, AC is still the most dominant account and is regarded as the quintessential 
formulation of botho and among its most cited descriptions in the literature include Metz’s 
(2007) definition and that of that of Tutu in (Mboti 2015: 127).  
Among leading academics none is as significant for popularisation of AC as Shutte, who has 
written extensively on the subject. According to Shutte, “the key insight that is the foundation 
of ethics of” botho is the idea that “persons depend on persons to be persons” (Shutte 2001: 
25). Shutte takes this to be an expression of traditional African thinking about humanity and 
argues that this is the heart of the African idea of community and claims this is the idea that is 
summed up by MKKB17. It is not hard to see why the roots of AC can be attributed to Shuttle 
to his first book Philosophy for Africa Gade (2011: 313-4). According to Gade the publication 
of this book is 
“an important part of the reason for why ubuntu came to be identified as something, 
which relates to the proverb ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu. … and [it] was the first 
book in English to explore the identity belief in the proverb” (Ibid.). 
 
From this point onwards, a formulation that had been prevalent in the public discourse now 
becomes part of mainstream intellectual discourse and would dominate the literature on botho 
in African ethics ever since. Thus, critics and adherents of botho alike would forever now base 
their arguments and theories on the botho-MKKB connection. This became the standard and 
accepted point of departure from with we see scholars repeating this connection (Mabovula 
2011: 40, Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 65.  
It is therefore not an overstatement to say that Shutte’s book did not only contribute in 
popularising MKKB as the definition of botho, it became instrumental in reinforcing this 
definition within the academia. It can therefore be argued that the formulation of botho in which 
MKKB becomes the formal definition of this concept and the two become almost inseparable 
was thus formally set up from this point onwards. Philosophy for Africa and the articulation of 
botho the book promotes has since been widely quoted in the literature as an authoritative 
definition of botho (Gade 2011: 313-315). This may explain in part why since then MKKB has 
remained the only proverb used with such consistency and prominence in discussions about 
botho. This formulation has had a huge influence on the current discourse and understanding 
of botho, and together with Shutte’s synthesis have become the standard rendition of what 
botho means in the literature. Besides Shutte another important figure and a leading scholar 
 
17 The use of the word “humanity” here to describe an African idea appears to be Shutte’s reading into African 
moral ideas, a universalist view because humanity (Shutte 2001: 9) is an abstract universal concept in orientation 
as it refers to humankind universally (Dolamo 2013: 2). It is arguable that such a reading is congruent with traditional 
thought, and the “context-sensitive universalism” Bujo (2001: 8) characteristic of morality in African culture. 
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of botho whose work has played a huge role in the emergence and dominance of AC account 
and significantly shaped the direction and tone of current botho discourse is Thaddeus Metz. 
Metz’s (2007) pioneering work exploring a wide range of areas of interest around botho; 
including botho as an African moral theory or moral status (2011), as a philosophy of social 
protection (2016), and other more recent works of his not mentioned here, can thus be 
regarded as the grounding that set the tone of the current vibrancy of debates around botho. 
Evidence of Metz’s prolific and unparalleled work on the ethics of botho, includes the wide 
range of response to his works in the literature which includes Ramose (2007), Matolino and 
Kwindingwi (2013), Koenane and Olatunji (2017), van Niekerk 2013), just to mention a few. 
Metz’s contribution is one that many friends of botho welcome and take as challenge. Of the 
current scholars of botho, Metz and Shutte are regarded as among the leading exponents of 
AC account of botho.  
As we intimated although AC’s communal formulation of botho is the most prevalent account 
of botho currently found in the literature, there is another formulation of botho, that express 
the personal agent centre articulation of its imperative, which are explained in terms of 
admirable character of the person. This begins of this account which equally justifiable, are 
discussed in the section below 
3.4  Definitions of Botho Foreshadowing Current Descriptions of Botho   
 
The ongoing botho discourse together with the volume of material being produced on botho 
means that often our attention is focused only on the current debates. This means often we 
do not take time to step back from the heat of the debates, to gain a broader and better 
perspective. It is partly this constant production of new material on the subject that there has 
not been an adequate systematic historical reflection on the meaning of botho, including as   
its articulation as ethic of virtue in the case of Sesotho speaking culture. Such a distant 
perspective enables analysis of the historical usage of the term and any changes and evolution 
in meaning, understanding and interpretation to be seen. In turn this makes for a better 
appraisal of current discourse and its interpretation of the concept where its contemporary 
meanings and understanding can be put side by side and analysed with other meanings of 
the concept and a better understanding of current uses is made. 
One of the scholars, who has applied this type of approach to botho is Gade (2011, 2013) 






(A) botho defined in terms of human quality. 
(B) botho defined in terms of a philosophy or an 
ethic. 
(C) botho defined in terms of African humanism. 
(D) botho defined in terms of a worldview. 
(E) botho was defined in terms of “motho ke motho  
 
 







Gade’s analysis (2011: 316-318) categorises common ways in which botho is described in the 
literature tracing the historical usage of the term from 1846 to the present. According to this 
study prior to the 90s botho is understood as the moral quality of a person. But  after this 
period we begin to see a noticeable shift where botho is progressively connected to other 
concepts foreshadowing the current dominant views including descriptions of botho as a 
philosophy, an ethic, African humanism and as worldview (Gade 2011: 303). The current 
predominant account of botho grounded on MKKB must therefore be seen as part of this 
evolutionary process in the meaning of botho.  A closer look of the main formulations of botho 
from Gade’s study, gives us two main categories. On the one hand, there is the older idea in 
which botho is characterized as ‘moral quality of a person’. Reiterating this historical usage 
Gade (201: 316) states that the term “appears to, almost exclusively, refer to a human quality 
in texts published prior to 1980 [and] up to the present day, a number of authors have 
continued to identify ubuntu as a human quality”. On the other hand, there is more recent 
formulations defining botho in terms of a phenomenon with emphasis on interconnectedness 
of persons” (Ibid: 488-498). Describing this, van Niekerk (2013: 2) points out that it is however 
peppered with “question begging terms such as African worldview, botho as a philosophy, or 
as humanism or even as a value system”.  
These two basic approaches, which will be referred to as quality and phenomenon accounts 
respectively form the background forming the core of the basic assumptions underlying and 
underpinning current debates. As such they are useful in making intelligible the multiplicity of 
formulations and descriptions of botho that we find in the literature. They are also useful as 
tools for analysis to gain a better insight into the variety of positions and divergence of views 
articulated by different scholars in current botho discourse. This study has enabled the 
identification common descriptions of botho and of key changes in the usage and 
interpretation of the concept including within current botho discourse, in the epoch before 
current debates. We can see what ideas are shared in the arguments and can find the 
emerging pattern of main ideas and views associated with botho in the discourse. This, in turn, 
supplies a more holistic insight into the nature of botho and what it means, unlike current 
conflicting arguments and counter arguments (Metz. 2014, Koenane and & Olatunji 2017, 
Ramose 2007).  
The first observation about the importance of Gade’s analysis to current discourse is that it 
has already shown how lack of consensus and common definition of botho in current discourse 
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means this is a recent development. This is because Gade’s analysis shows that botho was 
not always understood in such a variety of ways as we are seeing today (Gade 2013: 488). 
This raises interesting questions for current discourse including what is the reason for 
difference in terms of consensus, between the use and meaning of this concept now post 
1980s and its usage prior to this? The second observation is that general agreement seen 
prior to the 1980s about botho. This centred around descriptions of botho where it refers to 
certain human or the moral qualities of a person (Gade 2013: 488, Gade 2011: 308). Gade’s 
study further highlights the problems with the ahistorical approach to the analysis of this 
concept in current botho scholarship. This in turn undermines particularity and unique settings 
in which botho as a moral ideal derives and thrived18. These local and contextual nuances of 
meaning and application of botho, are not sociologically and ethically incidentals, that can 
simply be discard to the periphery as irrelevant, in pursuit of a pure ethic of botho whose key 
features are shrouded in universal notions of common and shared “humanity.” As a result of 
this approach, the Zulu people’s story of “ubuntu” and understanding as told through their 
moral tradition is treated as no different from King Moshoeshoe of Lesotho and his people and 
their experience of what is botho, as narrated in their grant narrative as Basotho people as 
handed down in their moral traditional from generation to generation.  
In the case of Sesotho speaking cultures, that story revolves around the idea of botho as 
essentially a statement about the moral character of a person. This understanding as we have 
seen, is in line with the older meaning found between 1846 and 1980 where botho exclusively 
described the moral quality of a person. This understanding is confirmed in Setiloane 
(1978:36), who points out that when we speak of botho, we also must understand that it, 
ubuntu (Zulu), botho (Sotho-Tswana) or ubuntungushi (Bemba) is a concept much deeper 
than the European word "person" or "personality" as it means “the very essence of being, the 
equivalent of "the soul" in Western Christian language”.  Here one can see from one of the 
earlier uses how this description of the concept already differs with recent accounts, which 
defines botho in terms of imputed interpretations of MKKB to this concept.  
 
 3.4.1  Definitions and Descriptions of Botho as a Phenomenon  
 
A quick survey of the literature shows that the differing formulations and views about botho in 
the current discourse can be grouped under the phenomenon account and as such this feature 
prominently literature19. It features typically in the tendency where statements are made about 
 
18 Van Nierkerk (2013: x) recognised this by pointing out the importance of how fluency in the ingenious languages 
associated with botho, authentic membership in a culture whose traditions espouse botho and personal experience 
of the authentic cultural milieu theorists in articulating botho, are all undeniably asset in current botho discourses. 
19 For an overview of various descriptions of botho that fall within this domain see Hailey 2008.  
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botho e.g. as a philosophy20, worldview or humanism (Kamwangamalu 2007: 26, Khoza 1994, 
Broodryk 2006:17) without any explanation of what is meant (Gade 2011: 317). If we take 
philosophy for instance, it is often not clear in what way botho can be regarded in that context 
as such a philosophy and what type of philosophy is being envisioned (Gade 2013: 488 and 
492). The kind of explanation one would expect we see for example with Metz’s (2016:3) 
“Philosophies of social protection”. Here Metz explains that the analysis is of botho as a 
philosophy of social protection and goes to explain this. An assertion is not simply made 
without justification or explanation.  Another term used in a similar manner is humanism 
(Khoza 1994) or humanity. Like other similar terms, it too is just said as a description of botho 
without further elaboration (Kamwangamalu 2007: 26, Broodryk 2006: 21). The same 
tendency can be seen with worldview. Here botho is described as a comprehensive ancient 
African worldview based on intense values of humanness (Broodryk 2006: 22-33). Shutte 
(2001: 21) also refers to worldview in explaining botho saying that “to get inside the idea of 
[botho], one must understand the world-view and the view of the person in which [botho] has 
its roots”. However, Shutte’s most notable description of choice for botho is in terms of it as 
an ethics (2001; 51). Together with the other scholars including Mkhize (2008) and Metz 
(2007) fall into that growing school of thought that defines botho as an ethic.  
What we are seeing here is that the hegemony of the conventional account has defined botho 
in a way that a choice of certain key terms e.g. philosophy, worldview and humanism or 
humanity appear as preferred descriptions of choice for botho. Like the application of MKKB 
in the discourse, these terms enjoy a star status position, where they the established 
conventional definitions of botho. These different formulations are not to be regarded as 
separate and independent accounts of botho as often they are interlinked and imply one 
another.  
For the purposes of this section what binds these together is that they do not defined botho 
as a description of the moral quality of a person (motho) and the moral character of persons 
(batho), which is the focus of the next section that I now turn to. 
 
3.4.2  Descriptions of Botho in Terms of Admirable Character  
 
In the earlier section, we have intimated that the current dominant descriptions of botho are a 
recent development. We implied that this is not how historically botho is understood and in 
turn articulated. This peculiarity i.e., between the older understanding and usage of the term 
 
20 van Binsbergen (2001: 69) is one of the scholars highly critical of this formulation questioning its legitimacy by 
arguing that what is presented “as the Southern African indigenous philosophy of [botho] amounts to a rendering 
…… of ideas that are certainly implied in Southern African village practices and ideas but that exist there under 
different, much more diffuse and situationally varying, linguistic formats”. He thus concludes that botho in the “sense 
of the conceptual complex which modern exponents of philosophy claim to exist around that term, is at best a 
transformative rendering, in a globally mediated, analytical language, of vernacular practices and concepts which 
are very far from having a one-to-one linguistic correspondence with the phraseology of philosophy”.  
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and its newer more recent interpretations is reflected in how differently botho is understood in 
Sesotho speaking culture compared to the current dominant understanding of the concept in 
the discourse. The Sesotho-Tswana concept “botho,” has tended to keep the older more 
traditional understanding of this concept i.e., as a moral quality of the person (Mphetolang 
2009:12). By contrast, its equivalent terms e.g. ubuntu in other Nguni languages in South 
Africa and parts of Zimbabwe have progressively incorporated much more and readily many 
of the recent and newer definitions.  
Explaining this difference Mphetolang (2009: 12) argues that unlike botho, the term ubuntu 
has “been turned more into a philosophy” and as a result of this it has, hence losing its very 
core as a way of life and not a worldview”. Gaie (2002: 277) imply that the terms are not the 
same saying that botho “is somehow similar” or that it seems “to reflect” Ubuntu. It therefore 
seems that even though the two terms are now widely regarded as having the same meaning 
in the literature, some scholars still draw a distinction. In Sesotho speaking cultures, botho is 
still predominantly understood as a description of moral character of motho. As we have seen 
this formulation has been lost in the more modern interpretations of botho now prevalent in 
the current discourse. This entry underscores this older understanding of botho as moral 
quality of person arguing that this is a more authentic understanding and application of this 
concept and it’s implied in the opposite idea of bophoofolo (Gade 2013: 488, Mphetolang 
2009: 13).  
Although this tradition is forgotten, it is certainly not dead as fragments of this tradition can still 
be found in many ways in contemporary moral discourse and ethical reflection. For example, 
Shutte in his explanation of botho in terms of humanity in Gade (2011: 314), states that botho 
must be “understood as a moral notion referring to overall quality of character, or attitude or 
behaviour or way of life”. Likewise, Broodryk (2006: 23) highlights the significance of character 
to who we are as moral agents, saying that while our character and everything that we are as 
agents is determined and influenced by our worldview, in turn our characters as moral agents 
is indicative of the worldview we subscribe to. So here we have instances where the relevance 
and significance of character as moral quality of person is underscored as not only significant 
but essential to an understanding of what it means to have botho, and yet this idea is not 
developed any further.  These examples I will argue are representative of the tendency of 
current botho discourse vis-à-vis botho as a description of the moral quality of a person. That 
tendency often manifests itself where scholars show no interest in the glaring necessity for an 
understanding of botho that is grounded on the primacy of character. This is possible due to 
the influence of prevailing dominant account of botho, itself heavily influence by modern 
Western ethics, which as pointed in chapter two has relegated character to the periphery of 
ethical discourse. Another manifestation of this tendency is found in current discussions about 
botho and personhood, where reference to the inculcation of “makhabane” i.e., moral virtues 
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(Letseka 2013A: 340) is often at the centre. As Letseka correctly points out in Sesotho 
‘makhabane’ denotes, morally admirable inner moral qualities of a person and these are 
qualities of character. And yet here too this dimension is only mentioned in passing and 
skipped over as though it is not the heart of the discourse on the nature and meaning of botho.  
Nowhere in the current discourse does this older tradition that describe botho in terms of moral 
character confront current discourse with such uncompromising force as in the classic 
Sesotho moral statement about personhood i.e., what it means to be a motho (person) in 
namely the statement “ha se motho” (ea nang le botho) - is not a person (who has botho) 
(Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009:71) and the corresponding moral term ‘bophoofolo’ (beastly)  as 
found in the moral language of Basotho. The discombobulating confusion of the unintelligibility 
of this statement to modern discourse, and the inability to grasp its function has given rise to 
all sorts of arguments in the literature, about what this phrase means, including whether both 
are a denial of one’s humanity and humanness or not? As it will become evident this moral 
term and this statement have less to do with articulating an account about humanity and 
humanness of individuals, and more to do with a moral statement and assessment of a 
person’s lack of qualities of botho which enable one to attain moral personhood, i.e., botho 
(Molefe 2017A , cf. Menkiti 2004). I will argue that here we find in the most concise way an 
explicit articulation of traditional formulation of botho as the moral quality of a person, 
expressed in terms of a shortcoming or failings. It is a judgement of motho focusing on 
character i.e., as not having the required makhabane (virtues) or admirable qualities of 
character befitting one who is a motho - person. And yet this important dimension and 
understanding of botho, is yet to find much support in the current botho discourse and is still 
largely ignored.  
But more importantly for the current botho discourse this rendering of botho is the more 
authentic formulation to how the concept was understood and applied for decades in Southern 
Africa. As Gade’s points out this interpretation was the most prevalent understanding of botho 
traceable to the early 1800s where botho is something describing moral quality of the person 
and their character (2011: 308, 2013: 488) and this is always linked of personhood. What this 
shows is that as a moral statement about the moral character of a person, botho always 
implies the potential for failure to live up to dictates of botho. That means along with virtues, 
botho must be understood in terms of the vices which are primarily defined in terms of total 
failure to live up to the expected standards of botho. In addition, botho is always conceived in 
terms of becoming motho (person) or failure to progress or make enough progress towards 
this goal. In Sesotho speaking culture this failure is summed in the expression “ha se motho” 
(he or she is not a person) (Mphetolang 2009: 18,  Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 71) and the 
significance of this to the account of botho I am endorsing here we have already outlined.  
 100 
Now that we have looked at the debates and prevailing approaches to botho in terms of 
common descriptions and interpretation, we are in position to critically analyse these, with 
reference to the Afro-communitarian (AC) formulation of botho, which is the still the most 
dominant articulation of botho in the literature.   
3.5  Critique and Appraisal of Current Interpretations and Ideas About Botho  
 
There are many ways in which the current botho discourse can be appraised, one of which is 
by recognising and acknowledging the focus of current discourse on the subject matter at 
hand. The other is the context, specifically, the role of key participants in the discourse and 
their authorial ideologies. In other words, as well as the message, the personality of the 
messenger and their intentions are relevant to the discourse. It is therefore important that as 
well as analysing what the revival of values of botho for contemporary contexts including in 
Southern African entails, we pay attention to, and be mindful of the significance of the context 
in which this exercise is taking place. In the context of current botho discourse, this is 
particularly pertinent due to the impact of this on the tone and character of the conversation. 
One of the noticeable aspects of this context is the role and influence the authoritative voices 
and opinion shapers leading the direction of botho industry.  
Describing these key players van Binsbergen (2001: 70) says they are largely “self-proclaimed 
experts on” botho, and a “globally informed” elite group of “Southern African” intellectuals, with 
little or no connection in terms of “place and social practice” with “the emic expressions” of 
botho “at the village level which they seek to capture”. To this can be added Gade’s (2012: 
486) telling observation about the under representation of African voices at the table of this 
discourse and over representation of scholars “who are not of African descent.”  In view of this 
and to fully appreciate and understand the nature of the current discourse it is therefore 
important to recognise the underlying authorial ideologies of many of these key participants. 
This is because the discourse is not immune to the ideologically held views and assumptions 
of its key players, in this case leading exponents of botho. First, as we have noted in Southern 
Africa there is this peculiar and discomforting reality that the academic discussion on botho is 
still largely dominated by views and voices of non-Africans. This is not to say these views have 
no place nor contribution to make. But it is an acknowledgement that such views will always 
lack that insight and knowledge, that comes with native knowledge of one who belongs to a 
culture whose moral traditions are the proper setting and context in which botho finds its 
definition and moral force (Letseka 2013A: 338; van Niekerk 2013: x). This is because botho 
is part of indigenous African knowledge system and the embeddedness nature of this 
knowledge means the “local specialist knowledge in the day to day physical and social 
environment of the” African “community”  (van Binsbergen 2001: 69) is crucial to unpacking 
its insights as reflected in the ethical ideal of botho.  Second, it is important to recognize the 
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context within which botho “became an object of particular interest” in different part of Southern 
Africa. In Zimbabwe and South Africa for example this was “the political periods of transition 
from white minority rule to black African majority rule (Gade 2011: 303, van Niekerk 2013: 3; 
van Binsbergen 2001: 53). Thus, as van Binsbergen rightly points out, botho “has been 
explored as a workable philosophical concept in the context of majority rule in South Africa 
and Zimbabwe. This may help to explain and understand the observation made by 
Kamwangamalu (2007: 35) that  
“South Africa is perhaps the only country in Africa where [botho] is so much 
talked about......In other African countries, however, [botho] is the norm, it is 
felt, it is practiced and reflected in the daily behaviour of the members of a 
community”. 
 
In the light of this, it is important to understand the social environment and the role this had on 
key players, because it is not inconceivable that the imperatives of nation-building prevailing 
in society would not have influenced their thinking as well and as such this became one of key 
drivers of influence on the discourse and botho discourse led the way.  It must also be asked 
how much is the neglect of the understanding of botho in terms of the moral quality of a person 
and character, a consequence of the influence of the ideological considerations of nation-
building and reconciliation espoused by leading botho scholars? This is even more so when 
one considers arguments made in the discourse in which some have insisted that talk of botho 
is always political and that botho discourse is always deeply embroiled in political 
considerations. As Praeg in Molefe (2014: 158) explains botho is never simply an intellectual 
investigation limited to the conceptual level but is also “a political act and” the responsibility of 
scholars of botho is “in recognizing this priority of the political”. In other words, to what extent 
can the predominant over emphasis of communitarian relational formulation of botho, be 
attributable to the authorial ideology of botho scholars. In the explanation of the significance 
of the strong interdependency formulation of botho in South Africa, Oduor (2014: 86) argues 
the same point that the currency of Ubuntu in public discourse is connected to the loss of 
ideological momentum by other ideological alternatives to capitalism. According to Oduor 
there is nothing unique about ubuntu because it is simply an expression of an altruistic position 
in response to the tension, found in any modern society, between altruism and individualism.” 
The current Afro-communitarian reading of botho is therefore of particular interest in this 
regard. This is because when we look at Sesotho speaking cultures, AC has not found traction 
in the public discourse, unlike in South Africa and Zimbabwe. It suggests there is no prima 
facie evidence of a connection between the socio-political influence at play in the societies 
and the emergence and prominence of AC (Gade (2011, 2012). In these societies, this 
concept is still understood as a description of moral character of a person. This can be seen 
in the moral language of Basotho where moral behavior is described in terms of whether or 
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not one has a good character, using words like ‘mekhoa’, ‘lokileng’ or ‘boitśoaro’, all of which 
denote good character or good behavior” (Gyekye 2011: par.10).   
It would therefore appear that the hegemony the AC, as found in the present, primarily South 
African botho industry, reflects the authorial ideology of scholars of botho and the socio-
political considerations of nation-building and reconciliation (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013: 
199). This, in turn, has led to the emphasis in current botho discourse on the theme of 
‘common humanity’ and ‘harmonious relationship. It may also explain lack of interest on the 
more personal dimensions of botho in terms of a character-centric account of botho. In so 
doing AC has thus unwittingly undervalued the personal dimensions of botho, whose tangible 
primary location is the individual motho, specifically the moral character of the individual 
person i.e., motho. In other, words we cannot understand the communal and relational 
imperatives of botho without first articulating its personal imperatives, in terms of the question 
“what is a motho” and its relationship to botho. The latter is the essential quality qualifying the 
former as satisfying the expected requirement for personhood. But at the same time, the 
possession and experience of botho in a person who has it has a communal effect. It radiates 
outwards in a complex network of social relationship from the most intimate at the level of 
family and relatives (lelapa/leloko), to the village (motse) or community one belongs to and 
others not belonging to one’s own community such as “baeti” travelers or visitors and even 
“strangers” are incorporated.  
 
3.5.1  Afro-Communitarianism and its Definition of Botho   
 
We have already touched on aspects of the communitarian or relational account of botho 
earlier. Here I will only highlight some of its major features as articulated by its proponents in 
the literature using an ordinary understanding of ethics and how it is defined using this as an 
entry point. According to Gyekye (2011: par. 1) the ethics of a society or the norms and 
standards of conduct of society are 
“embedded in the ideas and beliefs about what is right or wrong, what is a 
good or bad character; it is also embedded in the conceptions of satisfactory 
social relations and attitudes held by the members of the society; it is 
embedded, furthermore, in the forms or patterns of behaviour that are 
considered by the members of the society to bring about social harmony and 
cooperative living” . 
 
The current botho discourse has tended to focus exclusively on the communal relations and 
social harmony part. This view is supported by the over reliance to interpret botho in terms of 
the proverb MKKB. In turn, this proverb has a privileged status where it is regarded as the 
quintessential expression of African communalism (Metz 2012). Here MKKB is used as a 
catch-all distillation of botho, leading to established uniformity now common in the literature 
(Mboti 2015: 126).  As explained earlier, Shutte is the first scholar to have used and 
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popularised MKKB in connection with botho. As Gade (2011: 314) explains it is in the new 
foreword to the American edition of the book Philosophy for Africa, that Shutte introducing the 
book as about  botho, says central to the book 
“is the conception of humanity embodied in the traditional African proverb 
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person through persons). This 
understanding of human nature has its counterpart in the moral sphere in 
the idea of ubuntu. In English, this is equivalent to humanity, understood 
as a moral notion referring to the general quality of character, or attitude or 
behaviour or way of life.” 
 
Shutte’s explanation here is both interesting and intriguing. In one paragraph he manages to 
make but two significant conceptual leaps of thought. The first involves connecting “humanity” 
a highly abstract and universal concept to the meaning of MKKB transforming this proverb into 
an African philosophical statement about humanity. This is not the traditional interpretation of 
this proverb. The message of MKKB and similar proverbs is mutual care and sharing and 
communal solidarity (Ramose 2009: 312). The problem with interpreting this proverb as a 
statement about humanity is that the term is extremely wide and universal in orientation. By 
contrast, I will argue that while the truths claim and experience of MKKB can find resonance 
in other moral terrains of other cultures, its primary context as found in its cultural origins and 
social setting in Sesotho culture, is the local and concrete, not the universal and abstract. The 
second leap follows from the first. Having created this invention Shutte now link this to botho. 
The results an interpretation of botho that is firmly grounded in MKKB along with its implied 
references to “humanity” and in turn other related terms e.g., humanness or humaneness. But 
as can be seen, the meaning of these ideas i.e., humanity, MKKB, and botho have no linear 
relationship. These technical terms and definitions i.e., humanity as an expression of 
universality of our humanness, that have now been added here, stands in sharp contrast to 
ordinary usage of MKKB and botho “as a matter of course, and accepted parlance, in 
traditional Sesotho culture. What is important here is that Shutte’s explanation follows a 
familiar pattern observable in the literature. In most cases, without justification, a set of 
connotations is simply associated with botho, and then scholars “proceed to forward MKKB 
stating that this as an encapsulation of botho” (van Niekerk 2013: 4). This is the case here 
with Shutte and the use of MKKB.  
The significance of Shutte’s synthesis to current botho discourse must not be underestimated 
because it is behind the influence and popularisation of MKKB as a way of defining botho that 
we see in South Africa from around 1995. Thus, we see that from around this time “a 
preferential consensus of sorts grew and accreted around the” appeal to MKKB to describe 
botho (Mboti 2015: 126). This has since become characteristic way to defined botho in the 
discourse and this definition is now the standard Afro-communitarian account botho 
“irrespective of whether” one defines botho as “a human quality, African humanism, a 
philosophy, an ethic, or a worldview” (Gade 2011: 303). So, we find Metz (2007: 323) relying 
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on this same understanding saying that the central idea implied in botho i.e., “that one’s 
identity as a human being” depends on a community often figures into this proverb. This is no 
better expressed anywhere than in the statement attributed to Tutu in van Niekerk (2013: 1) 
in which he says botho again is described as “the very essence of being human…. It also 
means my humanity ….is inextricably bound up, in theirs”. According to this, botho is 
associated with being generous, hospitable, friendly, and compassionate. The significance of 
this is that it reinforces the notion of shared and common humanity (Mboti 2015: 127) to botho-
MKKB account. Among the proponents of AC, Metz and Gaie (2010: 275) further argue that 
MKKB is “a good starting point for understanding sub-Saharan morality” because the maxim 
carries important normative connotations, namely it requires of the moral agent i.e., “one’s 
ultimate goal” to be become a full person, a real self or a genuine human being. This view is 
underscored by Shutte (2001: 30) who argues that “the goal of morality” according to botho 
ethics “is fullness of humanity” or personal fulfilment without selfishness. Describing this Bujo 
(2001; 87) points out that the modern tendency is to define a person in terms of self-realisation 
as an ontological act.  
So, from this perspective, the precepts of botho enjoin one to moral growth in terms of 
developing one’s real or true self by relating to “others in a positive way.” One becomes a 
person solely ‘through other persons,’ which means that one cannot realise one’s true self in 
opposition to others or even in isolation from them (Metz and Gaie 2010: 275). The 
significance of the vocabulary of AC account here is revealing. This includes terms such as 
‘fuller’ and ‘fullness’ of ‘humanity’21, ‘real self’, ‘full person’, ‘inextricably caught up’, ‘proper 
self-assurance’, ‘human nature’ and ‘humanity’ in connection with MKKB. Anecdotal 
observation suggests this is an introduction of an understanding that is not supported by 
evidence from the cultures from which the proverb derives, more specifically Sesotho culture. 
This is because I will argue these concepts are not only viewed differently in diverse cultures 
and are not a reflection of how traditional moral thought of Basotho describes human 
experience. Analysis of MKKB’s traditional setting and its usage among Basotho shows that 
it reflects a doctrine whose primary interest and purpose is promotion of communal solidarity, 
mutual care and sharing, and the prioritisation of the welfare of all. The social function of this 
proverb thus is an as exhortation in concrete settings for practical mutual solidarity with other 
members of the community. It should thus not be read as a statement about personhood or 
personal moral growth as such, in the same way as “ha se motho” for instance. Just as much 
as other many other proverbs encouraging these values of solidarity, mutual aid and care 
cannot be interpreted as primarily statement about personhood instead of expressing mutual 
care and communal solidarity (Ramose 2009: 312). Moreover, this constellation of technical 
 
21 This is confirmed by Broodryk (2006: 20) who notes that these sort of concepts like humanness are viewed 
differently by different cultures.  
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terms connected to this proverb is philosophised with theorisations denoting characteristically 
abstract ideas with strong universal connotations. This too is inconsistent with traditional 
Basotho moral thought, which is context sensitive, local, and in orientation i.e., allows 
principles to take validity instances unlike “covering-law universalism” (Bujo 2001: 8,31). This 
also appears worryingly to be yet another symptom of an application of Western ideas and 
ideal on African concepts and thought. 
From the brief outline of Afro-communitarian account given here two observations can be 
made. First, that much of what constitutes AC’s account of botho, cannot be separated from 
the proverb motho ke motho ka batho (MKKB) and the corresponding self-realisation 
interpretations of the aphorism. Second, that this is a selective, unjustifiable privileged position 
and star status given to this proverb. This is problematic because it gives MKKB a false 
independence from the rest of Basotho indigenous knowledge of which MKKB is part of 
together with other Sesotho narratives. This amounts to an abstraction of the proverb out of 
its natural context. To the first of these observations i.e., self-realisation I turn to next while the 
second observation about the privileged reading and exceptionalism22 of this proverb will be 
dealt in the later sections.  
 
3.5.2  Overemphasis of Self-realisation and relational Dimension of Botho  
 
In chapter one we pointed out the tendency of AC to overemphasise the relational communal 
dimensions of botho together with an articulation and understanding of motho ke motho ka 
batho. This is best summed up by (Metz 2012:104) who says that MKKB as the articulation of 
botho entails  
“that one should develop into a real person, or live a genuinely human way 
of life, [and that this is] something that one does just insofar as one prize 
friendly relationships, ones in which one shares a way of life with others and 
cares for their quality of life”.  
 
According to this sub-Saharan morality is thus describe as a ‘self-realisation’ or ‘perfectionist’ 
ethic, where the moral agent’s ultimate goal is to become a full person, a real self, or a genuine 
human being (Metz and Gaie 2010: 274). We find the same idea linking self-realisation with 
communal participation and valuing of relationship by the moral agent in Bell and Metz (2012: 
83) who argue that “traditionally speaking, adherents to Ubuntu have thought of self-realization 
being a function of communal relationships with human beings and also “spiritual” ones such”. 
What we see here is how the notion of self-realisation evolves into becoming part of the now 
 
22 I used the term to refer to the tendency in the literature where motho ke motho ka batho is singled out and 
treated as unique, or exceptional to other similar African proverbs,  where an impression is made that this proverb 
falls outside the ambit of the normal rules of interpretation and use that applies to other proverbs and narratives. 
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accepted and established description of botho in the current discourse and in African ethics in 
general (Metz 2007: 331, van Niekerk 2007: 365). 
The problem with this is the description of community participation and the motivation for it in 
terms of self-realisation described in terms of becoming one’s ‘real self.’ From the perspective 
of Sesotho culture such terminology as that found here introduces an individualistic element 
to the notion of moral development by motho, inconsistent with the understanding traditional 
moral understanding of Basotho. This is because in terms of traditional moral thought of 
Bosotho, personhood or ‘becoming a person which is what botho and the communal 
participation imply, is not described in terms of “self-realisation.” Rather in the Sesotho culture, 
as in other African cultures, personhood is understood “as a process of coming into existence 
in the reciprocal relatedness of individual and community” through “common action” i.e., 
fulfilment of social roles which is the anchor that keeps one “from becoming an unfettered 
ego”23 (Bujo 2001: 87).  A formulation of botho therefore that defines motho in terms of self-
realisation through undefined relationships as the heart of African ethics as AC does, conjures 
notions of an individualistic unencumbered emotivist self (MacIntyre 1981: 31) foreign to 
African culture. The danger therefore of articulating the moral ideal implied in botho and MKKB 
as one of the many ways to elucidate what is botho in terms of a ‘self-realisation’ even if 
qualified as “through communal relationships,’ is problematic. This is because it could be 
argued that one could still enter in communal relationships with others and still be proven that 
one is not adhering to imperatives of botho. This could arise where for instance individual 
choice is the sole criterion and basis for the establishment of such relationships (MacIntyre 
1981: 32, 39). This is vastly different from the moral value of relationships that botho 
presuppose which are relationship not just based on choice but primarily based our social 
identity as moral agents. 
But more significantly this runs the risk of presenting a version of the self that conflicts with 
African communal sensibilities. From the perspective of Sesotho culture this is also foreign to 
traditional moral thought. This is because a more accurate way of understanding the self, 
presupposed by botho is “a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth 
to life to death as narrative beginning from the middle to end” (MacIntyre 1981; 205). This is 
because an understanding of a concept like botho, which is wedded to a concept with strong 
individualistic connotations like self-realisation, suggests the achievement of personhood 
through personal striving by the individual. This is neither how botho should be interpreted nor 
the African understanding of personhood and it amounts to a perversion of African moral 
ideas. As Bujo (2001: 87) explains in African culture a “person is not defined as an ontological 
act by means of self-realisation, but by “relations” or “a network of relationships that constitute 
 
23 In traditional African culture, this is encapsulated in the social roles the moral agent inherits and assumes 
throughout their life, or their social identity.  
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his inalienable dignity”. Self-realisation as a way of explaining botho appears to confirm an 
observation by Metz (2007: 331-333) of current theoretical interpretations of botho in the 
literature, that they are closer to individualistic Western moral views than they are to 
communitarian ones, one expects of African culture.  
So, from the perspective of Sesotho speaking culture and indeed African ethics, self-
realisation is not the best way to formulate our understanding of botho because, like its 
contemporary communitarianism revivalism in the West, it cannot detach itself from its 
Western origin and its strong individualistic connotations even if it is advanced within the 
context of a communitarian framework such as African communalism (Bujo 2001: 29, 43). The 
problem of descriptions of botho in terms of such abstract individualistic concept like self-
realisation understood as discovering one’s true self, is also not ideal as a description of botho. 
Such terms give the impression that the ethical ideal of botho is something that the moral 
agents can achieve individually or by personal achievement (Bujo 2009: 116). This would be 
against traditional African thought resident in proverbs and other idiomatic expressions. It is 
in this sense that AC’s account of botho in terms of self-realisation is rightly being challenged 
not only as founded on dubious grounds and illogical interpretations of motho ke motho ka 
batho but also as doubtful (Mboti 2015: 125; van Niekerk 2013:3). This begs the question how 
a discourse on botho ended up have as part of its central feature a term with such strong 
individualistic connotations like self-realisation. 
It is not easy to trace the origin of this interpretation it is not implausible. I will argue that 
anecdotal evidence points to the influence of Western trained botho scholars, “read into” 
traditional African idioms and moral language, abstract Western concepts, and ideas in line 
with their training and frame of reference. In other words, it is necessary to recognise that 
understanding of self-realisation” within current botho discourse and its plausible 
superimposition on the interpretation of MKKB, could not have happened without the influence 
of the personalities or the key actors in the botho industry and the educative pressures and 
their authorial ideologies influencing the intellectual realm and products of scholars of botho 
(Mboti 2015: 126; Selepe 1999: 52).  This means recognising that botho scholars are not 
immune from the influence of modern European mode of thinking and liberal ideas from the 
West. It also means acknowledging that most of these scholars if not all, have been trained in 
the Western tradition. And we know that in this tradition individual autonomy, freedom, and 
individual choice especially, in the realm of morality, are emphasised more hence the high 
value placed on the individual as a moral sovereign. In other words, unlike the African tradition, 
for the Western tradition 
“life is seen in terms of separation, independence, and conflict [of interests]. 
Separateness is treasured and regarded as intrinsic to the integrity of human 
life. Only when it is privatised, does human life have identity, autonomy and 
freedom” (Mafunisa 2008: 113). 
 
 108 
In view of this, it would appear that the attraction of a self-realisation reading within botho 
discourse is a lighter version of the Western idea of the autonomy of the individual, something 
perhaps that some scholars feared, in the case of botho ethics, that it would be lost in an 
ethical framework that is deeply communitarian in character and practise, which is 
characteristic of moral cultures like that of Basotho. For evidence of this one needs not to go 
any further than an examination of the state intention and purpose of Shutte, who is one of 
the few scholars of botho, whose authorial ideology24 is most explicitly stated. In his book, 
Ubuntu an ethic for a new South Africa (2001) he argues that “freedom and community” which 
are two guiding principles of underpinning “the ethic developed” in his book, both express the 
ideas of “self-determination” and “dependence on others” respectively, but that neither the 
“European nor the African” cultures do justice to any in their treatment as mutually exclusive. 
“I believe, however, that” [these] are not mutually exclusive as they may appear” he writes 
(Shutte 2001: 11). Here we see the intellectual basis to blend African concepts with European 
ones which is to infuse the European idea of individual freedom into the African idea of 
community (Ibid, 10, 51). It can therefore be argued that this twin-interlinked aim is one of the 
most plausible grounds for the introduction of a self-realisation within botho discourse. 
Elsewhere Shutte makes this mission even clearer saying with reference to a ‘reformulated 
Aquinas’ understanding of human nature,  
“I want to bring out the connection between this conception of human nature 
and two ideas that are central to traditional African understanding of people. 
These are the ideas …. of Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu and seriti” (2008: 
27). 
 
While it is not possible to credit Shutte with sole evolution of self-realisation in current 
discourse, the significance of the contribution he made in this regard cannot be 
underestimated. This is because Shutte is recognised as one of the first scholars to seriously 
engage with botho (Metz and Gaie 2010: 275, Gade 2011: 313, 2015: 125).  
Irrespective of origins or how it came about, self-realisation interpretation connected to botho 
is problematic. It introduces an individualistic shade of meaning and colouring to African 
communal concepts that is foreign to botho as a moral ideal and the traditional African 
understanding of motho ke motho It conjures up the notion of individual striving for moral 
excellence, too close in tone to ideals espoused by liberal individualism, which is the opposite 
of the African way of life. The conceptual appropriation of self-realisation in botho discourse 
thus introduces a radically different meaning to the MKKB, one which leaves this proverb 
vulnerable to an individualistic interpretation where the purpose of life, and in turn that which 
 
24 It is not a coincident I will argue that the period that this association between botho and this proverb was an 
important one in the history of South African politics i.e., transition from apartheid when the political pressure and 
idea for nation building was in vogue. So, it is not surprising that Shutte and others found in this proverb an idea 
that can be construed with the agenda of nation building and of building relationships across historical divides, 
hence the emphasis on commonness of “our humanity” in his thesis. 
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informs ways of conduct for the moral agent, is simplified to an individualistic pursuit of 
“development and fulfilment” of one’s capabilities to become a real self (Shutte 2001: 13,  Metz 
and Gaie 2010: 275, Metz 2007: 333).  
Traditional Sesotho moral thought and understanding of morality, and this includes the 
interpretation of this proverb as found in Sesotho culture, does not conceptualise moral life in 
these terms nor does it frame the understanding of what is “motho” and how to become motho 
in such terms. For this reason, I will argue that self-realisation as a formulation of botho, can 
be explained as an imported formulation whose necessity is questionable. From the perceptive 
of Sesotho culture and its understanding of botho the continued reference to self-realisation 
in relation to botho within botho discourse will always remain suspect. No matter how it is 
dressed up, whether in communitarian dressing and explanations like “self-discovery or finding 
one’s true self through valuing of friendly relationships, as a concept self-realisation will remain 
foreign to traditional Basotho culture and moral thought from which both botho and the proverb 
MKKB derive. This is because it denotes and conjure uncomfortable individualistic pursuit for 
moral excellence incompatible with traditional Basotho moral thought and ideal implied in 
many Sesotho narratives and proverbs.  
3.6 Redefining Use of Narratives in Current Botho Discourse  
 
My argument thus far is that central to the prevailing account of botho in the discourse or Afro-
communitarian account, is the proverb motho ke motho ka batho ba bang (MKKB) where this 
proverb is regarded as the encapsulation of botho. This means that among the African 
proverbs none has gained more prominence in debates and discourses of botho as this 
proverb and its Zulu variant, “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (Gade 2013: 492; Metz 2007:323; 
Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009:63, Shutte 2001). This selective privilege of MKKB along with 
another popular expression ‘I am because we are’ (Ikuenobe 2016: 150) can thus be taken as 
the hallmarks of AC. What is important to note here is how this proverb is treated as uniquely 
different from other African proverbs not only in articulating what it means to have botho but 
by implication what it means to be a person. In this view, MKKB is not only the summation of 
the meaning of botho (personhood), but also the quintessential embodiment of African 
communalism.  
One of the peculiarities of this exceptionalism in the usage of MKKB in the current discourse 
is also how much this proverb is invoked without reference to the normal social context in 
which proverbs often are encountered. This awareness of the contextual setting of proverbs 
seems to have been either ignored or discarded as irrelevant in the discourse. But as Derive 
(2004: 754) explains proverbs like MKKB and similar idiomatic sayings are typically used as 
part of ordinary everyday parlance, and they are often  
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“uttered by the elders to the younger group members, who may themselves 
reply with a proverb [and] …As witnesses and caretakers of the body of 
accumulated wisdom of the group, proverbs express the norm, the point of 
view, and the philosophy of the group, taking into account its tensions as 
well, since different proverbs can express contradictory theses” (ibid;  754).  
 
Describing the characteristics of proverbs Casalis (1861: 307) also shares this view pointing 
out that proverbs are “a spontaneous production of public reason and conscience” found “in 
daily use”. It follows that their meaning is to be understood as practical, hence they had to be 
“easy of comprehension” or to understand but at the same time have “undisputed [moral] 
authority.”  One of the characteristics of the Sesotho language from which MKKB originates is 
its metaphorical composition and style, which applies to proverbs too. In addition to the 
prevalent use of metaphors, one of the language styles common in Sesotho is the use of 
different terms to express the same idea or general idea. It is often remarked of Sesotho that 
it seems to an outsider as superfluous in character because often a Mosotho will repeat what 
is said by using several different expressions that denote the same meaning, to show that they 
have understood what has been said (Casalis 1861: 2017). This is not only part of the 
language requirement to prove eloquence of speech and competency but for those familiar 
with the language they “are careful to observe the shade of meaning peculiar to each” 
expression (Ibid. 304). 
Reiterating the importance of the context in the usage of proverbs and the “best” way of 
determining their meaning, Mokitimi (2004: 756) explains that “the meaning of Sesotho 
proverbs, …. is determined by” their “contextual usage when the speaker is communicating 
with the audience in a particular situation” as well as “the social factors surrounding” their 
application”.  One of the social factors that applies when proverbs are invoked is that there is 
always a subtext, implicitly known by all involved. That subtext is that utterance of one proverb 
implies reference to all the others, either in support of or counter to. Both the speaker and their 
audience are thus expected to know, based on their native knowledge of the culture and 
language that in addition to the immediate proverb uttered, an implicit reference is also being 
made of other similar proverbs within the culture which are regarded as reinforcing the same 
message (Mokolatsie 1997: 48). As Mokitimi (2004: 756) explains that as vehicles of 
communication in dialogue proverbs 
“entails the different levels at which they are applied in practical situations. 
The first level occurs when circumstances trigger the use of a proverb. The 
second level occurs when the participants or the audience respond to the 
use of a proverb in a way that shows the proverb to be appropriate or 
inappropriate. The audience may sometimes respond with another proverb 
that connotes either approval or disapproval of the speaker’s proverb”. 
 
For instance, in the case where MKKB is invoked in gratitude to the mutual aid rendered, one 
could reiterate the idea by saying in reply “nonyana e haela ka tšiba tsa engoe” (a bird builds 
 111 
its nest with feathers of another) or “ngoana sa lleng o shoela tharing” (a baby that does not 
cry will die on its mothers loincloth). Both proverbs support the idea of mutual aid or communal 
solidarity but evoke it differently. It must be noted that the proverbs that are implied do not 
necessarily and always have to support the idea expressed in the initial proverb uttered. 
Sometimes it could be those proverbs that pose a counter message, and this would be 
perfectly in keeping with Sesotho culture (Mokitimi 2004: 756). So following on from our 
example above with MKM as a statement endorsing rendering of mutual aid, the audience 
could invoke another proverb to challenge it, such as ‘moketa ho tsosoa o itekang’ (help will 
be given only to one who is trying) or ‘mphe mphe e ea lapisa motho o khonoa ke sa ntlo ea 
hae’ (it’s better to have your own food than constantly begging) (Seema 2012” 120).This in 
order to guard against perceived abuse of communal solidarity.   
The recognition of the contextual usage of proverbs just outlined is unfortunately lacking in 
current usage of MKKB. Were this context to be taken into consideration it would soon be 
clear that there is a whole rich deposit of similar proverbs which would not only enrich current 
understanding of botho but open new avenues of articulating the ethical imperatives of botho 
in different spheres of life that MKKB can’t. I am thinking here of a similar proverb “morena ke 
morena ka sechaba” (a chief is chief by the grace of the people) for articulating principles of 
ethical leadership grounded on botho principles and governance by consent. 
It is in this sense that Mboti (2015: 133) is correct to challenge the current fixation with MKKB 
in the discourse as a distraction. It is a distraction because of the selective arbitrary privileged 
status of MKKB and the suffocating effects this has on ethical reflection. This tendency of the 
analysis to focus only on MKKB does not recognise this proverb as a part of African narratives, 
which is a body of accumulated knowledge and a rich deposit of wisdom about botho. This 
knowledge is readily available for excavation and unpacking the insights of botho through such 
sayings.  
The main criticism AC is first, the over-reliance on this proverb which gives rise to the bias 
and tendency to conceptualise botho only in terms of its relational communal dimensions 
(Molefe 2017: 53). In doing so the discourse neglects to articulate other dimensions of botho 
characterising “our relationship with ourselves” (Shutte 2001:31). This is the dimension of 
botho that has to do with possession of virtues of botho i.e., inculcation of makhabane. This 
is a dimension that places emphasis on the desirable inner moral qualities of a motho, where 
the moral statement “ke motho” ‘he/she is a person’ denotes a certain level of achievement 
personal moral qualities of ‘good character’ (Ikuenobe 2016: 156). These are best expressed 
by a formulation of botho framed in personal terms i.e., formation and development of good 
moral character as the core ingredient of botho. Here the focus is the character of the 
individual or motho, who is the crucial linkage point at which the ethical dimension of botho 
i.e., both in its personal and communal dimensions is illuminated (Ramose 2007: 355).  
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Second, the problem with the current dominant account of botho is that it imputes a meaning 
not internal to MKKB and in doing so turn this proverb into something it is not, i.e., a moral 
statement purporting to say something about personhood. As it has been pointed out earlier, 
MKKB is a norm about mutual concern and communal solidarity. So together with many other 
similar idioms, it cannot be regarded as a moral statement about motho (person). MKKB is 
therefore not an expression of a moral evaluation of personal conduct and assessment of 
personhood in the same way that ha se motho’ (he or she is not a person) and bophoofolo are 
(Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 71, Ikuenobe 2016: 156). This exclusive privileged connection 
made of MKKB to botho is thus problematic because it gives the impression that MKKB is the 
only gateway to accessing the depth of meaning and insights of botho. I have argued thus far 
that in African oral literature e.g. other proverbs, we will find embedded there, rich deposits of 
the age-old wisdom resident in African idiomatic expressions and proverbs like MKKB (Khoza 
1994:3). The proverbs and sayings can offer scholarship valuable insights into the multiplicity 
of their meaning as a social commentary of community life and in turn what they tell us about 
what it means to be motho.  
As I have already argued the core of the message embedded in MKKB is mutual care and 
promotion of the spirit of communal solidarity. This is the understanding to be found in its 
application in concrete situations in its social setting. It is an understanding derived from a 
view of life as fundamentally an unfolding drama of mutual concern lived in a variety of 
communal contexts. These include classical activities such as letsema or communal work 
party (Casalis 1861: 163, Ramose 2007: 350), “mafisa and lesielo long-term loans of cattle 
(Duncan 2006: 81; Richardson 2009: 136) or of pigs and poultry, respectively. It is important 
to reiterate that in Sesotho culture this practice was not only understood in terms of a loan but 
in its most radical form mafisa was a gift, usually of livestock. As Matśela (1979: 87, 128) 
explains in Sesotho culture, the aim of mafisa, as part of traditional curriculum taught in 
circumcision schools, was to instil and encourage many of the values associated with botho 
such as “sharing of wealth with others on a gift or loan basis”. In this sense, MKKB is 
essentially and an exhortation for solidarity, mutual help, and a norm of how an individual who 
is a motho “ought” to relate to others.  
So, in terms of the relationship to botho, MKKB must be understood as one example 
articulating some of the expected mekhoa or manners related to sharing and generosity, that 
are expected of one who is a proper motho. That means it is an expression of what qualities 
of character one ought to have and display a matter of one’s identity and who they are in their 
relationship with others. It is as such an aspect of practical guide with respect to communal 
living as an essential aspect of botho, not the summation of the eternal truth found in botho. 
This is because apart from the fact that the truths and insight into the practical and concrete 
meaning of botho are also found in other proverbs, as a moral ideal, botho cannot be reduced 
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to a method of doing something (Dandala 2009: 260). MKKB is thus one of the many norms 
or an expression of the expected way of life one “ought” to have in the community. In other 
words, this proverb stands to botho, in the same way that five blind men, who were invited to 
see the elephant, stand to what is an elephant. Each of them each touching the elephant it at 
various parts, the head, the tail the truck etc. etc and the corresponding tactile sensory 
experience they got was adamant that his description of the elephant was definitive. (Broodryk 
2006: 20). On the face of it this exclusive association of MKKB with botho, e.g. in a statement 
like ‘botho is the short form of MKKB’ (Gade 2011: 313) appears to present no problem. This 
is because it could be argued that all what such statements are saying is that botho implies 
inhabiting and displaying a disposition that values community life. This is compatible with the 
spirit underlying the social and ethical imperatives of MKKB. The problem with this is that the 
converse will not be true i.e., that such statements are what it means to be motho, which is 
what botho entails. In other words, I dispute the implicit claim that such an association has 
come to mean in the discourse, and that is the idea that this one single proverb, in and of itself 
captures the totality of the meaning and wholeness of the virtues encapsulated in the ethical 
ideal of botho. More than that, botho, which is description of what it means to be a proper 
motho or person is therefore fundamentally a moral ideal denoting moral progress between 
botho and non – botho (Mphetolang 2009: 18). This means it can never be fully achieved, but 
at best will be approximated. It follows then, that such an ideal and the insight into it can never 
be articulated exhaustively and fully in one way. But rather because of the nature of moral 
ideals, botho will lend itself to expression and articulation in many ways. This may help to 
explain why there are so many proverbs in African culture, some appearing to have the same 
meaning but expressed slightly differently. They help to make understandable what it means 
to be motho in different contexts and situations i.e., how to live up to the standards of botho 
where botho is the organising principle around which life is structured. As a moral ideal, botho 
will by nature resist reductionist formulations and interpretations that look to reduces it to 
precise single definitions or single definitive formulations as the current application of MKKB 
in current discourse attempts to do.  
To put it differently, the transgressions that one may have regarding botho, are treated as 
serious, as they are not just about particular omissions but are fundamentally reflections of a 
deformed character lacking in those qualities essential to making one a motho. By contrast 
transgressions of the norm like MKKB are treated as important but would not always 
necessarily be regarded as deserving of stronger sanctions than a stronger reminder that one 
ought to try harder to become a good person. Botho, therefore cannot be equated with MKKB 
because it denotes and refers to personhood. The latter is more profound as it is a statement 
about motho and moral character. It is a statement defining what makes a “human being” a 
“person.” This distinction is often regarded as controversial in the literature especially by 
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scholars inclined to define personhood in narrow often Western individualistic value 
frameworks or those not familiar with the African normative conception of personhood (Molefe 
2017A: 218). But as most thinkers have seen this is the predominant way African ethics defines 
personhood and how botho should be conceptualised. As Ifeanyi Menkiti in Gyekye (2011: 
par 18) explains   
“personhood is the sort of thing which has to be attained and is attained in 
direct proportion as one participates in communal life through the discharge 
of the various obligations defined by one's [social role]. It is the carrying out 
of these obligations that transforms one from the it-status of early childhood, 
marked by an absence of moral function, into the person-status of later 
years, marked by a widened maturity of ethical sense—an ethical maturity 
without which personhood is conceived as eluding one”. 
 
In other words, since personhood is reached in direct proportion as one takes part in 
communal life, MKKB can thus be seen as expressing one way by which as moral agent we 
take part in community participation. And so, like other similar proverbs it would be in this 
sense that MKKB has connections with botho i.e., as one avenue, or norm giving guidance to 
the moral agent about how to take part in communal life which leads to habituation of 
dispositions of botho. But it will be a mistake to construe this as saying MKKB is equivalent to 
botho. It is in this sense that it can be argued that the current discourse struggles with how to 
properly conceptualise and explain the link between this proverb and botho25. This problem 
has thus led on the one hand to continued reliance and use of this proverb in contemporary 
botho discourses, and on the other hand to failure as far as I am aware to sufficiently explain 
the exceptionalism it enjoys which leads to the need to delink MKKB from botho, which I turn. 
The preference of MKKB as the most preferred explication of botho (van Niekerk 2013: 2) in 
the discourse, I will argue has given rise to a coupling of the two ideas that are not necessarily 
dependent on each other. In other words, the relationship between botho and MKKB is not 
one of mutual presupposition, where you cannot understand one without reference to the 
other. This is because to do so would suggest that botho cannot be defined analysed 
independently from this proverb which most botho scholars would not support. Moreover, 
prima facie evidence from the work of Gade (2011) and the Sesotho speaking culture shows 
no evidence supporting this seeming arbitrary connection. This contention is borne by the fact 
even within early sources in Sesotho speaking culture accounts of botho makes no such link. 
Instead, what we find botho is often paired with the concept of bophoofolo (Casalis 1861: 322, 
303). Similarly, in collection of Sesotho proverbs, Sekese (1994) makes no such link in the 
explanation of the plural form of MKKB “re batho ka batho ba bang”. The reason there is no 
such link in such sources is that in Sesotho culture there is an account of botho independent 
 
25 Molefe (2017A) thus correctly identifies this problem i.e., “the confusion in a quest to articulating a plausible 
conception of” AC as attributable to “the ambiguity attending the African notion of personhood” i.e., botho “in the 
literature” (Metz 2013, 7; Molefe 2016). 
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of MKKB. It is also the case that this is not how botho is spoken of in ordinary parlance of 
Sesotho speaking.  
This points to the challenge facing the discourse namely defining botho independently of 
MKKB. This is because the connection between the two that AC upholds has by and large not 
only “failed to adequately question” the dubious and “illogical interpretations of umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu and its variations”, (Mboti 2015: 125) but in most case it has built upon 
this as the basic foundation and only adding to it.  The greatest challenge for the botho 
discourse is therefore not only to go beyond the slogan-based definition of botho but to start 
the discourse afresh about botho as a moral ideal. As van Niekerk (2013: vii and 4) has shown 
the current approach has proved inadequate to resolving the difficulty of further explication of 
botho beyond the popular slogans and various question begging labels. Instead what it seems 
to have done is only to entrench the under-determined status of this concept in the discourse. 
It is time that this uncritical acceptance of the “selective privileged reading of MKKB re-
examined as its current application in botho discourse is not only unjustifiable but also 
suggests a certain arbitrariness.”  
3.7 Reimagining Botho Beyond Motho ke Motho ka Batho 
 
One of the problems intimated in foregoing discussion with current botho discourse and its 
usage of MKKB, is the failure to define botho independently of this proverb. The challenge for 
botho discourse is therefore to develop an alternative comprehensive account botho.  Such a 
comprehensive independent explication of botho will have to be grounded first on the 
recognition that botho is moral ideal and that in cultures such as that of Basotho it 
encapsulates a totality of values and virtues. It is in this sense that the challenge of 
contemporary moral environment discussed in chapter two now facing current botho 
discourse, is for an innovative approach of reimagining botho independently and beyond 
sloganeering of motho ke motho ka batho.  It will not be possible to articulate this reimagined 
account of botho here, as this is the focus of next chapter where I am discussing the character 
centric account of botho in the light of the primacy of character in Sesotho speaking culture. 
Here the argument I want make is simply that an account and formulation of botho that is not 
reliant on an appeal to MKKB is what is needed if ethical ideal of botho and its richness is not 
to be reduced to an interpretation of a single proverb.  
As a first step towards this, the discourse can begin to analyse botho in terms of Karenga’s 
notion of moral ideal (2004: 4). Explaining this Karenga (Ibid. 4) states that a moral ideal does 
not establish a pattern of behaviour, but 
“rather it is a "telos of a style of life" which "functions as a standard of 
inspiration, not by providing an articulate norm to be complied with, but by 
providing a point of orientation." It contrasts with an ideal norm which 
"functions as a standard of aspiration which issues in a sense of moral 
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progress in one's efforts toward ideal achievement." For "with an ideal 
theme... moral progress is measured not in terms of compliance with a norm 
but rather in terms of the degree of comportment with the ideal focus." Some 
examples of ideal themes are the……the Christian concept of agape, the 
Zulu concept of ubuntu, and the Kemetic concept of Maat.” 
 
To understand botho as a moral ideal is well construed because botho is fundamentally a 
constellation of core values and virtues of African ontologies and normative requirements 
(Kamwangamalu 2007: 26, van Niekerk 2013: vii). According to Cua in Karenga (2004: 4), a 
moral ideal has a power to stimulate different thoughts and interpretations. So, when 
interpreted in this way i.e., as a moral ideal, botho becomes an edifice around which traditional 
morality and values revolve. It is that highest good, the last end, desirable for its own sake, 
and for which other ends or goods are pursued for its sake (Waldstein 2017: 3-7).  
In other words, its relationship conceptually with other goods is that these are ordered towards 
it. This is because it is the highest good and not vice versa. When understood in this way 
botho is then the centre around which all other ethical values and traditional virtues expressed 
through the narrative dimension of education in virtue i.e., the narration of “morally freighted 
proverbs and folktales to” the young (Gyekye 2011: par. 5) and other character forming social 
practices and activities find their meaning and significance.  
It is within this framework that the use of narratives including proverbs finds their proper place 
as vehicles of moral education into virtues of botho. The discourse could thus make a 
comprehensive utilisation of narratives in their totality as a way of explaining the depth of botho 
as a moral ideal. It could evoke the individual meanings of each narrative or proverb to 
articulate one aspect without the risk of this being construed as the full explanation of botho. 
This way of deploying narratives is consistent with their traditional usage where they 
functioned in unity not insolation as vehicles for moral education and formation into botho. 
This is the case in Sesotho culture, and it is important here to clarify how they can be used 
towards this end. The best way to do is to further unpack the problem with the current use of 
MKKB and thus illustrate how this proverb and others can be used in the future as vehicles to 
support articulation of virtues enshrined in botho. 
One of the reservations about how MKKB is used, which I intimated earlier is that because of 
the uncontextual approach of doing ethics today, this proverb has now been severed from its 
proper context as part of oral literature. This in turn has given MKKB a false independence 
from other narratives and the function that these have as avenues for moral education. This 
is in part due to non-contextual usage and abstraction, and disregard of this proverb as part 
of the body of knowledge found in indigenous knowledge26 systems, such as that of Basotho. 
In that knowledge system the unity of narratives i.e., proverbs, folktales, riddles, is respected 
 
26 For more of Basotho indigenous knowledge and proverbs see Seema (2012), Possa and Makgopa (2010,) 
Mapesela (2004), and Maharasoa and Maharaswa (2004). 
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as these are important social resources for moral education. This unity is thus paramount in 
how each proverb or narratives is employed, and it is an essential requirement upon which all 
proverbs including MKKB derive and find their meaning and significance as part of moral 
education and teaching (Bujo 2001: 24).  
This unity internal to narratives as a body of collected knowledge is also important because it 
is a recognition that botho is a moral ideal and as such the understanding of this ideal is 
expressed through different narratives, e.g. in proverbs this is best achieved when these are 
used in their unity than in isolation. And in Sesotho culture it is in the depth of meaning and 
multiplicity of explanations of the values of botho that narratives including proverbs find their 
proper place in botho discourse as important vehicles of moral education including education 
particularly education about what is botho. In other words, the significance of recognising such 
unity is that together the meaning of such proverbs gives us a deeper insight of botho and 
what it means in a variety of social context and settings than they do individually. It is from this 
elasticity of meaning of moral ideals, that we find that among the Basotho one of the 
interpretations which is fundamental to the way the Basotho understand botho, which is based 
on the way they identify themselves as a people, is the notion of botho as an essential 
condition for peace (Chaka 2016: 65).   It is for this reason that I have argued for untying botho 
from a reductionist definition based on this proverb, and revisiting it afresh, to enable the use 
of other proverbs and narratives, that equally elucidate botho and thus further increasing our 
understanding of this ideal and its ethical imperatives. This means that proverbs, including 
MKKB, ought not only to be treated fundamentally as part of indigenous knowledge systems, 
but must always be interpreted in the light of this body of knowledge and the rationale behind 
it. When analysed from this perspective and context, it becomes clear why the current usage 
of  MKKB will be fraught with questions of legitimacy.  If we look at the Sesotho speaking 
culture for a moment and their usage of proverbs there is prima facie evidence challenging 
this selective reading and arbitrary preference of MKKB as the sole avenue for articulating the 
values and principles of botho.  
This exceptionalism is against everything we know about the unity proverbs as part of the 
corpus of Sesotho narratives and indigenous knowledge and it impoverishes the 
understanding of botho as a polysemic moral ideal. This contention is supported by the brief 
analysis of another proverb similar to MKKB namely “morena ke morena ka sechaba” (MKS) 
(a chief is a chief because of the people27). This proverb can easily be read as “morena ke 
morena ka batho.” If we take this proverb and MKKB one is struck by their similarity. They 
 
27 This proverb I will argue shows the impoverishing effect of the conventional account i.e., relying too heavily on 
one proverb as the encapsulation of the ethical imperatives of botho. In this proverb, we have probably the most 
attractive articulation of botho with regard to ethical leadership. This dimension of botho exemplified in its most 
classic and profound way in the ethical leadership of King Moshoeshoe (Prozesky 2016) I will argue is another 
dimension of botho, which contemporary African society, particularly at its leadership level today is in desperate 
need off and one which is best captured only in this proverb, in contrast to motho ke motho ka batho. 
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both have the same sentence structure. Both have a similar style and the play of words. But 
what is important about the two is the message they convey when analysed together i.e., . 
they complimentary meaning and corresponding values and virtues they presuppose and 
require of the individual. While both can be interpreted in terms of the messages they covey, 
it is what they also discourage that the essence of their practical meaning is also revealed. 
This adds to existing knowledge added information about botho. In adopting this approach to 
analysis, we will discover that the common understanding and interpretation underlying the 
two proverbs is rejection of the vices of boitśepo (Sekese 1994: 54) i.e., egotism or selfishness 
(Metz and Gaie 2010: 275), whether one is just an ordinary person i.e., motho or a person in 
a position of leadership and authority i.e., morena.  
It is therefore important to observe that from the analysis of MKKB and other similar proverbs 
in African culture (Sekese 1994: 54, Ramose 2009: 312; Bujo 2001: 87) the main message 
about botho they communicate in their own different ways, is rejection of selfishness, egoism 
or any form of self-importance. These are discouraged as vices that one who is a motho ought 
to avoid, for these are morally undesirable qualities for motho. The richness of the values of 
botho that gets uncovered in this brief analysis of the two proverbs underscores the 
impoverishing effect of current over-reliance on MKKB to explain botho and which will continue 
to be the case in the discourse unless this exceptionalism is changed. 
The point of the argument here is that there is a vast richness of meaning in proverbs, as a 
body of knowledge of traditional culture, that is a readily available resources for use in 
articulating the precepts and practical application of what it means to possess botho and 
practice its values and virtues in various spheres of life. This richness is currently not 
accessible to the botho discourse because of the neglect of narratives to the discourse and 
fixation with MKKB only. A case in point of this is the articulation of virtues of values botho that 
relates to ethical leadership (Prozesky 2016), a topic that is currently of foremost importance 
in many contemporary African societies including among the Basotho. The ethical imperative 
of botho linked to leadership are as equally relevant and necessary for today’s context as are 
those that focus on communal solidarity and safeguarding communal relationship. The ethical 
ideals of botho and corresponding qualities of character expected in the former, are far better 
communicated expressed in “morena ke morena ka sechaba” than in any other proverb. Nor 
can these be accessed and conveyed adequately, for instance by an appeal to MKKB.  
So, the most important lesson we can learn in terms of practice and behaviour, in using 
narratives in a way that respects their unity as demonstrated in the two proverbs i.e., MKKB 
and MKS, is that both share in common the same meaning, i.e., promotion of certain qualities 
of character or displaying of certain virtues in a person and lack of corresponding vices.  They 
explain the virtues expected whether one is an ordinary person or one in position of leadership 
and authority. In terms of the virtues that one who is a proper motho must thus display and 
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inhabit, as a matter of one’s character or identity, we can mention here virtues of humility 
“boikokobetso”, generosity, “mosa’, kindness, “mohau” mercy, kutloelo-bohloko, humaneness 
or feeling for fellow human beings, fellow feeling for the other. And equally important for one 
who is “Morena” i.e., a chief, which must be interpreted here as metaphor for leadership is 
possession of certain virtues, chief among which is hospitality and “toka” which means fairness 
but also with strong connotations of justice. All these virtues are regarded as evidence that 
one has developed a good character (Seema 2012: 129).  
It is interesting that among their proverbs about the chief, the Basotho seem to have 
emphasised virtues related to hospitality more than other values such as justice or strength, 
or power. This can be seen in the variety of proverbs about the chief that expresses this 
expectation including, “morena ke khetsi ea masepa” which literally translates, ‘the chief is a 
shoulder bag of shit”, This means the quality of a good leader -Morena- is forbearance and 
possession of the virtue of accepting all unconditionally, the useful and the useless, the 
resident and the traveller or foreigner alike, the reliable and the perfidious alike (Coplan 1993: 
102). This unconditional availability of the chief is expressed in another proverb, “Morena ha 
ete,” - the chief does not travel. This means that if one needs the help of the chief the office 
must always be there to attend to the needs of the people. These are important ethical 
imperatives of leadership demanded by botho, of those in positions of leadership, that need 
to be incorporated into the new formulation of botho referred to here, which is not tethered to 
interpretations of MKKB.  
The central argument therefore here is that adherence to the unity of narratives in the context 
of botho discourse, will allow the uncovering of the fuller and deeper meaning of botho, making 
it easier to apply this in different contexts and spheres of life.  Apart from this exclusive 
connection between MKKB proverb and botho, it is also the case, that with any form of 
discourse,  
“there are always “gaps in communication, and no way that meaning can be 
present in its totality at any one point,” [because] “meaning and essence can 
never be fully present in any one sign' or text” (Mapesela 2004: 320).  
 
This means whatever means of explicating botho that exist now, will always approximate its 
ideals but never articulate these exhaustively. This is equally true of the current botho 
discourse and its use of MKKB vis-à-vis its relationship to botho, which means, that MKKB 
cannot be regarded as the wholeness and totality of what botho entails. Hence the value of 
interpreting proverbs in terms of their unity of meaning to understand the breadth and depth 
of botho. This can be seen again when we analyse some of the Sesotho proverbs as a whole 
such as MKKB and similar proverb. Here it will be observed for instance with MKKB, that it 
belongs to a group of proverbs promoting certain behaviours and values in particular the 
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primacy of welfare of all or communal solidarity and other related values and virtues28.  These 
proverbs include “nonyana e haela ka tšiba tsa e ngoe” (a bird builds its nest with the feathers 
of another), or “khalapa li ea buseletsana, (to return a favoured done) (Mokitimi 1997: 14, 37). 
These proverbs are an endorsement of a behaviour that prizes communal solidarity, mutual 
aid, and cooperation (Mokitimi 1997: 13) and related values and ideals. These ideals are 
embodied in several social practices in Sesotho cultures in many agricultural sharing 
mechanisms such as letsema, or seahlolo. The former refers to a practice in African culture 
of cooperative community fields’ cultivation while the latter refers to share cropping (Letseka 
2013A: 342, Metz 2014: 68, Mofuoa 2014: 229). It is this idea of community cooperation and 
solidarity, which is an essential part of botho, which many of these proverbs including MKKB 
apply and articulate for different aspect of social life, that the use of narratives in unity enables.  
Another important value found in the use of proverbs in unity to articulation a deeper 
understanding of botho is the notion of vices to be avoided that they reject. Chief among these 
vices is boitśepo (Sekese 1994: 54), which is articulated in many ways by different proverbs. 
This can loosely be translated as selfishness and it is regarded as the antithesis of the virtue 
of botho. It is a social attitude that denotes pride in oneself, the kind of individualistic approach 
to life where an individual believes they do not need others and as such have no obligation to 
others as well (Sandal 1984: 5). In other words when used together narratives amplify the 
message they individually communicate, giving it a better outcome than they do individually.  
In this case the message that many Sesotho proverbs amplify is ‘that neither the single 
individual nor the community can define and pursue their respective purposes’ and ends apart 
from the mutual foundedness and complementary nature of being a person (Ramose 2009: 
309). This reiterates a well understood African idea of the dynamism of reciprocity and mutual 
concern expressed through sharing and harnessing of collective forces (Bujo 2001: 88; 
Ramose 2009: 308: 312).This is a feature of a life characteristic of the African community and 
also expected of one who is a motho. As these proverbs cited show, that they are an 
articulation of not only certain social norms and ideal, but even more importantly they point to 
the underlying constellation of virtues and moral qualities important for one who is regarded 
as a motho to have.  
It is not possible here to give an exhaustive analysis of the significance of proverbs as part of 
the Basotho indigenous knowledge, to the development of a richer account of botho, than the 
current one found in the discourse. But it will suffice to point out that like in many African 
cultures, Sesotho proverbs are a rich deposit of “ethics and morals” and “reach not only to the 
head but also the conscience” of motho to “help in the exercise of deciding between good and 
evil, justice and injustice, right or wrong” (Mokitimi 1997: xiv). The argument being made here 
for an alternative account of botho beyond slogans, is that in relation to botho, proverbs 
 
28 See No 7, 8, 147 in Sekese 1994: 53-54, 101 
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individually can never exhaustively capture the vast breadth of practical everyday ethical 
imperatives that botho has. To tap into this, we therefore need all the tools and resources 
available to communicate this and narratives do this best. As such they must be understood 
as always, a partial revelation of the virtues and eternal truths embedded in botho. It is for this 
reason that their message is best understood in their unity as a corpus of indigenous 
knowledge for it is there that the entirety of virtues of botho are revealed and can be accessed. 
The benefit of this comprehensive approach to narratives to unpack botho, is that it will first 
enrich current understanding of MKKB. Second, it advances the articulation of an account of 
botho as a moral ideal and thus addresses what some have described as a persistent stalled 
language game both in public and scholarly discourse characteristic of contemporary debates 
on botho (van Niekerk (2013: 9).  
In view of all this, the question must then be asked if it is not time that the discourse begins 
that all-important task of analysing botho as an ethical ideal, free from its dubious connection 
with ‘motho ke motho ka batho’ (Mboti 2015: 125). Is it not time for the botho discourse and 
African ethics to begin to take seriously the relevance of African indigenous knowledge and 
unity of its oral literature to the current quest for a better understanding of botho for today’s 
context? These questions point to the urgent need for a botho discourse and African ethics in 
general, to revisit afresh the value of proverbs as deposits of traditional wisdom and norms. 
There is therefore a need for a change of approach to excavate the rich “flora” and “fauna of 
African indigenous knowledge systems” (Mapesela 2004: 317), in order to uncover the hidden 
insights of botho and inform current discourse towards a more comprehensive systematic 
account of botho in tune with the whole body of knowledge that constitute African indigenous 
knowledge. This, in turn, will free the current discourse to look beyond the persistent confines 
of the current discourse to embrace among other things an equally important formulation of 
botho as a moral quality of person that pertains to an assessment of the moral character of 
motho.  
Currently the predominant formulation of botho in the discourse is not articulating and 
communicating many of these essential ideals embedded in narratives, many of whom are 
centred around qualities of botho defined in terms of moral character of persons. As such his 
dimension and function of proverbs and narratives is not emphasised much by the approach 
of the current botho discourse yet it is essential for a developing a new broader and richer 
account of botho. This is particularly important when communicating something as personal 
as the virtues of botho, which germinates in the community first in their concrete application 
and nurturing it in individuals as part of character and moral formation, which is the subject of 
the next section that follows here.  
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3.8  Reinstatement of Character to Definitions of Botho in Current Discourse 
 
The appraisal of the reinstatement of character advocated here must be understood as an 
acknowledgement of the positive contribution current botho discourse has made in drawing 
attention to the value of botho. It has raised the profile of this concept locally and internationally 
highlighting its ethical importance and contribution of botho ethics to ethics as an attractive 
alternative way of doing ethics. This development must be supported but also improved upon 
so that this ethic is in tune with today’s contexts, whose characteristic features includes  a 
stronger sense and consciousness of individuality, not to be confused with individualism, 
although the two are not too far apart. This is more so when one considers the negative impact 
of the dominance of Western approaches to ethics in different communities and their moral 
traditions. However, it is also the case that Afro-communitarian based accounts of botho can 
be misunderstood as overemphasising the communal dimension of virtue, neglecting to 
emphasise equally the much-needed personal dimension and agent centred imperatives of 
botho on motho, particularly those imperatives pertaining to character (Molefe 2017c: 51). 
What is interesting about the current botho discourse and its handling of character is that here 
and there reference to this is made but no real systematic account botho premised on 
character as such is ever developed. Take for example Shutte (2001: 32) remark that the 
range of moral virtues that make up botho consists of those virtues concerned with our 
relationship with others and those that characterise our relationship to ourselves. Here we 
have an acknowledgement of the importance of character to botho. But more significantly 
Shutte argues that this “takes the form of integrity, a solidity or wholeness of character” as well 
as other “positive qualities of character”. What we see here, which is characteristic of the 
current botho discourse is a recognition in passing of the connection between botho and 
character, but this is never fully developed as a formulation of botho. The exception here is 
among contemporary scholars of botho such is van Niekerk (2007:367, 2013: 84). But if the 
discourse were to follow this through as implied here, it would soon be discovered that it is 
precisely in the emphasis on character, i.e., in its formation and development, that the 
transformative power and attractiveness of botho as an alternative ethical framework 
appropriate for a change of contemporary moral attitudes is found. This is the agent centred, 
character centric account, where botho is linked to character as a vital moral concept, which 
in Sesotho culture is understood in terms of inculcation of makhabane i.e., virtues of botho as 
essential to one’s telos of being a good person. In other words, current discourse would place 
at the centre of ethical reflection questions of the moral character of the persons, to underscore 
the significance of individuals as the agents that make botho a reality in the community along 
with the corresponding practice of virtues upon which botho depends. Making questions of 
character the centre of ethical reflection on botho militates a rethink of the fundamental ethical 
problem behind the moral challenges facing modern individuals in Africa today highlighted in 
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chapter two. It allows for an better understanding of current ethical challenges and decay in 
the moral fibre of communities in Southern Africa discussed in earlier chapter, that these are 
symptomatic of problem of the displacement of character in ethics i.e., failure to create batho 
ba nang le botho (individuals who possess botho). This is an understanding we find underlying 
what it means to be a motho as found in traditional societies such as that of ancient Basotho. 
Here attention is focused less on “doing” and actions of moral agents, but rather on “being”.  
Earlier we referred to what MacIntyre (1982: 1) described as the disappearance of the moral 
agent's character in ethics and that the consequences of this has been relegation of our 
intentions, desires, dispositions and goal in life as agents, to the periphery of moral discourse 
and ethical reflection. This displacement of character as the central focus of morality and 
ethical reflection and evaluation of personal conduct (Richardson 1994: 91; MacIntyre 1981: 
195) is not only a problem with modern approach to ethics, but also to current botho discourse. 
This is because I will argue, that in Sesotho culture and by extension in African ethics, the 
notion of ethics without reference to moral character of a person is unintelligible, and this is 
the problem with current botho discourse has. One of the negative consequences of this is 
that this has led to an unfortunate disconnect between “doing” and “being.”  And yet when it 
comes to ethics, what we do is not morally immaterial to who we are i.e., to our identity 
because our actions reflect our character.  
What the displacement of character in the manner just described does, is that it enables an 
understanding of ethics where our actions can be considered as separate from who we are. 
We now can regard what we do as not a real reflection of who we are as agents i.e., our 
characters. Actions can now be treated as separate incidentals that can be assessed 
independently of our moral identity as agents. According to this then, our actions have no 
bearing on our character as individuals. But we cannot envision ourselves as agents in this 
way, because to acquire and possess botho and make this part of one’s character, one ought 
to be in the habit i.e., consistently performing actions coherent with ethical imperatives of 
botho. According to Gyekye (2011: par 16) the performance of good actions must be habitual 
if they in turn are to produce the “corresponding character” because a “good habit 
…persistently performed strengthen that habit;” and “in this way, virtue (or, good character) is 
acquired”.  
The displacement of moral character from the centre of ethics means that one’s character is 
no longer the primary point of reference for moral behaviour in ethics and in turn assessment 
of moral behaviour. Hence in most modern societies this has been replace by choice29 
(MacIntyre 1981: 20, 33). This is true of most traditional societies in Africa whose moral 
traditions have been heavily affected by the influence of modern Western ethics. Many 
cultures in Southern Africa today, including many of those from which botho derives are a 
 
29 See chapter 4, after virtue, (1981) for more on radical choice.  
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case in point. It is important to realise though that the displacement of character could not 
have occurred without the corresponding transformation of the traditional role and 
understanding of what is motho in the community i.e., as a beacon of botho and a microcosm 
of the community’s ideals (Mphetolang 2009: 19). The implication of this is that moral agents 
are now no longer accountable to others and neither can individuals be held to account for 
their conduct by others. So, when it comes to conduct, contemporary individuals are indeed 
their own moral sovereign whose accountability for a particular way of life is judged only by 
choice of the moral agent.  
The danger with this abandonment of character as the defining quality of morality in current 
botho discourse is two-fold. First the loss of sight of character as the core of the century-old 
understanding and interpretation of botho in Southern African. This is confirmed in the 
common usage of this concept in the cultures of traditional societies in Southern Africa from 
which this concept derives (Gade 2011: 308; Gade 2013: 487). Second, this means that 
current botho discourse will continue to neglect this as important feature of African ethics, and 
that morality and the fact that ethics for most African people is character-based. This is 
because for African ethics and this includes ethics of botho “good character is the essence of” 
what it means to be ethical and the “linchpin of the moral wheel” of traditional morality of 
African culture (Gyekye 2011: par 13). For this reason, questions of moral character are proper 
entry points into discussions about botho and are necessary for unpacking its insights as 
polysemic moral ideal. This is relevant because moral character reveals who we are as 
individuals and it is also that by which we define what is motho. This in turn is central to the 
interpretation and understanding of botho. That means analysing the concept of motho and 
how this is understood both in its descriptive terms i.e., referring to the individual, and its 
normative and most fundamental sense where it denotes moral personhood (Mabovula 2011: 
42, Ikuenobe 2016: 128). This is because motho is the embodiment of botho in the community 
and the individual becomes that through which the tangible experience of which botho in the 
community happens. What this tells us about moral character is that botho cannot be 
abstracted from the characters of the individuals who make it possible. In other words, the 
existence of botho cannot become a reality unless there is in communities’ batho, (persons), 
with characters so formed and still forming, that as individual agents they become de facto the 
living personification of botho and its ideals in the community. Through character formation, 
understood in its active sense i.e., the moral agent’s choice to be a certain sort of person 
(Richardson 1994: 92), botho can, in that sense be moulded on to one’s character (Otlogetswe 
2015:2). This, in turn shapes and defines the character of motho, becoming the essence of 
who the agent is in terms of their moral character and social identity. Through the practice of 
acts of botho in daily life motho thus strengthens the reality and existence of botho in the 
community.  
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Unless botho is reformulated afresh in terms of the character of person and acquisition of a 
good disposition of character, talk of botho thus will remain just that. For this to happen it will 
require shifting focus back to individuals as moral agents and their character as the primary 
focus of ethical reflection. The relevance of this is it that allows the articulation of personal 
dimension of virtues of botho. This dimension puts emphasis on integrity and personal 
character and turns the conversation about botho away from over emphasis and 
preoccupation with safeguarding communal relationships as the primary ethical consideration, 
to the individual personal level of becoming better at inculcating makhabane a botho (virtues 
of botho). This formulation is better in reaching contemporary moral agents many of whom 
self-identify more in individual personal terms than communal relations. But the net effect I 
argue will be the same regarding the communal consideration of harmonious relationships. 
The is because as shown many of the values and virtues being inculcate and internalised as 
part of the agent’s moral character, are communal in nature and orientation and not selfish or 
individualistic.  
It is in this sense that Afro-communitarian is described here as overemphasising the 
communal and relational imperatives of botho, at the expense of its more personal and 
individual dimension that focus on inculcation and cultivation of good qualities of character. 
The consequences of this are the all too familiar accusation that African ethics is too focused 
on the community while overlooking the individual, further entrenching this false dichotomy 
that I argue is unhelpful and takes away the rich reciprocity characteristics of African culture.  
This articulation of botho I will argued is compatible with the communal orientation of African 
ethics, and consistent with how botho has been understood and interpreted for generations 
including in Sesotho speaking cultures. In Sesotho culture thus we find botho, is at once 
concerned with questions of inner qualities of character of motho, and inculcation of virtues of 
botho, like integrity, honesty and dignity, self-respect just to mention a few (Dolamo 2013: 2; 
Casalis 1861: 303). In other words, it is an articulation of botho that locates moral value in the 
individual moral agent, where the emphasis is on inculcation and cultivation of good moral 
qualities of character, and many of these qualities have a strong communal orientation and 
focus, such as sharing, being kind and helpful to others etc. etc. This I will argue should be 
the heart of contemporary theorisation on botho as an articulation of African communalism.  
From the perspective of Sesotho culture, emphasis on dispositions of character is the correct 
formulation of botho because it coheres with how botho is understood (Casalis 1861: 322, 
Gade 2011: 108) while not denying the communal nature of ethics of Basotho.  This is because 
in Sesotho culture botho cannot be fully explained without reference to boitśoaro i.e., good 
behaviour which has to do with considerations of the character of motho and how one carries 
themselves socially and morally. Questions about the possession of botho by a person 
(motho), can only be fully answered with reference to questions about what kind of person is 
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in the first place i.e., who they are as a moral agent, in whose life and way of living botho is 
supposed to come alive in the community. It is for this reason that the call for the reinstatement 
of character in the botho discourse and analysis is long overdue, and the character-centric 
account of botho proposed here is presented an alternative  starting point.  
It is against this background that the case for the reinstatement of character in the current 
discourse is made. This means paying greater attention to individuals particularly to the notion 
of makhabane a botho30, i.e., inculcation of qualities of good character and virtues of botho 
and reinstating this to the centre of the discourse. This requires recognition that discussions 
about botho i.e., moral personhood, are ultimately discussions about qualities of character. It 
also means acknowledging the primacy of character as a starting point of analysis about botho 
understood as personhood. That means the question “what is motho” is thus taken to be in an 
important sense more fundamental and prior to the other questions of ethical reflection on 
botho, such the actions of the agent, or his or her valuing of harmonious communal 
relationships or some communal imperatives that botho entails. The implication of this to 
current botho discourse means that talk about personhood cannot be fully entered into 
independent of a discourse about the character of persons. One can therefore argue that it is 
going to be exceedingly difficult to expect motho without good character, i.e., as part of who 
they are or their essential makeup, to value and display the requisite dispositions of botho in 
communal relationships with others. This is because harmonious communal relations are the 
outward expression of the inner dispositions of one’s character or inclinations and qualities of 
character where the former presupposes the latter. There is therefore an internal hierarchy 
implied here, which entails that the communal relational dimensions of botho cannot become 
a reality independently of its personal individual dimensions implied in the development and 
formation of character. This means that the latter is prior in the sense that motho i.e., the 
individual agent, becomes the concrete wellspring of botho in the community and this is 
experienced primarily in their character. Hence in Sesotho speaking cultures, someone 
regarded as having botho is described as having a well-rounded character (Mphetolang 
2009:13).  The foundational moral claims encapsulated in botho therefore are claims about 
moral character and specifically as expressions of the assessment and evaluation of the 
character of motho. In other words, if we have agents with good moral characters first or 
persons imbued with proper dispositions of botho, then the communal imperatives of botho 
will occur and come naturally in the life of the agent. This is because central to good character 
is inculcation of values and virtues of botho, and many of these are communal in orientation 
and focus. Or to put it another way, the communal imperatives implied in botho, presuppose 
 
30It must be observed thought that in African culture the community is intrinsically involved in the moral agents 
acquisitioning of these virtues, it is not an individual solo effort, because in African culture the community is not 
satisfied to leaving the individual on their own on the journey towards personhood, without guidance and 
involvement of community. 
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the development of moral character in the members of the community that is compatible with 
the values and virtues of botho. Without these characteristic ways of living that is typical of 
who we are as a matter of our character or our identity as moral agents, living out the 
communal virtues of botho in the community becomes difficult if not impossible. This is what 
in Sesotho culture is referred to as mekhoa in the moral sphere, which denotes certain habits 
of moral nature of a person that reflects one’s true nature and identity as a moral agent. From 
this we can see why discussions about botho, are intrinsically connected to discussions about 
character which is an answer to the question “what is motho” and “the person they ought to 
be.” This is because it is the individual motho who is the tangible living embodiment of botho 
in the community including its communal imperatives. Because of this understanding in 
Sesotho culture it is precisely this interface between motho and botho, that is regarded as 
essential for ethics and the concrete experience of botho in the community especially the 
personal transformation in a person that botho formation engenders in a person as a moral 
being. The reinstatement of character as indicated is best understood in terms of the notion 
of inculcation of virtues. We have already touched upon this in passing with references to the 
idea makhabane (virtues) and here I want to underscore this.  
In Sesotho culture cultivation of virtues and avoidance of vices is very central to how Basotho 
speak about the character of motho, and in turn personhood. Botho or personhood in Sesotho 
culture is regarded not only as the foundation of ethical living but also in essence as the 
seedbed for what a Mosotho would call makhabane a botho i.e., virtues and qualities of 
character (Seema 2012: 134; Maharasoa and Maharaswa 2004: 109, Letseka 2013A: 340). 
As it can be seen this implies a shift from the externalities of current approaches preoccupied 
with actions and what individuals do, to the internal looking ethical concerns about motho. In 
other words, the interest here is with the continual internalisation of qualities of botho in motho. 
This makes the character an essential prerequisite for concrete and tangible presence of a 
communal practice of botho and its imperatives. The neglect of character thus has serious 
implications for current theorisation of botho which currently does not give adequate emphasis 
on this as an expression of the personal dimension, agent centred formulation of botho. First 
it means a continued lack of progress in broadening the discourse and advancing the 
discussion any further than where they currently are, which is described by some as an 
impasse or the cul de sac of the stalled language surrounding botho (van Niekerk 2013:7). 
Second, it means such analysis will continue to ignore the necessity and significance of 
character i.e., inculcation of good qualities of character as the core message for ethical 
reflection on botho. This is particularly pertinent in Sesotho speaking culture, where character 
is essential for moral life understood in terms of acquisition of makhabane. This notion 
expresses an internal inner quality of goodness in moral behaviour, and as such it is correctly 
described as the linchpin of morality and wellspring of moral agency (Gyekye 2011: par. 13) 
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and essence of African moral system. This further reiterates the argument that “in order to 
understand the moral obligation of motho to others, which is the communal imperatives of 
botho mantra of AC, it is necessary to first engage with the question “what a person is” in the 
first place (Mphetolang 2009: 14, Tschaepe 2013: 51) and this is done by way of assessing 
one’s character as a moral agent”. 
The high moral premium Basotho ethics place on character of motho offers a good starting 
point for the introduction in current botho discourse, of ways and approaches that articulates 
the personal agent centred account of botho, which is a perquisite for the realisation of the 
communal imperatives of botho advocated by Afro-communitarianism. This is because the 
emphasis on character highlights the crucial role that motho plays in the moral life of the overall 
health status of the moral life in the community. Because character is a moral property that 
exists in the individual this requires respecting the intrinsic link between botho and motho as 
an individual (Mphetolang 2009:13). Specifically, his and her moral character and its 
formation. In this sense botho must be understood as a description of that inner moral quality 
or beauty of motho that reflects a person’s character and implies his or her moral heritage. 
Because of this botho, cannot be separated from the African conception and definition of what 
is “motho” (person), according to which, motho in the robust sense embodies ethical 
presuppositions, much of which is centred around moral character of the individual (Ikuenobe 
2016: 129, Gaie 2002: 277). In Sesotho culture the word motho, has a specific interpretation 
that captures both the descriptive (physical and metaphysical) and normative meaning 
(Ikuenobe 2016: 144), which the English translation “person” does not really convey. A more 
correct translation of motho thus should read “individual person.”  
It is worth noting that the reinstatement of character is not incompatible with the central claims 
of AC vis-à-vis botho and its communal orientation31. It is in fact an endorsement of the 
significance of the community because the formation and development of character, through 
which the individual is nurtured and socialised into botho from childhood to adulthood, 
(Dolamo 2013: 5,  Casalis 1861; 267,  Bereng 1987: 40, Sekese 1994: 9) is a matter in which 
the community has a big stake and interest. Character as a reflection of one’s personhood or 
botho therefore does not only presupposes the community as its authentic context, it requires 
it. It is in this sense that it is correct to say one cannot speak of botho outside the community 
(Dolamo 2013: 8), because that by which botho is manifested in a person is something that 
comes about because of active involvement and nurturing by others. Our “communities and 
families are thus pivotal to the development of” our characters as moral agents, given that as 
 
31 Here I am thinking of Metz’s account of botho which has come to be the prevailing account of AC in the literature 
(Metz 2007, see also Molefe 2017c: 53 and 57). 
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agents we are products of our own community32 (Letseka 2013B: 357). This means that the 
individual as a moral agent, even as a hero of their own life story (Shutte 2001: 53), is always 
a reflection of their community.  
A detailed analysis of the role of the community in the formation and development of moral 
character of its members and the relationship with the individual agency is beyond the scope 
of this chapter33. This will however be discussed in chapter five under the social conditions 
necessary for botho to thrive and that make it possible. Here it will suffice to only emphasise 
that in Sesotho culture, the community is like a school of character. It plays a key role in the 
formation of character in the early years of one’s life and in its development in later years in 
adulthood through several social institutions and their normative influence on motho. In terms 
of this, it is the community in the end that creates out of individuals “batho bao e leng batho,” 
i.e., persons that have qualities of botho, and who become citizens that are truly human and 
morally upright. So, as it can be seen this status of the community in African ethics is a further 
endorsement of the case for reinstatement of character and articulation of a more personal 
agent centred account of botho. Because of this relationship of the community to moral 
development and formation, we cannot therefore strictly speaking theorise about the 
communitarian imperatives and values of botho in the community, without reference to moral 
character of the members found in those of the community.  
The argument therefore behind the reimagined formulation of botho advocated here, is that a 
more explicitly agent centred interpretation of botho is what society needs today more than a 
communally based account. The former is more suited to the context of the contemporary 
moral environment in which the individual is the primary unit of social consideration. This is 
because in today’s context society is organised around the notions of the individual as the 
basic social unit, of individual rights where people increasingly thinking of themselves in terms 
of individual autonomy. And the best way of formulating such a personal inward agent centred 
articulation of botho, I argue starts with an interpretation and understanding of botho primarily 
in terms moral character or the moral quality of a person (Gade 2012: 488), an account that 
is very personal and speaks directly to the individual. This is confirmed by Metz (2011: 391) 
who points out that to African thought “talk of “personhood”, which is what botho is essentially 
about “is inherently moralised such that to be a person is to be virtuous or to exhibit good 
character”. It is therefore not difficult to see how in the moral tradition of the Basotho, “botho” 
as the pinnacle of moral excellence i.e., personhood, is understood primarily in terms of the 
 
32This must not be understood as implying that the individuals have no role in the formation of their own character. 
The relationship with the community is a symbiotic one, because the community shapes the individual’s character, 
but at the same time individual reciprocally shapes the character of his or her community (Richardson 1994: 93).  
33 The term is used here in a specific sense to denote the lifestyle and community sprit often found in many 
traditional villages in places like Lesotho, or what could be called village life. This qualification is to emphasis the 
particularity of such a way of life which can get lost in ‘community’ which is easily universalizable especially in 
discourses where it is differentiated with ‘society’.  
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good moral character of motho, developed through the habitual practice of “mekhoa e 
lokileng”, morally good habits of motho in the community.  
In view of this it is now no longer a choice, but a necessity to articulate an alternative 
formulation of botho from the current Afro-communitarian one. The current approaches where 
the emphasis is on communal relations is problematic and not helpful within a modern context 
where the traditional sense of community belonging for most people is weak or non-existent. 
In other words, because modern urban existence of the West and liberal individualism has 
diseased contemporary moral environment of so many African societies so much,  the 
widespread sense of loss of community and belonging has rendered the current 
communitarian argument in the discourse to become almost irrelevant (Richardson 1994: 97). 
In that context, it seems that an articulation of the principle of botho primarily in communal 
terms is a failure to read the signs of the times, and a recipe for failure to communicate 
effectively by tailoring the message in view of who the audience is. The result is an account 
of botho that is experienced as irrelevant to most people, as it does not speak to the concrete 
reality that the modern individual identifies with. This leaves botho without that key social 
institution it needs to come alive in the community as its embodiment, namely motho or the 
individual and most important a motho with a certain character. This is also a missed 
opportunity to exploit the heightened sense of individuality of our times, as a readily available 
ethical resource, to bring about in communities the reality of botho by educating the individual 
towards virtues of botho in terms of habitual cultivation of qualities of botho as part of forming 
one’s moral character in daily living that makes one to be a good person, of which most people 
have an innate sense of what this means.  
In other words, there is a need to look at a different approach to botho ethics, in the direction 
of a character centric account analogous to that found in Sesotho culture, which shares many 
features traditionally associated with the moral tradition of the virtues. Such an approach 
involves the core of ethical reflection centred on questions about who we are i.e., “what sort 
of person we are as agents.” It will also of necessity be focused on the notion of good moral 
character as an essential part of answers to these questions because our character reflects 
who we are. The benefit of this approach, compared to prevailing ones, is that it requires of 
the moral agent choosing to be a certain type of motho, with certain kinds of beliefs and values 
where these are essential to one’s way of life, and in turn their personal conduct. Even more 
significant is that it further underscores that it is thus not going to be enough for motho, to 
occasionally display commendable acts of botho in communities. What is needed instead is a 
commitment to virtuous living by the moral agent as they aspire to become a motho, by leading 
a certain way of life infused with qualities of botho. According to this then underlying this 
approach is a view of botho ethics where motho has a clear sense of one’s goal in life, a telos, 
which becomes the moral anchor and compass that guides one towards virtue. In this regard, 
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this approach shares many tenets of the ethical approach traditionally found in virtue ethics. 
In it can be found many similarities with the central arguments often associated with the moral 
tradition of the virtues, not least in the emphasis on the supremacy of character. It is to these 
approaches that elevate character that I turn to.   
 
3.8.1  Botho as an African variant of Virtue Ethical Approach to Ethics 
 
The character-centric formulation of botho or agent centred of botho advocated here with its 
emphasis on the primacy of character is a big departure from the prevailing accounts of botho 
in the discourse. It asserts that when it comes to botho ethics it is inculcation of makhabane a 
botho (virtues of botho)that matters most and that it is this that is the foundation of grounding 
of relationships with others. It is based on the premise that character denotes integrity and 
self-respects and that one is more likely to respect others if they respect themselves. This 
makes this approach more at home within virtue ethical approaches commonly associated 
with virtue ethics (VE). This assertion is made against the background where there is a 
growing recognition in the literature on ethics that the moral tradition of virtues, or virtue ethics 
which for long time was exclusively defined in Aristotelian terms, can be found in many non-
Western traditions. Despite this, there is little in the literature, especially in the current botho 
discourse by way of interest in inquiring about the historical presence of this tradition in the 
moral traditions and cultures from which botho derives. It is not the intention of this study to 
make a comparison of botho ethics and virtue ethics here as this will be beyond the scope of 
this chapter, nor will it be possible here to give a fuller account of this. The aim is to highlight 
the similarity in approach in broad terms and especially on the emphasis on the primacy of 
character.  It is to state in broad speaking without arguing the case the basic common 
approach between this tradition and ethics of botho, and more specifically the supremacy of 
character that botho place emphasis on. In other words, this is further endorsement of an 
observation not that uncommon in the literature where parallels on this subject have been 
drawn before.  The recognition of this affinity between ethics of botho and virtue ethics is what 
is seen in Ntibagirirwa’s (1999:3) remarks about the lack of reflection on virtue ethics in African 
ethics pointing out that this is “despite its imperative necessity” and suggesting that renewed 
interest in the concept is in this sense a positive sign for the rediscovery and validation of the 
ethical approach. The most explicit parallel so far made is one by Metz (2012), who points out 
that although there are differences between the two, there are many commonalities, and 
adding that a plain reading of Aristotle on many topics suggests that he would readily agree 
with much that is found in sub-Saharan ethics. Likewise van Niekerk (2013: 89, 2009: 84) 
draws similar parallels arguing that the current definitions of botho, “reproduce the 
characteristic concerns of virtue ethics” [and the concept itself]; “seems amenable to a very 
particular set of claims intended to pick out the characteristic shape of virtue ethical theories.” 
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This study shares this view and emphasises the parallel with focus on the formulation of botho 
in terms of the primacy of character.  In this regard the basic premise for both is the same 
since VE takes the judgement of character as basic and foundational (Solomon 1997: 166) 
while botho ethics similarly highlights the primacy of character. Besides this we also see 
commonalities where VE maintains that the ethical task of each person  
“is to be become a person of a certain sort where becoming a person of that 
sort is to become a person who has a certain disposition to respond to 
situations in a [particular] characteristic way…..These features of human 
being on which virtues theory concentrate in depicting the ideal human being 
are states of character……which [motho]human must possess if they are to 
be successful as [a motho]…i.e., to reach the appropriate telos of [his or her 
life]”. (Ibid.)  
 
This similarity here is not least because the main preoccupation of all versions of VE, like 
botho ethics is living distinctively good lives and being good persons (Watson 1997: 67). It is 
also that with both, the notion of a morally good person is the irreducible starting point (Louden 
1997: 289), as opposed to considerations of what constitutes good actions and bad actions. 
In other words, for VE and ethics of botho the primary object of moral evaluation is motho i.e., 
the moral agent and specifically the character of the person. In others it can be argued that 
both approaches start from the premise that “assessment of human character is…, more 
fundamental than either the assessment of the rightness of action or the assessment of the 
value of the consequences of actions” (Solomon 1997: 166).  It can further be argued that the 
elevation of character as the heart of evaluative statements seen in VE , the primacy of 
character is what makes botho ethics understood in terms of cultivation of makhabane a 
version of VE. This idea of virtues as articulated in VE and its centrality and intrinsic connection 
to an evaluation of conduct is very much what botho ethics entails and how it functions in the 
moral culture of Basotho i.e., as an expression of a moral judgement following a moral 
assessment of conduct. Thus, we see that in both VE and ethics of botho the central focus of 
ethical reflection is the person (motho) i.e., the individual specifically his or her character, i.e., 
its formation and development. It can therefore be argued that without reference to character 
the reimagined formulation of botho this study proposes is unintelligible just as it is with VE.  
These initials observation about botho underscoring the significance of character for moral 
conduct show how much botho ethics as a character-based ethic, reflects many key elements 
traditionally associated with the moral tradition of the virtues. This understanding of I will argue 
is well construed because like many virtue ethical approaches, botho ethics places the 
significance of character at the centre of ethics. It is in this sense that ethics of botho can be 
treated as an African variant of the moral tradition of the virtues. I will therefore argue that its 
key themes; primacy of character, emphasis on cultivating virtues of botho (makhabane), and 
the moral significance of the community all resemble features of ethical approaches 
characteristics of many pre-modern and traditional cultures similar to the ethical approach 
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traditionally found in Aristotelianism. It must, however, be stressed that this does not mean 
that the reimagined formulation of botho envisioned here i.e., in terms of character and the 
requirement of the practice of virtues, must take on a “neo-Aristotelian” form. Variants of VE 
do exist that are not, for instance, in the East, this tradition can be traced to Mencius and 
Confucius, (Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2016). This is the case with botho in sub-Saharan 
Africa and how it is applied and functioned as a moral ideal in Sesotho speaking culture. As 
an ethical ideal and basic moral frame of reference, it encourages inculcation of makhabane 
a botho (virtues of botho), many of which can be found in the lives of paradigmatic figures in 
the culture of the Basotho. I am thinking here of figure like Chief Mohlomi, philosopher and 
teacher and his protégé, Moshoeshoe, King of the Basotho. The two are the most notable 
adherents of botho ethics, from which valuable lessons about virtues of botho can be learned 
especially about leadership today. Moshoeshoe34 later went on to become one of the most 
renowned ethical leaders of his time; practitioner of ethics of botho par excellence in 
eighteenth century Southern Africa, championing peace as an important principle and a virtue 
highly regarded as central tenet of botho (du-Preez 2012: 9; Prozesky 2016) among his 
people. 
The character-based approach to botho ethics advanced here is yet another voice in the 
growing debate about the relevance of character in ethics in general. Traditionally this 
approach is associated with virtue ethics, hence the argument about the parallels between the 
two.  This approach is best understood in terms of an approach to ethics that “articulate moral 
value through a focus on the morality of dispositions of character, rather than on the morality 
of acts” (van Niekerk 2013: 84). In Sesotho culture, the equivalence of this is the insistence 
on the cultivation of makhabane a botho, as central to botho. It implies that the assessment of 
moral conduct is not only a matter of how one acts but more importantly it is a matter of one’s 
character and the way one lives their life. This, in turn, ought to be the central focus of the 
discourse. The insights within botho, that are being rediscovered by its interpretation in terms 
of character, for example the priority of the ‘goodness of motho’ over the ‘the rightness of 
actions of motho’ provides contemporary moral environment with a workable alternative 
ethical framework which is much needed today (Shutte 2001: 9). This is because unlike the 
existing major ethical theories, botho is a rejection of the idea of ethics as something 
concerned primarily with  rules about “the right thing to do” i.e., priority of what is right over 
what is good (Richardson 2009: 142). In other words, it is preoccupied with a different set of 
 
34 In Sesotho culture he is also accredited with the invention of ‘mafisa’ system, a practice sharing of wealth in the 
form of cattle with those who have no cattle on a gift or loan basis (Matśela 1979:87). The moral significance of 
this practice, which in the current discourse is sometimes erroneously referred to only as loan term loan of cattle 
(Richardson 2009: 136, Mofuoa 2014: 229) often misunderstood as merely an expression of African 
communalism.A closer analysis of this practice reveal the moral character of the person in that it is an eternal 
expression that demonstrates the possession of the virtue of sharing, kindness and kutloelo bohloko, (fellow feeling 
for another person) values and virtues (makhabane) that are highly regarded and encourage in Sesotho culture as 
part of moral education of Basotho.  
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interest namely the character of motho as revealed in their life and the way one conduct 
themselves (Mkhize 2008: 42). This formulation of botho it can be argued that it does not only 
encapsulate eternal truths relevant for contemporary sub-Saharan society, but that it is also 
relevant to ethics in general as it underscores necessity of the reinstatement of character and 
virtue ethical approaches to ethics, which is traditionally associated with VE (van Niekerk 
2009: 84,  Richardson 1994: 89). This is because it places premium on moral character of the 
agent as the basis of moral value. It focuses how well moral agents perform in acquiring good 
moral qualities of character that make a person a truly “morally beautiful person” (Ikuenobe 
2016: 129). When viewed this way botho ethics presents an attractive alternative to modern 
approaches to ethics and is a validation of an approach that resonates mutatis mutandis with 
the moral tradition represented by virtue ethics. This is the tradition that in the West is 
synonymous with Aristotle’s ethics, which some are now questioning the wisdom of its 
abandonment due to the influence of the enlightenment on modern ethics (MacIntyre 1981: 
117).  
The most persuasive argument of the similarity between botho ethics and VE is the conception 
of botho in Sesotho speaking culture. As already mentioned in Sesotho culture ethics is 
described in terms of virtues and vices. Similarly botho is defined in that way as well i.e., the 
virtues it encourages in a person and the vices it discourages. It is for this reason that botho 
as virtue is evoked in Sesotho culture always in opposition to bophoofolo as its corresponding 
vice to be avoided i.e., failure to acquire botho. Linked to this is that the Sesotho understanding 
of this concept puts great emphasis on attainment of botho through inculcation of makhabane 
(virtue) as a habitual moral training in character. What this points to is the importance that 
Basotho ethics placed on moral formation specifically in training for character. All else thus 
flows from this including inculcation of makhabane. The same is true of virtue ethics. As 
Hursthouse (2016: par 2, 59). explains for proponent of virtue ethics, (a) virtues and vices are 
foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them, 
and (b) great emphasis is put on moral education, where the goal is not inculcation of rules 
but the training of character of individuals”. As it can be seen in both cases great emphasis is 
put on moral life being understood in terms of virtues and vices, both equally place great 
significance on moral formation and training for character. In terms of elaborating this in 
relation to botho, this will require a further analysis of how botho as moral concept is 
understood and its intrinsic connection with character. Some of this has already been 
discussed in earlier sections so here I will just summarise the main points.   
If one looks at ordinary parlance in Sesotho culture it will be seen that references to botho and 
how it is spoken of, is as a description of moral quality or an attribute of a character that either 
a motho has or does not have. And the context within which this assessment is made is not a 
single act, but the whole process of moral education into the virtues, a process of education 
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that is lifelong. This is what botho fundamentally means i.e., motho progressively acquiring 
certain admirable good qualities of character or makhabane. In other words, the central 
questions at the centre of ethical reflection according to this account are questions about 
motho and the moral quality of their life (Richardson 1994: 89, 93), questions which as we 
know are the running theme of VE.  
The relevancy of the character centric formulation of advanced here echoes VE’s central idea 
of training in character, with the emphasis on the idea of inculcating virtues. This does not only 
reaffirm the primacy of character, which is a key theme of VE but highlights the significance 
of moral training that both VE and botho ethics emphasis as essential to the quality of a 
person’s character. The is also consistent with one of the foundational claims underlying virtue 
ethical approaches, which is ‘what sorts of persons we are and ought to be and how we should 
live’ (Hursthouse 2016: Par 3; Richardson 1994: 92).  
The implication of this for current botho discourses among other things includes a shift towards 
interpreting and redefining botho in terms virtue ethical approaches, whereby the inculcation 
of admirable moral qualities of botho is the purpose and aim of being moral or as VE puts to 
be virtuous. This means interpreting botho in terms of encapsulation of virtues, whereby even 
the valuing of harmonious relationships is understood as dispositional state partially 
constituted by and intelligible in terms of the moral agent’s character and how it is formed (van 
Niekerk 2009: 84). In other words, these relationships must be understood as not sufficient on 
their own, they still require active effort by the agent to acquire the right set of character 
dispositions which are agreeable to forming and sustaining harmonious communal relations 
and integrating these into one’s character as part of who they are and how one lives. It is in 
this sense that botho is understood as that by with other normative ideals and values are 
defined or lived in conformity to. It is because botho is itself a moral ideal consisting of a 
conglomeration of virtues (van Niekerk 2009: 87, Shutte 2001: 32). In this way botho, becomes 
the principal normative ideal upon which other moral ideals are grounded, because as found 
in Sesotho culture, botho fundamentally denotes the totality of makhabane. That means full 
attainment i.e., perfection in possession or complete attainment of botho is never fully 
achieved because this would mean a perfect motho, which is not possible because as agents 
we are never perfect.  
The possession of botho and the virtues it encapsulates therefore is always a matter of 
degrees, measured in terms of evaluating whether one is making sufficient steady progress 
towards this or not. It is in this sense that botho can thus be considered as the goal or telos in 
the moral agent’s life another. Here again one can see elements of teleology of VE her 
although not that fully developed. In other words, personhood or botho and makhabane denote 
moral growth and maturity where the emphasis is on the link between being ethical and moral 
maturity. Personal moral growth which botho presupposes is then to be understood an 
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acknowledgement that motho as a moral agent is a work in progress i.e., “a still evolving and 
growing being whose full attainment of botho or personhood is a matter of degree. In other 
words, making progress in how well one lives their life in terms of learning about education in 
virtue that one gets from lived experience and from others with the requisite moral standing in 
the community or moral example (van Niekerk 2013: 88).  
It is interesting to observe here that this description picks on the teleological orientation and . 
this is another area of commonality of botho ethics and virtue ethical approaches. It manifests 
itself most clearly in what is commonly referred to as normative conception of personhood. 
This is an understanding of motho is reasons for being, which in Sesotho culture can be 
interpreted as doing what one ought to do as a moral agent or motho. It is a view of life of the 
moral agent seen as consisting of moving steadily through life towards one’s ultimate purpose 
in life or telos and this is achieved by the way our whole life is constructed (McIntyre 1981: 34, 
147, 175). In terms of this understanding, botho denotes possession of good traits of character 
inculcated over time and consistently displayed over one’s whole life. Its possession i.e., good 
traits of character or more correctly inculcation of makhabane by the agent, makes motho to 
be good in terms of performing their purpose or telos well, and in African ethics, this is implicitly 
understood in terms of simply being a motho i.e., good person and fulfilment one’s obligations 
and role in life. This teleological connotations in botho is best captured in the joint notions of 
personhood and acquisition of makhabane. These denotes possession of botho as “the sort 
of thing that does not develop in motho automatically, but rather has to be acquired through 
habitual practices in the course and during one’s life. This is done by the way a person lives 
their life and it implied a possibility of failure in achieving this or success (van Nierkerk 2009: 
84, Molefe 2017c: 58). Success here must be understood in terms of, making adequate 
acceptable progress towards a complete and fulfilled life, which is one’s life goal35. 
Makhabane, on the other hand, denotes the practising of the virtues in the course of one’s life 
and the steady progress one makes through regular practice and participation in social 
practices36 i.e., those types of human activity that provides the arena in which the virtues are 
exhibited, and moral habits are developed and sustained. 
The centrality of character or virtuous character is not only the overarching theme of character 
ethics that VE denotes, but it is also its bedrock. This can be argued is the same about ethics 
botho because development of good character is the governing principle. And since character 
entails a certain stableness and permanency, i.e., a behaviour pattern formed because of past 
 
35 The meaning intended here is akin to that which is applied when describing individuals in terms of the success 
in a career, the emphasis is on the whole of a person’s life in that particular career as a whole, whose final 
assessment is at the end. The same applies to botho as the evaluation of the moral life of motho. When understood 
in this sense then botho in its most radical form refers to a complete and fulfilled life achievement, which fully 
assessment can only be made at the end, as the ancient Greek proverb say 'Call no man happy until he is dead” 
(McIntyre 1981: 34). 
36 See McIntyre 1981: 187. 
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persistent actions (Gyekye 2011: par. 16) it is the sort of thing that does not change 
significantly over time but evolves gradually so to speak due to growth and maturity i.e., 
character development. For this reason, character tends to be understood in terms of those 
dispositions and good moral qualities that last much longer and change less easily. It is in this 
sense that moral virtues (excellences of character) or vices likewise are understood as the 
consequences of habituation (Ibid.). This is true of the understanding underlying possession 
of virtues of botho too, which is an expression of the acquisition of qualities that describe the 
moral beauty of a person. And like virtues these admirable inner qualities of character that 
reflects a person’s good character are cultivated over time and are not easy to acquire. But 
like habits once they are cultivated they become part of one’s make up and as such they are 
not easy to change hence synonymous with our characters (Ikuenobe 2016: 132) and are 
therefore a reflection of who we truly are. For this reason, a person’s moral standing i.e., 
assessment and evaluation of this is always in terms of good character. This is because 
according to traditional understanding  
“the most important …. and lasting judgment that can be made about a 
person is about his inner beauty or moral character. It is one’s character or 
inner beauty that determines what one does; and what one does, is also a 
reflection of one’s inner beauty” (ibid., 132). 
 
One of the reasons moral character is central to the understanding of botho in Sesotho culture 
and indeed in African ethics in general is that, in the moral language of many of Africa cultures, 
particularly those from which botho derives, there are no equivalent terms for English words 
“morality” and “ethics” (Gyekye 2011: par. 10). Instead, these cultures describe this sphere of 
life, i.e., moral behaviour and personal conduct in a language terms that denotes character, 
whether it is in their moral terms or proverbs. Regarding proverbs it shall be recalled from 
earlier chapters that many of them function as a catalyst of morals and ethics and are decisive 
in communicating ethical goods and correct behaviour (Bujo 2001: 24). Hence it will be seen 
that those proverbs dealing with ethical and moral issues reach not only head but also to the 
conscience, stir it and helping in the exercise of deciding between good and evil, justice and 
injustice, right or wrong” (Mokitimi 1997: xii, xiv). The ethical significance of proverbs as the 
deposit of moral values of the culture has already been discussed. Here I only want further to 
underscore their significance by pointing out that many of them have normative imperatives 
of botho that pick on admirable qualities of character. Thus, we find proverbs that encourage 
and promote “hard work, kindness, love, bravery, strength, unity, trust, justice, fairness, 
friendship and generosity”. We find others depicting vices to be avoided such as “slander 
greed, laziness, thieving, backbiting, injustice, untrustworthiness, lying and murder, 
arrogance, selfishness and incest” and many other qualities regarded as bad for one’s 
character (Ibid. xiv). What we can see from this is how central proverbs are, as an articulation 
of virtues of botho and that as such their primary function is as a resource for practical wisdom 
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in ethical decision making for a person. Here again we can see similarities with another theme 
found in VE namely the significance of practical reasoning (phronesis) that is found VE.  
What is clear though is the observation that many of the qualities or virtues outline above are 
descriptions that are ordinarily used when we speak of character. This further supports the 
centrality of character found in common between ethics of botho and virtue ethical approaches 
and underscores the significance of the character-centric account of botho advocated here. 
Similarly with the moral terms used to describe the moral life, we have already seen that these 
include terms like ‘boitśoaro’ and mekhoa’ both of which denotes and describe morally 
admirable behaviour and habits, which are descriptions of character.  
In other words, in cultures like that of the Basotho from which ethics of botho applies, the ideas 
and beliefs that pertain to ethical conduct are described always and solely in terms of moral 
character. Thus we find that in the moral of language of the Basotho, for instance when a 
person is regarded as having bad or no morals, a Mosotho will say “o boitśoaro bo bobe” (he 
or she has bad behaviour) or “ha na mekhoa” (they have no manners) and “o mekhoa e mebe” 
(they have bad habits/manner), or simply “ha se motho ho hang nthoeno” (-is not a person at 
all that thing). All these statements while on the surface express value judgements about 
behaviour and habit, they are fundamentally statements about character as the sole standard 
by which possession of qualities of botho is evaluated and assessed. This means that botho 
as representative ideal of the African morally ideal person, must therefore be understood and 
interpreted equally in terms of character.  
In view of this it is arguable if a person with bad character can simultaneously be regarded as 
having qualities normally associated with botho. This is because “it would be illogical for 
anyone with botho to demonstrate concern for others and at the same time have the” 
tendencies of someone with a bad character” (Letseka 2013A: 340). According to this then, to 
say of one he or she is a person is thus to make a claim about someone being morally upright 
or virtuous; it is to make an assessment about their moral praiseworthiness (Molefe 2017A: 
220) which is ultimately an appraisal of the person’s good character i.e., they are morally 
outstanding. In other words, when motho is praised for having botho, what in effect is being 
pointed to, is the achievement one has made in inculcating certain qualities of character and 
virtues. It is these virtues of botho that makes a person morally good, admirable, and 
commendable and a morally outstanding person. This leads to the next point that botho shares 
with VE approach to highlight. 
The exercise and practice of virtues as it will have been detected in this chapter is a social 
one, although they are attained individually. It is therefore important to recognise that central 
to virtues is that they are the sort of thing that by nature thrive within a certain social setting, 
that they are fostered by certain types of societal arrangement and conversely are endangered 
and stifled by others. The same is true of botho and the virtues it encapsulates. It is for this 
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reason that it is important to emphasise that the agent centred account of botho advance here 
is inherently communal and personal but not individualistic. This is because African ethics, 
more than the classical text of VE does, makes an especially important intervention here in 
terms of its conceptualisation of moral formation, in that it finds the proper setting for this as 
the community setting of the village or motse. Hence the expression it takes a village to raise 
a child. The character-centric account of botho proposed here validates this in acknowledging 
that these admirable qualities of character, as personal and central to the individuals’ ultimate 
goal or telos, are best understood and acquired in one’s participation in social practices 
(MacIntyre 1981: 187) and communion with others (Shutte 2008: 25; Mkhize 2008: 39). In 
other words, they are not developed and perfected in isolation or as a solitary endeavour by 
the individual alone. This means that fundamental to the practice of virtues, in this case, virtues 
of botho, is an understanding that this requires the existence of an enabling suitable social 
order to thrive. Such a society does not only make the practice of virtue possible; it encourages 
this and treats it as an admirable and morally worthy thing to do.  
What this imply is that for the practice of virtues to have the desired effect i.e., take root socially 
it is not enough to have moral agents with the right disposition of character. This is because 
to paraphrase Prozesky (2016: 7) for virtues of botho to be a reality in society, personal moral 
character of individuals alone will not be enough. This is because what genuinely inclusive 
ethical living i.e., practice of virtues mean and require in practice as well is “sound ethical 
support structures and resources available to them analogous to those available to King 
Moshoeshoe” one of the most ethical figures in 18th century Southern African (Ibid.,). And this 
necessity of an enabling social order is confirmed by the emphasis African ethics places on 
the community spirit characteristic of traditional African village life and moral formation and 
how the latter was regarded and functioned in those cultures from which botho derives.  
It will be seen that in African culture, moral education i.e., character and its formation or 
development does not only go hand in hand with the community (Letseka 2013A: 342) but 
entails the inculcation and acquisition of the values that lead to the emergence of a particular 
social order. As suggested, this is the same consideration that is found underpinning the 
central claims of VE. This is because according to (Statman 1997: 2) behind the recent interest 
in the revival of virtue and character in ethics is a “dissatisfaction with some basic aspects of 
modern (Western) society” and an implied preference for the establishment of “a different kind 
of society and for a different relationship among its members”. In other words, if in the moral 
sphere VE implies dissatisfaction with the problems of modern ethics or the “futility and 
sterility” of contemporary moral debates, in the social sphere it expresses opposition to some 
fundamental aspects of modern (Western) liberal society. Similarly, the approach to ethics that 
is being advocated. It  implies a desire for a deep revision of existing social order and a 
rejection of the current sociology underpinning contemporary social order (Ibid. 2). In other 
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words, underlying the revival of character ethics underscored here is an implicit critique of 
existing social order and a call for its replacement with a different kind of society and a different 
kind of relationship among its members (Statman 1997: 2, 15). This should come as no 
surprise because, with character-based ethical approaches, the focus of morality is on virtues 
or makhabane and as we have explained these are best achieved in the context of community, 
or more correctly within certain types of communities. Moreover, certain social arrangements 
are essential for the practice of virtues, while others are detrimental and, in some instances, 
even discourage their practice, hence the difficulty today of living out some of the traditional 
makhabane a botho or virtues as before.  
This helps explain the concerns in the literature with the contemporary moral environment, 
where the existing social order is regarded as not conducive to the practice and inculcation of 
the virtues in the way it was possible in traditional societies. Describing this environment 
MacIntyre (1984:6) succinctly summed it as living after virtue, “where neither the virtues nor 
virtue are regarded as central to the general moral culture and discussions about behaviour 
and conduct.” Ours is a society where all social life is arranged and defined in terms of the 
individual as the primary unit of social and political organisation, as well as civil liberties. But 
more important is that it is a social organisation where moral sovereignty and autonomy are 
now all vested in the individual, as the sole accountable person. In such a society the 
“community is [treated as] simply an arena in which individuals each pursue their own self-
chosen conception of the good life” and people only come together for pragmatic purposes 
because society is morally incidental and there is no essential moral link between people 
(Richardson 2009: 140). This is reflected in the widely held view in the contemporary moral 
environment, where most people think that they should be allowed “to do anything they want, 
provided they do not violate the rights of others (Statman 1997: 7). Such a society will therefore 
most likely be conflict with the ethical imperatives botho because botho presupposes priority 
of the common good, not the individual’s rights37 along with the social order such imperatives 
require to sustain them and is conducive for the inculcation of the virtues (MacIntyre 1981: 
115-117). In African society, according to Molema in Gyekye (2011: par.37) this is the end 
and aim i.e., telos of each moral agent and in harmony with, and conformity to, that the conduct 
of motho is moulded. This means that the virtues or makhabane are similarly best achieved 
and practised not individually and in isolation but in common and with others, and more 
specifically in the pursuit of the common good. Hence in African culture, the good of the 
individual is primarily understood as bound up with the common good. The acknowledgement 
 
37 This simply means “that the social character of morality requires that the individual member of the society, ever 
mindful of his interests, adjust those interests to the interests and needs of others) (Gyekye 2011: par 66). In African 
ethics it is crucial that this is conceptualised correctly so as not to give an impression that the individual’s interest 
don’t matter.  
For more on the debate on African ethics and individual rights see Gyekye 2011: par 67-77, Molefe 2016: 116, 
Molefe 2017B and Molefe 2017C: 53.  
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and recognition here is that as moral agents and members of a specific community, we are 
not just bound up together for pragmatic purposes but that there are essential moral links that 
we share together that are morally important to who we are38 (Richardson 2009: 141). The 
same notion is found in Aristotle’s ethics and the ethical significance of and the function of the 
polis, in relation to the practice of virtues whereby the primary concern is the whole of life, not 
only this or that good but “man’s good as such” (McIntyre 1981: 156). Similarly, with African 
ethics, this is revealed in the African representation of values (Metz (2012:100) “where it is not 
possible to achieve the ethical ideal individually or as a strictly personal achievement” because 
this is made possible in the community. In other words, it is in and by being part of the 
community from its smallest manifestation in the form of the family to its largest form in the 
polis that as moral agents we can find a deep meaning and substance to our moral beliefs. 
This means that it is in the community i.e., through its social institutions, particularly of lelapa 
or family (both nuclear and extended) (Letseka 2013B: 356) and the village, or neighbourhood 
that one learns and perfects the art of becoming a motho by practising the virtues of botho 
such as how to be generous, kind, hospitable and ultimately what is good (Ntibagirirwa 1999: 
79, 82). Describing this Kasenene in Ntibagirirwa (1999: 105) states that “a person who 
becomes famous and respected in the community... as a virtuous person” is one who has 
proved in the manner in which they live their life to be superior to the norm in some way, and 
has excelled in their life plan or telos, achieving a moral standard admired by the community”.  
In other words both African and Aristotle’s system of ethics, which are standardly defined in 
terms of excellence of moral character of motho, and his or her permanent exhibition of the 
virtues through one’s character, start from the premise that moral goodness and the practice 
of the virtues, cannot be described independently of the individuals’ character as a moral agent 
(Metz 2012: 100) as so formed by one’s community and culture. So, it can be seen from this 
that the central tenets of Basotho approaches to ethics displayed in their understanding of the 
ethical ideal of botho are similar with virtue ethical approaches represented by Aristotle’s 
system. This is because both start from the premise that ethics, in particular moral formation 
or education, which first occurs in the family and later in adulthood in the community and one’s 
participation39 and active involvement in habitual practice and various social practices, is 
undertaken with an eye on the community of which as moral agent we are inescapably a part 
of.  
In comparison to current approaches to ethics which are largely abstract and individualistic, 
the approach to ethics in Sesotho culture advanced here is an attractive offer for the creation 
of moral agents who have a place among friends and in the society and who is a better citizen 
in his or her community and in the universal human family in general (Ntibagirirwa 1999: 117). 
 
38 This helps to explain the prevalence and emphasis by some scholars of the relational dimension of botho that 
one finds in the literature (Metz, 2007: 333, Molefe 2017c: 53). 
39 See Giddy’s notion of personal participation (2014: 23 and McIntyre’s idea of social practice (1981: 187). 
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The reimagined agent centred account of botho inherent in this approach and advocated here 
for consideration, places significance and moral attention on the primacy of character of motho 
as the focus of ethics which for Basotho was a central feature of their understanding of ethics. 
This leads to the next section examining the primacy of character in Sesotho culture in the 
next chapter.  
3.9  Summary 
 
The chapter gave a critical appraisal and overview of the current botho discourse and interest 
in the revival of botho ethics. It locates this within the larger context of the debates on botho 
and the background of the dominant ethical theories underpinning contemporary moral 
environment. The analysis of botho and prevailing approaches, highlights some of the main 
debates around the concept, primarily in South Africa. Here the chapter outlined concerns 
about botho related to perceived overuse and misuse of the concept, where it risks becoming 
almost meaningless. Other concerns are that the concept is no longer a suitable ethical 
approach for contemporary modern society, which is different from traditional communities 
which botho implies. Some point to the lack of precision of the concept at one of its problems. 
The chapter highlighted the nature of these debates around botho and showed that these can 
be grouped into two main schools of thought. One school is of those critical of botho industry 
and questioning the wisdom of reviving a concept like botho which is at home in traditional 
community settings characteristic of the past and no longer possible in modern complex 
mobile communities. Among those questioning botho, the concern is with what is regarded as 
the one-sided portrayal of the good side of botho as practiced in traditional communities 
leaving out the negative elements found in those communities as part of the communal 
approach and practice of botho. For these critics, the revival of such traditional moral ideal as 
“botho” as a relevant ethical framework suitable for today’s complex mobile societies is not 
realistic or desirable in some instances. The other school of thought argues that the ethical 
approach and imperatives implied in botho is just what modern day societies need and the 
relevance of botho for today’s context is clearer now than ever. Scholars in this group have a 
positive appraisal of botho and constitute the most dominant view in the discourse currently. 
This view accounts for much of the development of the conventional or Afro-communitarian 
account of botho now the main interpretation found in the discourse. The chapter analysed 
this understanding of botho focusing on its definition primarily in terms of harmonious 
relationships. It analysed this account which is derived from and is dependent on the 
interpretation of the proverb motho ke motho ka batho ba bang.  Here I have however argued 
against this formulation of botho pointing out that based on the experience of Sesotho 
speaking cultures, there is no evidence of this usage where botho is defined in terms of this 
proverb. The relationship of mutual presupposition that the current discourse presents of these 
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two I argued is at best an academic invention that has more to do with academic scholars’ 
interest and scholar of botho than a reflection of actual usage of the two in social setting 
reflective of the experience of lived reality. 
The chapter also critically analysed a central claim in Afro-communitarianism that feature in 
these debates, which maintains that there are other similar terms and ideas as botho in other 
African cultures in sub-Saharan Africa and that these terms all have similar meaning. Here the 
chapter showed that although these terms may be similar, they are nevertheless not the same. 
I therefore argued using the example of botho in Sesotho culture and Ubuntu in Zulu culture 
that these terms in their social context of their respective cultures will reflect local nuance in 
meaning as determined by their context, hence caution should be exercised in treating these 
as meaning the same thing. For this reason, in this study the preference is of the Sesotho 
term botho, as opposed the more common combination of ubuntu-botho. This is to underscore 
the Sesotho perspective and the underlying understanding accompanying the use of the term 
botho in their culture. Another aspect of the discourse that the chapter discusses is the 
inherent connection the concept has explicitly and implicitly with personhood. Here the chapter 
showed that the current discourse is taking place within an ongoing debate within African 
ethics about personhood. The chapter argued the connection with personhood is based on 
the premise that botho cannot be fully explained without first unpacking the African 
understanding of what is a motho. The chapter showed that this debate plays itself out in the 
discourse in the common argument about the priority of the community versus that of the 
individual. The chapter here suggested that the mutually exclusive dichotomy characterising 
this debate is unhelpful, within the context of the proposed character centric formulation of 
botho of this study. The chapter posits the narrative conception of the self of Basotho culture, 
implied in the formulation of botho proposed in this study as a viable alternative avenue for 
forging a convergence between the two that the discourse can explore to explain the 
relationship between the individual and community as not mutually exclusive. This is because 
the moral responsibility required by character formation, become a responsibility the enjoins 
the two in a common project, where they are both equally important role players. Thus, in 
doing so the difference portrayed in this argument become less and the opposed positions 
they are supposed to stand for are not as far apart as initially it may have seemed. Another 
area of analyses this chapter focuses on is the challenge a topic like botho presents because 
of the volume of new material constantly being produced. This makes it difficult to survey the 
material in a comprehensive manner that one can draw out themes and common 
observations. However, the chapter found the use of a historical approach tracing historical 
analysis of the usage of botho in written sources a useful tool in this regard. This provided the 
analysis with a way to review the evolution of the usage of botho in southern Africa and to 
compare current understanding with how this concept was understood traditionally. The 
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chapter analysed different definitions of botho found in current botho discourse from the late 
1800s showing that the current formulations of can grouped onto two main categories. One 
category botho is described in various ways but all expressing it as a phenomenon. Here the 
chapter found descriptions that includes botho as a worldview, philosophy or as humanness. 
The other category is of definitions where botho is understood in terms of moral quality of a 
person and moral character of the person. This latter reflects a much older usage and the 
chapter argued is consistent with the understanding of the term in in Sesotho speaking culture. 
The chapter analysed both approaches i.e., the phenomenon account of botho and the moral 
quality of person account suggesting that the latter is a better and more practical articulation 
of the concept for today’s context.  
The chapter also gave an critique of current botho discourse, challenging first the overly 
communitarian formulation of botho that is now the predominant formulation in the discourse. 
Along with this is the corresponding self-realisation understanding of this concept. Here I 
showed that this formation and supporting definitions are not the most appropriate formulation 
of the essence of botho as a normative concept about personhood. I pointed out that the notion 
of self-realisation as a conception of African ethics, is counter-intuitive to traditional African 
thought about personhood. I also argued that this runs the risk of introducing an individualistic 
shade of meaning to motho ke motho that is not found in this proverb. I thus suggested that 
this is a later reading in African ethics driven by considerations of articulating the need for 
individual autonomy within an ethical framework that is regarded as essentially 
communitarian. I have challenged this, pointing out that the place of the individual within 
African ethics is never in doubt citing several examples to substantiate this, including the 
ceremony of naming which in African culture underscore  the uniqueness of the individual as 
a member of their family. I have thus suggested that the implicit reference of individual 
autonomy implied in self-realisation is not a African problem for ethics in Africa nor for 
traditional African moral thought and that its introduction in the discourse is unnecessary, at 
least from the African ethics perspective.  
The chapter also mounted a robust critique of Afro communitarianism as the dominant account 
focusing on its over reliance on the proverb motho ke motho as means of articulating the 
richness and totality of values and virtues encapsulated in botho. The chapter showed the 
weakness of this. Firstly by demonstrating how this is a poor use of the richness of African 
proverbs. Using experience of this proverb and other narratives in Sesotho culture, I argued 
against the exceptionalism of this proverb as amounting to a misuse. The chapter pointed out 
that this give the proverb a false independence and abstract character from the unity of 
proverbs and other narratives, which it does not have and is not how it functions.  I therefore 
challenged singling out one proverb out of many with similar meanings that cast light on botho 
and its meaning, contending that this deprives the discourse of the multiplicity of meanings 
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and applications of such aphorism necessary for the explicating botho for the complexity of 
contexts that is today’s moral environment. This in turn the chapter suggested gives rise to 
the impoverished account of botho compared one that which could be gained from the added 
richness of meaning from other narratives. Here the chapter cited the proverb morena ke 
morena ka sechaba as an example of the benefit of the use of proverbs in the discourse in 
their unity not isolation. I argued that the ethical leadership imperatives of botho, desperately 
needed today are better articulated in this proverb than they could ever be in motho ke motho. 
The chapter thus calls for a more comprehensive and complementary use of proverbs and 
other narratives in the botho discourse to further unpack what is botho beyond how it is 
currently the case.  
Second, I argued that botho as a moral concept, is best conceptualised if it is treated as a 
polysemic moral ideal, with many meanings that are inexhaustible, and as such it should not 
be reduced to simplistic formulations or definitions. I thus argued that the reduction of this 
moral ideal to a single proverb as the chief way in which it is understood and interpreted is 
problematic. I pointed out that to do this is not only problematic because this equates botho 
with this single proverb, but also that also misunderstands the nature of botho as polysemic 
moral ideal that is best described in multiplicity of ways and approaches that rejects 
reductionist definitions. I argued this is problematic because such use of single source 
explanation as that found in this proverb reflects just one way of elucidating the values virtues 
of botho. I pointed out that because botho is a polysemic moral ideal it cannot be fully 
expressed in only one way like in a single proverb. Rather that it requires the recourse to the 
whole depth and breadth of Africa narratives to reveal its full meaning. Here the chapter 
stressed the significance of proverbs and narratives and the internal unity as vehicles of moral 
education and the complimentary meaning of botho they supply each other when used in unity 
than in isolation.  
I further argued that this calls for a revisiting of botho where the understanding of this concept 
is not premised on motho ke motho ka batho, in favour of an account of botho premised on its 
understanding first as a moral ideal with multiplicity of ways of explicating it including through 
narratives and proverbs. The chapter suggest that the articulation of such a reimagined 
account of botho i.e., one whose values are inexhaustible, requires for its communication and 
interpretation, a more comprehensive use narratives like proverbs in their unity not isolation 
as is currently the case and one that goes beyond the fixation with single proverb motho ke 
motho. Narratives, which includes folktales and proverbs I argued its values  are still the best 
tools to unpack the richness of botho as the ethical ideal, many of whose values remain 
untapped and embedded in most of the African narratives as the deposits of traditional 
understanding of what is botho. This I have argued in turn will contribute towards the 
development of an account of botho that is not married to motho ke motho. The starting point 
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towards this I thus have argued begins with the reinstatement of the description of botho in 
terms of the moral quality of a person, specifically the primacy of character as central focus of 

































CHAPTER FOUR: REVISITING BOTHO AND THE PRIMACY OF CHARACTER IN 
SESOTHO SPEAKING CULTURE AND THE MORAL THOUGHT OF BASOTHO  
4.1  Introduction 
 
The essence of botho cannot be fully understood without reference to 
moral character of motho because its existence presupposes inculcation 
of certain dispositions of character. 
 
The chapter examines the understanding of botho in Sesotho speaking culture and centrality 
of character to their understanding of this concept, where it is used primarily in the context of 
moral assessment of motho. The chapter will underscore the central claims underpinning this 
study that defines botho as a description of moral character of a person as suggested in the 
quotation above and implied at the end of forgoing chapter. Here this interpretation is thus 
discussed detail in this chapter as the essence of the formulation of botho underpinning this 
study. The chapter will examine the experience and moral life of traditional Basotho 
communities as a case for introducing a character centric articulation of botho in the current 
discourse. The chapter will show this is a more authentic formulation of the concept because 
it is consistent with the older usage and understanding of botho in many traditional 
communities in southern Africa before the 1980s.  The chapter will therefore give an account 
of the significance of character to ethics of botho in Sesotho culture by surveying the social 
and cultural aspects of Basotho culture and moral life that reflect their understanding of the 
importance they give of character, especially in their moral language and the linkage of this to 
their understanding of botho. The chapter thus is implicit case for the reinstatement of 
character as the central focus of ethics. It will examine the importance of moral formation in 
Sesotho culture and the role of Sesotho narratives as the chief means of education into virtues 
of botho. Of particular interest here is litśomo (folk tales) and their power as stories to 
communicate the values and virtues of botho for today’s context beyond the cultural origins of 
botho itself. 
The reality of many modern societies, including communities in Africa today, is the 
displacement of character and its significance from public life and ethics where character 
formation as a moral concept commands little moral significance and authority. The 
abandonment of character as a key moral consideration in discussions about personal 
conduct is one of the most noticeable features of contemporary moral environment discussed 
in chapter two, including in current botho discourse. This contrasts sharply with moral attitudes 
and approaches of traditional moralities of many pre-modern cultures such as that found in 
Sesotho speaking culture, one of the cultures from which botho derives. It is for this reason 
that it comes as a surprise when on occasion; the quality of a person’s moral character is 
brought to the centre of public discourse in evaluating the moral conduct of a person. An 
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example of a rare public evoking of moral character as an important ethical consideration for 
assessing conduct a person we see in an open letter by a senior party official in South Africa 
recently to then president of the country who said: 
“I cannot continue to look the other way whist shameless leaders without 
character or integrity wreak havoc with the principles of those who liberated 
our country so that there should be a better life for all40” (IOL 2017)   
 
The significance of this is not in the power or profoundness of the statement made here, or 
the moral authority it commands thereof. Nor the fact that this is a public statement by a 
contemporary politician in a leadership position of in society. It is rather, that moral character 
of a person is here being presented as relevant and appropriate consideration in the assessing 
morally the conduct of a person. In this case the person whose moral character was being 
assessment was a public figure in a position of leadership. This underscore the argument of 
this study which is, being a good person, which is what botho entails is bound up with the 
quality of character, as the reflection of our inner selves and who we are as moral agents. The 
relevance of this is that it shows the significance of moral character as an important 
consideration in the moral assessing of the individual. This I will argue in Sesotho culture is 
always understood in terms of having botho i.e., the kind of person one considers themselves 
to be as a moral agent. While this anecdotal evidence may not be that conclusive to support 
the argument of the moral significance of character, it underscores the rarity in which moral 
character features as an important ethical consideration in discourses and public discussion 
about conduct of moral agents on which one can be called to account on. This supports the 
central argument underlying this study calling for the restoration of character in current botho 
discourse and ethics in general, and by showing how much the Basotho experience echoes 
an ethical approach I will argue is commonly found in African culture where moral goodness 
is inseparable from consideration of good character and botho i.e., what it means to be person 
or personhood. Metz (2011: 391) makes this clear that ‘in typical African reflection, talk of 
being a motho is moralised in terms of being virtuous or the exhibition of good character’. This 
shows how moral evaluation of a person or unacceptable level of immorality is intrinsically 
connected to the character.  
It is not surprising therefore that the displacement of character in contemporary African moral 
culture is one of the main criticisms levelled at modern ethics and its impact on African 
cultures. It follows then that this concern will be one of the reasons behind the current moral 
disquiet in African levelled at the failures of modern ethics. According to this the failure is 
specifically with formation of good character in individuals where individuals care about the 
good of others, as wells as one’s own legitimate interests (Prozesky 2007:105). It is because 




reinstatement of a character-based ethical approach to the centre stage of both our moral and 
social life and what some may call ethics of conscience. It is here that I think botho and African 
ethics can make a unique contribution not only to the current botho discourse but also to the 
larger enterprise of ethics in general.  This is context that the character-centric account of 
botho as found in the moral tradition of the Basotho examined here is being revisited. It’s 
relevance, is partly as a response to the failures of modern ethics and partly as a critique of 
current botho discourse and Afro-communitarian account of botho. It is not going to be 
possible here to give a detailed account of the relevance of character to ethics. I will thus seek 
to show how an understanding of botho in Sesotho speaking culture is intrinsically connected 
to character and inculcation of makhabane i.e.,, good moral qualities and virtues associated 
with possession of botho. This is taken in turn as an entry point to the larger conversation 
about rediscovering and reinstating character to the centre of ethical discourse including 
current botho discourse.  
In Sesotho speaking culture the development of moral character often understood in terms of 
inculcation and cultivation of qualities of good character is the essence of what possession of 
botho means. But before looking at the primacy of character as the hallmark of understanding 
of botho in Sesotho culture, it will be important to give a brief overview of the traditional moral 
scheme of the Basotho. This will include its hierarchy of key moral terms of setho, and motho. 
Together the three represent the traditional morality of Basotho within which botho is found 
and from which it derives its moral authority.  The three are thus regarded as the most 
important set of moral terms in the moral language of Basotho. Their relationship is equally 
special in that it is one of mutual presupposition and that by which botho is understood and 
interpreted. I will argue here that this way of interpreting this concept, which I now turn to, offer 
the current botho discourse another avenue by which it can work towards the development of 
the reimagined account of botho beyond motho ke motho discussed in the foregoing chapter.  
 
4.2  Botho and the Hierarchy of Moral Terms in Sesotho Culture 
 
It has become common in the literature to find various linguistic or morphological analyses 
presented as a way of analysing the meaning of botho41. Along with this one also finds 
equivalent terms in other languages sub-Saharan Africa (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 64, 
van Binsbergen 2001: 54; Kamwangamalu 2007:25, Murove 2009: 322) presented as 
evidence supporting the meaning of botho being suggested. As an entry into the analysis of 
the Sesotho word botho we shall take the same approach and compliment this with the 
dictionary meanings of the word. It shall be recalled that the Sesotho dictionary describes 
 
41 Others like van Binsbergen (2001: 71) have however questioned this approach. 
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botho as “se bakang hore diketso tse ntle di bonahale ho motho and boitshoaro bo botle ba 
ntho e phelang’.42(Chitja n.d: 59). The literal translated of this is “that which makes visible good 
actions of a person” and “good moral behaviour/conduct of a living being”. In other words, 
botho is that sort of thing that reveals the good qualities or character of a person. This is the 
basic way to understand the meaning of this term, but it is worth noting that in Sesotho culture 
it is recommended that this description be compared to the meaning of another related moral 
term, ‘setho’. A full analysis of this term will be made later. Its relevance here is to underscore 
another common way in which the meaning of botho is determined in the literature. As it will 
be seen the word botho in Sesotho and Setswana group of languages is composed of the 
addition of the prefixes ‘bo’ to the stem ‘-tho’43. From this stem comes related words; setho 
from the prefix ‘se-’ and motho from the prefix ‘mo-,’ plural batho from the prefix ‘ba’.  Casalis 
(1861: 322), a French missionary in present-day Lesotho in the early 19th century, thus 
commented on the structure of the language of the Basotho, that   
“[One] property of these prefixes, and that which is most remarkable is to modify 
and extend the meaning of the roots. Thus, by adding by turn to the root tu(sic) 
which represent the general idea of man...the prefixes mo, bo, se, we get 
motu(sic), the man (the individual); botu (sic) humanity, the quality, the title of 
man; setu (sic) human language [respectively] 44”. 
 
Most of these analyses tend to come to the same conclusion which is to support the current 
and predominant Afro-communitarian formulation of botho which defines the concept in the 
relational communal account (Metz and Gaie 2010: 275). By contrast, Casalis’ goes further 
than most and identifies another prefix ‘se-‘ from which the word setho derives, which is not 
often found in similar morphological analysis. This leads to one of the problems with current 
botho discourse which I want to highlight here and that is the uncontextual theorisation of 
botho. By uncontextual here I am referring to the tendency of analysing botho as an abstract 
concept and from a universal perspective where it can be studied without reference to specific 
moral system or cultural perspective of any of its cultural origins and from which it derives. 
This is analysis of botho done independently of or in isolation from other related key normative 
concepts or related moral terms with those cultures, which supplies added insight and deeper 
 
42 This understanding is intrinsically liked to setho another important moral term in Sesotho culture. It is defined in 
terms of “boitshoaro bo botle ba motho; tloaelo e ntle ya boitshoaro ba motho (good moral behaviour and habits of 
a person) or as “tumelo le diketso tsa morabe o itseng ha o bapisoa le merabe e meng. Tsela eo sehlopha sa 
sechaba kapa morabe o itshoarang ka yona le ho etsa mekgoa le meetlo ya sona” (beliefs and manners of a 
particular people, and the way they do their things in terms of their customs and culture) (Chitja. n.d. 698). Here 
setho links being human with (1) good behaviour (boitśoaro) of a person and in terms of ‘tloelo’ (habits/manners) 
and (2) the person’s cultural origins (meetlo) and customary ways of conduct (mekgoa). This is the definition of the 
term that also inform this study and its understanding of botho.  
43 This root as found in the Sesotho expression “batho ba reng tho” denotes to be truly, proper genuinely human, 
and is closely related to “setho” understood here as humaneness, which means the property being humane, which 
always presuppose the having the quality of being human. It is important that the converse does hold as there are 
human beings who are inhumane. 
44 A better rendering here would be the dignity of a person or seriti which denotes aura that surrounds a person 
(Shutte 2008: 29,  Casalis 1861: 245). See “botho” also in Chitja n.d.:59. 
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understanding to the meaning what it means to possess botho.  In Sesotho speaking culture 
this is of particularly concern with regard to those key moral terms that shares the same 
linguistic origin with botho within the culture. I am thinking here of the terms setho45 and motho. 
These moral terms are not only related to botho but also are crucial for the fuller understanding 
of botho in the moral language of the Basotho. Its theorisation thus must be made with 
reference to these, without which the meaning of botho will not be fully grasped.  
The necessity of approaching the analysis of botho in this way is not only a better way of 
understanding of how this concept should be analysed but also recognises that botho as a 
moral term and key concept in African ethics, does not function in a vacuum. But rather that it 
finds significance in part from its intrinsic relationship with the whole body of moral language 
and key moral terms found within the languages of the cultures from which it derives. This is 
what is its proper context that informs its meaning and application. It is this context that gives 
the concept its meaning and authority within the cultures in which it applies. This contextual 
approach in how botho is theorised enables the discourse to find a justifiable basis to integrate 
some of the interpretations and formulation of botho now common in the discourse. I am 
thinking here of the interpretation of botho in terms of humanness or as humanity (Tschaepe 
2013: 49; Shutte 2001: 2). While both notions are related to botho in so far as they describe 
characteristic human qualities in a person, it will be noticed that is not necessarily the same 
as saying this is what botho means. In other words, the question is what is the basis for making 
this assertion besides simply stating it and does it stand up to scrutiny? Anecdotal evidence 
from the analysis of botho in connection with ‘setho’ I will argue suggests it does not. This is 
because a closer analysis of this shows that, it is on account of its the connection of setho that 
botho can be described in terms of humanness or humanity. Both qualities are strictly speaking 
properties relate to setho which denotes human nature more than they do to botho, because 
in Sesotho culture botho relates to personhood which presuppose setho. 
It shall be recalled that at the heart of the meaning of botho, i.e., moral personhood, is the 
moral distinction that says even though one may be human, they may still lack botho, i.e., 
those qualities of character that makes one a person, and therefore need to still develop and 
inculcate these. In other words, by analysing botho in the light of related moral concepts, the 
analysis can understand individually the relative importance of the meaning of each concept, 
within the moral language of the culture (Paroz 1974: x). This is because in the case of botho, 
the relationship of mutual presupposition that it has with setho and motho means that botho 
 
45 Setho is a difficult to translate but it denotes both human nature as wells as one cultural and moral udbring and 
formation. It is defined as in Sesotho and Setswana dictionaries  as “tsela eo morabe o itseng o itshoarang ka yona 
le ho etsa mekgoa le meetlo ya ona” which is loosely translated as “beliefs, customs and manners of a particular 
people or nation in which as a  particular people that nation or people typically do things (Otlogetswe 2015). 
According to Nqosa (2010: 318) the term setho is also used to denote values that are consistent with tenets of 
botho and here it will also mean a moral culture of the Basotho people within which and by which individuals are 
brought up into as persons.  
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will imply the meaning of the other two, even though it may itself not directly have that 
meaning. This is the case with humanness which is the properly a quality that is expressed by 
setho. This way of analysing botho therefor supplies the discourse with new and a deeper 
insight into the meaning of botho. The necessity of this is because each of the concepts i.e.,, 
setho and motho adds a complimentary shade of meaning unique to itself to our understanding 
of botho resulting in a richer and deeper meaning and understanding of botho. This 
underscores another important feature about botho and how to theorise about it, and that is 
its polysemic character (Karenga 2004). As already shown, this is one of the reasons that 
makes it difficult to explain this concept, much to the frustration of some scholars interested in 
preciseness as we have seen in Chapter two. Describing this Shutte (2001: 85) thus points 
out that botho is deep and wide in scope that traditionally stories have been the best vehicles 
for accessing and illuminating its insights. The reference to stories as a means by which to 
explicate botho must not be underestimated as forms of narratives. I discus this later towards 
the end of the chapter where I highlight their relevance in Sesotho culture of narratives to 
moral education into values of botho. The reason stories are best suited to articulate the values 
of botho is because of its polysemic character. For this reason, I argue that stories are still the 
best way to explain and describe botho and that this must be at the centre of how we analyse 
botho in the current discourse. This is the case in Sesotho culture where the chief form of 
moral education into botho was through the traditional medium of storytelling commonly done 
in the narration of those well-known stories in Sesotho called litśomo (folk tales). The 
significance of these in moral education is discussed later in the chapter when we look at the 
narrative dimension of virtue or the narrative account of makhabane (virtues).  
When one looks at Sesotho culture it will become clear that one of the key terms that it is 
imperative to have in mind when analysing botho is setho. So central to the full understanding 
of botho in Sesotho culture is setho that it is arguable if it is possible to full grasp the meaning 
of botho without reference to setho. The difficulty with setho, in comparison to botho, is there 
is little material in the literature in terms of a systematic account on this concept and its 
analysis as a moral concept and what one finds is very limited, with the exception of a few 
instance in Mofuoa (2016), Otlogetswe (2015) and Futhwa (2012). Considering its closeness 
to botho, one would have expected there to be significant material compared to the huge 
volume of material there is now on botho. What is clear though is that setho has strong 
connotations with the nature of being human as understood and defined through tradition 
within the African culture. Like many principal African moral terms, setho is a complex notion 
to describe, highly value-laden and inextricably linked with the particularity of cultures and the 
ontological assumption of African culture. From available material we find that it is described 
as having to do with the indigenous “belief system of the people of Africa”, where “botho is the 
value system, encompassing the lifestyle and norms of batho, (plural for motho)” or a practical 
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manifestation of how people live (Futhwa 2012: 7). We also find that the understanding of 
setho is intricately connected with that sphere within the African culture that often is referred 
to conventionally as part of African indigenous religions (Dube 2009: 200). Another 
interpretation one finds is where setho is defined in terms of human quality or humanness. In 
other words, setho is something that relates to human nature or being human. According to 
African moral thought, setho can thus be described in terms of “human traits found in” a person 
(motho). Its deficiency in motho “is what in Sesotho speaking culture is called bophoofolo or 
sephologolo which means “beastly and barbaric” (Otlogetswe 2015: par 3, Mphetolang 2009: 
18, Casalis 1861: 303). This refers to lack of botho in a motho (person). 
From this, we learn two things. First that we can see where the link between botho and 
humanness derives, which is that it is implied indirectly in terms of bophoofolo, the opposite 
of which is being human i.e.,, humanness in which the emphasis is on being human hence 
humanness. In other words, it is the interpretation of bophoofolo that makes botho, as 
humanness intelligible. Without this the association of botho stays tenuous and leads to the 
ambiguous tendency in the literature that has surrounded this strand of theorisation of botho 
in terms of humanness or humanity (Shutte 2001:2). This leads to the second, point and that 
is, it is by virtue of the mutual relationship of setho to botho in motho that we can explain the 
origin of the formulation of botho in terms of humaneness, that human quality characterized 
by tenderness, compassion, and sympathy for other.  What is beginning to emerge here is the 
significance of setho to current botho discourse, which points to this as one area for future 
research that needs to be investigate alongside the other description of botho namely “ha se 
motho.” But more important for the case for character centric account of botho, is that we are 
also seeing here that setho is a human quality and that this is an individual property of a person 
rather than a communal one, and this manifest itself as part of the character of the person. 
This calls for closer examination on what setho is and how exactly does it relate to botho and 
motho.  
 
4.2.1 Botho and Centrality of Setho in the Moral System of Basotho  
 
The term setho is not easy to translate into English but in Sesotho culture it denotes both one’s 
human nature and how one was brought up in terms of socialisation by one’s cultures46. 
Therefore, setho can be described first as denoting human nature where it used in general 
terms without specific reference motho i.e.,, an individual. At this level setho refers to human 
 
46 In Sesotho language when the prefix ‘se’ is added to a root word, it denotes the same meaning of the English 
word species. In other words when used on its own ‘se’ simply means of such and such a species.  So, when it is 
added to the root word ‘-tho” which means human (van Binsbergan 2001:54, Kamwanngamalu 2007: 25) it we get 
the Sesotho word setho, meaning of human species hence its interpretation in terms of human nature. The same 
principle with other species, thus we see with humans we have setho, in the case of animals you would have 
sephoofolo, and in relation to birds, one gets senonyana. 
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nature or those intrinsic qualities which define one as human (Otlogetswe 2015: par 3). But 
since human beings do not exist in isolation, setho, also denotes one’s origins in terms of 
culture. This means when used with reference to a specific person, not just in general, 
emphasis is on the way these human qualities every human being has, have been shaped 
and moulded in a person by their culture and society one is part of. What this tells us is that 
no human being can escape the life-changing effects of culture, and this leads to another 
definition of setho that we find in the literature. And that has to do with the fact that setho is 
understood as that which expresses certain human qualities as expressed in a person in terms 
of human manners or customs (Paroz’s 1974: 390) of a particular people. This definition is 
shared by Tlhalosi in Otlogetswe (2015: par 1) who also defines setho in terms of manners in 
which a particular people do things. In terms of this cultural definition, the emphasis here is 
how these human qualities in a person, manifests themselves in that person which in large 
part is determined and shaped by who one is as a moral agent i.e.,, with regards to social 
identity as so formed and socialised into society by one culture and by one’s people and one’s 
society. When understood this way setho denotes cultural upbringing in terms of one’s cultural 
origins and socialisation. It is for this reason that in Sesotho culture setho is intrinsic to botho 
because the latter is the Basotho way of moulding these human qualities in a motho into what 
Basotho regard as a motho (Person). In other words, the role of culture in how these qualities 
become integrated into motho or who we are as agents and how we live and relate to others. 
In other words, this process is heavily changed by one’s “setso47” defined in terms of one’s 
roots understood in terms of a person’s cultural origins and customs of that culture. This leads 
to the definition of setho that pertains to the role of culture.  
Describing this in Sesotho speaking cultures Otlogetswe (2015: par 1) defines setho therefore 
as “mokgwa o batho ba dirang dilo ka one” [a manner in which people do things] or “mokgwa 
o rategang wa motho” [admirable/morally commendable traits/manners]. Chitja (n.d.: 698) 
likewise echoes this definition, where setho is described as “tumelo le diketso tsa morabe o 
itseng ha o bapisoa le merabe e meng’ or tsela eo sehlopha sa sechaba kapa morabe o 
itshoarang ka yona le ho etsa mekgoa le meetlo ya sona” (Belief and manners of a particular 
culture in comparison to others. The way a certain people or ethnic group conducts itself, its 
customs and manner of doing things). It is in this sense that setho is more than these natural 
human traits we have as humans. When understood in this way, setho recognises a certain 
nature that humans share with others, but it will be observed that it’s meaning transcends to 
local and particular as the term denotes primacy and centrality of culture in modifying and 
determining the orientation of these human traits or qualities in a motho. This explains why 
the latter interpretation of setho is the most used. This is the understanding therefore of these 
 
47 The word derives from ‘motso’ which in Sesotho means root, which when applied to a person becomes ‘setso’ 
(Chitja n.d.: 428, 703). Its usage denotes in connection with botho thus the origin or background of a person in 
terms of their moral upbringing and socialisation into botho by family, the community, their clan, or tribe etc. etc. 
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terms as used here i.e.,, as that which denotes Sesotho cultural origins and moral particularity 
and social upbringing of individuals into being what is socially acceptable for the individual to 
be a motho. This does not reject the common humanity of setho and is presupposed by botho, 
but it gives significance to culture and particularity as decisive in determining and shaping the 
orientation of setho. In other words, even though a systematic account of setho and its 
relationship to botho in African ethics is yet to be written, what can be deduced from the 
general consensus in available literature is that setho is connected with or has something to 
do with the interplay between “being human” or and “culture or how moral particularity shapes 
and moulds human nature differently in different and particular contexts”.  
In the case of Sesotho culture, the product of this interplay in a motho is what we call botho, 
where the function of ethics is the creation of batho ba nang le botho - individuals who have 
botho and this is the purpose and meaning of life. It is in this sense that in Sesotho speaking 
culture botho is regarded therefore as the agency of setho in motho. Although setho denotes 
something about moral agents as human beings, this must be understood and interpreted with 
reference to the characteristic ways of being human in diverse cultures and societies. So 
Setho in the context of ethics in Sesotho culture will denote ‘mekhoa le meetlo ea Basotho 
meaning” customs and manners of Basotho i.e.,, characteristics ways of doing things as 
Basotho, hence the expression “e ka re has ngoan’a Mosotho” (it is like they are not a child of 
Mosotho, when evaluation conduct of a Mosotho person who behaves like one not raised like 
a Mosotho. This way of doing things or mekhoa is what Basotho call botho especially when it 
is applied to the moral sphere and ethics among Basotho. This rediscovery of setho therefore 
brings to the fore another important insight into the discourse, and that is in order to fully 
understand and appreciate the normative foundations and significance of botho, it requires 
reference to setho and the traditional understanding of motho particularly the normative 
presuppositions underpinning this understanding as found in the “motse” (village) or the 
community48.  In the moral tradition of Basotho, the best way to conceptualise setho is in terms 
of its position withing the traditional moral scheme of Basotho (figure 1).  
Figure 1: Setho Ethical Worldview (Mofuoa 2016: 104) 
 
 




This schematic representation of traditional morality of Basotho is best explained in terms 
setho as the foundation of moral agency in a person whereby botho is the manifestation or 
“the fruits of setho” in a person (Dube 2009: 200).  This formulation is confirmed in Casalis’ 
analysis where setho, botho and motho stand to one another in a morally material and 
significant way, and the latter two presuppose setho. In other words, what we learn here is 
first that moral personhood i.e., motho presupposes having botho which in turn presupposes 
setho. In terms of the current botho discourse what is even more relevant is that here we learn 
that botho as a moral term presupposes setho. More importantly, that the interpretation and 
analysis of botho according to this does not only require reference to setho but that without 
this, such ethical reflection and understanding of this concept will remain wanting and 
impoverished. 
What we see from this moral scheme is the crucial importance in Basotho morality and culture 
of the interface between our “nature” as human beings on the one hand and one’s moral 
particularity or “setso” i.e., one’s roots or characteristic ways of doing things as found in the 
culture. In the moral sphere this “way of doing things” manifests itself in motho as their moral 
character understood both in its passive and active sense (Richardson 1994: 92). But as it will 
be seen, moral character is always formed in a large part within the context of and according 
to the values and manners of communities that we belong to. In other words, our characters 
are formed differently because of the cultures we are brought up in (Hofstede et.al. 2010: 6-
10). In other words, different cultures articulate, emphasis and mould these natural “common 
intrinsic human qualities” differently in their members, in accordance with and in the shape 
and orientation of their values, beliefs, ideas and understanding of the world they have as 
handed down through the tradition of that culture.  
In Sesotho culture, the consequences of this in a motho is what is now called botho. In other 
words, that orientation and modification on human nature that occurs is recognised as being 
in terms of all the traditional social and moral values and principles associated with the moral 
ideal of botho. That means among other things, the emphasis is on fusing together these 
natural human traits with the values and moral ideals of African culture to form in motho certain 
dispositions of character recognisable as having botho. In this way, one’s character, which is 
the public manifestation of who we are, is ultimately a reflection of the values of one’s culture 
in as much as the agent’s own values both of which are an expression of our unique traits and 
qualities as individual human beings. What this reveal is the significance of the community to 
setho in relation to motho and their character and its formation. 
Since each society consists of diverse groups, and within each society diverse groups each 
have its own mekhoa and mannerisms or typical ways of doing things, it means that each 
society or community will mould differently these human qualities shared with other cultures 
 157 
in their members. This explains why we find that in some societies, these human traits are 
tapered for instance in children in such a manner that the child soon learns to think of 
themselves as “I” the individual, while in other societies they think of themselves as “we” 
(Hofstede et.al 2010: 91). This means that culture gives these natural human traits a particular, 
texture and orientation, in line with the values, ideals and beliefs that the community or culture, 
in which the individual is a part and brought up in. It is in this sense that setho is connected to 
human manners, or mekhoa i.e., a way of doing things by a particular people.  
In the Sesotho speaking culture, setho must therefore be understood therefore as denoting 
the way these natural human qualities, have over many generations been shaped, moulded, 
and continued to be coloured with Sesotho culture and values of Basotho. This then manifests 
itself within motho or the individual as botho, hence the expression botho is the fruits or agency 
of setho in motho. In other words, as Otlogetswe (2015: par 4) explains  
“botho presupposes setho in a motho …. [and] “it would be farfetched to 
expect one who lacks setho to show botho. There is a hierarchy here. Motho 
must have setho to have botho.”  
 
According to this rendering, setho is thus best understood as the agency whose manifestation 
in a motho is botho (Mofuoa 2016: 103). It is from this understanding that there is an emphasis 
on the need to respect the traditional hierarchy within which these moral terms have functioned 
and found their moral significance.  
This brief account of Setho in the moral system of Basotho highlights the importance of 
conceptualising botho with reference to setho and where the two fuses together in the 
individual to form what Basotho call a motho i.e.,, person not just a human being. This is 
because in them we get a deeper insight into the tenets of the moral scheme of Basotho, and 
that is only a motho who has with setho in them can display botho. This is consistent with the 
understanding within the culture because where this is not the case a person like that is duly 
regarded as being like an animal i.e.,, phoofolo, from whence the moral sanction bophoofolo 
in Sesotho culture comes from. The important insight we get from this, which is relevant to the 
current botho discourse and the topic of moral personhood is that a motho must first have 
setho to display botho (Otlogetswe 2015: par 4). It is for this reason that the linguistic similarity 
seen between setho, botho and motho is significant for ethical reflection in current botho 
discourse. It shows that because these moral concepts share the same overall meaning, 
whatever we take their specific individual meaning to be, must always be interpreted in the 
light of the other two. In the case of botho, this means that its analysis cannot fully uncover its 
insight without reference to setho and what ins Sesotho motho means, because the 
relationship between these is one of mutual presupposition.  
In other words, the relationship between these terms, implies that if it is correct that botho is 
a moral description of a motho, as the central claim of this thesis implies, then the question 
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becomes what about motho is it describing? It is in answer to this question that the Basotho 
make references to character, that embodiment of the habitual practice of moral virtue that 
defines and turns a human being into a motho. That is to say, the primary function of botho, 
the lack of which is summed up in “ha se motho,” is the assessment of the moral character of 
“man” i.e., motho. Within the context of the current botho discourse, this is significant because 
it shifts focus from the relative tunnel vision like effect thus far created around botho, fixated 
on MKKB,  to paying attention to the wider moral terrain implied by setho and motho which is 
the proper context for locating the normative idea of personhood. We have already alluded to 
the traditional African notion of personhood previously, noting that according to traditional 
thought there is a specific definition and understanding of what is a motho.  
The reinstatement of setho to the current botho discourse enables the changing of the 
trajectory of the discourse i.e.,, from with attention on existing accounts of botho, to broadening 
analysis of botho in the light of setho. This is because as Otlogetswe (Ibid. par 4) points out 
only a motho with setho can display botho. This points to the significance of character and its 
formation because if these natural human qualities are to become part of who we are as moral 
agents, we know that this does not happen automatically nor are we immune from the vices 
that makes us inhuman. In other words, it is through a society actively encouraging and 
promoting good conduct i.e.,, through moral formation and training of character in its 
members, that our natural human qualities as human beings are developed into good 
admirable qualities of character. It is through character formation that societies become more 
humane, more kind, more honest, and individuals become more ethical. In other words, the 
introduction of the notion of setho allows a more explicitly rehabilitation of character as primary 
moral consideration to the centre of botho discourse and the understanding of this concept, in 
a manner like the way it is understood in Sesotho speaking culture. To this I now turn to in the 
section that follows here.  
 
4.3 Botho and the Primacy of Moral Character in the Moral Culture of Basotho 
 
The central argument of this study is that in Sesotho speaking cultures the understanding of 
botho is always described in terms connected to boitśoaro ba motho (moral behaviour or 
conduct of a person), or ‘mekhoa and sebopeho tsa motho’ (manners or habits and nature or 
character of the person. The best way of explaining this is to say in Sesotho culture one cannot 
be regarded to possess botho without displaying a acceptable boitśoaro and mekhoa 
according to Sesotho culture and this is understood primarily in terms of what in English is 
referred to as good moral character. In this section I am going to argue that the best way to 
understand what a particular word means in a particular language is to examine its common 
usage in ordinary daily living by the practitioners of the language and how this usage is 
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informed by the tradition and indigenous knowledge system of the culture. This I will contend 
is the case with botho in Sesotho culture. So, we find that when confronted with the term botho 
in the context of daily living, such as saying someone ‘ha se motho ea nang le botho’  (they 
are a person who has no botho) or ‘ke motho ea se nang botho’ (they are a person who does 
not have botho), the first thing that comes to mind to an ordinary Mosotho is the behaviour of 
a person. Questions that come to mind thus include: What kind of person are they? Are they 
a good person or not? Do they have good or bad character, are they helpful to others, kind 
and peaceful? Or are we talking about someone who is cruel, selfish, does share with others? 
In short are they a nice person? All these questions in Sesotho culture are understood to be 
asking about the qualities of character of the person. This we find implied in Paroz’s (1974) 
definition of botho as “state of being a person”, which presuppose an understanding of what 
a person is49. The same definition is found in the Setswana dictionary (Otlogetswe, 20125: 
62), which defines “botho as mokgwa kana maitsholo a motho a itshwarang ka ona” meaning 
habits or behaviour or conduct that one displays. It is also defined as “maitseo a mantle a 
motho a nang le ona,” the good manners that one has.” Similarly, Kgasa and Tsonope in 
Otlogetswe (2015) describe botho as “mokgwa o siameng wa motho” [the good manners of a 
person], again emphasising the good character of motho as the basic meaning.  
It must be noted here that the equivalent of mokgwa in Sesotho refers to what in English can 
be described as a characteristic behavioural habit, denoting and revealing the sort of person 
you are and who you really are as a person. In other, words a person character. The most 
precise articulation of this conception and understanding of botho i.e.,, as a moral quality of a 
motho, in Sesotho speaking culture is found in Gaie (2002: 277) who says that botho 
“captures the essence of human being hood or personhood. To say that 
somebody has no botho is to mean that they have no personhood. It means 
that even though the thing might be a human being, it lacks qualities of a 
person.” 
 
Casalis (1861), one of the earliest European missionaries among the Basotho in Southern 
Africa writing about the same time as some of the texts cited in Gade (2011: 308), articulates 
the same understanding among the Basotho people.  One of Casalis’ great contributions were 
to rigorously commit into writing much of Sesotho culture and language at the time, long before 
any real contact with European culture and or influence as such. His account of life among the 
Basotho in many ways is one of the few and earliest available written sources of traditional 
Basotho way of life, although tainted with European bias. He nevertheless provides valuable 
 
49 This dictionary is one of the few Sesotho Dictionaries produced in and it give as close a definition of this concept 
as we can get to the usage of the as found in traditional Sesotho culture, which has not changed that much from 
the contemporary understanding of the concept. This definition is also the same one found in  
In terms of this understanding it is in contrast with the definition of “ubuntu” in the South African version of the 
Oxford dictionary 2nd edition 2006, where the Zulu concept is described “as a spirit of fellowship, humanity, and 
compassion especially associated with African Society”.  
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insight into 19th century Sesotho speaking culture in Southern Africa even if through the prism 
of European moral and cultural superiority complex. Describing ethics in Sesotho culture 
Casalis writes 
“The external appearances of moderation and decency constitute in the eyes 
of the [Basotho] what they call botu (sic) the title or dignity of man in opposition 
to bopofolo (sic) the brute life a name they apply to every immoral act of an 
excessively scandalous nature” (Casalis 1861: 303).  
 
The first thing that one notices in this account is the use of the term ‘moderation’ and ‘decency’ 
in connection with botho and the explanation that this refers to the “title, quality” and “dignity 
of man”. The use of these terms and the variety of meaning and connotations suggests an 
attempt to capture the essence of botho in Sesotho culture and the difficulty Casalis 
experiences in finding the right definition. I will suggest that this is because of the polysemic 
nature of botho that in this study I argued is one of the features of this concept not fully 
appreciated. The discourse gives the impression that the process of explaining botho is almost 
settled. Here we can see the refusal of this concept to be confined to simple reductionist 
definitions. The meaning of “title’ here must therefore be understood in moral terms, to signify 
high moral standing of a person among peers, which is articulated in dignity. It seeks to 
express a level of moral dignity, respect, or admiration. In the language of ethics, we could 
say moral gravitas that is associated only with one who has achieved and has in an exemplary 
way displayed excellence in botho. In African culture and ethics, this is closer in meaning to 
seriti (Shutte 2008: 29, Mphetolang 2009: 24) which refers to a person’s shadow. This word 
is not easy to translate into English, but it denotes moral dignity or aura that exudes from one 
who has a certain moral and social gravitas. Casalis’ account reflects an understanding of 
botho that implies a recognised social stating morally and dignity accorded to a person 
because of excellence in acquiring and displaying qualities of botho. 
As already intimated in this study these qualities typically are attributes characteristic of 
personal character, which is regarded as the truest reflection of who we are as moral agents. 
What this implies is that if botho is connected to how we conduct ourselves as moral agents; 
it would make no sense that this does not involve personal character as the expression of who 
we are moral agents.  It is in this sense that Casalis’ description of botho in terms of a title of 
man is a description of a person’s character, signifying the moral gravitas and dignity of the 
individual. It points to the roundness of character and the resulted moral assessment where 
one is adjudged to being morally admirable and beautiful. In other words, they qualify to be a 
moral exemplar. It is thus something that becomes a source of inspiration to others. In other 
words, the use of the term “title” as a moral description of a person entails that such a person 
is displaying dignity of behaviour, and morally admirable qualities of character, hence some 
that is regarded with high regard and admirable. This description should therefore be 
understood as denoting the moral dignity that comes with being conferred with the status of 
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being morally admirable and beautiful person. That means being regarded as being a motho 
who has botho “i.e., integrity, dignity and decency.” These are the qualities that constitute the 
“moral standing” or “the title of man” i.e., the honouring of motho in the community for having 
qualities of botho,  i.e., an accumulation of certain “manners” through habitual conduct that 
the community considers morally admirable, commendable and encourage in its members 
(Otlogetswe 2015).  What is also clear here is that in Sesotho speaking cultures ethics is 
conceptualised in terms of virtues and corresponding vices. This is the case with botho as 
often it is evoked in conjunction “bophoofolo” which is its opposite (Casalis 1861: 303) or 
sephologolo (Mphetolang 2009: 18). This is an essential element of how botho must also be 
understood and Casalis was observant enough to pick on this. So, to fail in this regard i.e., 
not to have botho means the individual gets the moral status or title bophoofolo, (beastly). 
One of the peculiar things about Sesotho language is that there is no direct equivalent of the 
English word “morality” or “ethics” in their moral language and lexicon of key moral terms even 
though character plays such an important role in their social and moral life (Gyekye 2011: par 
10). This may lead a casual observer of Sesotho culture to conclude that claims of morality or 
ethics among Basotho being character-centric are dubious and without basis. But those 
familiar with the moral traditions of the Basotho and their culture will point to several important 
social rituals and practice in Sesotho culture full of inference and reference to character as 
evidence of high regard Basotho placed on inculcation of good moral character. This means, 
if one looks beyond the surface and delves deeper into Sesotho culture and their moral 
language, one soon finds prima facie evidence of the centrality and primacy of character in 
their morality. This is because in Sesotho culture the moral language that Basotho use to 
describe the moral sphere of life, i.e., ethics or morality, often has strong connotations of good 
character, as will be seen shortly. As such, like other African cultures, discourses, or 
statements about morality in Sesotho culture often turns to be discourses or statements about 
the character (Ibid.: par 11). In view of this i.e.,, character-centric orientation of thinking about 
the ethics of their culture, the morality of the Basotho can thus be described as a character-
centric ethic and the evidence of this can be found in various spheres of life in Sesotho culture 
especially in their moral language. 
 
4.3.1 Prominence of Moral Character in the Moral Language of Basotho 
 
The underlying argument upon which this study is premised is that in Sesotho speaking culture 
character is essential as the primary formulation and interpretation of botho and what motho 
is i.e.,, to be a motho and the understanding of ethics. One of the strongest foundations for 
holding this view i.e.,, the primacy of character in Sesotho culture is the moral language of 
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Basotho50. By paying a close attention to the nuances of the moral language of the Basotho 
and some of their key moral terms, one discovers a moral tradition and culture seized with 
safeguarding the moral character of its members from childhood to adulthood. In other words, 
from the analysis of the moral language of the Basotho, the understanding that we get of botho 
is that first and foremost this is a normative concept primarily concerned with moral 
judgements and or assessment of a person that are connected with the moral character of a 
person. One will therefore discover that when referring to the moral sphere of life or ethics, 
Basotho tends to use words that denotes or normally refer to behaviour and character. Thus, 
when a Mosotho wants to make the moral statement “he has no morals” or “her action is 
unethical” he or she will say “o boitśoaro bo bobe” (they have bad conduct/behaviour) or “ha 
a na boitśoaro” meaning they have no good behaviour (Gyekye 2011: par.10).  Both 
fundamentally point to the bad character of the person and that the person is unethical or 
immoral. The same can be seen in what a Mosotho would say “when a person behaves (or 
acts) in ways that are morally right”. They would say of such a person “o boitśoaro bo botle, 
or bo lokileng” which means a person has a good character or their behaviour is good (Ibid.). 
In addition to “boitśoaro, (behaviour, personal conduct),” we find other morally freighted words 
Basotho use to describe moral character. Worth mentioning here is the moral term “mekhoa,” 
which denotes habits, tendencies, and inclinations of a moral nature that a person has. 
Another term is “sebopeho.” It is closer in meaning to the character but also denotes the nature 
of the person in terms of their make up as a person. These and other cognate moral terms 
and key moral concepts such as “bobe” (ugliness) “botle “(goodness and beautiful), “lokileng” 
(good in terms of being just, all share one thing in common and that is they are expressions 
of certain moral values or personal qualities all connected to moral character of motho. And 
as I have argued this is implied in botho and strongly associated with a person’s behaviour 
denoting good or bad character. According to this then the interest in a good character as the 
most fundamental to the moral life of a person, is a characteristic feature of Basotho morality 
that it is found permeating much of their moral language, and this would necessarily be the 
primary understanding of botho for Basotho.  
This means that from the perspective of Sesotho speaking culture to properly conceptualise 
botho, current theorisation around botho needs to take into consideration the significance of 
character, as implied in the moral language of the Basotho. This is because Sesotho culture 
is one of the traditional cultures in Southern Africa with a history of botho. It is also because 
this concept and its moral significance cannot be separated from it being part of the moral 
language of the culture, in which it functioned. In this context it thus operated under certain 
 
50 Today Sesotho language is spoken in present-day Lesotho and parts of the Free State 
province and Matatiele both in South Africa. Both places are two places outside Lesotho where 
there is a large population of Sesotho speakers and where fragments of traditional Sesotho 
culture and some of their traditions can still be found. 
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cultural and language rules, rules and contexts that gave it meaning and relevance. In other 
words, botho even as it is regarded as a concept has a context both cultural and linguistic that 
the current botho discourse cannot just strip away, as irrelevant to its interpretation. That 
means even as botho is elevated to the superior status of the governing moral principle or 
central pillar of African ethics, it is important to recognise that in the moral thought of the 
Basotho and practice morality or ethics, of which botho is an expression of is not understood 
in single terms. This explains why the Basotho understanding of botho in terms of character 
is expressed in many ways. In Sesotho culture the moral sphere of life is thus conceived in a 
number of associated terms, all related to character and any one of these terms is sufficient 
to express the general idea - about character or what it means to be a motho, but at the same 
time contributing a shade of meaning which is peculiar to each term (Casalis 1861: 304). This 
is certainly the case with mekhoa, boitśoaro, and sebopeho, as it is so with setho, botho and 
motho and other key moral terms in Sesotho language. All these as it shall become clear are 
consistent with Basotho ethics as character-based ethic where character overarching moral 
consideration information moral education and formation.  
A further examination of the moral language of the Basotho reveals other moral terms that 
further underscores the significance of character as key concept for ethics in Sesotho culture. 
I am thinking here in addition to “botho” (personhood), of concepts like “letsoalo” (conscience), 
“sebopeho”51 (character), mosa (kindness) just to mention a few. The same emphasis on the 
supremacy of moral character as the object of ethics can be seen with traditional education 
system and training of Basotho. A large part of what constitute what could be called traditional 
curriculum both in formal and non-formal education, is centered on training in character 
through inculcation of makhabane a botho (virtues of botho). Worth mentioning here are 
virtues such mosa (kindness) boikhutso (peacefulness) bohloeki  (purity/chastity), 
boikokobetso, (humility), mamello (perseverance) and hard work, (Matśela 1979: 183, 
Maharasoa and Maharaswa 2004: 109, Letseka 2013A: 342, Casalis 1861: 306). What we 
learn therefore from the moral language of the Basotho is that good character and its 
development is thus the sole goal of socialisation of individuals and it became the central focus 
of moral formation from childhood. If we look at some of the key moral concepts of the Basotho 
it will be seen that many have strong connotations denoting moral character as its key. 
Of these moral terms, none captures the idea of the primacy of character and its significance 
to moral life more vividly than the Sesotho word mekhoa (habits). The word can loosely be 
translated as habits or more correctly habitual behaviour, as it has strong connotations of 
behavioural conduct on a consistent basis, hence its connection to character. The significance 
 
51 In Sesotho language there is no exact equivalent word for character, but in addition to sebopeho several other 
words are used including mekhoa, (manners/habits) boitśoaro (conduct/behaviour) just to mention a few all which 
adding a shade of meaning to the central idea explaining moral character which could be good or bad (see Paroz 
1974: 28, 156,432). 
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of habits to training in character is a well-recognised feature of ethics of character because as 
moral agents we acquire the virtues of character from habitual exercise. In other words. we 
become honest, caring, kind, humane, or loving by habitually performing honest, caring, kind, 
humane and loving acts (MacIntyre 1981: 154).  We have already come across the definition 
of this term “mekhoa” earlier (Casalis’ 1861: 228), where we highlighted its ethical significance 
and the place it occupies in the moral language of the Basotho. It shall also be recalled that 
this term featured prominently in the various descriptions of setho. In Sesotho culture 
“mekhoa” could mean; behaviour, habits, customs, or manners and as it will be observed 
these are compatible with descriptions of the character. In its ethical meaning, the term 
mekhoa means all of these but as intimated the term is commonly associated with boitśoaro, 
which means good moral conduct and behaviour, or moral conduct displayed by a person on 
a consistent basis. Thus, mekhoa as normative term implies in a certain sense, habitual or 
typical boitśoaro where it denotes the highest form of normative authority governing the 
conduct, akin to that of a self-regulating internal norm. It is in this sense that Casalis’ (1861: 
228) is correct in observing that in relation to the social organisation of the Basotho the 
“mekhoas” (sic) constitutes the real laws of the country much higher or more authoritative than 
“melaos” (sic) i.e.,, the legal laws of the culture. From this, it can be seen how in the moral 
language of the Basotho “mekhoa” as a description of an individual motho, is connected to 
and is the description of the character. Thus, when a Mosotho asks “mokhoa hau o joang?” 
(what kind of person are you) what they are really saying, is making a moral statement that is 
asking about the character of the person, particularly of the person’s questionable moral 
conduct.  
When “mekhoa” is referred to in relation to the moral sphere of life and botho in this way its 
close connection with moral character becomes clear. That is to say, the primacy of character 
as the characteristic feature of morality among the Basotho gives the term a more precise 
meaning, that denotes actions and behaviour related to habit forming conduct. This is because 
mekhoa understood as character results from the habitual daily ways of behaving or conduct 
of motho (person). As Gyekye’s (2011: par 15) explains because character is defined in terms 
of habits, and the latter in turn results from a person’s deeds or actions, character, therefore 
comes from our actions. It is important to observe that consistently behaving in certain ways 
will produce certain habits and in turn produce corresponding character. It is in this sense that 
mekhoa, understood as habits or habitual ways of conduct, is the necessary character forming 
social practice (McIntyre (1981: 187) essential for the practice of botho possible. 
Another feature in the moral language of Basotho that reflects centrality of character is how 
the words Basotho use to describe character and make moral judgements about botho, many 
of them describe qualities of the heart (pelo).  The heart is thus an important metaphor for 
character in the moral language of the Basotho and in the articulation of qualities of botho. It 
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signifies the centre and core of a person’s being and seat of all thought and moral deliberation. 
It is in this sense that botho as a description of the moral quality of a person is not intelligible 
without reference to the goodness and gentleness, or lack therefore, as the characteristic 
attributes of a person’s heart. In Sesotho culture the heart is regarded as the seat of all life, 
feeling, thought and will (Casalis 1861: 243) and as such it the chief means by which most 
moral judgements in Sesotho culture are made. Reiterating this Bujo (2001: 100, 120-122) 
points out that “African ethics locates the seat of ethical conduct in the” inner “organs of the 
human person” [and here] “the heart occupies the primary position”. In other words, Basotho, 
like most Africans, attribute everything in particular, moral reflection and the seat of moral life 
to “that organ that signifies the core of a person’s being” namely the heart (Bujo 1992: 100, 
Bujo 1990: 98). Thus, we find that in Sesotho culture moral deliberation is understood and 
thought of as fundamentally the function of the heart. As such, moral goodness i.e.,, botho or 
good character is described and understood primarily in terms of the qualities of the heart 
(pelo). The Basotho believe that a person’s heart is therefore the most authentic and true 
reflection of a person’s moral character and who they truly are. When described in this way 
the morality of the Basotho can thus be seen as kind of “morality of the heart52.”  This is 
because pelo is not only the locus of ethical conduct but also the sources of humaneness, 
hence it is the true embodiment of a successful integration of makhabane (virtues of botho), 
which are essential for moral assessment and evaluation of motho and his or her moral 
conduct.  
According this then what we find is that moral judgements and assessments are expressed in 
terms of positive or negative attributes and qualities associated with the heart. This included 
statement such as describing a good person as “o pelo e ntle (they have a beautiful heart). 
This is often a moral statement describing a person adjudged to be morally a good person 
and of good moral character. Such a person is thus associated with qualities like mosa 
(kindness), ho fana (generosity), ho rata batho (love of people) mohau (mercifulness) bonolo 
(gentleness) and many similar attributes characteristic of the heart. It shall be recalled that in 
Sesotho culture virtues are promoted side by side with corresponding vices to be avoided. 
Thus, we see that as well as positive qualities of the heart as a way of describing the character 
of a person, so too are the negative one. This features in expressions like “o pelo e mpe” (they 
have bad heart) meaning evil person, or ‘pelo e tśoeu’ (white heart) describing a greedy53 
person, and “o pelo e thata” (they have a bad heart) i.e., to be hard-hearted, referring to a 
 
52 The significance of this and its contrast to the devotion and centrality of reason in Western ethics must not be 
lost sight here as this further highlights the contrast and difference in approaches to ethics in Sesotho culture and 
Western approaches, where reason is the heart of ethical methodology. 
53 In Sesotho to be greedy is not only lust for food, but denotes selfishness and to be unwilling and to not be 
prepared to share what one has, whether it’s food, one’s labour to help others, one’s resources to lend to others. 
it is contrasted with being generous, kind, and hospitable or loving. It is in this sense it always implies and is closely 
connected to being selfish. 
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person regraded as uncaring, unmoved by anything, stingy, and without mercy. This relates 
to the vice of bokhopo, which can mean cruelty, evilness and being inhumane, and not loving. 
Bokhopo as the greatest vice contrast with kindness as a virtue which is regarded as one of 
the greatest among Basotho (Casalis 1963: 306). 
The final observation about moral statements in Sesotho language is that most judgements 
describe moral character in terms of aesthetic language characteristic of African conceptions 
of beauty in which something beautiful is also regarded as good (Ikuenobe 2016: 128, 131). 
In other words, these descriptions can be found in terms that ordinarily convey African 
concepts and notions of beauty or appreciation of something ‘beautiful.’ Thus, we find that in 
Sesotho culture, for instance, judgements of conduct that is morally good and regarded as 
right is often described using the phrase “e ntle,” it is beautiful, which means it is morally good, 
admirable, commendable, and praiseworthy. Similarly, conduct judged to be bad and wrong 
is described using the words “-e mpe,” it is ugly, meaning it is morally reprehensible. This 
usage of aesthetic language with moral underpinnings is also found in the word ‘bobe’, or 
‘mashoe’ (ugliness) to articulate the idea of moral evil (Casalis 1861: 304). Typically, this is 
found in statements like “o boitśoaro bo bobe” (they have bad behaviour) which is a moral 
statement about one who is regarded as lacking certain expected qualities of botho.  Other 
similar moral statements with aesthetic connotations to express a moral judgement and 
evaluation of conduct include “motho ea hantle” (a good or nice person) or “o pelo e lokileng” 
(They have a good heart) to described someone regarded who has a morally good heart.  The 
normative weight of the word “hantle” from the stem “ntle’” from which the word ‘botle 
(beautiful) derives together with its opposite “-mpe” from which we have the word bobe, 
(ugliness), must not be underestimated54. In both cases these terms convey a moral 
judgement of being a good person or a bad person, respectively. And this they do in the 
emphasis they make which is the description of the character of the individual motho. These 
are therefore important part of the moral lexicon of Basotho and go hand in hand with the 
moral judgement about lack of botho. These add to the existing moral vocabulary of terms the 
idea of conduct as being morally admirable. At the heart of this is the notion of moral 
admiration and praiseworthiness of character of a motho.  
These aesthetic terms used in the context of moral performance of a person adds to the 
evaluation of moral goodness another unique way of expressing moral judgements in African 
ethics in which moral concepts are combined with conceptions of beauty. In other words, in 
this type of moral judgement we have an aesthetic judgement that is at the same time moral, 
where the conception of moral goodness and admiration of something good are combined 
(Ikuenobe 2016: 128, 131) to reflect being moral and ethical as something that is also 
 
54 The word for beauty (botle) in Sesotho consists of the prefixes ‘bo’ and suffixes ‘ntle’ from which the word ‘motle’ 
derives. In both cases these terms while they convey moral significance on being a good person in relation to 
others, their primary description which is the character of the individual motho, locates moral value in the individual. 
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admirable hence why others should and ought to want it and aspire it. Aspiring to be morally 
beautiful and admirable is a notion not common these days, and yet it is the essence of being 
ethical. So, in the moral statement “motho ea ketso li mpe” (a person with ugly/bad actions) is 
an expression of undesirable character of the person as the emphasis here is on habitual 
conduct (Gyekye 2011: par 15, 16) i.e.,, the character of the person who in the statement is 
judged to have displayed chronic failings to meet expected standards.  
So, what we see is about ethics in Sesotho culture is that moral judgements with aesthetics 
connotations, express an assessment of person’s inner dispositions and qualities of character, 
symbolised by their heart, in addition to their external behaviour. It is all these together that 
makes such a person to be regarded as morally admirable, and in that sense morally beautiful 
(Ikuenobe 2016: 128) hence such a person can be elevated to the status of moral exemplar. 
In Sesotho culture the understanding is that “the inner moral beauty of a person is the 
reflection of their outer public moral character”. The understanding is also that it is this inner 
beauty of character that manifests itself externally as botho hence that which is commended 
and said to be praiseworthy. As with the other moral judgements in Sesotho culture, here too 
reference and emphasis are once again on the character of the motho and the sort of person 
they are, which is understood in terms of the reflection of the moral agent’s heart and its 
disposition.  
What we see here then is that the individual i.e.,, motho through his and her conduct, 
symbolised by their heart as a manifestation of their character is given moral praise in part for 
inculcating the acceptable qualities of character, and integrating these into their character. 
The significance the heart in the moral language of Basotho is as an articulation of the Basotho 
idea of internalisation of ethical norms and success of moral formation and development of 
character oriented towards botho. The heart therefore occupies a primary position in the moral 
culture of the Basotho as the quintessential reflection of a person’s character or moral 
goodness. It is in this sense that actions, which are inseparable55 from whom we are as moral 
agents are relevant ethically because they are the visible and outward manifestation of the 
invisible inner qualities of character of a motho, which is what matters most in ethics. We see 
this in the Basotho’s account of makhabane, or virtues. According to this, a person’s 
possession of botho or lack of it, is believed to reflect the nature of their heart and ultimately 
a person true identity and character, both of which are regarded as a true reflection of who 
the person is and what kind of motho they. 
 
 
55 This is important as sometimes in matters about ethics and conduct there are attempts to draw an artificial 
distinction between what “we do “and “who we are” hence the expression “that is really not me” as if to suggest 
that yes I did that but that’s not really who I am. In character based moral judgments this distinction does not arise 
because “there is no separation between doing and being” (Bujo 2001: 124) and with character ethics the focus is 
primarily on the person not their actions as such. 
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4.3.2  Social Practice and Ceremonies Symbolising Character in Sesotho Culture 
 
In addition to the moral language of Basotho, further evidence of the supremacy of character 
is found in many traditional ceremonies and social practices of Basotho. In these one finds 
that having a good moral character was celebrated and promoted as an important part of what 
Basotho want in a person and hence it features prominent in moral formation and education 
activities in their social life. 
If one takes a quick glance at the social life of ancient Basotho one finds that the Basotho 
celebrated or marked key moments and stages of life with certain rituals, ceremonies, or rites 
of passages. These played an important part in the social life of the community, including in 
the in the moral formation and education of individuals. Thus, we find that from the moment of 
birth to adulthood, ethics of Basotho is preoccupied what kind of moral character their 
members would have. For Basotho good moral character, a person and the ability of a person 
to inculcated good qualities of character is the embodiment of botho i.e.,, being a motho. In 
this regard, none among the many social events in Sesotho culture is considered more 
important and treated with high regard than the birth of a baby. Here thus we find 
corresponding rituals and practices performed in the first few years of the baby’s development 
all pointing to the significance of character. One will see therefore that a major consideration 
underlying many of these social practices, rituals, or rites of initiation in the development of 
the baby is to ensure that the baby grows up to have a good moral character.  In many of 
these ceremonies or initiation rites and practices related to the growth of the baby (Bereng 
1987: 37-41), the symbolism found in all of them is all about moral character. i.e.,, ensuring 
that the baby grows up to be morally a good person by which is meant an outstanding motho 
and member of the community56.  
A key requirement in all such rituals that we see is that the central figure during the ritual i.e.,, 
the person selected to play the leading role, is always a person regarded as having 
outstanding moral character. In other words, it had to be a person adjudged in the eyes of 
community as being of good reputation, morally outstanding and possessing admirable and 
commendable character. In short, a morally upright person (Matśela 1979: 141, Bereng 1987: 
40). Highlighting this requirement in the customary practice of kindling the fire of the house 
afresh after the baby was borne Casalis (1861:267) states that “for this purpose it was 
necessary that a young man of chaste habits should rub two pieces of wood quickly one 
against another, until a flame sprung up, pure as himself”. Here chastity is regarded as a virtue 
and a sign of good behaviour and good character. The same requirement is seen with 
 
56 The significance of the communal understanding and nature of character and moral development in the culture 
must not be lost sight of here. In these rites and rituals, he community through its social institutions i.e., lelapa 
(family) and tradition and custom, which the family adheres to, is actively involved to ensure that its new members 
become the kind of person’s that reflects what a motho is to be. 
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kananelo a thanksgiving ceremony after the baby is born. The term derives from the word 
“ananela” meaning to appreciate or accept a new member into the family (Matśela 1979: 113, 
121, 153). This is one of the few such practices that has lasted even today although now often 
found in a slightly modified form. Traditionally kananelo was also the occasion of giving a 
name to the baby. In Sesotho culture like most African cultures, the ceremony of naming a 
child is a particularly important one. As such this decision is not one to be taken lightly nor is 
the name chosen arbitrarily, and just a matter of the parents. According to tradition, a name 
had to have some social significance and as such names were given “not merely as a mark 
of identity” (Matśela 1979: 79). Names were carefully chosen and the person they were named 
after had to be regarded as an outstanding exemplary individual. In other words, besides being 
a recognition of individuality and uniqueness of the person (Bujo 2001: 6) naming was 
important in a moral sense specifically with regards to moral formation of character. This is 
because as Matśela (1979: 146) informs us for Basotho,  
“a good name meant a lot to a person as it was thought to influence him/her [in 
life] in some way, as the proverb goes: " bitso- lebe ke seromo " ("A bad name 
is a permanent bad smear" or "Give the dog a bad name and hang him”).  
 
According to traditional thought, one of the reasons behind the names babies were given was 
so that the children “could resemble as much as possible the [character of the] great or 
beloved ones whose names they bore.” In other words, “A child given the family name of a 
grandparent or a relative was so that he/she should be like that person” (Ibid., 113.)   
Another important ceremony of Basotho where the primacy of character is the primary 
consideration is kuruoetso57. Traditionally this is a series of small family or homestead events 
done in the first year of life to introduce the baby to various aspects life in the community. The 
first of these is a ceremony is called ‘ho fuoa nama’ (to be given meat). This is the time when 
the baby is given “its first morsel of meat” to introduce it to eating meat (Matśela 1979: 135, 
Sekese 1994: 9). Here a person was chosen, and they would then spit on a piece of meat and 
give this to the baby (Sekese 1994:19). The belief is that “the saliva of an adult swallowed by 
a baby remains forever in the child as part of its life and in turn, the baby swallows that person’s 
good character. It is for this reason that in Sesotho we have the expression ‘swallowing of 
character’” (Bereng 1997: 37, 41).  
What is significant here is that the person selected is selected because of their character. 
They therefore had to b to be a person with a good reputation, of good standing in the 
community and someone considered a good person. In other words, someone who has 
displayed “mekhoa e metle” i.e., proven to be a person of good manners or habits overall and 
more important good behaviour or character. This means among other things being a person 
 
57 The second month after the baby is born marks what in Sesotho is called kuruetso. This an important stage of 
development from when the baby is slowly introduced to various things like food, the elements through a series of 
ceremonies. (For more on this ritual see Sekese 1994: 9-10, Paroz 1974: 192).  
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“who is generous, not selfish, and who is generous and shares what they have with the 
community.” They were not to be greedy, i.e., not only lust for food but also inability and 
unpreparedness to share with others. According to traditional belief it is believed that a child 
given food by such a person will “have resistance and withstand immoral temptations”, and if 
“by any mistake the child was to get its first food from a person of bad character the child 
would likewise become a person of detestable character”.  This preoccupation with securing 
good moral character among the Basotho can be found in the second practices linked to 
kuruoetso ceremony is “kuruoetso ea mohami58” (Sekese 1994: 10). If the former ceremony 
was about introducing the baby to solid foods, this one is about introducing the baby to liquids 
and the main participant here is mohami, (the milker) i.e., the person that milks the cows for 
the household. Again, here we see that mohami, usually the herd boy of family, is selected 
because they have proved themselves through their exemplary character, and inculcation of 
admirable values that they have good character. Describing the moral and social qualities that 
are expected of mohami, Sekese (Ibid.) tells us that this person had to be someone “ea e-
song ho itšilafalitse” meaning one who renowned for being of good repute, especially with 
regard bohloeki i.e., being chaste59, or pure and chaste. Even more important is the 
requirement that they must not only be chaste but be good in an all-rounded way. In other 
words, they must not just be good in one aspect of their lives or character. But they must be 
seen to be good in their whole behaviour and be honourable in other areas of life as well. The 
significance of purity of life and complete roundedness of character implied here as the height 
of moral uprightness and botho, must not be lost sight of as these virtues are implied in botho 
(Mphetolang 2009: 13).  The same emphasis on good character we see at play in the third of 
ceremony of “ho beelloa” also known as “kuruetso ka pula’ (Sekese 1994: 10) of the baby. 
Like the other rituals, the aim of ho beelloa was to introduce the baby to the elements 
symbolised by rain. According to custom the baby would be stripped and laid in the courtyard 
by a “clean” i.e., chaste older youth child (a virgin) of its sex and removed when it started 
crying (Matśela 1979: 147, 232; Sekese 1994: 10, Paroz 1974: 192).   
What these rituals and ceremonies have in common is they all reflect symbolic acts akin to  
“imprinting” the baby’s character, with the good character from a community representative 
who is a moral exemplar, so that in adulthood the baby can become a motho (person) with 
good character. These rituals therefore are not only symbolic events denoting the centrality of 
character to moral development and formation. They are an expression of the primacy of 
 
58 Mohami (the milk boy) is the role of a herd boy, usually responsible for looking after the family or homestead’s 
cattle and one of the social roles is to milk the cows. The availability of milk is a very important responsibility in 
traditional Sesotho household, so Mohami occupied a very small but important position within the household. He 
had total authority and responsibility and exercised a lot of discretion within the remit of his role and could determine 
if and when there will be milk in the home.  
59See Matśela 1979: 165 for the moral relevance of being chaste in Sesotho culture or bohloeki, (purity) 
(Maharasoa and Maharaswa 2004: 109). In Sesotho culture the general attitude is that youth, i.e., boys and girls 
or the unmarried, should be chaste (Matśela 1979: 165). 
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character to Basotho understanding of motho, and how this is integral part of the curriculum 
of the ongoing moral instruction and formation of the individual from childhood to adulthood. 
In other words, the central message at the heart of these practices is always connected to 
shaping the individual’s character, and as such ensuring that the baby develops a good 
character is a recurring theme in many of these.  These rituals and social practices must, 
therefore, be understood in terms of two primary aims they serve from the perspective of 
Sesotho culture and its ethics. First, these rituals and practices must be seen within the context 
of moral formation and education, as an important part of the moral life of the community. In 
this sense, they are to be understood as building in the baby a foundation for good character 
in adulthood. This is to be further developed in adulthood by the individual through moral and 
character development, and inculcation of good qualities of character and in turn becoming a 
motho. Second, in these rituals, one finds that the Basotho understood them as a kind of 
vaccination preventative protection against moral vices whereby the baby is as it was 
symbolically vaccinated against getting later in life a bad character.   
The prizing of moral character as the focal point of ethics and moral formation and in turn the 
essence of good conduct and of botho we see in many of these rituals or practices can be 
seen in other aspects of the social life of the Basotho in adulthood. This is most notable in the 
education of the young as carried out in their traditional educational institutions. Nowhere in 
the culture of the Basotho is the importance of moral character more clearly told and 
pronounced than lebollo, circumcision schools. Describing this (Matśela 1979: 135 –150) 
points out that because it was seen that the youth learned more from examples than mere 
words, those entrusted with leadership and teaching of the young initiates, were selected from 
people of good repute. The teachers or facilitators (basuoe) in these schools were not only 
openly known paragons of virtue, but also people of character “adroit in the ways of men, very 
experienced and respected for good behaviour, kindness, wisdom and healthy social 
relationships” (Ibid. 204). In turn the initiates were encouraged to learn, by observation from 
the characters of basuoe, what good qualities of character look like, which they should develop 
as an essential part of who they are and make this part of their character as well. They were 
thus expected through their character to be wells of courage, insatiable seekers of wisdom, 
truth, and social justice, of health and beauty, wealth, and kindness” (Matśela 1979: 203). For 
this reason, the curriculum of most of these circumcision schools reinforced the cultivation of 
good qualities of character. As Matśela in Maharasoa and Maharaswa (2004: 109) explains 
some of these qualities of character taught in these schools includes qualities of bohloeki 
(purity), in its literal and metaphorical sense and makhabane (virtues), both which speak 
directly to questions of character. In other words, just as we saw in the rituals about the 
development of the baby where the person playing the leading role, was selected on the basis 
on their good reputation and outstanding moral character, the same was the case with basuoe. 
 172 
The selected aspects of the social life of Basotho from childhood to adulthood and their 
symbolism underscores the primacy and centrality of character in the moral consciousness 
and culture of Sesotho speaking culture. They show how the primacy of character would 
become the predominant way in which botho is interpreted and understood.   
What we therefore learn here about character, as symbolised in such rituals as just outlined 
above is that as primary description of botho in Sesotho and Tswana speaking cultures, botho 
is something that as it were can be moulded on to a motho through character development 
and moral formation (Otlogetswe 2015: par 2). Or to put in another way, because “character 
is acquired through our actions, habits, and expected responses to moral instructions, it can 
be changed or reformed” (Gyekye 2011: par 15). This means that the formation of character 
is an ongoing process from childhood that a motho carries forward into adulthood by adopting 
habitual actions of botho, through ‘boitśoaro’ and ‘mekhoa e metle’ (good, admirable 
behaviour and habits) infused with values of botho practised in the community. The individual 
continues the process of shaping their character with these values and dispositions, while the 
community also continues to shape one’s character as well (Richardson 1994: 92). In this 
sense, our character defines and distinguishes who we are as moral agents. It is that by which 
we freely choose to be a certain kind of person, i.e., qualities of character emanating from a 
deliberate acquisition and active striving to inhabit certain values as opposed to others. It is in 
this sense, that as a moral agent my moral character reveals, “who I am” and “what kind of 
person I choose to be” (Shutte 2001:53). In other words, it is that by which I choose what I 
may and may not “permit myself to do in light of the conception I have of my own so far formed, 
and still forming, moral character” (Richardson 1994: 92).   
What this points to, which is discussed in the next section is that moral praise or sanction of 
motho in the community is always connected to an understanding that an individual is living 
up to or not living up to what is expected. This implies that in traditional societies like that of 
ancient Basotho, motho as a moral agent is regarded as a microcosm or reflection of the 
community or society in which he or she was brought up. As a moral agent one thus becomes 
the embodiment of the values encapsulated in botho and a beacon through which virtues of 
botho radiate outwards and a concrete tangible experience of acts of botho in their community 
or society which is the focus of the next section below. This leads us to the question of the 
relationship of motho and the community because one cannot speak of moral character 
without reference to the community, regarded by many as one of the traditional institutions 
that played an important role that is not lost and desperately needed in today’s context.  
 
4.4 Motho as the Beacon and Site for the Experience of Botho in the Community 
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The reinstatement of the traditional notion of moral character, central to an understanding of 
what is botho in Sesotho speaking culture advocated here must be seen against the larger 
context underlying this study, which is the dissatisfaction with the character of modern society. 
Of relevance here is the disconnect between traditional ways of thinking about morality 
presupposed by botho ethics, and contemporary approaches to ethics promoted by modernity 
and modern Western ethics. The former promotes social identity as central to societal norms 
where motho is understood as the microcosm of the moral life of the community. The latter 
promotes the notion of the self that is morally accountable to itself and autonomous, where 
the individual is not only a moral sovereign but can choose their own values (MacIntyre 1981: 
34, 62). The focus of this section pays closer attention to the former and more specifically the 
traditional Sesotho way of thinking about motho i.e., the individual as beacon of botho and 
public embodiment or representative of the community values and norms and custodian at the 
same time. This must not be construed as as looking back “to the past for a previously 
developed set of traditional values and virtues” to bring them back to the present (Walmsley 
2013: 31). Rather it is about revisiting traditional “ways of thinking about morality and 
approaches to ethics” embedded in traditional culture, which may be relevant and applicable 
for the contemporary situation” and from which lessons can be learned. I shall argue here that 
it is in part “these ways of thinking about morality and approaches to ethics” that make the 
practice of botho easier. It is in recognition of this that some of the current voices in ethics are 
calling for ethical reflection to look beyond the moral tradition of the Western culture to other 
moral traditions like that of the Basotho. It is these traditional ways of thinking about ethics, 
whose vindication against modernity and Western ethics through revival of ethics of botho, 
that I will argue is to be found in something similar to the understanding of botho ethics in pre-
modern culture of Basotho people.   
One of the big differences between pre-modern cultures and the way they thought about 
morality and ethics and contemporary ones is how the moral agent is conceived60. This is 
relevant for the current botho discourse and today’s context in view of the moral predicament 
and crisis of values discussed in chapter two facing contemporary moral agents. Today the 
prevailing conception of the moral agent is that of an encumbered autonomous self, 
accountable only to what it chooses (MacIntyre 1981: 31). In traditional cultures, such as those 
where botho derives and thrived as a popular and dominant ethic, this was different. In these 
culture motho i.e., the self was understood in terms of its social embodiments and its social 
identity. In Sesotho speaking cultures one of the defining social embodiments of the self or 
motho was one’s social role as the beacon of botho and the embodiment of the communal 
values or norms. In other words, the individual was always conscious of reflecting the 
community and its values in the way one conducted themselves and as such mindful of this 
 
60 See Sandel 1984: 173, MacIntyre 1981: 31-34f, and 127,205 -217 for more of the modern self. 
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all the time (Mphetolang 2009: 17). And this is where the interface between possession of 
botho and honour are found. This because it is in the possession of botho that a motho has 
honour and moral standing both in terms of self-respect but also respect by others in the 
community. This relationship is best described in the words of Berger’s (1984: 151) 
explanation of the concept of honour61. He says that the qualities that honour enjoins us as 
moral agents, do not only express the connection we have with the community, but also the 
connection of self with  
“the idealized norms of the community: ‘Honour considered as the 
possession by men and women of these [idealised norms and standards] is 
the attempt to relate existence to certain archetypal patterns of behaviour.”  
 
This means the moral agent living their moral life both as a concrete living representative and 
a custodian of the moral virtues of the community in one’s moral behaviour and personal 
sphere of influence and conduct. It means calling “the individual to responsible behaviour with 
knowledge that such behaviour will have consequences for one’s neighbours and indeed the 
whole community” (Mphetolang 2009: 17). In other words, as far as ethical living is concerned 
motho or ‘the individual does not consider himself to be the only one involved in his action” 
(Bujo 2001: 29). The community is always a central part of the considerations such that without 
this dynamic relationship between motho and the community, correct ethical decisions and 
acts of virtue by motho alone are impossible (Bujo 2001: 29, Mphetolang 2009: 17). In Sesotho 
culture, this is best captured in the normative meaning of the idea of ‘boitśoaro bo botle’, which 
is one of the moral qualities highly regarded in the community that a motho ought to inhabit. 
This can loosely be translated as good behaviour in the moral sense or comportment i.e., the 
way a person carries themselves and overall conducts oneself morally. This is like what in 
“Tswana culture” is called “tlhong botho” which “is used to refer to the habitués of botho, [or] 
the ways that one learns from childhood to comport oneself” (Mphetolang 2009: 20). It is 
important here to stress that boitśoaro in Sesotho has strong connotations of self-policing 
norm, which is regarded by the individual as of value to self and to others equally. It has the 
same connotation as the emphasis on the morally good behaviour of an agent in an all-
rounded way does, not just in a certain aspect of one’s life, or in an inconsistent way. The term 
captures both inward morals regarding of oneself, i.e., how one self-regards themselves, but 
also the outward looking other-regarding focus that considers how one’s moral standing is as 
viewed by the public. This way of thinking about ethics reflects the nature of how personal 
conduct according to traditional thought, is inextricably bound with its impact to the good of 
the community including its moral life (Shutte 1994: 34).  
 
61 It is interesting to note that in spite of the obsolescence of the concept of honour in general in ethics today, it is 
nevertheless still common to hear people lament that an individual has no shame i.e., loss of face in the community, 
which is only intelligible in relation to honour (Berger 1984: 151,  Hofstede et al 2010: 110). 
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In other words, boitśoaro as an inward-looking, self-regarding ethical consideration, is 
connected to questions of qualities of character that motho is asking regarding themselves. 
Here considerations of conduct of the self are decided not only by “what am I to do but who 
am I really, i.e., in terms of my upbringing?”. “What kind of person morally am I, who do I want 
to be and ought to be?” As an agent centred moral term, ‘boitśoaro’ implies moral intentions 
of a person relating to their public moral image. It expressed how the moral gent is morally 
invested in safeguarding and protecting this image in the way they conduct themselves, in a 
manner that is consistent with this sense of who they are as a moral agent. This underscores 
the normative authority of this concept where it denotes the moral agent self-regulative 
behaviour in the light of the person’s standing in the community and social identity. This self-
regarding consideration of conduct must be confused with narcissistic obsession with the self 
or confused with selfishness or the unhealthy preoccupation with the individual self, 
associated with the kind of self-absorption akin to egotism (Richardson 1994: 91). 
This way of thinking about the social role of motho consists both of the “self-regarding” 
dimension of the virtue of botho i.e., agent centred and “other-regarding” dimension (Shutte 
2001: 32). What this means is that in their personal conduct motho aims to keep a healthy 
balance of the two dimensions of botho. This is because in African ethics the understanding 
is that,  
“one’s personal conduct affects the entire community …. [and] through his 
conduct and his actions, the individual has an effect on the [community and 
therefore] …the individual cannot avoid reflecting on how his ethical actions 
affect the community. Ethical norms are not [lived] by the individual ex nihilo; 
rather, the individual … [identifies] with something that already exists” (Bujo 
2001: 125). 
  
In Sesotho culture, this is put into practice by self-policing normative imperatives codified and 
implied in boitśoaro. It implies our attitude as moral agents towards how we are perceived 
morally by others public i.e., the external and public imperatives of personal conduct. This is 
because motho is also perceived by others as a custodian of moral values and virtues of 
botho. But it also expresses how motho perceives themselves in terms of this social function, 
and the practical implication of such social embodiment on one’s personal conduct in general. 
The implication of this is that, while living their life the moral agent is mindful of their boitśoaro 
and how this reflects on their social identity. Because of this, the individual cannot act solely 
for their own interest, without due regard of what their moral life says about them as member 
of a specific family and community, with certain values and certain ways of doing things.  
The relevance of this pre-modern way of thinking about morality to ethics today is that as 
agents we cannot escape our social identity. We are both accountable to others and can hold 
others to account. This is because as moral agents we enter the moral arena of life, to an 
existing drama with a specific role assigned to us in that drama. The requirement for us at 
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minimum, as new entrants to this ongoing drama of being moral, and in the role, one plays 
during one’s life, is to play our part of this dram well. This is what excellence in virtue means. 
This is what botho means and requires. This means that the role of an agent is to live their 
moral life as best as one could, conscious of the significance of one’s moral heritage and 
tradition, which forms one’s moral frame of reference. This stays as the purpose and aim of 
life until one leaves the scene as it were, to leave the drama to continue to be performed long 
after each moral agent has left the scene. In other words, as moral agents, we are always 
representative of the moral values and ideals of our communities, whether we consent to this 
or not. And part of this entails external public representation and internalisation through 
upbringing and moral formation, the moral values and ideals of one’s society or communities 
that one identifies with which become the external moral identity of the agent.  
So, in terms of ethics this means that our primary purpose and responsibility as agents is to 
exercise good stewardship in the sphere of life where we have influence, of the moral life we 
inherit and utilise as a valuable common good. Like an actor in a play, each of us thus seeks 
as best as one can, excellence in one’s specific role in life i.e., moral life of the community, 
especially in the way one lives and conduct themselves in their own personal life. In relation 
to the practice of botho this means that motho i.e., the individual once again being the concrete 
tangible social spaces in the community where botho is experienced and felt. When this is not 
the case i.e., an individual no longer represent the values of the larger community they are 
member of, it follows that the experience of botho as the characteristic feature of the 
community and what makes the community the way it is gets lost.  
This leads to the need to examine the significance of the community as a supporting and 
enabling environment for agents as the beacon botho. This is the reason why “one cannot 
speak of botho [and motho] outside of community” (Dolamo 2013: 4) which is coherent with 
the Sesotho understanding of motho as “a process of coming into existence in the reciprocal 
relatedness of individual and community” (Bujo 2001:87). This relationship between the 
community and individual and the role of the community as social institution that makes the 
practice of botho possible will be discussed the next chapter as one of the key social intuitions 
of Basotho. 
 
4.4.1  Bophoofolo and Lack of Botho in Motho in the Eyes of the Community  
 
One of the observations about the moral culture of Basotho that is beginning to emerge is that 
possession of botho is understood not only in terms of the positive definition of botho but also 
in terms of its negative definition or lack of thereof. In other words, description of botho in 
terms of what it is not is very much part of education into botho. In Sesotho culture, this is 
summed up in the expression “ha se motho” the full expression being ‘ha se motho ea nang 
le botho’ (- is not a person who has botho). This expression is used together with another 
 177 
related moral concept “bophoofolo” (Mphetolang 2009: 16). As can be seen from both that 
they are considerations that describe botho in connection with personhood.  This means that 
botho is not only a description of the moral quality of a person, but also a definition of a certain 
type of person (motho) (Mphetolang 2009: 16). This implies that to fully understand what botho 
is, one must be able to answer what constitutes motho first (Tschaepe 2013: 51). In other 
words, understanding the traditional Sesotho conception of personhood i.e., what it means to 
be a motho. Here it will be seen that, like most African cultures for Basotho, botho is a status 
that is achieved, and its acquisition manifests itself in good character. It is for this reason that 
in Sesotho culture there can be no full moral evaluation of a motho i.e., whether one possesses 
botho or not without reference to character, because as Gyekye (2011: par 14) explains in 
“African moral systems” bad and conduct “is put down to the lack of a good character” and 
possession of good character respectively. This is because the understanding is that “it is from 
a person's character that all his or her actions—good or bad—radiate: the performance of 
good or bad acts depends on the state of one's character”.  What this means is that it is the 
character of the person that matters most morally, as this is often taken to be that which 
defines who one really is. In African culture who we are as moral agents is defined in terms of 
a particular, understanding of being a person i.e., motho, not just a human being. This is why, 
a person’s character is the standard by which moral judgements about motho are made, and 
in turn a person’s botho i.e., personhood is evaluated and judged.  
Much has been written about African conceptions of personhood and how it differs with 
Western conceptions (Bujo 2001: 3, Menkiti 1984, Letseka 2013A: 340). But none captures 
better the Sesotho understanding of personhood or botho than this pithy well-known 
expression “ha se motho” (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 71). So central to the evaluation of 
botho in a person is this expression that it can be argued that among many African moral 
judgements we have, this articulates in the most profound way the essence of the African 
conception of personhood. It is this same idea of personhood we find in another common 
expression describing failure to have qualities of botho. It shall be recalled that in African ethics 
morality is conceived in terms of moral virtues and moral vices. The Basotho understanding 
and definition of motho i.e., an agent that has botho is similarly expressed in this fashion where 
botho, is a moral virtue to aspire to inculcate. Failure to achieve this does not only leaves 
motho with the unenviable status of ‘ha se motho’ but also that of bophoofolo (beastly), a 
description of a moral vice that one who considered themselves a motho ought to avoid 
(Mphetolang 2009: 13). The latter concept has not received as much attention in the current 
botho discourse and African ethics in general like ha se motho has. But in Sesotho culture, 
you cannot talk of one without implying the other. As Casalis (1861: 303) explains among 
Basotho to possess botho i.e., decency of personhood is conceptualised “in opposition to 
bopofolo (sic) the brute life a name they apply to every immoral act of an excessively 
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scandalous nature.” The point that Casalis is trying to put across here is that bophoofolo 
expresses the fundamental censure for conduct adjudged to be antithesis or complete 
opposite of botho, and that is complete debasement of character, not befitting one who ‘ought’ 
to live and conduct themselves like motho.  
In Sesotho culture the significance of moral personhood as expressed in ‘ha se motho’ goes 
beyond the current debates on this issue and the perennial question in African ethics about 
the priority of the individuals versus that of the community. When understood in terms of moral 
progress made, this expression thus is an articulation of an even more fundamental notion 
about personhood found in Sesotho culture, that denotes a similar as idea of a telos (MacIntyre 
1981: 34) understood in terms of one’s purpose and function as a person in life. And according 
to traditional thought, this relates to being a motho i.e., attainment of and displaying of certain 
expected moral virtues in one’s character befitting a human person. It is for this reason that 
botho is to be understood in terms of character because both character and botho denotes a 
certain consistency of habit, or characteristic way of being, i.e., mekhoa in Sesotho. It is an 
expression of an account of agent’s being, over the course of their life and how they chose to 
be a certain sort of person who lives life in a particular way rather than a certain type of person 
who lives in another way i.e., one modelled on values and virtues of botho.  This conception 
of a person presupposes personhood as a process, starting with the initial natural state of just 
being a human being i.e., “motho-as-he/she-happens-to be” and motho-as-they-could-be 
progressively if they respond well to moral formation and developing  a good moral character 
or living one’s life  with the view to wanting to be always a motho and having this as the 
objective of one’s life or as MacIntyre (1981: 52) would say “man-as-she/he-could-be”. This 
means that although it is acknowledged individuals are born as a “human being,” the 
attainment of botho, or personhood, does not happen automatically or naturally. For this to be 
i.e., “a development specifically of one’s character into becoming a person (motho) “comes 
through the process of socialisation” (Dolamo 2013). It is in this sense that Shutte (2001:24) 
is correct to say of this process of moral growth, “in the beginning, at the start of my life, I am 
really not a person at all” although I am still human. The concept of human nature articulated 
here is one in which there the understanding is that “an individual can be a human being 
without being regarded as a person (Gyekye 2011: par 23), and the aim of moral formation is 
for motho to attain the latter status.  
What this understanding of personhood reveal about Basotho moral traditions is a culture 
which has a twofold conception of motho or human nature62. First it is the conception of motho 
‘as-he-or-she-is’ by virtue of being born human, i.e., as yet unsocialised and formed by culture. 
Second it is a conception of motho as ‘what-she-or-he-ought-to-be’ i.e., if they are brought up 
 
62 This is akin to the teleological moral scheme described by MacIntyre (1981:52) which conceived human nature 
in similar ways i.e., a human being as he or she is, and a human being as she or he could realise his or her true 
nature or telos, and the role of ethics is that which bridges enables transition from one to the other.  
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well, by which Basotho means moral formation and development. ‘Ha se motho’ refers to the 
latter not the former (Molefe 2017A: 220). When viewed in this way this expression is more 
than a moral judgement but is a further explication and reiteration of the basic ethical outlook 
underlying the morality of the Basotho which is the attainment of botho or moral personhood. 
This, in Sesotho culture is connected to the notion of leading a morally praiseworthy, and 
outstanding life for which moral formation and education play a crucial part. It for this reason 
that for Basotho moral formation was one of the important parts of the function of the 
community. It ensured that motho as an individual is thus supported with the necessary ethical 
resources, to make it possible to attain personhood, and because of the complexity of this 
task Basotho relied heavily on the dynamism of narratives, in addition to community moral 
exemplars as chief means of moral education, which is discussed below.  
It will have been noticed that in general moral judgements and statements in Sesotho culture 
are made in the light of attainment of certain virtues and absences of corresponding vices. In 
others by an implied juxtaposing virtues side by side with vices. This means that in the case 
of “ha se motho” and “bophoofolo” both of which represent the vices, the virtue here is to be 
motho i.e., possession of botho. In Sesotho, such a person would thus be described simply 
as “motho ea hantle,” (a morally good person) to a question “what kind of person are they”? 
This statement is an acknowledgement and recognition of one’s overall goodness of character 
and moral standing or uprightness of character. These implies progress in the acquisition of 
the various virtues and in getting rid of corresponding vices. It is in this sense that as a moral 
judgement “ha se motho” cannot be analysed completely without reference to the normative 
idea of a person i.e., African concept of a person or personhood (Gyekye 2011: Par 19, 20, 
Menkiti 2004). We can now see why in order to interpret botho correctly, it is therefore 
necessary to revisit botho in the light of its older descriptions as denoting moral quality of a 
person and notions of character and the practice of virtues (Gade 2013: 488, Gade 2011: 308) 
and avoidance of the vices all of which are essential for personhood. That means if possession 
of botho and its associated qualities amounts to acquiring the virtues enshrined in botho, then 
bophoofolo is the articulation of corresponding moral vices and the associated behaviour one 
ought to avoid. The significance that is implied in the term bophoofolo expressed here, must 
not be lost sight of as here we see again the character-centric orientation of botho. This is 
because bophoofolo donates a state of being, with the emphasis on the way one lives their 
life in general. The significance of this to current botho discourse is that it further reiterates the 
nature of botho which is less interested in individual acts of a person, but more with the quality 
of a person’s life in its wholeness and how they live it. This distinction is important as it points 
to the primacy of character implied in “being,” which entails a consistent or particular way of 
behaving over a long time. This  manifests itself publicly as the moral character of a person, 
or his or her botho. In Sesotho culture as it will have been seen the development of good 
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character is the special focus and aim of moral formation and education. The importance of 
this to inculcation of qualities of botho is discussed in the section following below.  
4.5 Narratives as Chief Form of Moral Education in Sesotho culture  
 
The relevance and significance of the narrative dimension of education in the virtues63 implied 
in botho and African ethics so far appear to have attracted little or no interest from botho 
scholars. This is despite the recognition of this as an obvious necessity and acknowledgment 
that narratives especially stories in expounding the values and ideals botho. We see this with 
Shutte (2001:16) who explain points out that traditionally the illustration of botho was in songs 
and stories” and that because of the scope of the concept which wide and deep stories are 
still the best way to illuminate the meaning of botho even if our stories now refer to present-
day realities”. This is not only a recognition but an endorsement of the significance of 
narratives to explicating botho in the current botho discourse. And yet in spite of this i.e., 
natural relevance of the narrative dimension of virtue as a resource for explaining the virtues 
of botho as a normative ideal, there is still no real interest among scholars of botho that one 
can speak of in the current botho discourse in the theorisation of this concept and unpacking 
its fuller meaning as a composite of virtues (van Niekerk 2013: 87). There is therefore yet to 
be in the current discourse a systematic and focused analysis of narratives, as a vital avenue 
for uncovering the insights of botho embedded in narratives especially those narratives found 
within most cultures from which botho derives. The significance of this is even more pressing 
when considering the over reliance of the discourse on motho ke motho, as example of the 
value that narratives can bring to the discourse.  
It must be recalled here that that in many of the cultures where botho was popular traditionally, 
the spoken word i.e., oral tradition was the chief form of moral education, preserving and 
transmitting knowledge and handing down the culture’s heritage, including its moral heritage. 
One therefore finds that stories and indeed all narratives in many pre-modern cultures or 
traditional societies play a vital role in imparting knowledge about norms and standards that 
regulate behaviour and personal conduct. Therefore, narratives are important in a society and 
in general relevant to ethics because of their inalienable significance for correct interpretation 
of life. This means that as moral agents, whether we acknowledge this or not, we are what the 
past has made us, and we cannot remove ourselves from and since stories are about the past 
we are in this sense also story formed beings (Richardson 2009: 145; Dandala 2009: 263, 
Bujo 2001: 27).  This is true of most traditional societies or pre-modern African cultures 
including Sesotho culture and Basotho society. But as it has been recognised narratives are 
not accounts that occur in a vacuum, but they always express “the historical memory” of 
 
63 This is borrowed from Bujo (2001: 27, and McIntyre 1981: 229). 
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particular society in which they are narrated, (MacIntyre 1981: 121, 127). This underscores 
the relevance of moral particularity and context within which narratives occur (Ibid. 221), which 
is itself an important aspect of ethical reflection that must always be taken into consideration 
in ethics, because it underlines the vital social role that narratives play in the moral life of a 
culture. It follows then that of necessity, narratives will have moral ideals and values held 
deeply by a society making them one of the richest deposits of moral values of a culture. Thus, 
it will be seen that many narratives do not only reflect the history of the cultures from which 
they emerged but that they are also an expression of and a reflection on that culture’s moral 
heritage. Therefore, most narratives will presuppose certain social order and moral beliefs, 
vital for one to know or be familiar with to fully grasp the messages that they communicate 
and the moral lesson they intend to convey. Explaining the significance of this Bujo (2001: 27) 
points out that “stories do not only constitute the past, which is handed on in narration; they 
also “have contexts64 that supply the outlines and “body” of that which is narrated, moulds 
without which the narration loses some of its significance and in turn rendering narratives 
unintelligible, and therefore ineffective as a means of education into virtue”.   
Narratives therefore are important in a culture, especially stories, as a social philosophy of the 
culture; they “makeup theory and are, therefore, real and legitimate sources of data and ways 
of being”, (Letseka 2013B: 354), and this is the case in Sesotho culture as we shall see shortly 
with litśomo (Letseka 2013A: 342). One of the primary use of narratives and stories in such 
cultures, including that of the Basotho is they are the chief form of moral education in virtue. 
While moral education and teaching are often seen as the preserve of stories in these cultures, 
it is equally the case with other narratives like proverbs, riddles, guessing games, dance, and 
songs (Bujo 2001: 24, Casalis 1861: 337). In all these the virtues communicated are learned, 
internalised, and practised, not in a static manner but in a manner that they are correctly and 
appropriately applied to all existential situations, particularly the ethical sphere (Bujo 2001: 
25).  As it will become clear here, the main objective behind narratives, in cultures like that of 
the Basotho is training in character (Mapesela 2004: 321) and inculcation of makhabane i.e., 
virtues (Letseka 2013A: 341, 342, Maharasoa and Maharaswa 2004: 109). In other words, “the 
belief is that the moral narratives would help the young people to acquire and internalize the 
moral values of the society, including specific moral virtues, embedded in [these] ethical 
narratives” (Gyekye 2011: par. 15).  
 
64 This reiterates the importance of moral particularity of those culture traditionally associated with botho which is 
implied in these stories and ought to be the primary context of analysis of botho. The narrative account advanced 
thus is an affirmation of the problem with the approach of current botho theorisation, which lacks the sufficient 
context especially in relation to the narrative dimension in education in the virtues of botho. Instead the approach 
almost treats botho as an abstract concept that can be analysed independently and defined in precise terms, 
without little or no reference to the articulation of these virtues of botho in different ways in the stories within the 
culture that explains and interprets what it means. This tendency can be seen in some of the concern raised in the 
discourse about its lack of preciseness and corresponding efforts to give precision to its definition (Mboti 2015: 
130, Lutz 2009: 2). This in turn leads to a misunderstand of the nature of botho, which is that it is not just a normative 
concept but more importantly that as moral ideal it is by nature a very polysemic concept. 
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The ethical significance of narratives that will be explored here therefore, using selected 
narratives from the culture of the Basotho, will be of narratives as the paradigm of education 
in virtue. It is therefore important to point out from the outset that narratives do not only mean 
stories, and thereby restricting the narrative dimension of education into virtue to stories. The 
narrative element in education in virtue does not need always to be in the form of telling or 
narrating stories, or tales, or fables. It is equally present in dance, poetry, songs, praise singing 
and other nonverbal forms of moral education and instruction, including in the life of moral 
exemplars, whose whole life story is a kind of story narrated for others to learn from.  
It is important to realise that narratives are part of the wider context of African indigenous 
knowledge and education system. This is therefore the framework within which they 
functioned and carried out their task of moral education and teaching. Equally important is to 
understand the nature of the narrative element of education in virtue. In African culture it aims 
to illustrate the virtues to be inculcated and it delineate vices, which are to be avoided (Bujo 
2001: 27). This is particularly pronounced in some of the traditional tales in Sesotho culture 
illustrating makhabane of botho as the goal of moral education. When analysing the narrative 
dimension of virtue with reference to botho and the cultures from which it derives, especially 
the Sesotho culture, it will therefore be important to recognise that narratives are first the 
articulation and explanation of botho as the encapsulation of virtues. Second that their 
narration has a context i.e., wherever they are narrated narratives are told with a particular 
and specific social context in mind and against the background of that social context.    
Sesotho culture like most African cultures has a variety of narratives. This includes stories that 
narrates their history and self-understanding as a people including stories of their heroic past 
and conquest as well as their moment of loss and defeat. This is the case with lithoko, (praise 
poems) which are common form of narratives in Sesotho culture65. Basotho also have within 
their culture other forms of narratives used explicitly for moral education. I am thinking here of 
that stock of stories handed down from generation to generation and narrated in every 
household conveying life lessons about the good way to live as a person and bad way to lead 
your life as well. A keen observer of Basotho culture will thus be aware that central to their 
culture is an understanding and conception of moral life, where good character is promoted 
as the essence of goodness and what it means to be motho i.e., a good person. This was in 
turn encouraged as that which ought to become the characteristic way one displays the 
possession of botho in the way one lives their life.  This way of thinking about moral life was 
passed on from generation to generation through narratives where fellowship with moral 
exemplars of the culture, where the company of the old wise and experienced members of the 
 
65 The difference between lithoko and litśomo is that the latter was predominantly deployed as means of moral 
education, while the former is often a narration of the past heroic age of the culture. Typically, lithoko tells of great 
historical events and corresponding display of excellence in virtue such as extra ordinary acts of valour, courage, 
or kindness or wisdom (see Casalis 1861: 328).  
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community is itself part of education in virtue and a key part of moral education. In other words, 
moral instruction, and education into a virtue in these cultures were primarily through stories 
(Bujo 2001: 24). In Sesotho culture, this is found in that stock of Sesotho folk tales known in 
Sesotho culture as litśomo66 (folk tales) (Letseka 2013A: 342, Letseka 2013B: 354). 
Before looking at the significance of stories in Sesotho culture and their role in moral education 
in general and litśomo in particular, it is important to look first at other Sesotho narratives and 
how they were utilised in education into virtue. Of interest are those common sayings and 
expression akin to proverbs. This is because this underscore the importance of the unity of 
Sesotho narratives, whereby litśomo (stories), lithoko (poetry or praise songs) maele 
(proverbs or common saying and expressions), lilotho (riddles) are not to be treated as 
separate entities. These narratives are instead to be treated as one body of knowledge, whose 
deployment and utilisation presupposed knowledge of the others. Their relationship to one 
another is therefore a complementary one, which is how traditionally these functioned and 
would have been understood and applied as part of the indigenous Sesotho system of 
education into virtue. It is in terms of this unity therefore that narratives must be understood 
especially as part of the non-formal part of traditional Sesotho education system which took 
the largest part of every person's education time covering all his/her days of childhood, youth 
up to adulthood (Matśela 1979: 188). This form of education includes all forms of education 
and training which took place anywhere and anytime. It differs from a formal one like that 
which took place in lebollong (circumcision school) which took place under supervision and 
close monitoring of recognised experts and exemplars. Non-formal education is always 
spontaneous and took advantage of situations as they presented themselves to impart 
knowledge and encourage the concrete practice of virtues. Among the virtues Basotho 
regarded highly and encouraged in their society and made them the focus of their education 
system includes "correct forms of behaviour and morality... chastity, honesty, reliability, 
courage, humility and respect for elders " (Ibid: 191).  
Just as there is little interest as yet in the current discourse to investigate the experience of 
botho from the perspective of Sesotho speaking culture and its understanding of botho, so too 
it would appear with the use of Sesotho narratives as vehicles for explicating botho.  The 
closest one finds to this is reference to “motho ke motho ka batho” and related moral statement 
“ha se motho.” This study thus explores and analyses other related narratives or expressions 
in Sesotho culture for their ethical insights about virtues of botho and introduces these to the 
discourse as a way of broadening the discussion on botho. Worth mentioning among these is 
the doctrine of “o se re ho moroa moroa tooe” (Nqosa  2010) as an expression of the virtues 
of generosity, hospitality and non-discrimination all of which are ethical imperatives implied in 
 
66 According to Coplan in Letseka (2013A: 342) litśomo like “auriterary metaphors, are intended to startle untamed 
meanings from their burrows. They are full of surprises and attacks ranging from the uncanny to the fantastical, 
with mythical creatures, wild animals, and even wilder humans pursuing improbable stratagems”. 
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botho as it applies to Sesotho culture. It is important for the discourse to realise that these 
expressions or proverbs are part of a large body of narratives that traditionally supported the 
practice of the virtues of botho by providing further guidance on what it means to be ethical 
and to live a life consistent with the principles of botho. In this section, similar expressions are 
going to be examined to highlight their normative significance as a means of moral education 
in to botho within Sesotho culture.  
A keen observer of Sesotho narratives, especially proverbs, and other similar adages or moral 
sayings will be aware that because of their primary social function as chief vehicles of moral 
educational, narratives are designed to be easily remembered and applied appropriately 
depending on the context. Most of them are intentionally brief and sometimes poetic hence 
they must always be understood as condensed synthesis of moral education into virtues of 
botho as found in culture’s past experiences (Bujo 2001: 25). In other words, they are not only 
“concise, pithy, reflective statements that are both simple and complex,” and easy to 
remember, but “that they also compactly express large, abstract ideas or concepts” (Mokitimi 
2004: 756). In terms of communication in the context of moral formation they therefore function 
like summarised accounts of the narration of the ethical imperatives of the grant narrative 
about Bosotho and botho. As it shall be recalled this is what we referred to as the overarching 
narrative, summing up all the Basotho’s combined knowledge and wisdom i.e., views and 
ideas about what it means to be a motho as handed down through tradition.  
One of the expression Basotho commonly use normatively as part moral education of their 
members is the expression “ngoana mosotho67” (a child of Mosotho). This expression can be 
used to pass moral judgement of good or bad behaviour. I start with it use in connection with 
the former. In this context typically it’s used to describe conduct of a person who behaves 
themselves morally well where Basotho would say “ke ngoana oa mosotho.” This can loosely 
be translated to mean ‘they are child of mosotho’, meaning the person conducts themselves 
as expected of one who is brought up as proper mosotho or in Sesotho way. A careful reading 
of this statement suggests an underlying greater story that this expression presupposes which 
has to do with what it means to be a mosotho or being raised as a mosotho child.  Traditionally 
the “upbringing of children” as a preparation for adulthood or future life including moral 
formation, was understood in a particular and specific way among Basotho. It was not so much 
on preparing individuals for the future, because nobody knows what the future will be but the 
focus of education into the virtues was on preparing individuals to live their lives well and fully, 
whatever their future will be (Matśela 1979: 84). The distinction made here further underscores 
Basotho ethics as essentially teleological in nature, because here the statement denotes 
 
67 For elements of Basotho social and moral culture that constitute the normativity of this phrase see Ellenberger 
(1912: p268, 290), and many of the moral imperatives attached to ngoan’a mosotho (Mapesela 2004: 322) are the 
same as those implied by to Bosotho, and in both cases the normative imperative they refer to implies certain 
conduct of a particular regarded as befitting one who is a Mosotho. 
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commendable progress i.e., a degree of excellence in virtue that an individual is displaying 
towards their ultimate goal. The second usage of this expression is as a censure for 
unacceptable conduct. Here a mosotho would say “e ka re ha se ngoan’a mosotho” (it’s like 
they are not a mosotho child) or “Ke ngwana waga mang68” in Setswana meaning whose child 
is this one. Both poor conduct and failure to make good progress to one’s education in virtue 
through upbringing (Mphetolang 2009: 19). The emphasis in these two statements, is about a 
person who lives their life in a manner inconsistent with one who is brought up as a Mosotho 
child. As with the first expression, here too the moral denominator is Bosotho i.e., the culture 
and way of Basotho and the assessment being made is that the individual in question he or 
she is behaving or conducting themselves i.e., in life in general, as if they are not a child of a 
Mosotho (Mapesela 2004: 322).  
The normative dimensions of virtue implied in the utterance of both statements reflect what 
Bujo (2001: 27) sees as characteristic feature of morality in African culture where virtues are 
depicted side by side with the vices to be avoided. This is the case here in these two 
statements. In the first statement is an expression of a positive affirmation of conduct that the 
result of a life lived in alignment with the attainment of virtue. The second is an articulation of 
the failure to live according to expected standards as narrated through tradition handed down 
in Sesotho culture. This amounts to the capitulation of the individual to vices. So, we find that 
the first phrase implies that all that is acceptable and cherished in a well-natured Mosotho 
child is present in the way of life of the individual in question. With the latter, it means that 
such behaviour displayed by the individual is not only regarded as bad but also as not 
expected of one brought up as Mosotho i.e., a child of a Mosotho. The second point relates to 
the word “child” in the phrase “ngoana mosotho” (a Mosotho child) which denotes child in a 
moral sense much like in the same sense as moral personhood is understood. Here “ngoana 
mosotho” thus must be interpreted as referring to a person’s moral progress in relation to their 
ongoing upbringing but more important the individual’s response to that. In other words, has 
the person responded in a way that they can be judged as having made satisfactory progress 
i.e., in terms of their education into virtue through their upbringing? Or has the person in their 
conduct showed signs of regressing or not responding well to upbringing (Mphetolang 2009: 
19).   
One of the ways to understand many of the proverbs or sayings in Sesotho culture is to show 
the conditions under which a Mosotho would resort to many of these sayings. As Mokitimi 
(2004: 756) explains “the meaning of Sesotho proverbs is best understood when they are 
studied in the context of their actual use” i.e., “when the speaker is communicating with the 
 
68 This expression similarly to its Sesotho counterpart, can also be a moral statement questions the social institution 
responsible for upbringing and how well they can do their job. In this case this would be directed at the person’s 
parents, family and indeed the community about seeming failure to bring up one of its own properly (Mphetolang 
2009: 19).  
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audience in a particular situation”. This does not only give us the relevant context, which we 
have already pointed to its significance in moral discourse, it also gives us insight into the 
intention behind the invocation. This is what Bujo (2001: 31) refers to as the direction of the 
communication intended because these were not just statements and expressions that were 
uttered with no particular intention and conversational context.  In the case of a ‘ngoana oa 
mosotho’, one finds that the circumstance in which a Mosotho resorted to these is to reiterate 
a moral idea already commonly shared and implicitly understood in the culture (Mapesela 
2004: 322). And that is an underlying understanding of Bosotho being a kind of normative 
standard, a way of life for one to live their life by and that by which conduct is regulated. What 
this implies is an understanding within the Sesotho culture where Bosotho denotes a 
conglomeration of certain standards of conduct regarded as typical of one who is a proper 
Mosotho. Thus, according to this being brought up well as ‘ngoana oa mosotho’ means an 
individual whose conduct is in conformity with this as a standard. When a person does not live 
their life according to this, then a Mosotho would say of such an individual, o itśoere joalo ka 
ha eka ha se ngoana oa Mosotho.” This is as much a moral statement as it is also a moral 
assessment of the person’s conduct in general, meaning that such a person, he/she is not 
behaving in a manner befitting one raised as a Mosotho child, i.e., brought up accordingly to 
certain standards of upbringing regarded as characteristic of Sesotho culture.  The implicit, 
meaning of “ngoana Mosotho” that is being communicated here, reflects how the Basotho 
regarded their culture or Bosotho as a kind of an expression of a particular way of life that 
presuppose certain ways of living or moral standards that marks it as Bosotho. This we see in 
the extent to which Bosotho as expressed in, mosotho child is spoken of as a normative 
standard synonymous with values and virtues that constitute botho. In other words, as 
Mapesela (ibid.) explains “not only do these phrases encourage the development of identity 
with Sesotho culture, they also promote and encourage the development of good ethics and 
botho.”   
Another important expression in Sesotho culture that features prominently in moral education 
into the virtues is the common Sesotho expression “ngoana ke ua sechaba”, which means ‘a 
child belongs to the nation” (Mapesela 2004:322, Matśela 1979: 87). It is important to observe 
that in this expression the message that children are being told vis-à-vis their conduct is that 
they should conduct themselves in an exemplary way in the presence and or absence of their 
immediate parents. But this expression equally expresses ethical responsibilities for any adult 
person vis-à-vis their duty in the social upbringing of young members of the community in the 
right way. In other words, “Basotho were concerned about proper behaviour among younger 
members, whether they knew them (the children) or not” (Matśela 1979: 87). As Mapesela 
further explains “this phrase implies that raising a child is not only the responsibility of a child’s 
biological parents but rather of every elderly person in the community” (2004: 322). This was 
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a way of ensuring moral education and teaching of the young by deterring bad behaviour 
among youth. This was because children would know that at any time an adult person could 
be around and reprimand them.  
What we therefore learn about these expressions and sayings such as these explored here, 
is that they are excerpts of a grand narrative of the Bosotho. Their pithiness made it easy to 
recall the main lessons of what it means to be a Mosotho and how one who is brought as in a 
Sesotho way is ought to conduct themselves. In short, these sayings and expressions 
presuppose knowledge of this grand narrative about Bosotho, specifically the moral story of 
the Basotho as a people. This is because through upbringing one got exposed to the narration 
of the full story including the understanding of personhood and botho as implied in their social 
practices or customs of Basotho as well as those reflected in their forms of politeness and 
rules of etiquette (Casalis 1861: 207). Central to this story is the high moral value Basotho 
place on a person being of good upbringing by which it is meant not only the actual parental 
education in virtue of a child but more importantly how the child responds to such education 
and moral formation. This explains the strong feeling every Mosotho has towards acquiring 
the unenviable status of being regarded as “motho ea se nang mekhoa i.e., a manner less 
person of bad character and behaviour” which every Mosotho who considered himself or 
herself decently brought up could not afford (Ellengberger 1912: 293). As can be seen without 
this background and knowledge, it is arguable if the analysis of such expressions and 
statements along with their constituent key moral terms such as “mekhoa” or boitśoaro is not 
going to misrepresent the true meaning and ethical significance that such expressions enjoyed 
in their original settings and social milieu within which they applied and gave them significance. 
 
4.5.2  Significance of Litśomo in Moral Education in Sesotho Culture 
 
The significance of stories as a specific type of narratives with a special role in moral formation 
and education into virtue has so far been indirectly discussed or by inference as part of an 
account of narratives in general. But as it will become clear here, in Sesotho culture, stories 
played a crucial role not only in the psyche of a society but in moral education and education 
into virtue as well. This means that that we can best learn about the ethical imperatives of 
botho and the virtues it encapsulates through stories. Moral stories, therefore, capture in the 
most vivid way how the essence of our lives as moral agents and quest for meaning found in 
narratives. Most stories can be understood by everyone without any need for the explanation 
of what the moral lesson is. Describing the importance of stories in moral education, McIntyre 
(1981: 121, 216) explains that in addition to being the doorway into understanding society 
“It is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, …. that children 
learn or mislearn both what a child and what a parent is, what the cast of 
characters may be in the drama into which they have been born and what 
the ways of the world are.…... Hence there is no way to give us an 
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understanding of any society, including our own, except through the stock of 
stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources”.  
 
This is the power inherent in stories as vehicles for moral education hence why they fascinate 
us. This is true even today where traces of this can be found in the fascination with “modern 
stories”, although the content and nature of these and their narration may have changed.  
In Sesotho speaking culture the narrative dimension education into virtue is found in that stock 
of moral stories called litśomo, which I will discuss shortly.  Traditionally the narration of litśomo 
was in fellowship with the elders and was primarily for moral education. They helped young 
people to acquire and internalize the moral values of the society and affirmed the values of 
social morality” which is focused on “on human relations” (Gyekye 2011: par 6, 15). The same 
cannot be said of many modern “stories” told through the medium of technology and television.  
This has distorted the social value and significance of stories not only in relation to our moral 
life as agents but more specifically in relation to moral education into virtue particularly of the 
young which is that we live our lives predominantly through stories. This is because as a moral 
agents motho is social animals and  
“in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a storytelling 
animal. He…. becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to 
truth. [And]…the key question…. is not about their own authorship; I can 
only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question 
'Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” (MacIntyre 1981: 216). 
 
This means that  it is in part through stories that we seek answers to fundamental existential 
and moral questions”, questions such as ‘What does it mean to lead a good life’?, “how does 
one become motho i.e., a good person and live life well or indeed “what does conduct or life 
worthy of one who is morally good look like?”  Different cultures throughout the ages have 
answered these questions in their different ways, hence we find different stock of stories in 
different cultures. They range from stories that explain our identity within the narrow 
boundaries of family and community to those that explain our identities as nations. They reflect 
some describable story i.e., of a particular community and its moral tradition (Richardson 
2009: 145).  So, if we want to learn about the moral beliefs of a culture, paying attention to the 
stories of that culture seem to be a good starting point.  
This is true of those traditional pre-modern cultures like Basotho culture, from which botho 
derives. Looking at these cultures one will find that the “chief means of moral education is the 
telling of stories” usually from a stock of stories “handed down from generation to generation” 
and often peculiar to that culture (McIntyre 1981: 121). In other words, it is through stories that 
most cultures transmit knowledge and educate their members and future generations into 
virtue. This means that stories do not only reflect a society’s moral beliefs and values but 
ultimately, they reflect the virtues and moral ideals that a particular society holds dear. In turn 
they outline preferred ways of living individuals are expected to emulate.  One of the reasons 
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that stories are so important for moral education is that they have a unique way of preserving 
eternal moral truths, irrespective of cultural origins and place. They can convey a message in 
a way that transcends time and space or age. In this sense, most stories are timeless, because 
the moral lesson they teach is always relevant to any context. This is true of the stories of 
most of the cultures associated with botho which is why stories are the ideal way to explain 
the meaning of botho (Shutte 2001: 16).  
Because of this unique standing of stories among African narratives, it is time current botho 
discourse renounce the bias against traditional tales as a means of theorising and explaining 
the values enshrined in botho. This is given credence when one considers that it was through 
stories that in African culture stories are the chief means of moral education into virtue. This 
means the same should be the same for current botho discourse in learning about botho and 
what the concept means, most notably in relation to cultivation of good qualities of character. 
As such one finds that in most traditional cultures, such as Sesotho speaking culture much 
time was devoted to the narration of stories as the first stage in character-building (Dandala 
2009: 265). Thus, we find that in Sesotho speaking culture storytelling was the most common 
means of day to day moral instruction and education especially for younger members of 
societies (Casalis 1861: 337; Ellenberger 1912: 297) with narration of litśomo as the most 
prominent, which the focus on the next section.  
Before looking at litśomo and their significance to moral education and formation in Sesotho 
culture, I would like to make a few preliminary remarks. First, to point out that it is not the 
intention here to give an exhaustive analytical analysis of all litśomo found in Sesotho culture. 
Second, that it is important to realise that litśomo as part of narratives, like other moral 
education resources in Sesotho culture, function within a much larger context of indigenous 
education and knowledge system of ancient Basotho (Mapesela 2004, Maharasoa and 
Maharaswa 2004). This knowledge system like all knowledge systems makes certain claims 
to the truth about life in its beliefs and moral system. Of interest for us here is what this 
knowledge system says about motho and what it means to be a person. As such this 
knowledge system provides an overarching framework to narratives including litśomo and it is 
that which narratives their moral authority and significance. Narratives like litśomo will 
therefore reflect this and the particular moral theory and ethos it subscribes to. I will therefore 
argue that many of Sesotho narratives are unintelligible, and their moral significance will not 
be easily accessible if analysed and theorised without reference to this knowledge system. 
This is because they presuppose the central tenets of this knowledge system, and often 
directly or indirectly imply it. This is true of botho as well. But the scope of work this requires 
means this is an area of interest worth a study in its own right. Any attempt to do this here will 
be an injustice. It will therefore suffice here to only highlight the importance of litśomo as the 
 190 
chief means of moral education, highlighting their role in moral education about virtues, 
training in character and moral personhood according to Sesotho culture. 
In ancient Basotho society, litśomo were usually narrated around the fire, in the evenings 
usually by elders to younger members usually when all household chores were completed. 
They were told and retold in every hut in the village, such that they were almost known 
everywhere by heart. They were the chief means by which the community taught its members 
about admirable qualities of good character, virtues (makhabane)  that one ought to inculcate 
and vices to avoid. Describing this even the early missionaries with their European bias and 
prejudice of African culture acknowledged the moral significance of litśomo, with Casalis 
(1861: 339) saying of their role in moral teaching “here and there we find valuable moral 
lessons proving that evil never remains unpunished”. Narration of litśomo in Sesotho Culture 
is an important part of the non-formal education of the Basotho (Matśela 1979: 191). Today 
litśomo are no longer commonly narrated in households, as was the case in the past. The 
decline of the practice is another consequence of the displacement of traditional Sesotho 
culture, more specifically oral tradition by modernisation and Westernisation of the Basotho 
culture69.  The power of storytelling is now replaced by the proliferation of reading and writing.  
I will argue here however, that litśomo remains one of the most valuable and relevant and 
underutilised resources for moral education about botho and virtues of botho, currently 
available to current discourse. In other words, for current ethical reflection to benefit from the 
rich ethical resource that litśomo represents, it is imperative virtues of botho are analysed in 
terms of how they are articulated in narratives in general and in many litśomo in particular.   
As the chief means of moral education litśomo should thus be read less as stories for 
entertaining children or mere African literature.  Many litśomo, if not all of them convey and 
communicate deep moral lessons and express eternal moral truths about what the culture 
regards as good character and bad character (Letseka 2013B: 354). In them we find captured 
there the traditional African moral thought about what it means to be moral, to be a person of 
good character, which in Sesotho speaking culture is defined in terms of being a proper motho 
(Mphetolang 2009: 17). They are a vivid articulation of Basotho’s values and qualities of moral 
character regarded as befitting one who has botho, and hence a proper motho. They also 
depict metaphorically the existential question crucial for moral life of motho which is the 
ultimate life-shaping choice confronting motho as moral agent. That choice is succinctly 
depicted in Kierkegaard's Enten-Eller and the choice between the ethical way of life and the 
aesthetic way of life (McIntyre’s 1981: 40), which is a  metaphor resembling the ultimate choice 
 
69 I use the terms modernisation and westernization here with specific emphasis to denote discontinuation of some 
social practice within a culture for what appears to be no apparent rational reason or benefit other than as a result 
of general tendency in Africa of uncritical embrace of much of Western culture which often is regarded as modern, 
and implying progress and develop. With litśomo some would argue if their abandonment is progress, considering 
the general embrace of television stories even of bedtime stories reading practices. 
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for motho depicted in litśomo, i.e. a choice between the good way to live life  and the bad way 
to live.  
But unlike MacIntyre’s “ultimate choice” between two ways of life, in then narration of litśomo 
to live their life as an individual motho and in turn the audience is always confronted with a 
fundamentally different choice. Here the choice to be made is first informed by the 
communitarian character of African ethics or social character of African morality where the 
moral agent must always “give due consideration to the interests and welfare of others” 
(Gyekye 2011: par 66).  In Sesotho culture this choice is understood in terms of that which 
defines one as a motho i.e., a choice that defines the kind of person we are. In other words, 
the kind of life we will build for ourselves, and those we affect. … where the choice we face 
as moral agent is the choice between generosity and greed” (Prozesky 2007: 76).  Or to put 
this differently in litśomo the choice is portrayed is between “the selfish way of living or the 
unselfish one, i.e., living mainly of oneself or living with a real and active genuine concern for 
others” (Ibid: 77). Second, in litśomo the moral agent in this case the audience listening 
themselves does not confront the moral of the story i.e., the choices depicted in the story from 
a neutral standpoint” but from their moral starting point as “ngoana oa Mosotho (a Mosotho 
child). This is because as earlier discussed as a normative statement “ngoana oa Mosotho” 
precludes one who is brought up as such from certain moral choices that would be inconsistent 
with this status. Making such a choice, if one makes it, amounts not only to the rejection of 
oneself and who one really is, but leads one to gain the unenviable moral status of bophoofolo 
(Casalis 1861: 303, Mphetolang 2009: 18; Otlogetswe 2015: par 3). In other words, to be 
regarded as “motho ea se nang mekhoa i.e., mannerless person”, a status every Mosotho 
who considered himself or herself decently brought, would not want (Ellengberger 1912: 293, 
Mapesela 2004: 322).  
So, the narration of litśomo must be understood as aimed at reinforcing the values and ideals 
already encouraged in the moral practice of the agents by their upbringing in one’s moral 
journey as a motho. The ultimate purpose in litśomo therefore is the reaffirmation of a way of 
life already lived by virtue of one being brought up as “ngoana oa mosotho”, and to reinforce 
the practice of virtue in the agent’s life as a good way to live one’s life. Litśomo thus must be 
read as enabling the moral agent to introspect by reflecting on the two ways of life depicted in 
these stories. Their narration is an opportunity for one to recommit themselves to a life lived 
in virtue and validation of that way of life. It is a time for the moral agents to meditate on 
choosing the ethical way of life and how to become better in living out the virtues which that 
way of life presupposes. With the narration of litśomo the kind of choice where the moral agent 
is presented as confronting both choices having as yet embraced neither is not possible 
(MacIntyre 1981: 40). According to traditional morality every moral agent confronts these 
moral choices in life from a morally pre-defined standpoint and moral particularity that is one’s 
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starting point.  As such a choice of a way of life depicted in the litśomo, that would entail 
emulating a way of life inconsistent with the status of being “ngoana oa Mosotho” is simply not 
an option.  It is for this reason that the narration of litśomo is often presented by elders with 
the necessity moral insight and maturity to correct impressionable young minds who may 
sometimes misunderstand the enchanting lifestyle of some of the main characters in the 
stories for virtues to be aspired to and emulated.  
Another important observation a keen observer of Sesotho narratives will be aware of is that 
the narrative dimension of education into virtue as found in litśomo, is the juxtaposition of the 
virtues and their corresponding vices to be avoided (Bujo 2001: 27). In litśomo, the aim is 
therefore to learn the difference between good and evil, good and bad.  It is also for motho, in 
the form of the audience listening to the narration to show growth in discernment to distinguish 
the best way to live life well and fully, from the bad and therefore the wrong way for one to 
live70. The possibility of failure to make the right judgement in discerning, especially of younger 
members of the society, about the true virtuous way of life as depicted in the story is the reason 
elders narrated the stories most of the time.  Having made that distinction and recognising the 
right one, the expectation is then for one to internalise the virtue and values of this way of life 
by habitually doing those acts that produce these values. This becomes part of the growth in 
moral wisdom for daily conduct and for application in different situations calling for ethical 
action.  For this reason, litśomo are narrated repeatedly to the point that they were known by 
heart, and often the children would themselves be asked to narrate these to others. This, in 
turn, fostered and encouraged the development of good habits of character. So, if we do not 
usually read litśomo in this way, to paraphrase McIntyre, it is because over-familiarity with 
their narration has lulled us into believing that these are mere tales for leisure whose only 
moral significance is the moral education of children. It is such views of litśomo and the bias 
of the new i.e., where everything that is “new and modern” is treated as always implying 
progress, that has dulled our sense to the value of litśomo and the power of their messaging 
about how to live life well. It is the conviction of this entry here that litśomo are not only relevant 
to ethical reflection on botho, but have a unique, and as yet realised potential to contribute 
immensely to current analysis and theorisation of this concept.  
The brief overview of the relevance of litśomo just outlined provides necessary background to 
litśomo and their role in education in virtue in Sesotho culture. Now we can explore a few 
selected classic litśomo, that best capture the narrative dimension of education into virtue and 
their social function in moral education especially in training about character.   
 
 
70 According to the traditional morality a “good way to live” is always understood in terms of prizing the welfare of 
all and this is the underlying message of most litśomo i.e., underlining the values of social morality or the common 
good (Gyekye 2011: 77) 
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4.5.3  Analysis of Selected Litśomo in Sesotho Culture 
 
None among the stock of litśomo of Basotho capture the essence of the narrative dimension 
of virtue and training in character than those depicting the character of ‘mutlanyana’, the hare. 
In these stories often the character of the hare or lifestyle is typically portrayed as the clever, 
cunning good for nothing character71. It is often depicted as a creature of envy who is “doing 
well” despite not applying any effort in life. It lives an extravagant life from unjust rewards 
coning other animals out of their possessions as illustrated in the story with the jackal. 
 
(a) The Hare and the Jackal 
In the English version of this story “The guardian of the dew pond”, all the animals decide to 
build a dam to “catch the dew by night” to address a severe drought. But  
“one animal, the good for nothing hare, refused to lend a hand, but sat on 
the big rock and laughed and jeered as the others sweated and toiled in 
the heat of the summer sun, and the angry creatures vowed that not one 
drop of water would they allow him to drink” (Savory 1962: 31). 
 
Following this, a rota of guards was created, and all the animals took it in turns to guard the 
pond to make sure the lazy hare goes nowhere near the pond. Where this story is leading to 
is self-evident as the hare as usual got up to his tricks to get what he does not deserve. The 
basic character and way of life of the hare’s character depicted here are recounted in another 
similar tśomo “The end of the wicked one” (Ibid, 57-59). Here we see the hare’s sneaky 
character and cunning lifestyle of getting his way through life without putting in the required 
effort. We are told that after the jackal, known for his building skills, was asked by the animals 
“to build them a house where they could gather together and enjoy themselves”, when the 
hare got up to his same old tricks. The jackal, having judiciously begun his work and now 
roofing the house, “the hare came sauntering past”. With his “intentions” as usual, very far 
from good” it offered to help. The jackal thinking nothing of this agreed gratefully. With the 
jackal working on the roof from the outside, the hare working on the roof from the inside the 
hare proceeded carefully to sew the jackal’s tail firmly to the rafters along with the grass. Then  
“Having made quite sure that the jackal was now unable to jump down from 
the roof after him, the wicked hare climbed down from his perch inside the 
roof, …. then climbed onto the roof and killed the poor jackal, after which he 
carefully skinned him [and] … putting the jackal’s skin over his own, 
[proceeds to live as the jackal] (Ibid. 57).”.  
 
Disguised as a jackal he goes from house to house selling them dagga (marijuana) until one 
day one of his customers discovered that “his jackal’s skin was not all that it appeared to be”. 
 
71 The term lifestyle here is used deliberately to emphasis the way of life that the main character led as opposed 
to their actions as the moral lesson contained in litśomo i.e., focus is on “being” or character and not of “doing” or 
actions as such.  
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The moral of the story is clear to see here and what qualities of characters and corresponding 
behaviour is being encouraged and discouraged. Suffice to say the character of hare in the 
story i.e., clever, wise and on the surface enviable at least from the perspective of the other 
animals, is not reflected in good light. The subtext of the story points to its character as a 
whole as somehow deformed and not the kind to be encouraged or admired. These are not 
qualities of character or more correctly this is not a good way to lead one’s life and therefore 
by implication something that the listener ought not to aspire to emulate in their own life, 
because  it is based on falsehood, and not expected from one who is morally a good person.  
In other words, a careful reading of many of the stories of the hare, one finds that although at 
superficial level the character and lifestyle displayed by the hare seems attractive, it is on the 
whole discouraged. As a characteristic way that one conduct themselves, the lifestyle chosen 
by the hare as depicted in many of these stories is it is nevertheless disapproved off and 
discouraged as befitting one with good character and as a way of life. The listener is therefore 
left in no doubt as to which way of life is regarded as good and therefore the right way to live 
and conduct oneself morally, and which way is bad and unacceptable for moral behaviour.  
 
(b) Moshanyana Sankatana or Kholumolumo72  
The theme of ultimate ethical choice between the two ways of life i.e., the good and bad way 
to live life central to the moral teaching many litśomo, is depicted in its most dramatic 
presentation in the classic story of Kholumolumo (The Monster Beast). It is depicted vividly in 
the qualities of character of the main characters and the kind moral agents represented.  
Kholumolumo is a tale of the giant, ferocious, mythical beast which devours all the people 
except one pregnant woman. She gives birth to a child, Sankatana, who grew up in an extra 
ordinarily fast manner after his birth. He was born able to walk and speak. And he asked his 
mother where the people are seeing none around. Upon being told that they have been 
devoured by Kholumolumo, Sankatana sets off and attacks and kills the beast. He liberates 
his people from the belly of the beast and in gratefulness the people of the village crowned 
him their king. But soon resentment and jealousy creeps in and the people plot to kill him. 
After many failed attempts Sankatana was finally killed out of jealousy and misunderstanding 
(Manyeli 1992: 33.  Savory 1962: 40, Casalis 1861: 347, Ellenberger 1912: 300).   
Here too the moral of the story is clear in terms of how not to conduct oneself if one is a proper 
motho, and a good person. This is depicted in the personality of Sankatana which is contrasted 
with the figures of those among his people wanted him killed. 
 
 
72 The origin of this myth or legend of Sankatana or Litaolane as the boy is called in other versions because of the 
amulets and divining bones around his neck, is a source of many debates from the time of missionaries in Lesotho 
because of the similarity of the mysterious birth and growth of Sankatana with that preached by Christianity about 
the birth of Jesus Christ (Manyeli 192: 34). 
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(c) Masilo and Masilonyane 
It is perhaps in the tale of two brothers, Masilo and Masilonyane (Casalis 1861: 339 -343, 
Savory 1962: 35-39), that the normative significance of the two ways of life, i.e., the selfish 
and unselfish way to live that both MacIntyre (1981: 40), and Prozesky (2007: 76) refers to 
finds its most vivid articulation and strongest depiction in litśomo. Following custom of 
narrating litśomo in Sesotho culture where the audience receives a cue for the beginning of 
the narration, I shall observe this traditional protocol here. “Ba re e ne re”, once upon a time, 
there were two brothers, Masilo and Masilonyane, Masilo was the oldest. One day they 
decided “to go and get rich”. “After a few sleeps they came to a place where two roads lay 
before them, one leading to the east and the other to the west”.  Masilo “chose the latter while 
his brother took the opposite direction”. After a few days, Masilonyane came across a place 
with many pots turned upside down and decides to see if any treasure was hidden beneath 
them73. Pushing them one by one he came to one of immense size, which remained 
immovable. Suddenly it gave way and out toppled a monstrous angry man whose one leg was 
very large. “For your punishment, you are condemned to carry me,” said Big leg. Following a 
failed escaped from Big-leg, Masilonyane, in despair decided to kill him setting his dogs on 
Big-leg instructing them to only “leave his great leg”. Cutting the leg up with an axe he strikes 
a fortune, and out came an immense heard of beautiful cows, including one more beautiful 
than the rest, white as snow. On the way back home the two brothers meet again at the place 
where they separated and had agreed to meet.  
Masilonyane considering himself fortunate said to his brother “Take as many as you like 
except the white one”, for it “can belong to no other person but me”. But Masilo was not 
satisfied as he envied the white cow and kept repeatedly asking for it but to no avail. 
Eventually, Masilo’s greedy and jealous character led him to decide to kill his brother. Passing 
the fortune of Masilonyane as his own and claiming no knowledge of the whereabouts of 
Masilonyane. All was well for him were it not for the long-tailed widow bird, which kept perching 
itself on the horn of the white cow and singing about what happened. Masilo attempts several 
times to kill the bird, but to no avail and the truth is eventually known (Casalis 1861: 339, 
Savory 1962: 35).  
The portrayal of the two ways in this story is one of the most vivid among the litśomo. First, 
we see a selfish way of life or a life lived without virtue, as depicted in the character of Masilo. 
This is depicted in terms of a range of vices in Masilo: evil thoughts, jealousy (mona), envy 
(ho khala), greed (meharo or ho ba pelo e telele), deceit (bomenemene), lying (leshano). All 
these are presented as qualities of bad character and what their corresponding consequences 
 
73 In other versions of this story it is a large sesiu (grass sewn granary or a large earthen 
pitcher), of which Masilonyane enlists Masilo’s help to turn it up. The latter refuses annoyed 
at this waste of valuable hunting time (Savory 1962: 35) and goes on to hunt.   
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are. The subtext and the underlying message to the listener of the story is that these are vices 
and a type of moral character one who is a motho, ought to avoid as qualities of one’s 
character. This is because leading a life like this is not botho. But as it will be seen these are 
representative of perennial vices faced by human beings and thus the message is that one 
will encounter these, but one must work hard not to succumb to them, as Masilo does. Second, 
we have life lived in virtue which is depicted in the character and personhood of Masilonyane. 
This story depicts among other virtues Masilonyane inhabits; generosity or sharing (ho fana), 
not being self-fish (ho se ikhabe), kindness (mosa), being truthful (‘nete), justice (toka) and 
forgiveness (tśoarelo). These are the ideal qualities of character, one ought to cultivate and 
hence by implication practice in daily living as part of shaping and developing one’s character 
in the right way.  
Furthermore, in most litśomo the juxtaposition of the two ways of life and its connection to 
primacy of character, is sometimes mirrored in depiction of the characters of the older sibling 
versus that of the younger sibling.  In most litśomo, the character of the younger sibling is 
always admirable and commendable while that of the older sibling is portrayed flawed and 
prone to bad judgements or decisions and entertaining ill thoughts and ideas74.  The same is 
true of this story, and it is the finds echoes in the of Morongoe and Morongoenyane which 
follows below. 
 
(d) Morongoe le Morongoenyane 
This motif of the older sibling and young one depicted in terms of bad and good character 
respectively is often found running through many litśomo as part of the overall moral education 
in virtue in Sesotho culture. This is the case in another sibling story of the two sisters: 
Morongoe the older, spiteful and unloved and the younger sister Morongoenyane, kind and 
much loved.  In the story, Morongoe conspires against her younger sister (Savory 1962: 27-
29. One day the elder sister called all the girls in the village to gather wood with her in the 
forest and they all set of in high spirits for day of fun. When the wood was gathered, they 
 
74 The normative imperatives of the metaphor of the “older sibling” contrasted with the “younger sibling” and the 
respective ways of conduct and characters as depicted in litśomo i.e., as flawed character and imperfect with regard 
to moral development must not be underestimated here. In most litśomo this is often reflected in the names of the 
sibling which always follow the same structure, with the younger sibling’s name being the diminutive of the older 
sibling’s name, such Masilo and Masilonyane, Morongoe and Morongoenyane. 
This is particularly important in cultures such as that of Basotho where the social role of the elder sibling tis usually 
as the natural successor to the father or the heir. In other words, this role was a leadership role, in whom was 
vested huge moral responsibilities including responsibility for the moral education over other siblings by setting 
good example (Casalis 1861: 180). Yet in litśomo, the figure of the older sibling more often than not is portrayed 
as morally imperfect, often displaying undesirable qualities of character, while by contrast the younger sibling is 
often portrayed in displaying the right character dispositions or admirable character to be condoned and emulated. 
This is best exemplified in the tale of Masilo and his young brother Masilonyane (Casalis 1861: 341), where the 
former’s greed leads him to kill his younger sibling for the latter’s fortune. This is one of the benefits of the narrative 
dimension of education in virtue that the current botho discourse can benefit from in trying to apply the principle of 
botho in different sphere of life including in this case to ethical leadership.  
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romped and played until the younger one said it was time to go back home. The elder sister 
laughed and said: The afternoon is young: let us sleep for a while after our play. When 
Morongoenyane had gone to sleep her sister persuaded the others to steal quietly away and 
leave her there alone. Soon the moon arose, and lions came upon the sleeping 
Morongoenyane.  “Ah here is meat” said the lion, “today we will sleep well with our hunger 
fully satisfied”. But one of the lion’s children said, “no don’t kill her yet. Let me play with her for 
she is strange to me”.  A bond of friendship developed between the two and the baby lion 
swallows Morongoenyane to save her from the older lions. When the older lions returned the 
Morongoenyane was nowhere to be found. The little lion joined the search and after a while 
they gave up and went their way. The little lion then carried Morongoenyane carefully to her 
father’s hut ensuring her safety. Morongoe was upset and angry to see her sister safe and 
sound, so tried again to get rid of her. The story ends with a juxtaposition of the two sisters’ 
fortunes in life. The younger sister Morongoenyane leads an admirable commendable live, 
loved by all. By contrast the old sister Morongoe died as she has lived – unloving and unloved 
and a cross old maid.  Here too we see how innocence, kindness, in the character of 
Morongoenyane is depicted as admirable qualities of character or virtues and what has lasting 
moral value.  While jealousy, envy and evil thoughts represented in the character of Morongoe 
symbolise undesirable qualities of character not befitting one who is a motho and in the end, 
these do not pay off.  
In these stories and many similar ones it is the character of the main characters that is the 
focus of the story where the good and bad characters are juxtaposed. In Sesotho culture this 
was part of training in character that Basotho were very concerned to safeguard in their 
members. These traditional stories are therefore important sources for an understanding of 
botho the requisite cultivation of good qualities of character. The important insight about 
litśomo is that they formed one of the chief means of moral education. From them we find the 
essence of what can be referred to as a narrative account of the virtues in the moral thought 
of Basotho. They are the closest to a systematic and authoritative account of the virtues, 
specifically virtues of botho, we can get in Sesotho culture. They are also the most reliable 
account available of what Basotho regarded as good qualities of character and in turn 
descriptions of qualities of botho. Therefore, it will be seen that in many of these stories the 
characters of the “hero” and the “villain” both representative of the virtues and vices 
respectively, are often juxtaposed side by side to drive home the message about the 
importance of developing good character or inculcating the corresponding makhabane. In 
these stories is embedded unique ethical and moral insights relevant and essential to 
understanding what it means for a motho to possess qualities of botho, not only for 
contemporary Basotho in Lesotho today but for interpreting the principles of botho to others in 
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other contexts. They provide current discourse with a rich source of insights for understanding 
the ethical imperatives of botho is a wide variety of social settings. 
For current botho discourse litśomo are relevant for the analysis and interpretation of botho 
from the perspective of the moral culture of Basotho, as one of the cultures traditionally 
associated with botho. They are therefore indispensable for unpacking the ethical imperatives 
of botho as this concept is understood and applied traditionally within Sesotho culture. This is 
because in the process of narration, the meaning of what it is to have botho which is coded in 
the words, actions, and conduct of key characters in litśomo, is simultaneously decoded. They 
ensure that the ethical imperatives of botho embodied in litśomo are not only mistaken in what 
is outwardly obvious and perceived in the story but more importantly are continually reinforced 
as an aspiration and goal of a motho for his or her moral life (Mapesela 2004: 321). Here Bujo 
(2001: 25) makes an important observation which is instructive for current botho discourse on 
the relevance of stories for teaching about botho ethics. He points out that “the virtues 
communicated and acquired by means of fairy tales and proverbs are not intended to be 
applied in a static manner to the various situations in life”. Rather, they must be continually 
expounded and actualised anew. The repetitive nature of the narration of litśomo in Sesotho 
culture thus serves this purpose of ongoing illumination of the virtues necessary for shaping 
daily habits. These in turn plays an important role as part of the process of moral growth and 
internalisation of qualities of botho by reinforcing certain dispositions of character as morally 
desirable and by implication implicitly promoting and encouraging the inculcation and 
cultivation of these as part of one’s moral growth in the journey of life. 
For our purpose in this chapter, litśomo are relevant for ethical reflection on botho in their 
social function as chief means of moral education, especially their role in outlining in a non-
prescriptive way the inculcation of qualities of good character as essential to being a person. 
In other words, it is in their representation of the narrative dimension of virtues or education in 
virtue that the relevance of stories applies to current botho discourse. They offer a richer 
elucidation of what qualities of botho are essential for good character and which ones are to 
be avoided as vices. In them we find botho or more specifically good character and its qualities 
defined, explained and described in a manner that sheds more light on its meaning than the 
current analysis can do so far.  This means that botho as the assessment and ultimate 
culmination of the process of moral education, is best explained in part in terms of qualities of 
good character often depicted in these stories. What this means is that this concept is 
intelligible as a key part of the process of moral development and growth, and part of 
understanding what it entails, or its definition is explained much better through and in stories 
such as litśomo.  
The implication of the narrative dimension of virtues to ethical reflection on botho is a need for 
shift in the analysis towards focus on the assessment of conduct and behaviour of motho in 
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terms of the process of acquiring good qualities of character. The significance of reinstating 
the narrative dimension of virtue in botho is that this enables a much more comprehensive 
way of unpacking the values and virtues encapsulated in botho.  Its benefit is the timelessness 
power of stories to articulate and explain botho as a polysemic moral ideal and moral values 
and ideas it embodies. This means that traditional stories like litśomo are far more suited and 
in turn more attractive as the primary means of articulating the ethical imperatives of botho 
and interpreting its meaning. This is because stories like those found in litśomo, have an 
inherent power to speak across cultures in terms of time and space. They can convey their 
message within the immediate borders of their origins as well as beyond those borders in an 




This chapter discussed the experience of botho in Sesotho speaking culture showing that the 
centrality of character in traditional Basotho society and the understanding of botho, 
foreshadows the current prevailing interpretation of this concept in the discourse. The 
character centric account of botho discussed in this chapter is presented both as critique of 
Afro-communitarianism formulation of botho in the current discourse and a defense for an 
alternative agent centered account and articulation of this botho as found in Sesotho culture. 
We saw that the interpretation botho in terms of character in the experience and moral life of 
traditional Basotho communities as discussed in this chapter is not a new way of 
understanding botho. Instead, this is a return to a much older usage of the term consistent 
with its traditional understanding in Southern Africa. The chapter as whole is therefore making 
a general case for reinstatement of moral character in current botho discourse and analysis 
of the concept, which is understood is an important consideration in assessing the moral 
standing of an individual. The central argument thus underlying this chapter is that if the 
understanding of botho is to become a reality with practical application to personal conduct 
and moral life of individuals at a personal level today, this will be found in the interpretation of 
this concept in similar way it is understood in Sesotho culture where it is primarily linked to 
character and inculcation of makhabane by individuals as moral agents. 
The chapter gives an overview of the significance and primacy of character to Basotho 
understanding of botho understood as personhood by surveying aspects of Basotho culture 
and moral life especially their moral language that express the significance of good moral 
character. This includes examination of anecdotal evidence and collating the insights drawn. 
It showed how in their culture, their language and in their social practices Basotho have always 
prioritised formation and development of good character as the core focus of their approach 
to ethics including of course the understanding of botho.  It showed that the foundation of the 
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primacy of character as the basic understanding of botho is rooted in the moral culture and 
social life of Basotho. The chapter thus analyzed many of the ceremonies and social practices 
of Basotho and showed how in these we find the most explicit account of the priority of the 
primacy of character in Sesotho culture. The chapter gave an account of these social practices 
showing this interest in character among Basotho as journey to personhood which start from 
childhood progressively up until adulthood. Here the chapter showed that in Sesotho culture 
the common thread in many of these ceremonies and rituals performed for motho along this 
journey is always focused on securing good character and Basotho’s preoccupation with 
individuals becoming citizens with good character.  The chapter outlines this journey start with 
the first of these ceremonies performed for a baby called the kuruetso ritual, which is a series 
of small ceremonies during childhood and analysis the practices of Basotho along the pathway 
to adulthood up until lebollo (circumcision schools) which marks adulthood phase of one’s 
moral formation and development. Throughout this pathway the chapter showed the 
preoccupation of Basotho with good character of their members is unmistakable. The chapter 
showed that in many of their ceremonies and social practices performed for new-born babies, 
one finds that having a good moral character was celebrated and promoted as an important 
part of the ceremony or rituals. Here the chapter showed that in the selection of lead person 
during these the character the person was the primary consideration. In other words, the 
choice of such an individual is always based on their good character. The belief and the 
symbolism here are that the child would take after the character of that person as well and in 
turn become a morally good and admirable person. Now the connection with botho here is 
clear since it was the primary consideration for Basotho that one must show in the way they 
live that they possess botho i.e., have acquired the expected good qualities of character.   
Among the various kuruetso rituals and ceremonies, which is the introduction of the baby to 
the natural environment and various aspect of the community life, the chapter examined the 
ritual of ho fuoa ritual (to be given) referring to introducing the baby to solid and liquid foods 
and kananelo (thanksgiving). What we see here is that these rituals are treated already as 
essential part of moral formation where good character is symbolically moulded onto to the 
character of the baby, and by implication botho indirectly as well. This is because in Sesotho 
culture the understanding is that botho is the sort of thing that can be moulded in a child 
through moral formation. 
The chapter showed that the prominence of character in ethics in Sesotho speaking cultures 
can also be observed most prominently in their language. This is particularly noticeable in 
some of the key moral terms Basotho use as central to their moral language and 
understanding of ethics as reflected in their traditional moral scheme of Basotho.  Here the 
chapter highlighted the neglect in current botho discourse of the significance of key moral 
terms of setho, botho and motho. The chapter showed the significance of these as the core of 
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moral scheme of traditional Basotho, where the relationship between these is one of mutual 
presupposition. In terms of this scheme, morality or ethics for Basotho revolves around the 
essential hierarchy of these as they are among the key moral terms in their language. The 
chapter therefore argues for the respect of the unity of these moral terms as this governs how 
they are to be understood and applied. The chapter highlighted this as one of the weakness 
with the current theorisation and analysis of botho, because according to this it means botho 
cannot be fully grasped without reference to the other two. The chapter thus argued that in 
Sesotho culture botho as a key moral term is understood not as a moral concept that is evoked 
in isolation. For Basotho this moral term functions better in unity with setho and what their 
understanding of motho is. In other words, the understanding of each of these moral terms 
presuppose an understanding of the others. It is in this sense that the chapter implicitly 
cautions against the tendency of removing and abstracting the concept botho from this 
hierarchy of the key moral terms by analysing it in isolation from setho and motho. This is not 
only an essential part of understanding its full meaning but that by which that meaning 
becomes intelligible. The necessity of this is because each of the concepts i.e., setho and 
motho adds a complimentary shade of meaning unique to itself to overall understanding of 
each term. This result in a richer and deeper meaning and understanding of botho as a 
polysemic moral concept.  
The chapter thus gave an in-depth investigation of the meaning of setho in Sesotho culture as 
one the key moral terms influential in the Sesotho culture that informs the understanding and 
application of botho as a key moral term in Sesotho language. It showed that this term, like 
some of the key African moral concept is not easy to define, but also that setho is currently 
not theorised much in the discourse. In comparison to the popularity of motho ke motho ka 
botho in current botho discourse the absence of this key moral concept in the analysis and 
theorisation of botho is surprisingly inconspicuous and it is unknow as part of the explanation 
and definition of botho, yet it is central to what botho means. We saw that in Sesotho culture 
the term expresses two ideas about motho (person) denoting qualities connected to our nature 
as human beings or human nature and also expressing strong connotation of cultural 
upbringing or a person’s cultural and moral origins understood in terms of upbringing. Thus, 
as found in the moral system and language of Basotho, setho therefore refers to both. In other 
words, it expresses the complex process that combines a person’s  human nature with the 
societal norms and values, or the manners and ways of doing thing by a particular people as 
reflected in an individual. What we learned here about setho is that as property of motho it is 
heavily determined by culture hence this is the leaning of its predominant meaning. In other 
words, setho relates to or has something to do with the interplay between being human and 
cultural socialisation. It denotes how moral particularity of one culture and upbringing shapes 
and moulds human qualities in persons differently in different contexts. The chapter thus 
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showed that in Sesotho culture the outcome of this interplay in a motho i.e., the individual is 
what we call botho. The chapter showed that in the moral scheme of Basotho the 
conceptualisation of setho in relation to botho is that the latter is the fruits of the former. In 
other words, setho is the agency whose manifestation in motho is botho. In Sesotho culture 
this is typically understood in terms of personhood and is connected to and achieved through 
inculcation of makhabane a botho (values and virtues of botho). 
The chapter also analysed other aspects of the moral language of the Basotho that validates 
the primacy of character and cast light on botho in addition to the significance of setho. Here 
the chapter highlighted the significance of moral terms like “letsoalo” (conscience), “sebopeho” 
(character), makhabane (virtues) and mekhoa (manners or habits) to day-to-day moral 
vocabulary of Basotho and ethics. The analysis of these showed that they are all connected 
to descriptions of qualities of the character of the person. In other words, they too underscore 
the primacy of character and its significance to moral life in Sesotho culture. We also saw 
something else about these and that is these are used in statement to make moral 
judgements, and that many of these judgements are expressed in terms of positive or negative 
attributes and qualities associated with the heart. The chapter gave a brief account of these 
descriptions which describes the state of character in terms of either having a bad evil heart 
or good and morally admirable heart. Here the chapter showed the significance of the heart in 
the moral language of Basotho  and that in Sesotho culture the heart is regarded as the inner 
most argan of a person and that as such it is taken as the seat of all life, feeling and thought. 
It is therefore thought of as the one organ in which all ethical conduct emanates from. The 
understanding here is that the heart is the most authentic reflection of the character of a person 
and this is further endorsement of the Basotho ethics as essentially character centric.  
Another aspect of Sesotho culture and their understanding of botho that this chapter analyses 
is the understanding of motho (person). Specifically, the conception of the individual motho in 
terms of social identity where, as a moral agent, a person is regarded as a site for the 
experience of botho and a beacon botho in the community. The chapter showed how in 
Sesotho culture this understanding of motho i.e., definition of individuality in terms of its social 
embodiments meant that one of the expectations of the individual is to be the beacon of botho 
in the community. It is to be the embodiment of the communal values and norms and this was 
understood in terms of excellence in botho by the individual in their personal conduct 
(boitśoaro). The analysisshowed that it refers to both an inward-looking self-regarding 
imperative of botho, and outward looking other-regarding focus that considers how one’s 
moral standing is viewed and seen by others. To both of this consideration the thus analysed 
the term itself in terms of this function of the individual and showed that as description of 
possession of botho, it first expresses an inward-looking, self-regarding qualities of character 
of a motho where considerations of conduct are determined not only with respect to the 
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individual but with due regard of others in the community as well.  The chapter thus showed 
that in Sesotho culture the understanding is that as a moral agent, motho is always a 
representative of the moral values and ideals of the community whether one consents to this 
or not. In this context the Basotho understanding therefore of ethics is the creation of batho 
ba nang le botho - individuals who have botho. Or to put it different to produce batho bao e 
leng batho – individuals who are persons, and this in turn become both the purpose and 
meaning of life of motho as a moral agent, the pursuit of, is what determines personal conduct 
and shapes personal ethics.  
One of the features of botho highlighted in this chapter is the description of botho in connection 
character and how this articulation of the virtues of botho always implies cognisance of the 
corresponding vices. The chapter showed that in Sesotho culture references to botho are 
always made in the light of its opposition “bophoofolo, as the corresponding vices whose 
possibility is always here. This term we saw that it denotes a quality of character and describes 
a person who in their conduct shows total disregard of all tenets of botho. This quality is also 
found in the phrase ‘ha se motho’, (- is not a person) which feature prominently in current 
botho discourse as a description of failure in inculcating qualities of botho. The analysis of 
bophoofolo and this statement showed that both express failures to achieve personhood. Here 
I argued that personhood thus is understood as a two phased process; “motho-as-they-
happen-to-be” and “motho-as-they-could-be”. The former express, the initial natural state of 
just being a human being, i.e., a being that is human, and the latter, denotes the moral for 
development and growth as a result of moral formation and development of a good moral 
character. This conceptualisation and way of theorising about botho I argue would enrich 
current discourse. 
The chapter concludes with focus on moral formation in Sesotho culture where the chief 
means of traditional moral education into values of botho is stories or narratives. The chapter 
showed that the goal of Basotho society, in their culture and corresponding education system 
was creating people with good moral character. Here I argued that the relevance and 
significance of the narrative dimension of education in the virtues implied in botho and African 
ethics so far appear to have attracted little or no interest of botho scholars in spite of this being 
recognised as an obvious necessity and their suitability as ideal vehicles to explicate the ideals 
of botho because of its polysemic nature as a moral ideal. Furthermore the chapter suggested 
that similarly, just as there little interest as yet in the current discourse to investigate the 
experience of botho from the perspective of Sesotho speaking culture and its understanding 
of botho, it appears that there is as yet no noticeable interest too on the use of Sesotho 
narratives as vehicles for explicating botho. The only exception here as already pointed out is 
the use of “motho ke motho ka batho” and passing reference made to “ha se motho.” In view 
of this the chapter investigates the how in Sesotho speaking culture, like many pre-modern 
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cultures the use of narratives especially litśomo is the chief form of their non-formal moral 
education.  The chapter showed the significance of litśomo as part of stories and how through 
such stories traditional Basotho society taught its members the ethical imperatives of botho 
and the virtues it encapsulates. It highlighted how litśomo as stories played an important part 
in the articulation of the moral life of Basotho culture, both in terms of preserving its values 
and norms and transmitting these to future generations. The chapter narrated selected litśomo 
as representative of the stock of moral stories that Basotho used as part of their moral 
education. Worth mentioning here are the story of siblings Masilo and Masilonyane, Morongoe 
and Morongoenyane, with the common theme of litśomo of the good way and bad way to live 
depicted and symbolised by the contrasting moral characters the siblings. The younger 
siblings typically depicted as display good qualities of character and the older as agents with 
flawed and still lacking in growth. The brief analysis of the usage of litśomo in this chapter 
showed that main message and the goal behind for Basotho was connected to training in 
character and encouragement of inculcation of makhabane i.e., virtues. The chapter showed 
that the repeated nature of narration of litśomo, is part of informal education of Basotho aimed 
at supporting the internalisation of values and virtues, many of which are implied in botho.  
The chapter also showed that the narration of litśomo was aimed at reinforcing the values and 
ideals already encouraged through upbringing as part of in one’s moral journey as a motho. 
We saw that this is common captured in the expression  ngoana oa Mosotho (a child of 
Mosotho). The chapter highlighted the significance of the use of stories like litśomo as ethical 
resources for current discourse in explaining the values and ethical imperatives botho, which 
is that they enable a clear elucidation and teaching about the acquisition of virtues of botho, 
where the intention is for these not to be applied in a static manner to the various situations in 
life but to be continually expounded and actualised anew. 
The chapter thus showed that narratives like litśomo make a persuasive case for the 
reinstating of the narrative dimension of education into virtue in the current discourse and its 
theorisation and analysis of botho. This is because the narrative account of the virtues enables 
the unpacking of the values and virtues encapsulated in botho in much better and diverse way 
than the current botho discourse does. The chapter also showed that approach does. But 
more importantly, the benefit of using stories from the culture within which botho derives to 
explain what botho, is the timelessness power of stories as interlocutors of botho as a 
polysemic moral ideal and the moral values and ideas it embodies. The chapter thus has 
suggested that narratives like traditional stories such as litśomo are an attractive means of 
articulating the ethical imperatives of botho and illustrating the qualities of character that botho 
presupposes, which agents ought to inculcate. This is because stories like litśomo, have an 
inherent power to communicate across time and space. When used within current discourse 
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they can convey their message equally within the immediate borders of their cultural origins 
as well as beyond those borders. 
What this chapter has implicitly revealed about the account of botho just outline in this chapter 
is the social conditions within Sesotho culture that made the practice of botho possible. The 
significance of social conditions necessary for botho to prevail is an aspect of the analysis of 
botho that is more relevant in today’s context if botho is to be not only animate communities 
in those cultures it derives but more importantly if it is to be exported to other contexts as a 
viable alternative ethical framework. This is because this outlines the social conditions 
necessary, the social order required to be in place in a society for botho to thrive. In other 
words what kind of social order must be put in place or created to make the practice of botho 



























CHAPTER FIVE: ETHICAL RESOURCES AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES THAT 
SUPPORT THE PRACTICE OF BOTHO 
 
 5.1  Introduction 
 
“Ethics, with its relevance to society, as much as to individuals cannot be 
understood without recognising the role of social institutions” -Vishwanath 
Pandit75  
 
This chapter will look at the normative significance of traditional social institutions and social 
roles in Sesotho culture and how this influenced personal conduct and the behaviour of 
individuals and their relationships with others. It will examine the nature of Basotho social life 
and how this functioned as the required social context and environment supporting the 
practice of botho and sustained its existence. The chapter will highlight the essential link 
between ethics and social institutions76 expressed in the quotation above, and how social 
institutions of Basotho provided a traditional Mosotho with the necessary supportive 
environment required for moral formation and development of good moral character. The 
chapter will analyse aspects of Basotho culture characteristic of their way of life, as the 
necessary conditions in broader environment that the practice of botho in Sesotho culture 
presupposes for botho to remain a popular ethic. Among these the chapter will analysis the 
religious underpinning of ethics in African culture and related institutions because morality in 
African culture is neither secular nor religious, but simply part of the wholeness of life. It will 
also analyse the significance of the community and the social institutions and social roles 
characteristic of the social organisation of Basotho and how these influence conduct. This will 
include focus on the institutions of lelapa, leloko and motse (village) and their corresponding 
social roles. This chapter will argue in that the normative nature of institutions and social roles 
in Sesotho culture sustained and engendered botho. It will further show that this can offer 
lessons for today’s context, about the types of institutions and attitudes to social roles required 
to sustain botho ethics, analogous to those found in 18th century Sesotho culture and made 
ethics of botho to thrive a predominant feature in their society.  
If one looks closely to botho ethics and the conception of the virtues enshrined in botho, it is 
hard not to concluded that such an ethic could only have become possible within a particular 
social setting and society. What this means is that the nature and character of ethics of botho 
 
75 Pandit V. 2016. Ethical Norms and Social Institutions. In: Ethics, Economics and Social Institutions.pp99-112, 
Singapore: Springer.  
76 The terms institution here is used in its broad sense meaning to mean a regularity in social behaviour that is 
agreed to by all members of society, specifies behaviour in recurrent situations, and is either self-policed or policed 
by some external authority” hence the use of the term normative as well. It is similarly used to denote the norms of 
rules associated with social institutions and which people are expected to comply with. These norms or rules thus 
influence the way individuals intact with them, determining what is permissible and right and what in impermissible 
and wrong.  It is in this sense institutions have a regulative effect on how individuals conduct themselves.  
(Argandoña 1991: 1-3). 
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like ethics in general is nurtured by certain types of social institutions and endangered by 
others (MacIntyre 1981: 195). In the case of botho it is therefore hard to imagine it becoming 
a predominant ethos in the societies it did, independently of the social institutions and roles 
found in those societies supporting and sustaining its existence77. In other words, botho cannot 
be understood and made intelligible without reference to certain type of social order with tis 
corresponding social institutions and social roles, that enforces adherence to its principles, 
promote its values and supports training in character and inculcation of the virtues that botho 
presuppose and encapsulates. Similarly, ethics as a reflection on the moral life of a society 
both at a communal and individual personal level, cannot be fully reflected upon independently 
of a reflection on the underlying influence of social roles and social institutions to the moral life 
of a community or society (Pandit 2016: 92). In other words, it is arguable if a full account and 
reflection on botho is possible without an analysis of the how institutions of the cultures within 
which it functioned and prospered, influenced and shaped personal conduct. For if this ethic 
is to be revisited afresh as an alternative for today’s context and become a reality, it will be 
partly by creating such institutions or something like them in today’s context. This is because  
“howsoever good the individual members of the society may be, according 
to whichever criterion one may choose for such assessment, they are almost 
bound to be ineffective as members of the society in the absence of well-
designed institutions governing it. … For this reason, any discussion of 
ethics in its relation to society is incomplete unless it specifically pays 
adequate attention to the prevailing institutions, with respect to their 
structure, and mode of functioning” (Pandit 2016: 99) 
 
In other words, for ethics of botho I will argue having individuals with good morals and 
characters is necessary but not sufficient. It is in this sense that Prozesky (2016: 14) correct 
observes that “morally weak or even corrupt contexts can undermine and weaken the moral 
character of good people’ while “morally strong contexts can do the opposite”.  The implication 
of this for current botho discourse is that botho cannot be thoroughly theorised independently 
of social settings or context. Social institutions and social roles are thus an integral part of this 
context or social setting that the analysis of botho needs to take into consideration and ask in 
what way did this context influence the practice of botho. These institutions and roles are the 
necessary ethical support structures i.e., an essential part for being ethical. Describing the 
significance of context in relation to successful ethical leadership, Prozesky argues that 
institutions provide a “continuing back-up of “an ethically strong, supportive context” for being 
moral. Using the examples from the Sesotho speaking culture he points to the role of the 
community with its principles of mutual support, generosity and hospitality, elders, family, as 
 
77 The term institution is used here in its generic sense to denote not only organisations but also institutions in their 
subtle forms which get modified through time and function specifying the behaviour of individuals through several 
norms, customs and conventions “so that a regular and stable pattern of behaviour is created” (Argandoña 1991: 
1-3, Pandit  2016: 91,). 
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integral to that context. Prozesky is right because in Sesotho culture central to this “supportive 
context” or ethical support structures is a network of social institutions and social roles, and 
other social support systems in which principles of botho were embedded and made alive. 
This means that for botho to thrive, it presupposes a particular social order i.e., existence a 
certain kind of society, along with its social support systems including institutions.  It is these 
traditional social support systems and institutions that this chapter underscores as essential 
for the existence of botho in Sesotho speaking culture. It will be realised that this includes 
social roles as defined and understood through customs and tradition. All these structures 
supplied the necessary social support structures to make possible a of living consistent with 
ethical imperatives of botho. They ensured adherence to botho values from generation to 
generation and the next section unpacks their significance to ethics of botho with focus on the 
social roles and social institutions. Before looking at the function and place of social institutions 
and social roles, and how they influence individuals’ behaviour in Sesotho culture, it is 
important to contextualise this by first examining the social function of institutions and their 
significance to the moral life of a society in general.  
5.2  Ethical Relevance of Social Institutions and Social Roles  
 
If one looks at each society one finds that not only does each have its own unique ways in 
which it governs and organises its affairs and they all do through their social institutions and 
social roles. It is therefore difficult to imagine how a community or society can exist without 
these. As (Downie 1964: 29) explains society is a “complex network of institutions” formal and 
informal, “which gives structure to the life of the community”. That means society is always 
more than “the aggregate of individuals who happen to occupy a geographical area.  Echoing 
the same sentiment Argandoña (1991: 2) states that  
“the aggregate behaviour of a society is not the simple sum of the behaviour 
of the men and women that make it up. There are intermediate structures 
that limit and guide the actions of people towards some social ends. We will 
label these intermediate structures institutions in a generic sense”. 
 
So, we can see that institutions are not only the bedrock upon which society organises itself 
and arranges its affairs but that they are essential to the very being of a society. It will also be 
observed that “just as communities differ with respect to the kinds of social support structures 
and dwellings that mark them, they also differ with respect to their characteristic social 
institutions, roles and role duties” (Sciaraffa 2011: 123). This means that the differences found 
in these institutions in different communities will reflect the rationale behind their creation. 
They will also reflect the values underlying their creation, values which that society regard as 
important. These values often are linked to the common good or fundamental goods a society 
regard as important for its existence. In turn these translates into the norms and standards of 
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that society for its members. What this shows is that institutions as well as corresponding 
social roles are purposeful “acts” of human creation and as such they are not ethically 
indifferent. This means that “by virtue of their origin, social institutions and social roles have 
an ethical content” and are of necessity value laden (Argandoña 1991:6). It is in this sense 
that institutions are “images of ourselves as moral creatures” irrespective how they came 
about (Downie 1964: 31). And as part of our “growing up within these institutions and constant 
interaction with them later in life” as moral agent in turn “we tend to internalize the values and 
ways of life embodied by social institutions and their constituent roles” surrounding us from 
childhood (Sciaraffa 2011: 123). That means the social institutions a society has and maintains 
reflect what that society values as important, socially and morally. It is for this reason that it is 
important for ethics to pay attention to the relationship that exists between institutions and 
individuals, as the embodiment of society, and the influence they have in regulating conduct 
and influencing behaviour.  
Social Institutions, whether we consent to or not, limit, restrict and specify expected behaviour 
from us as moral agents, and that of others and how they should relate to us (Argandoña 
1991: 2).  This is because we do not get involved and engage with social institutions qua 
individuals, floating butterflies each doing their own aim in life. We do so fundamentally as 
bearers and occupiers of specific social roles with certain well understood concepts of what it 
means to be good in that role. For this reason, our identity as moral agents is always a social 
one because it is not possible to divorce who we are from our social roles, (Berger 1984: 154).  
With regard to social roles we inherit these by virtue of our social memberships “as members 
of families, communities, tribes and nation, together with a “variety of debts, inheritances, 
rightful expectations and obligations”; and all this “constitute the given of our life, and moral 
starting point”. Within this context as moral agents, what is good for me therefore has to be 
the good for one who inhabits these roles” (MacIntyre 1981: 220). This means that in our 
involvement and interaction with social institutions we do so always as bearers of certain 
“social roles. These spells out for us a pattern of rights and duties the natures of which are 
decided by the natures of the institutions which give rise to the social roles” (Downie 1964: 
29). Thus, for example my involvement in my family as a social institution is as a bearer of 
many roles: as a husband, son in law, son of my parents, a brother to my siblings, and in more 
important in African culture as first-born son, and a neighbour to my neighbours as well and 
so forth and so forth. It is in this sense that Berger (1984: 154) correctly points out that “it is 
through performance of institutional roles”, that as moral agents we discover our true identity 
and “participates in history, not only of” social “institutions but that of society as a whole”.  It is 
for this reason that modern ethics in its conception of the self is accused of a tendency towards 
a curious ahistoricity (Richardson 2009: 139).   
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This brings us to the contentious issue of our relationship as moral agents with social roles. I 
say contentious because we have seen the progressive transformation of this relationship 
since the enlightenment project on ethics, where the self is regarded as distinct from its social 
roles (MacIntyre 1981: 31-35). But as Cordell (2011: 255) rightly points out as moral agents 
at “various points” in our lives we are bearers of certain social roles and these carry with them 
certain role-specific duties, standards, and expectations of their occupiers. But even more 
radical about the normativity of social roles is that they place on their bearers certain normative 
“obligations that are not necessarily coextensive with those incurred by virtue of one’s status 
as “human” or as an agent”. This is because from the moment one is born not only is our life 
a life-long occupation and habituation of a multiplicity of social roles “into which we have been” 
born into, but also a lifelong programme of moral development and growth into these roles. It 
is for this reason that as an occupier of social roles, motho has to learn what these roles are 
in order to be able to understand how others respond to [him or her] and how his or 
her]responses to them are apt to be construed (MacIntyre 1981: 216) by others and their 
understanding of these roles I occupy as a motho.   
Peter Berger (1984: 154) aptly captures this by pointing out that as a moral agent, motho 
“discovers his true identity in his roles and to turn away from the roles is to turn away from 
oneself”.  And because social roles are part of who we are, fulfilment of the duties of role 
inherent in social roles cannot be separated from our behaviour and conduct and in that way 
social roles have an influence on us morally. In other words, social roles have a distinct 
normative function that shapes and influences our lives as moral agents in a significant way 
(Cordell 2011: 255) and thus forms part of moral compass.  This means that however much 
we may protest and pretend that we are what we chose to be, as autonomous moral 
sovereigns that modern society has made us believe we are, we cannot depict ourselves as 
entirely independent of the social roles we inhabit. We are inescapably bound up and 
surrounded by the duties of social roles we occupy, and this is the nature of our social identity. 
Explaining the significance of this Berger (1984: 154), points that for motho to attempt “to turn 
away from” [social roles] “is to turn away from himself” and that it is in “the performance of 
institutional roles that the individual participates in history, not only the history of particular 
institution but that of his society as a whole”. It is therefore not an overstatement, nor should 
it be surprising therefore, to find that as moral agents we “typically do little more than spend 
the bulk of our” lives “fulfilling the various” duties and obligations about our social roles 
(Sciaraffa 2011: 107). What this means is that as individual moral agents, we are living our life 
both social and moral always 
“as bearers of a particular social identity [be it as] “someone's son or 
daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle” or as a member of this clan, that 
tribe, this nation” (MacIntyre 1981: 31, 220). 
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Given this, the moral task then for us as bearers of these social roles is first the validation of 
our roles through role identification and understanding what they mean. That means learning 
from our own experience, our tradition, and also from others before us who excelled in those 
roles, i.e., in what it means to be an occupier of such and such a role. This process therefore 
cannot be the sole prerogative of the individual. This is because in any culture the definition 
of social roles is never an event in the life of an individual. It is rather, a collective process of 
learning, considering the larger narrative context in which that role is defined through customs, 
tradition, and current experience in the culture. The first step then in learning what being an 
occupier of a role means, is aligning one’s explicit valuation of the goal of the role with their 
emotional valuation, thus conceiving of “oneself as a person for whom the pursuit and 
realisation of the goal is” not only necessary but important for one’s life and their envisioned 
purpose in life (Sciaraffa 2011: 110). It is in this sense that one can argue “whether we can 
even coherently conceive of a moral agent” independently of “their social roles”. This is 
because social roles are an integral part of our social identity (MacIntyre 1981: 34) and so 
much of our moral actions are in direct response to the requirements of these roles (Cordell 
2011: 256).  
It will thus be observed that social roles confront us daily with a cluster of duties and obligations 
that bind us. It is because of this nature of social roles that a moral judgement is possible to 
make i.e., how well, or uncaring, or indifferent one is in fulfilling the duties of their role (Cordell 
2011: 256). Thus, as agents we experience and accept social roles as binding (Sciaraffa 2011: 
107,109) because “what an individual is expected to do qua spouse”, son, daughter, and so 
on, and the “reasons they are expected to do it, stem distinctly from their roles as such” 
(Cordell 2011: 255). It is in these expected and inherent “standards unique to each role, that 
agents as role bearers ought to meet” (Sciaraffa 2011: 109) that the normativity of social roles 
is most visible. Individuals are in turn judged in terms of how the individual lives up to these 
along with the corresponding obligations and responsibilities handed down from generation to 
generation and by tradition.  What this means is that social roles are the indicators by which 
a determination is made on how well as agents, we have integrated the role we occupy and 
the person we are or become, or what Downie (1964: 32) refers to as the “morality of the role 
and morality of role enactment”78. This is because in social roles one discovers oneself and 
gets a deeper understanding and knowledge of who one is. In other words, social roles form 
that space within an interlocking set social relationship that we inherit as moral agents and 
without which or lacking that space, we are nobody, or at best a stranger or an outcast 
(MacIntyre 1981: 34). This is because in social roles one finds themselves “placed at a certain 
point in a journey with a set of goals i.e., obligations and duties where to move through life is 
 
78 As role bearers we do, in the way we fulfil the duties of the role make a personal stamp on how the role is 
experienced by others, and it is this which qualifies the agent as a role bearer exceeding the requirements of the 
role.  
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to make progress or fail to make progress” (Ibid). In this journey, our lives as moral agents are 
a continuation of the story, a display and public statement of our success and progress or 
failure and inability to make progress, towards a certain given purpose and end i.e., our telos 
(MacIntyre 1981: 34). In other words, it is in part in the fulfilment one’s role duties or lack 
thereof that personhood i.e., moral assessment and evaluation of a motho is made. From this, 
we can see how social roles constitute a large part of what we are as moral agents but also 
who we are (Downie 1964: 30) and the ethical imperative of living virtuous lives with respect 
to each of the roles we occupy. As Wright (2010: 96) explains “one starts out to live a virtuous 
life” in one or other social role, e.g. as parent where “the virtuous life” requirement of this role 
is for “one to be a virtuous parent”. This is true for all other social roles. 
What this shows is the centrality of social roles as part of our moral life, and why they are 
relevant to ethics and ethical reflection, including current discourse on botho. The reason is 
because as moral agents we “are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of 
our own narratives” but always “embedded in a life with its own demands and obligations” 
(MacIntyre 1981: 213, Wright 2010: 96). Those duties and obligations are what is at the heart 
of social roles. They are a well-established set of social expectations, duties, and dues, not of 
our making, but have instead been created over time by tradition and a long-standing set of 
social practices. In fulfilling the duties of our roles, through role enactment we choose to be 
certain sort of persons, according to our understanding of our roles in terms of our upbringing, 
our personal and moral formation and development as persons.  
The above outline of the influence that social institutions and social roles has on personal 
conduct provides us with background necessary to examine aspects of Basotho culture and 
the role of institutions and social roles in their life. This is relevant with regard to how social 
institutions have implications for ethics and the moral agent. This is more with regard to the 
practice of the virtues that botho entails, which is the focus on the next section below with 
focus on the traditional institutions of motse (village) lelapa and leloko (family and clan) and 
lenyalo (marriage). 
5.3  Influence of Selected Social Institutions of Basotho on Ethics  
 
Traditional Basotho communities in Sesotho speaking culture organised and structured their 
society and managed their social affairs and moral life through their social institutions and 
corresponding social roles of their members. Although many of these would have emerged 
organically, the reason Basotho society maintained them is because they fulfilled an important 
role in society. They are therefore an embodiment of its beliefs, they safeguard its culture, and 
promotes its moral values. It is in this sense that traditional social institutions of the Basotho 
functioned as ready-made ethical resources. They provided moral agents with crucial social 
support systems to be ethical. As such we find that they played an important function as part 
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of the supporting and enabling context for individuals to be ethical, which is a prerequisite of 
maximum lasting well-being which is the principle underpinning ethics of botho (Prozesky 
2007: 46). 
In Sesotho culture there is no better place to look for the influence of social institutions on 
conduct and behaviour than in those paradigmatic institutions of the family (lelapa), marriage 
and (lenyalo) (Matśela 1979: 99). Both were held in the highest esteem by Basotho but also 
an important role in their communities.  But as anyone familiar with Sesotho speaking culture 
will know this would be premature. This is because an account of these two will be incomplete 
without reference to the village (motse) as overarching social institution. In Sesotho culture a 
village is a complex network of formal and informal social institutions with corresponding 
bearers of social roles and with their sets of duties and social and moral obligations. This also 
means that we cannot properly speak of the village independently of the normativity of these 
complex, interlocking network of institutions within it and the corresponding roles. This is 
because the village in traditional Basotho society is itself a complex institution or social system. 
It is composed of many other institutions including moreneng (the chief’s place), khotla (court), 
lipitso (village meetings), lelapa and leloko (family and the clan), lenyalo (marriage) 
(Ellenberger 1912: 265, Casalis 1861: 124, 233) and many other institutions and informal 
roles. And all these play a unique normative function in the village. They constitute the social 
conditions necessary to engender botho in the village. So, the village as the edifice around 
which traditional life in Sesotho culture was lived, is naturally the ideal entry point for analysing 
the ethical significance of the social institutions and social roles in Sesotho speaking culture.  
But before doing that, it is necessary to address one of the reservations often cited in relation 
to talk of a revival of elements of traditional African Culture and in this case, its institutions and 
morality.  
As with all matters related to revisiting elements of traditional African culture and its traditions, 
in this case, its moral traditions and the social institutions that sustained it, the immediate 
problem one encounters is the accusation of romanticism and idealisation of African culture. 
What is interesting about such accusations though is it appears not to be an issue when certain 
moral traditions are being revisited from other cultures. I am thinking here for example of the 
revival of say Aristotelian ethics for example. This bias can be seen often in the literature, 
especially in relation to the current botho discourse, where talk of botho is described as 
another version of those failed African stories of narratives of return regarded by many as a 
failure nor desirable (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013: 199). But as Bujo (2001: 131) correctly 
points out one must avoid the mistake of not distinguishing  
“between the ideal and its realization [because] it is precisely [the] ideal that 
reminds the ethical subject that he often fails to live up to what is required 
and that he is not entitled to be content with mediocrity.” 
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This is true of current botho discourse of which this study is a part of, and the appraisal of 
botho as a representative ideal of African moral traditions and as that towards which personal 
moral conduct is ordered i.e., a moral compass in the moral maze of social life today. That 
means the perceived failures of contemporary Africans to live up to virtues of botho including 
the corruption of African value systems that we see today, does not and should not invalidate 
its relevance and validity. This is true of some of the social institutions and social roles that 
will be discussed here in Sesotho culture. Their relevance to the current discourse, to use van 
Binsbergen (2001: 58-59) phraseology should be seen in their utopian and prophetic 
functions, i.e., as an expression of the ideal and the imperfect. Their analysis is to highlight 
the neglect of the significance of social institutions that supported botho and corresponding 
social roles as found in their classic form in the African way of life in the village. This is 
important for a fuller understanding of botho because it is for instance in how the village as an 
institution functioned and operated in regulating life more than its physical makeup, that made 
the practice botho possible. Much of the institutional dimensions and function of the African 
village, is not only relevant to today’s context but with appropriated modifications, can offer a 
useful blueprint for today’s context. While we do not need to replicate the traditional pre-
modern and pre-colonial era villages, there is a case to be made of the value of the social 
institutions found in the village and their role in sustaining its way of life and lifestyle. In other 
words, some elements of traditional African village lifestyle, for example, generosity and 
hospitality, mutual care and accountability are elements found in the village that I will argue 
are much needed in modern urban villages and semi-rural communities in today's’ context. 
The traditional villages supplied more than just homes for people, but a moral framework and 
social support structure within which individuals could be ethical and become moral, i.e., 
continuous striving to be motho and what this means in daily living was possible. This I will 
argue is what modern ethics and the current botho discourse can learn lessons for today’s 
modern “villages from traditional institutions. 
 
5.3.1  Normative Influence of Motse as Social Institution in Sesotho Culture  
 
If one looks at Sesotho culture and in general how traditional Basotho lived, one finds that the 
primary form in which their society was arranged was villages. A traditional Basotho village 
(motse) can be described as mainly single homesteads, usually owned by primary families. 
According to Matśela 1979: 98) these would be a cluster of huts and that “several of these 
clusters, usually formed by households or homesteads of agnatically-related families, 
comprised a small village or hamlet”. In the olden days a traditional Basotho village consisted 
of numerous huts (matlo), a place of resort for the men khotla which also functioned as a 
public court (Casalis 1861: 123) with an animal enclosure or kraals (masaka) at the centre. 
Villages consisted of a well-established governance structure and norms under the 
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stewardship and leadership of Morena, (the chief or headman) whose function as social 
institution is custodianship of the village's norms and standards. Although today most villages 
in Lesotho are no longer like this, we can, however, see to varying degrees the general 
characteristics of a Basotho village lifestyle or way of life as recorded in available and different 
sources. Today villages consist of small urban towns, although some are still rural, most 
villages are becoming bigger and urbanised now and losing many of the traditional features. 
Although traditionally villages or patterns of settlements, varied and differed in size, in general 
village living had a recognisable character and ethos consistent with principles and values of 
botho handed down through tradition and custom. Ellenberger (1912: 293) describes captures 
this life in the village simply as where “everything was done deliberately and in good 
fellowship”. It is important to note that good fellowship, which is the quintessential features of 
the lifestyle in the traditional village of Basotho, is not an automatic thing, or something that 
comes naturally by virtue of people living in the same area. It is something that must be 
deliberately chosen, habitually practiced which brings it in the sphere of ethics.  
The analysis of the Basotho village that follows here underscores how members in the village 
regulated their conduct and relations with others in the light of the norms and standard that 
the village has. This is because within traditional villages of Basotho there is a certain 
established regularity in social behaviour to which all consent to which specifies behaviour 
either self-policed or policed by others (Argandoña 1991: 1). It is in this sense that the village 
is an institution because through its customs and tradition peculiar to each village, it regulates 
the social behaviour of its residents. As the basic unit of social life, the village provided 
individuals with a stable practical social support system of norms and social rules. This 
ensured social and moral equilibrium in the village, and enhanced, promoted, and protected 
the values and ideals of the village. This is in part what made botho ethics in the village a lived 
reality. 
In Sesotho speaking cultures a village was an embodiment and depository of collective 
experience and moral knowledge accumulated over time and in it was enshrined the moral 
tradition of the culture. It is from this that the village was able to “limit and guide the actions” 
and behaviour of its residents towards some common ends and aims (Argandoña (1991: 2). 
This common end and aims is understood in Sesotho culture in terms of certain conceptions 
of shared future, a future in which certain types of conduct and behaviour is encouraged as 
morally good, and certain kinds of actions and behaviour are precluded because they are 
morally bad and wrong (MacIntyre 1981: 215) and not befitting of one who is a motho or 
ngoan’a mosotho (a properly brought up person). Here it can be seen why and how in the 
moral culture of Basotho ethics as a private matter for the individual becomes unintelligible. 
One of the clearest ways in which this manifests itself in the village and in its way of life, is in 
the strict adherence and respect the Basotho had for norms and values about generosity and 
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hospitality. This is expressed in its most profound form in the scrupulous reverence to rules 
and norms of hospitality and generosity especially visitors, i.e., outsiders or strangers. This 
often features in the much-cherished code of conduct in Sesotho culture codified in the 
doctrine of “O se re ho moroa, moroa toe” (don’t say to a bushman, you are just a mere 
bushman) (Nqosa 2010). It is important to emphasise here that in Sesotho language there is 
no equivalent term for the English word of “stranger,” the closest is recently invented word 
‘matsoantle’79. This is because in the Sesotho language the most common way “strangers” 
are characterised is “baeti,” which means visitors or travellers. The difference in the tone and 
attitudes implied in the terms “stranger” and “visitors” (moeti) reveals a lot about the underlying 
ethos informing personal conduct and attitude of traditional Basotho towards “outsiders”.  In 
many accounts of village life of Basotho culture, one finds recounted with striking consistently 
how welcoming and open their attitude is towards baeti. So important was the value of 
hospitality to baeti, that it is found expressed in several ways in traditional Basotho village. 
Among these, the most notable is their designated place at khotla, which is loosely translated 
as the court, where visitors reported when they arrive in any village80. Describing this Casalis’ 
(1861: 125) notes that, not far from the chief’s residence was “a place of halt for strangers” 
and it is reported that “the old chiefs continually exhort their sons to be constant in their 
attendance there, to receive travellers”. Ellenberger (1912: 269, 291) likewise makes the same 
observation that “strangers were always welcome, and their persons and property inviolate” 
and points out that Basotho “thoroughly understood and practiced the laws of hospitality in the 
most generous manner [where] the stranger was always welcome and given every assistance 
possible”.   
An intimate knowledge of Sesotho culture thus show that this predisposition to be generous 
and hospitable is actively encouraged in that the doctrine of “o se re ho moroa, moroa toe” 
captures the essence of the Basotho understanding and thought about the treatment of 
outsiders, and the normative authority of this doctrine. As Casalis (1861: 208) explains 
Basotho “instead of considering the desert as beyond the limits of laws of men”, they believed 
“travellers are entitled to as great a degree of security as if they are under the immediate 
protection of their respective sovereigns”, because as we say in Sesotho “tsela ke morena” 
 
79 This a derogatory term that translate “those from outside” coined recently to describe fraught relationships 
between locals and new arrivals in the country referring mainly to other Africans of north and east Africa origins 
and to some extent Chinese people in Lesotho. 
80 Khotla was another important institution in the village, almost like a seat of governance and administration. So, 
the significance of making provision for and designating a place for visitors in the heart of village administration 
shows how highly regarded the ideal of hospitality to “strangers and foreigners” was for the Basotho. This plus the 
Basotho’s adherence to relatedness through liboko (totems) bears striking resemblance to heroic societies where 
there was “a well-defined status to which any stranger who arrives from outside can be assigned” (MacIntyre 1981: 
124).In Sesotho a stranger arriving in a village with no immediate relatives, would be found “relatives” in the village 
by asking their seboko (totem). Upon this being established then the visitor would be introduced any family in the 
village with the same totem for them to care and provide hospitality for the traveller. This way no one would ever 
not have relatives. Those who did became the responsibility of the chief. 
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which loosely means “the road is king” meaning traveling takes one to unknown places. So, it 
was common practice in traditional villages that  
“A stranger, on entering a place where he has no acquaintance, seats 
himself in a place of public resort. He does not remain long unnoticed; the 
chief, or one of the principal men of the place, soon comes up and asks him 
from what country he come from …. Meanwhile refreshments are brought 
…. The most profound respect will be paid to his person and his baggage” 
(Casalis 1861: 208) 
 
What is important to note here about the Basotho and their village life is the adherence to the 
principle of hospitality as exemplified in their attitude to outsiders. It ensured and encouraged 
kindness to strangers and entrenched this attitude as the default position in relation to 
“outsiders” in their midst. The significance of this doctrine as articulation of botho principles is 
evident and highly applicable for today’s context including in places like South Africa where 
incidents of attacks on foreigners are happening with frequent regularity and in Europe where 
there is a growing rise of nationalist and anti-migrant sentiments. The lesson it teaches us 
today about how much botho is an inclusive ethic is unmistakable. This is more pertinent in 
view of debates in current botho discourses about how botho can remain authentic to its 
cultural origins but at the same time apply to other contexts. This doctrine offers an authentic 
African grounding for an answer to this concern, from the culture within which botho was 
practised. As Nqosa (2010: 334) explains this doctrine expresses a strongly held Basotho 
principle,  
“which affirms of the equality of humans regardless of race, ethnicity, or 
social standing, and unreservedly condoms discrimination based on such 
criteria. The doctrine also carries a powerful moral force by banishing 
discrimination by stereotyping.”  
 
This hospitable attitude towards “strangers” as formulated in this doctrine is a manifestation 
of the normative significance of this proverb and the values of botho it propagates, which 
translate to practical ways of behaving of individuals in the village.   
Basotho placed such high regard on the generosity and sharing and correlating attributes that 
some of the most highly regarded makhabane -virtues and values of botho, in the village were 
defined in terms of hospitality and sharing e.g., ‘ho fana’ which is to be generous and giving.  
It is from this deep sense of solidarity and sharing that reveals another important feature that 
characterised traditional villages of Basotho, the strong sense of belonging, mutual care, and 
responsibility for others. Thus, we find that every Mosotho felt obligated and responsible for 
their neighbour” and their wellbeing in good things and in bad things” and one was liable to be 
punished for any crime of his neighbour (Bujo 2001: 86). As Ellenberger (1912: 268) explains 
“If any man saw two other fighting and did not intervene to stop them, he 
was held to be conjointly culpable if either was hurt. …A village was 
collectively responsible for each one of its inhabitants. If the skin of a stolen 
animal was found in a village, or the spoor traced to it, and the thief not 
 218 
caught, that village, collectively, had to compensate the owner, and to pay a 
fine “to clean the ground.” 
 
It was this communal accountability and responsibility for one another found in Basotho 
villages that ensured a high degree of generosity and hospitality as the hallmarks of the village. 
This, in turn, played a vital role in sustaining the practices and habitual acts botho. It spurred 
individuals to aspire towards the acquisition of virtues and apply themselves in inculcating the 
dispositions of botho.  
Besides generosity and hospitality which implied mutual responsibility for one another, 
Basotho villages were renowned for their adherence to the old age practice the Basotho are 
renowned for and that is “ho lumelisa,” to greet others (Matśela 1979: 159, 63, 71, 132) 
whenever you meet them it does not matter how often. This practice which entrenched the 
values of botho is typical of traditional Basotho villages and one of the few that still hold strong 
sway even today. It was in part because of this that children mostly were monitored with regard 
to whether “ke ngoana ea tsebang ho lumelisa” (a child that greets people). For Basotho, 
greeting someone was a social practice by which a person expressed and showed botho, 
denoting deep respect of the other (Prozesky 2016: 9), hence the great formalism involved in 
litumeliso (greetings protocol). Thus, when greeting people, one had to use respectful titles; " 
Khotsong bo -ntate " ("peace be with you, sirs), or Lumelang ntate le 'me" ("Greetings, father 
and mother") (Matśela 1979: 159). As a social practice81 litumeliso was therefore not just 
inquisitiveness about the other person’s affairs or just saying “hello” to someone, it was a sign 
of respect for the other person according to Sesotho culture.  
Respect for others whether young or old through litumeliso was one of the most admirable 
qualities of character in a person and a manifestation of being brought up well that a person 
could have. As such it was a highly regarded personal attribute and quality of character for a 
motho to have and a sign of satisfactory progress towards excellence in having botho. As one 
of the cardinal ethical concepts in the moral tradition of Basotho litumeliso was one of the first 
and most noticeable habits or manners (mekhoa or behaviour) that showed that an individual 
is succeeding to integrate the values and dispositions required for botho into their character 
and identity. Therefore, deeper ethical significance of this practice is that it was one of the 
indicators of satisfactory progress in inculcating makhabane or virtues of botho, especially the 
virtue of tlhompho, i.e., deep respect of the other person). So, what we see is that ho lumelisa 
was the most fundamental and primary way of showing tlhompho, (politeness and respect), 
both of which are normatively significant for engendering ethical relations with others implied 
in botho. In other words, failure to succeed to master the imperatives of botho at this most 
 
81 The use of this term here is in the Aristotelian sense to denote an activity “providing the arena” in daily living “in 
which the virtues”, in this case its virtues of botho, “are exhibited and in terms of which they are to receive their 
primary, if incomplete, definition” (MacIntyre 1981: 187).  
 
 219 
primary and basic level made it unlikely that one would be successful with more morally 
demanding requirements of botho in other spheres and aspects of life. Litumeliso was a way 
of showing that one has the virtue of respect and politeness which means good manners both 
of which goes hand in hand with tlhompho. These were for the Basotho among the highly 
regarded virtues for one who regards themselves to be a good person and possess botho. 
The way you greeted someone also revealed your goodness as a motho. The requirement for 
respectful politeness in daily living was so important for Basotho that there were all sorts of 
norms and rules about being polite covering all classes of people, children, adults, neighbours, 
friends, and chiefs. Describing this Ellenberger (1912: 292) notes that there is “so much 
politeness and so many rules of etiquette which were faithfully observed” and that “if anyone 
spoke to someone older than himself, politeness required the use of a term of respect and 
affection”.  
It is not difficult to see how an emphasis on such a norm i.e., politeness accompanied with 
respect towards others, can have an enormous impact on society in terms of the tone and 
quality of relationships and a general amicable feeling that prevails in social relations. The 
normative implications of such a practice on the general tone and warmth of personal relations 
between individuals vis-à-vis the adoption of behaviour and a way of conduct that fits in with 
values of botho are clear. It meant that everyone aspired to be as a matter of who they are 
and their moral character, respectful, polite, and friendly hence the association of botho in the 
current discourse with primacy of harmonious friendly relationships (Metz and Gaie 2001: 
276).  In the practice of litumeliso, we therefore have a Sesotho version of what it means to 
treat the other as a person, and this is at the heart of what botho means. It is for this reason 
that ho lumelisa and politeness were among the primary behaviours often used to judge how 
welcoming a village was. According to this then a model village was one where these were 
prevalent and prospering. This is particularly significant in relation to the moral formation of 
young members of the society who grow up with this as the understanding of how to be a good 
person or motho. The significance of the practice of ho lumelisa is not only a genuine 
expression of solidarity and showing interest in the welfare of the other person, but it was also 
one of the means by which moral assessment of the character of the individual was carried 
out. It was indeed the central features that defined a village as “good” and moral. If you were 
a person who greets other people you were a good person and vice versa. In turn, the 
character that a moral agent has reflects their upbringing, hence its relevance to the village. 
As it can be seen adherence to litumeliso norm was thus not only a socially acceptable thing, 
it influenced and shaped personal conduct, in that “no one who considered themselves 
decently brought up i.e., a proper Mosotho could afford not to adhere to this because this 
would earn one the unenviable description of a mannerless person – motho ea se’nang 
mekhoa” (“a person without proper manners”) (Ellenberger 1912: 293). Contemporary friends 
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of botho would say of such a person “ha se motho” which denotes not only that the person is 
judged not to have been brought up well, but even more important that they show lack of 
qualities of botho. The point about this is to show that it was precisely in terms of certain social 
practices, such as the strict devotion to certain norms, or standards of politeness and rules of 
etiquette in the village that a person was adjudged to have acquired mekhoa e metle (good 
manners and behaviours) that make them a person (Ellenberger 1912: 292, 268; Casalis 
1861: 207). As it can be seen this was in part one of the way Basotho defined botho 
understood it in terms of personhood 
Unfortunately features like this sense of accountability for one’s neighbours or one another, 
are some of those aspects of African culture and lifestyle that have suffered the corrosive 
effects of modern “sins” of contemporary Africa (Bujo 2001: 137) and are in a noticeable 
decline in society. These old ways of life and many others features that characterised African 
culture in village living have suffered under “progressive re-colonisation of the world by First 
World culture” or European culture (Shutte 2001: 4, Casalis 1861: 209) and this continues till 
today. So, in many places in Lesotho traditional culture and its traditions are no longer that 
dominant and as such is no longer the source of a shared moral frame of reference for most 
people as it was in the past.  
However, despite this, it is also the case that, some elements of traditional village living and 
practices, characteristic of African culture and morality have not totally disappeared and are 
very much part of the modern way of life. I am thinking here of social practice like visits of 
condolences when there is a death and the overall attitude of African culture towards 
bereavement. This practice along with its remnants, which can be found in various forms even 
in urban areas, has remained part of the contemporary way of life even today. It is, in fact, 
striking to see even today, many Africans travelling long distance to attend a funeral not only 
of close family members but a friend, a close neighbour or sometimes just another member of 
the village where one comes from. Often many do this because according to tradition, it is not 
so much what consolation one brings, but the most important and “greatest thing is to have 
come, often travelling long journeys in order to show sympathy with those mourning” 
(Ellenberger 1912: 263). In Sesotho culture, no one who considered themselves decently 
brought up, would want to be seen to be failing in this aspect of being a motho, hence the 
respect of this old age practice even in the context of modern living. As such even today the 
village practices around bereavement are vital in many communities. People still gather at the 
family of the bereaved and help as much as possible, with food and other practical 
organization related to the funeral. It is practices like these first that enable moral agents as 
individuals to practice values of botho, but second, it is these practices considered in their 
unity as expressions of virtues such as sympathy, empathy that provided that much needed 
supporting social infrastructure that supports and makes botho possible in the village. 
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So, the “village” as an institution is more than just its sociology but is also an embodiment of 
a specific moral tradition. It embraces certain norms and values peculiar and important to that 
village. It is in this sense the custodian of a moral tradition, i.e., set of moral and ethical 
regularities, and behavioural norms that have emerged organically over time, which in turn 
inform and influence the behaviour of its members (Argandoña 1991: 2). When viewed this 
way, the village thus has a specific characteristic activity, namely the development of agents 
with botho. Through its normative authority derived from its moral tradition, the village and its 
ethos make it possible for the moral agent to live up to the imperatives and ideals of botho. It 
is in this sense that African ethics has been described as always “we”-ethics as opposed to “I 
ethics”, because it “does not rest content with supplying ethical norms, to the individual without 
accompanying them on the path of praxis” (Bujo 2001: 71) like the way many people view 
ethics today. One means by which this support to the individual is given in Sesotho culture is 
through the social roles conferred on the individual which will be discussed next. But before 
that there is another important institution in Sesotho culture without which the village as 
institution would struggle to meet its obligations and functions, and that is what in English is 
called the family.  In Sesotho culture, the family consists of two distinct but intrinsically linked 
institutions, namely lelapa and leloko. Both are very influential when it comes to conduct and 
regulating behaviour of their members82. In these I will argue is embedded essential elements 
that we can learn lesson from about botho and its practice for today’s context to make botho 
possible. 
 
5.3.2  The Family as a Normative Social Institution in Sesotho Culture 
 
The effect and arrival of outside influences on traditional Basotho social institutions, none has 
suffered lasting damage than the family and what it stood for traditionally. Among Basotho 
institutions, none was as important in terms of moral formation and transmission of values 
than the institution of the family as it is known in Sesotho. The family or lelapa and leloko as 
the family is called in Sesotho culture with their corresponding roles played pivotal roles in 
moral education and adherence to social norms sustaining the practice of botho and 
inculcation of makhabane. Lelapa can loosely be translated as the family while the leloko is 
often translated in the literature as kin or members of the same clan. The form that the 
institution of the family takes in different societies often is determined by the culture of the 
society (Shutte 2001: 83), however, what is common to all, is that the family remains the most 
 
82 Leloko is part of the family (lelapa) but bigger and has higher governance powers. Often it consists of families 
(malapa) of the same surname or who share common descent or lineage. Although part of the family, leloko is 
distinct understanding of family relationships. It denotes broader relationships and many more families of the same 
lineage than those involved in lelapa. The two are best understood in terms of the former representing the inner 
smaller circle of the family lineage consisting of close family, and the latter representing the larger broader circle 
of family lineage consisting of many more families or a clan. 
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important and primary social institution in many societies and this is true for the Sesotho 
culture.  Many of the features of the institution of lelapa and leloko that will be discussed here, 
will also resemble a way of life found in other African cultures mutatis mutandis, largely 
because within the African culture there are as many commonalities as there are differences. 
It is in these similarities that we find enough evidence of certain salient common and 
unquestionable features characteristic of the normative character of the family as an 
institution. This is often the case about ways of conduct, “language, social organization, 
economic system, political structure and other modes of socio-cultural expression” (Matśela 
1979:30). The understanding of lelapa and leloko in Sesotho culture denotes broader and 
deeper forms of relations that entail relatedness and belonging. They also imply accountability 
and responsibility for obligations and dues one has to other members in far stronger ways that 
the English word family does. This is because both have strong connections to family 
traditions, kindred, kinsfolk, or the family stock and custom (Paroz 1974: 197) along with a 
strong connotation of a family decent by seboko (totem). As the primary institution of Basotho 
society lelapa and leloko, are particularly important social units central to the village as a 
normative institution, governing every aspect of the life of a Mosotho of old. In Sesotho culture, 
like most sub-Saharan African societies before the influence of modernity, the family, also 
sometimes referred to as ntlo (household) was a system of governance or social organisation 
among Basotho, that consisted of “both the primary and extended families, with the primary 
governed by and through it (Matśela 1979: 31, 102,129, and 162)”. But as we have said each 
family was subservient to leloko of that family or the clan. Leloko is not easy to translate into 
English as it has strong connotations of the family, clan, and tribe all at the same time. It shall 
therefore here, be loosely translated either as a clan where it shall denote the sense of 
belonging and relatedness that is not only understood in terms of marital relations but also of 
decent or seboko (totem) in Sesotho.  
Those not familiar with African social institutions may find it difficult to understand the 
significance of lelapa and leloko, particularly their normative significance. Traditionally these 
institutions had a huge binding effect on individuals as moral agents commonly expressed in 
the family palaver with its mini judiciary like authority (Bujo 2001: 48). In Sesotho, the function 
and meaning of these two concepts are therefore always heavily loaded with customary and 
traditional expectations of their social function. The moral authority they have over their 
members, even as this is constantly under refinement by each generation of members of the 
family, was not only well-established and understood by everybody, it was something that 
everyone had a personal stake in its protection and safeguarding. But above all its decisions 
were respected and acted upon as normative. However, the way the relationship of belonging 
is understood, in the institution of lelapa and leloko the most important thing is that while the 
“primary family generally consisted of the spouses and their dependent 
children…. more often than not, their close relatives' children or their aged 
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or ageing parents [also] lived with them or nearby under their care” (Matśela 
1979: 99). 
 
It will be noticed here that central to the notion of family in Sesotho culture was this intense 
sense of mutual responsibility for other members of the family. It was thus common for many 
families to look after close relative’s children and ageing parents, including living with them as 
part of one’s family. Here we can already see the key feature of the family according to 
Basotho understanding in relation to responsibility and accountability for other family 
members. This is something modern families today can learns lesson about. This reveals the 
obligation and requirement of members of the family to be the sort of people that act and 
behave this way towards other relatives in need. This is because that is what a family is and 
ought to be. Ke botho (That is part of botho).  So, here we can already see how the Basotho 
understanding of kinship or family informed conduct and shaped behaviour.  It entailed mutual 
care and wellbeing of other family members as something each member of the family felt 
deeply. While this is in part due to being taught from early on in life, it was at the same time 
something one had to choose as an adult and therefore value deeply and which one has 
strong vested interest in. It is for this reason that it was common for families to live with other 
relatives.  
The deep sense of family solidarity in traditional societies like that of Basotho is one of the 
features of family belonging and solidarity that modern society can learn a lot from. For 
Basotho, it was the intimate and deep solidarity found in the family i.e., nuclear and extended 
family that was extended beyond parents and siblings to include the larger circle of relatives 
and relations. This we see in lelapa and leloko where it encompasses the broad sense of 
kinsfolk, even including those relatives from the moral agent’s great people, fondly known in 
Sesotho as “ba heso moholo” which refers to maternal relatives. This extended belonging of 
lelapa was so important in Sesotho that it is recounted poetically in oral literature by the 
character of the poet-singer, “Mohlang ke shoang le joetse beso, le joetse beso le beso-
moholo” (The day I die inform my people, inform my people and my great people as well), and 
has now become everyone’s song (Bereng 1987: 23).  As a result of this attitude, the family 
taught its member the value of the bond of belonging, or ‘ho amana’ (relatedness) no matter 
how distant. Individuals were taught to regarded this as an important part of one’s life, and as 
such no less deserving of the moral agent’s time and nurturing as those relations with 
immediate family members. For this reason, one of the important social expectations and 
norms among the Basotho was for the individual to nurture a myriad of familial relationships, 
starting with knowing all of one’s relatives by name, both seniors and juniors and wherever 
possible visit them (Matśela 1979: 161). The requirement to visit relatives is still noticeable 
even today especially among the diaspora Africans or city dwellers. Many of these when they 
go back “home” a practice of going for a visit to one’s village periodically, it is expected to visit 
 224 
as many of the relatives as is practically possible. In some families failure to visit some 
relatives during these annual “going home” visits is  a source of serious family disquiet that 
must be addressed in serious family palavers about the offence caused to some members of 
the lelapa or leloko who felt aggrieved at not being visited.   
Describing this intense sense of “ho amana83” or relatedness and belonging (Matśela (1979: 
5) states that this is one of the major reasons for the high degree of unity among the Basotho. 
This would make sense because the true meaning of “ho amana” implied in the phrase is not 
simply about being related to someone, but also describes the quality of the closeness of the 
relationship. The literal meaning of “ho amana” derived from “ho ama” (to touch) denotes a 
quality of closeness and sensitivity in the relationship akin to skin touch. And this is the type 
of belonging that is expected of member of the same lelapa or as we say in Sesotho “ba –
amani,” i.e., those who are related to one another. Ho amana or kinship by decent is therefore 
another form of belonging often found and implied in leloko, which includes relations by liboko 
(tribal emblems/totems) or the main descent groupings of the Basotho (Matśela 1979; 100). It 
too implies similar closeness of the relationship and plays an important role in what individuals 
should do in relation to those they are closely related to and those they are not so closely 
related to.   
The notion of “ho amana” (to be related to someone) i.e., the bond of familial relationships and 
kinsfolk (Paroz 1974: 5) also implies obligations, claims and dues owed to one by other 
members of the family in the network of relationships found in lelapa and leloko. In Sesotho 
the relationships within lelapa and leloko relations, place greater emphasis on the underlying 
duties, obligations, and expected behaviour of members of the family have towards those they 
are related to i.e., as we say in Sesotho “ba amanang le bona”. This is because in Sesotho 
culture to say of another person “re ea amana” (we are related), is means by virtue of this 
relationship there are certain dues that we justifiably can expect of each other i.e., dues owed. 
So “ho amana” in moral sense denotes a prescriptive claim, to the effect that, as relatives we 
are mutually accountable to another. By virtue of the relationship we have and the role of being 
a “relative” that we each occupy we owe one another certain dues, obligations and 
responsibilities (MacIntyre 1981: 218). “Ho amana” therefore stipulates ways of behaviour for 
the moral agent and expresses social expectations of how anyone who bears the role of being 
a relative “ought” to conduct themselves in relation to other relatives. Not to adhere to this 
etiquette or custom in the way one lives their life is therefore to act wrongly, and in turn, makes 
one “bad” relative.  
It is important also to remember that this sense of belonging and relatedness found in the 
family was for the Basotho possible and desirable to be extend further by expressing it in other 
forms. The most notable case here is in “mo haeso” (homeboy/girl) which literally means “one 
 
83 This is derived from the verb “ho ama” which means to light skin touch (of a hand).  
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from my home place”, in recognition of being from the same village. In other, words, solidarity 
or the sense of belonging practiced in the lelapa and leloko here is being extended outside 
the restrictions of family relationships only i.e., marital and blood ties only, to incorporate other 
people from the same village, or of the same seboko (clan/totem) (Murove 2009: 316). When 
interpreted in this sense “mo haeso” become all-inclusive because it means virtually no one 
in the village can be left without “relatives” as anyone in one way or another could be 
accommodated into the bond of belonging. It is this treasuring of “mo haeso” and extending 
the reach of “ho amana” i.e., relatedness in Sesotho culture, first as found in the sense of 
belonging in the family, second as scaled up through the clan and mainstreamed into the 
culture and life of the entire village, that village life became an intricate web of intense sense 
of belonging and solidarity. It is this generalised sense of solidarity that makes the village an 
important social institution that provide a conducive environment for the practice of botho in 
the family and in the village. 
So, the relevance of the institution of the family here is that all this had a normative effect 
primarily by being enforced through adherence to the norms and values of each lelapa and 
leloko. So, the role of the family in engendering this profound sense of mutual accountability 
for the welfare of other family members or family belonging (Matśela 1979: 162, Futhwa 2012: 
91) made it an important institution in the village particularly for the educational of the young 
more especially moral formation. When viewed this way the family was indeed a school of 
character, because it was in the family that moral formation took place, whereby mothers and 
grandmothers “carried out most of the education of the society’s children (Matśela 1979: 95, 
Ellenberger 1912: 297)”.  
Earlier we pointed out the challenge of applying the English word family to the institution of 
lelapa and leloko in Sesotho culture. It was intimated that like most traditional African concepts 
when translated into English, the full meaning and bond of belonging and relatedness implied 
in Sesotho concepts gets lost in translation. This is because as Bujo (2001:48) explains the 
African notion of “family” is much more comprehensive than its understanding in the West 
because it embraces more than the nuclear family. In addition, the English translation does 
not capture the sense of belonging, that is often associated with the dues that accrue as 
dictated by custom and tradition. This is what is at the heart of the Basotho understanding of 
family. It is a narrative concept of belonging and this applies equally to the sense of belonging 
and relatedness found in lelapa or leloko. This we see for instance in the special significance 
Africans place on having the same surname, where the understanding is that a shared story 
of belonging. For most Africans, this is often regarded as bona fide grounds of claiming 
relatedness traceable to the story of the same lelapa or seboko (clan) or family stock. Thus, 
we see the curiosity of Africans when they recognise a familiar surname. Often there is a 
tendency to inquire further to try and find if the person is related to or if they “know” so and so, 
 226 
of such and such a village. This behaviour is still practiced today although not by everyone. 
The same desire to establish a sense and bond of belonging can be seen also among people 
who have the same seboko (totem) or tribal emblems (Ellenberger 1912: 241), who feel 
somehow that they owe one another certain dues or responsibility as a relative. This form of 
belonging still exists and is acknowledged by most Africans and the same is true of Basotho 
as well.  
 
5.3.3 Marriage as a Normative Social Institution in Sesotho Culture 
 
So far, the account of the family outlined here has not said much about, the institution of 
lenyalo (marriage) 84. This means that there can be no fuller account of the ethical significance 
of lelapa and leloko (family) without reference to marriage. Lenyalo is not only another 
important social institution in Sesotho culture but one that is the centre of creating and 
expanding family relationships and bonds of friendships between families in the village and 
between villages. It is therefore one of the important social institutions among the Basotho 
and here only the outline of its moral significance will be discussed, as part of a network of 
institutions found in the village that influenced behaviour and personal conduct.  
As just indicated the institution of marriage is very important in Sesotho culture because 
among other things it was the absolute precondition of social maturity for the young couple” 
(Phoofolo 2007: 367). So important was the social standing of lenyalo for Basotho, it required 
the exchange of the most valuable asset in Basotho society — likhomo, (cattle) in the practice 
of bohali (bride price). It is not surprising therefore that such an important institution in the 
society was designed fundamentally as a public affair, in which there could not be too many 
witnesses (Ellenberger 1912: 272). It was therefore regarded as an invaluable institution 
whose survival was guaranteed by the united interests of several parties, more specifically 
parents or members of the family (Ibid. 273, Casalis 1861: 183,). It was also the responsibility 
of all members of malapa i.e., immediate members of the two families as well as extended 
family members from both sides to make sure nothing threatens its viability. It is in this sense 
that marriage was regarded as the matter of extended family and lineage that went beyond 
the dictates and fates of the two contracting parties (Phoofolo 2007: 368). to some degree this 
is the still the case today. It was therefore truly everyone’s business in the family lineages of 
the new couple. This can be seen with the payment of bohali, where often “the bohali cattle” 
was understood as coming from the bridegroom’s lineage, not just his immediate family. In 
Sesotho culture it was customary that several members of the boys’ family lineage contributed 
 
84 In Sesotho the marriage process is often a matter between families. The boy will usually signal to his parents 
the desire to marry. Then the father would then discuss this with family members and the mother including which 
girl they like as a daughter in law (Matśela 1979: 104). For more on Sesotho marriage see Duncan 1960, chapter 
2, and Ellenberger 1912: 271). 
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to the bohali cattle. Similarly, it was common practice for the bride’s parents to share the bohali 
“cattle among members of her kin” such as with malome, maternal uncle” ((Phoofolo 2007: 
368, Ellenberger 1912: 262, 271).  
In Sesotho, the institution of lenyalo is always associated with certain virtues and values that 
are highly regarded, such as “respect” “commitment and permanence of marriage” or fidelity 
in marriage. Among this boitśoaro bo botle (exemplary good moral behaviour) was one of the 
highly stressed virtues those in a marriage were expected to display. This included respect 
(thlompho) of oneself, themselves one’s partner, the in laws and the community at large in the 
way one conducts. The understanding here is that this is behaviour that reflect an overall an 
admirable good character. Adherence and inculcation of these values and virtues thus 
influenced and regulated personal conduct of those involve. This we see most clearly 
expressed in relation to monogamy, where this virtue was regarded with high esteem in the 
village (Casalis 1861: 186, Ellenberger 1912: 273). This does not mean that fidelity in 
polygamous marriages was not needed, but it would appear this reflects more the bias of 
missionary views towards monogamy.  
What is important for our purposes here is the instrumental role of lenyalo as an institution, 
and its social standing in Sesotho culture and its normative influence moral formation. It will 
be observed that in Sesotho culture among young men and women, not yet married, good 
behaviour became one of the goals i.e., something to aspire to and to inculcate in part because 
it was that which one will be assessed by in the village when it comes to important phases in 
one’s life. This includes marriage where traditionally the parents chose a marriage partner for 
their son or daughter, and the moral character of the potential wife or husband of their child 
become one on of the key considerations in the minds of all family members. For instance, 
when parents were looking for a daughter in law, among the key questions they considered 
would include, what kind of family is the girl’s family, are they good people or not. What about 
the girl herself, is she well brought up etc. etc. The same deliberations applied to the girls’ 
parents in relation to their potential son in law and his people. Are his people good people i.e., 
batho ba nang le botho, are they the kind of people to be proud to have as bakhotsi, (in-laws) 
and associated with? In this way marriage as an institution played an important role in terms 
of encouraging inculcation of good qualities of character or dispositions of botho among the 
young adults.  
When we take a closer look at the status of marriage in Sesotho culture, one therefore will find 
that another primary functions or ultimate purposes and goal of the institution is that it “linked 
lineages together in an endless and enduring reciprocal” ever expanding network of 
relationships and obligations between and among lineages (Phoofolo 2007: 368). It is in this 
sense that in African culture “marriage strengthens and re-establishes fellowship and solidarity 
beyond blood relations” (Bujo 2001:35). Hence the endearing description we find in Sesotho 
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referring to the in-laws as “bakhotsi,” which denotes close intimate friendship. This signifies 
the high esteem in which marital relationship was held. It follows then that, for the Basotho, 
as is the case for most African cultures, lenyalo is thus understood primarily as the expansion 
of  the bonds of “ho amana” relatedness and belonging. It was the creation of new bonds of 
belonging hence marriage arrangements traditionally were concluded by parents and relatives 
between respective families.  
In African culture, it is common knowledge that marriage was seen primarily as a creation of 
a bond of not just relating but belonging between families. It is for this reason that one will 
notice that in ordinary parlance in Sesotho, a Mosotho often, in referring to the marriage of 
one of their children, would say “o nyetsoe ke “ba ha-” (is married by the family of -), which 
means he or she is married to so and so’s people i.e., mentioning the name of their bakhotsi 
or in laws (Ellenberger 1912: 274). Remnants of this traditional understanding of the institution 
of marriage can be seen in the customary practice among many Africans even today of “ho 
qela mohope oa metsi” (to ask for a calabash of water). This is a traditional formal way by 
which the boy’s parents ask permission from the girl’s parents to marry their daughter. Along 
with this is also the practice of bohali or lobola (dowry) even though this aspect has seen the 
most dramatic changes, and to some extent corrupted, it is still practised till today (Ellenberger 
1912: 272; Matśela 1979: 103). It goes without saying that in Sesotho culture, like many 
traditional societies, the role of marriage was not only socially highly regarded, it was one of 
those social institutions with clearly specified functions in the village and not only to the 
individuals directly involved partners but most importantly their families.  
In addition to purposes internal to a marriage i.e., starting a new family and, in the process, 
ensuring the continuation of leloko, marriage was also a way of extending belonging and 
friendship between families. What we see in this understanding of marriage is that it was s 
social institution with a clearly defined social function which is an institution by which families 
extend bonds of family belonging and friendship hence the care and thought about their future 
son or daughter in laws but the whole family regarding the family that they are about to be 
married to when one of their members gets married. It was thus common for families to actively 
pursue friendship with other families they liked and after befriending each other to seek 
solidifying these bonds by encouraging marriage between their children. In other words, 
lenyalo, extended and expanded the Sesotho notion of “ho amana,” relatedness between 
families together with the accruing obligations and dues associated with familial relationships 
or baamani (relatives). What this enlarged bond of kinship and belonging means is increase 
in size of social obligations that those in this network of relatedness accrue, which will 
influence individual's behaviour. This is because these relationships in Sesotho culture implied 
certain obligations and responsibilities that results in certain ways of conduct on behalf of 
those involved.  
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This is because in Sesotho culture marriage relationship between families did not only have 
obligations on the two immediate families and the parties involved. It also implied the same 
for other members of lelapa and leloko who also have a stake in it and its welfare. As such 
those in a bond of relationship on account marriage owed each other accountability about the 
status of that marriage. As such anyone involved could be held accountable to hold others to 
account if it is felt they are not living up their obligations by virtue of being related. This applied 
from those in inner most circle of the young couple themselves, including their respective 
families, extending outwards to the larger circle of members of lelapa and leloko.   
So here we see that for Basotho marriage was a vehicle that ensured the never-ending 
expansion of bond of friendship and belonging between families through successive 
interlocking networks of marriages relationships. When this is taken together with the practice 
of adhering to strong bonds of relationships through totems, it meant that in a traditional village 
one ends up being related in one form or another with everybody, to whom dues of friendly 
relationships are owed as per custom and practice. The implication to personal relationship in 
the village and between families is that one ought to value these relationships highly as if they 
were those of close relatives.   
The point being made here is that in Sesotho culture one of the implicit functions of traditional 
understanding of the institution of marriage is the extension of “blood relationships to embrace 
and expand the circle of relatives i.e., bonds of belonging, communal solidarity and friendship 
found in lelapa and leloko with other families outside these two (Matśela 1979: 100, 138).  In 
turn this expanded network of relatedness enjoined individuals in a materially significant way 
where now they owe one another dues of family belonging and friendliness. It is in this sense 
that Metz is correct to describe botho as an ethic that must be understood as placing basic 
moral status in loving relationship between people (Metz 2007: 337).  This means that it is 
important to resist the temptation to only view the institution of lenyalo, through the narrow 
modern lens of contemporary social order, premised on individual autonomy, rights, and 
individual choice. To do this is to miss the point namely that marriage was an institution, that 
like many traditional institutions had a clearly recognisable function and purpose, one of which 
was the establishment of new relationships and expansion of family bonds of belonging, and 
not just an agreement between two individuals for their own good.  
This leads us to the all-important matter of the normative imperatives of social roles85 
characteristic of traditional social institutions of Basotho which sustained botho, and in turn 
supported the family and marriage in their institutional function as part of village in creating 
“batho ba nang le botho” - people with botho. I now turn to this in the following section. 
 
 
85 For more on Basotho social roles and their function see Ellenberger (1912: 268, Bereng 1987: 23-28, and Futhwa 
2012: 50).  
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5.4  Influence of Traditional Social Roles of Basotho on Personal Ethics  
 
The brief analysis of selected social institutions of Basotho above has shown the influence 
that they have on conduct and behaviour of individuals, and in turn their relevance to ethics of 
botho and current botho discourse. What this analysis has not examined sufficiently though is 
the extent to which the moral authority that social institutions enjoy is in part carried through 
social roles, specifically the fulfilment of the duties of the role that moral agents occupy. It is 
important therefore that we unpack the nature of social roles in Sesotho culture to understand 
their influence on behaviour and personal ethics. This is because as it will be shown social 
roles have a big ethical influence on our lives as moral agents, setting parameters of what we 
can and can’t do, what is permissible and regarded as good and right and what is not allowed 
and regarded as bad and wrong. It is not the intention here to analyse the various roles found 
in traditional villages and families of Basotho. The aim is to show that in Sesotho culture many 
of their social roles came with inherent obligations that were binding to the role occupiers. 
Thus, they impose certain responsibilities and duties and that it is in the fulfilment of the duties 
of the role that behaviour of moral agent is moderated and regulated. In this way social roles 
are interlinked with ethics because they influence conduct in certain ways which were meant 
to be consistent with values of botho. I will therefore argue that the influence of botho ethics 
in Sesotho culture cannot be fully explained without reference to the social obligations and 
responsibilities that came with social roles. 
Earlier we saw that as moral agents, our relationship with social institutions is never just qua 
individuals. But that we interact with social institutions as bearers of specific roles as a given 
of our life. What this means is that many of us “typically inhabit a number of roles” and as such 
life can be regarded as consisting in a large part of fulfilling the duties of our roles and their 
various demands and responsibilities (Sciaraffa 2011: 107). Moreover, as human beings, we 
regard our role as somehow provide us with the justification for much of what we do and how 
we live our lives. This means also that often the “reasons that our role-duties provide, make 
up the lion’s share of our everyday practical reasoning [or phronesis] for acting in a particular 
as opposed to another (Ibid. 107). When understood in this way social roles are central to who 
we are and to our social identity (Berger 1984: 54). 
If one looks at Sesotho culture and its social organisation, we find that their social stratification 
or differentiation reflects many of their common social roles. These are usually disaggregated 
in terms of social groupings including gender, age or rank or some other grouping unique to 
Sesotho culture. Among these we can mention roles such as the role of ‘ngoana’ (a child), 
motho e moholo (adult person) bashanyana (boys), banana (girls) Bo ‘M’e or basali (mothers 
and adult women) and Bo-Ntate or banna (fathers and adult men) (Matśela 1979: 116). We 
cannot forget of one the most important roles in every village, namely the role of mohaisane 
(neighbour) which was expected of every family to be, and of course morena, the chief. Some 
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of the common social roles worth mentioning here, within institutions of lelapa and leloko, are 
the roles of: batsoali (parents), bo-ntate moholo le bo-nkhono (grant parents), bana (children), 
bo-motsoala (cousins), ntate moholo (paternal uncle), rakhali (paternal aunt), bo-malome 
(maternal uncles) and 'mangoane (aunt i.e., younger sister to one’s mother) nkhono, in the 
case of the older sister of one’s mother. These can be further broken down into ‘M’e (mother) 
ntate, (father), khaitseli (sister), moena/baholoane, (brothers) (Bereng 1987: 23-28, Matśela 
1979; 100, Futhwa 2012: 50) and the eldest son, on whom the responsibility of good behaviour 
for all other siblings was upon his shoulders.  It is not the intention not will it be possible here 
to analyse all various roles found in the village, but here it will suffice to underscore their 
normative influence.  
Among traditional social roles in Sesotho culture nowhere is their normative influence more 
pronounced than in those social roles implied in relationships found in the institutions of lelapa 
(family) and lenyalo marriage, and the broader network of social relationships that is formed 
between in-laws or bakhotsi as we say in Sesotho. This usually manifests itself in the 
exceptional moral weight freighted on the labyrinth of relationships typically around these 
institutions among Basotho. Much of this moral weight is because of the newly created 
relationship of ho amana (relatedness) as well as new roles that individual now will have to 
occupy all which gets established when a marriage agreement is entered. In other words, the 
complex set of relationships of ho amana that is found between members of lelepa and leloko 
can thus be understood as the explication of the associated social roles that members occupy. 
And as such it spells out a certain way those who are related “ought” to relate to one another 
and to towards each other. So, in relation to siblings, these relationships at same time express 
inherent social expectations, which determine and influence conduct and behaviour in terms 
of what a good sibling occupying that role denoting a degree of relatedness to another sibling 
“ought” to behave like.  
In Sesotho culture marriage thus is one of those relationships of belonging that sets in motion 
a whole new set of new roles for individuals along with their corresponding duties towards the 
in-laws in addition to one’s existing roles duties. These new roles are expressed through an 
elaborate new network of relationships that get set up. Each of these relationships implies and 
entails certain obligations and dues owed. If we look briefly on the relationships that obtain 
within the family and extended family members especially children, we find that Basotho went 
to great lengths to distinguish each of the web of relationships that exist between siblings.  
These are far more elaborate than the simple ones expressed in the relationships of just 
brothers and sisters. In other words, what is significant here is that these relationships are 
prescriptive, in that they coffer specific roles unique to those who occupy along with 
corresponding responsibilities. Thus, one finds elaborate mixture of names for each of these 
relations usually denoting how siblings are related to one another. These include ‘ngoan’eso,’ 
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(sibling), ‘ausi’ and ‘abuti,’ (older sister and brother) respectively. Among male children, we 
have ‘more’ (a younger brother) ‘moholoane’ (elder brother). There are other relations 
denoting certain implicit special roles. I am thinking here of the ‘khaitseli’ exclusively for male 
and female sibling that succeed each other86. Although khaitseli refers to one sibling, just like 
ngoaneso, or ausi and abuti, it is different from these. It denotes a special relationship 
characterised by deep affection and protective caring (Prozesky 2012: 8). So, siblings with a 
khaitseli relationship have an implicit special relationship or obligation to that sibling that is not 
necessarily the same to those of other siblings. There are other similar with special obligations.  
Among these none has special established role than the role of ‘ngoan’e moholo, firstborn87 
and “ngoana’ofela” - last born. These are as much about birth order as they are about the 
social standing in the family and in the village, expressing a social role and in turn prescribing 
a way of conduct implied by the role occupiers of that role.   
So we see that some roles in Sesotho culture come with greater responsibilities. The first born, 
for instance, besides being the heir and having to care for the well fare of other siblings, is 
also responsible and accountable for boitśoaro (manners, behaviour, conduct) of all other 
siblings (Casalis 1861: 180). Similarly, with the role of an adult person in the village, ‘motho e 
moholo’. Here too the role occupier is expected to play their part in the moral education of the 
younger members of the village. So, if motho e moholo comes across bana (children) 
misbehaving, it was his or her duty to reprimand them irrespective who those children are. 
This is because moral education is the responsibility of every adult person in the village in 
Sesotho culture. The children for their part as part of their role as ‘bana’ (children) understood 
this as well hence, one of the qualities they inculcated from an early age was respect of any 
adult person (Ellenberger 1912: 268). This idea is found in the well-known saying ‘it takes a 
village to raise a child’. So here the duties of the role of motho e moholo, precluded certain 
conduct from one who occupies that role i.e., not reprimanding children when they misbehave. 
The role also enjoins one to a certain course of action i.e., reprimand the children thus altering 
one’s behaviour which otherwise would not be the case if they did not occupy that role, e.g. if 
they occupied the role of another child.  
All these family relationships or network of social relations, are de facto social roles and have 
very clearly understood normative requirements with direct impact on the behaviour of 
 
86 The word khaitseli, has a slightly different emphasis on the relationship between siblings than English words   
brother and sister convey mainly because of its normative weight in governing this relationship. It is used to describe 
a relationship between a male and female sibling, usually who are born after each other and it is meant to denote 
a special bond of love (agape) and friendship between such siblings. Customarily this was probably to defuse the 
bitter sibling rivalry in adulthood associated with bahlahlamani (sibling that succeed each other) which often 
threatened the unity and peace of the entire family. The normative significance of khaitseli here is best captured in 
the now famous saying in Sesotho culture by Chief Mohlomi  a mosotho moral philosopher who is reported to have 
said of the value of peace, khotso ke khaitseli ea ka, ‘peace is my sister’. 
87 Today there is a common expression of “black tax” which refers to a practice mostly among black people where 
siblings, due to circumstance, assume responsibility for the economic well-being of their family and sometimes of 
relatives as well. This is very much the case traditionally with the eldest child as well, who was often regarded as 
the heir especially if it’s a son. 
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individuals, including certain prohibitions attached to them. And this is the same with all other 
roles. They all have well understood inherent expectations and responsibilities, claims they 
can make upon each other as well, and all this has a normative influence on the individual 
siblings on how they conduct themselves. These roles govern and make possible many of the 
features that characterised Basotho culture. It is in part due to the adherence to duties of these 
social roles that traditional Basotho society kept many of the features it became known for, 
such as deep sense of solidarity, concern with other’s wellbeing, generosity, kindness, and 
responsibility for others. These attributes provided Basotho society with a social environment 
conducive for the practice of botho. 
As it will have been seen social roles and social institutions exist in complex web of primary 
and secondary roles and duties. This is the case where both are invested in the same 
individual. The person inhabiting a certain role, can at the same function as a social institution 
with a clearly defined role in the village recognised as such by others. So, for instance bo-
Nkhono (grandmothers) this is both a social role and a social institution whose social function 
is often that of being grand-parents in a household and also an educator in the community. 
The same is true motho e moholo, (adult person) in addition to their primary role in the family, 
either as husband, wife, or parent, as an institution, an adult person is one whom children in 
turn can approach for recourse on anything due to a child as a member of that community. It 
is in this sense that social roles and social institutions are two sides of the same coin, and it 
is also in terms of fulfilment of the duties of both social roles and institutional roles that that 
individual’s moral goodness is also evaluated. In other words, a good ntate (father) is one who 
is both a good parent, a good husband, but also a good ‘motho e moholo i.e., performs well 
the duties of an adult member of the community.  It is the social institution for instance of 
“mohaisane” (neighbour) that demands and provides the individual with the norms and rules 
of conduct towards a mohaisane, and also that allows one to be regarded as a good 
mohaisane and in turn the dues and privileges that go with one who performs such a role. In 
the absence of the defined social role the norms that govern bohaisane (neighbourliness) 
would be a matter up to the individual’s choice, to decide, define on their own. By contrast in 
traditional Sesotho villages, the function of the social institution of mohaisane is defined by the 
tradition and custom with individual role occupies each adding a unique contribution to the 
continuing dynamic role definition and function of this as an institution.  
Today the notion of social roles as bearing any material significance to who we are as moral 
agents sounds alien to many. But a closer look at many of our interactions show that these in 
fact implicitly presuppose this. We still regard ourselves as members of our family household, 
related to our relatives in some way, a parent to someone or some people, an uncle, an aunt 
and a grandfather and grandmother to some. Even in modern complex societies one is still a 
neighbour to some people and resident of such and such a town or township and member of 
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such and such society. These associations impose tacit social roles that we occupy which 
have inherent duties that we fulfil. The only difference is that today many of these social toles 
are no longer subject to communal accountability as it used to be and as such are devoid of 
the associated communal duties and deserts and privileges that are due to one who inhabits 
those roles. The sense of identity of the individual roles is thus less defined and very shallow 
and, in some instance, it is only by name.  Traditionally this was not so, and the idea that one 
could bear a role and not assume the associated personal and communal duties and 
responsibilities expected of one who inhabits that role was unheard of. Such a conception of 
the self is a concept that is foreign in Sesotho culture. I tis in this sense that imagine an 
individual without such social embodiments or distinct from his or her roles in such a manner 
is not only to “imagine a person without moral depth” but someone “wholly without character 
conjuring something with a ghostly character (Sandel 1984: 172; MacIntyre 1981: 33). This is 
something akin to the restless mythological figure of sethotsela, (ghost) in Sesotho culture, a 
restless soul that belongs nowhere, i.e., neither to the community of ancestors or the living. It 
is in this sense that in Sesotho culture each person is born into his place in the world and 
knows it which gives one certain rights and dues as well as responsibilities and obligations 
(Ellenberger 1912: 281, MacIntyre 1981: 33).   
Another important nature of social roles in Sesotho culture that is relevant to ethics of botho 
and its communal orientation is the social nature of the Basotho understanding of roles. In 
other words, even though it is individuals who occupy roles, it is the village and the community 
that defines and decides these, both regarding what they entail in term of conduct and in terms 
of success in fulfilling the duties that apply to the specific role. This is because the modern 
idea of moral agent who is an autonomous moral sovereign as suggested today does not exit. 
This means that social roles are the sort of thing that are socially conferred upon a person, 
and so is the fulfilment of specific expectations and duties of the role (Richardson 2009: 133). 
In Sesotho culture fulfilment of duties of social roles are regarded as having an impact on the 
larger community and its moral standing. For this reason, if children were regarded as brought 
up badly that was a reflection not only of lack of good upbringing by the parents but of overall 
poor ‘khalemelo’, reprimanding of children in the village by those occupying relevant roles for 
this duty i.e., ‘batho ba baholo’, adult members of the village (Mphetolang 2009: 19). The same 
would apply to a bad parent, their failings are regarded as a blemish that brings shame not 
only to the immediate family but the whole village.  
What this tell us about social roles in Sesotho culture is that inherent in them are norms and 
standards as well as obligations. It also tells us that in addition to the considerations of the 
role bearer to fulfil the duties of the specific role, it is also how others view this as well that is 
morally important. It is for this reason that where one fell short in the fulfilment of duties of their 
roles, they are subject of justified criticism, not just by the family members but also the larger 
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community. In Sesotho culture this took different forms including shunning or shaming of the 
person (Sciaraffa 2011: 117,123). This understanding is that while each of these roles had 
their own unique functions peculiar to each within the individual family (Futhwa 2012:50), the 
same obligations were expected of anyone occupying the same role.  In other words, many 
traditional social roles found in Sesotho culture were given definition and interpretation through 
custom and tradition.  As such there was a common understanding of what they entail, and 
role occupiers performed the duties of their roles in the light of this understanding. They also 
knew that at any time they could be called to account in terms of how well or not so well they 
are performing in their specific role. There was a consensus therefore of what roles meant 
and what to expect of those who occupy them.  
So, the normative standard for conduct for the role bearer thus consists of an accepted base 
of a set of duties, obligations, behaviours, attitudes, and dues. These were not understood as 
only owed to oneself but to others as well. This meant that there is a legitimate interest and 
stake others have in how as moral agents we perform and fulfil the duties of our roles. This 
was the case with many social roles in Basotho culture. This conception of social roles is in 
part one of the features of traditional ethical resources, that I argue played an important part 
in sustaining and encouraging the practice of botho as an ethic in Sesotho culture.  
What we learn from this as well is that social roles thus make us as moral agents accountable 
to others as well as to ourselves for the fulfilment of the duties of the roles we occupy. In this 
sense social roles are the public expression of mutual accountability implied in botho. This is 
in sharp contrast to contemporary moral attitudes today where it is common to hear “it’s none 
of my business” or “it’s their choice’ when matters of conduct are discussed.  When understood 
is this sense, social roles become a basis of justifiable grounds for holding individuals to 
account and for moral agents to be accountable to one another (Sciaraffa 2011: 109). It is 
here that the foundation of normative authority of social roles is located, because as a moral 
agent  
“I am answerable for doing or failing to do what anyone who occupies my 
role owes to others and in addition I am not only accountable, [but I am also] 
one who can always ask others for an account, [and] who can put others to 
the question” (MacIntyre 1981: 126, 218).  
 
In other words, in Sesotho culture because I am the firstborn son, I can justifiably be held 
accountable in my village, community or society for how I live up or not live up to the expected 
and required standards of this role. This is because as ”ngoan’e moholo” (the eldest child) I 
occupy a role with established duties and widely accepted and long standing “standards that 
persons occupying” this “role ought to meet.” And any falling short or “deviations” from these, 
“are taken to be” a justifiable ground “for criticism” or holding one to account (Sciaraffa 2011: 
109).  But it must be stressed that this does not mean that as moral agents we are or become 
nothing but the social roles which we inherit and occupy (MacIntyre 1981: 31). This is because 
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as agents in the fulfilment of the duties of the roles we also add to it by virtue of our own 
agency a unique stamp. This idea of accountability and social roles is going to come across 
as alien to contemporary moral agents brought on the assumption and acceptance of liberal 
individualism as given. But what the experience of Traditional Basotho shows is that as moral 
agents neither are, we free and uncommitted agents. We are always bearers of specific and 
sometimes multiple social roles. These in turn influence and shape our conduct by binding us 
through “patterns of rights and duties, the natures of which are determined by the nature of 
the institutions which give rise to the social roles” (Downie 1964: 29)”. This means that in our 
efforts as agents to be good persons or make noticeable progress towards personhood i.e., 
becoming a motho as we say in Sesotho, we are “never able to seek for the good or exercise 
the virtues only qua individual”. Instead we always approach this and “our own circumstances 
as bearers of a particular social identity” i.e., as occupiers of multiple social roles (MacIntyre 
1981: 220).   
Another observation about social roles in Sesotho culture is that they are often typically 
defined in and through the rich heritage of narratives including proverbs and other similar pithy 
sayings (Coplan 1993: 92). Here the significance of social roles is that they are defined also 
in terms of the virtues the role occupiers ought to inculcate to perform that role well. I am 
thinking here of proverbs like, fura88 la ngoana ke ho rongoa”, (the role or function of a child is 
to be sent to run errands), which captures the general understanding of what is considered to 
be a definition of a good child i.e., one who is brought up well, is one who plays their part in 
the life of the community through efficient carrying out of messages and running of errands 
(Matśela 1979: 132, 162). But this also articulates the virtues a good child ought to inculcate, 
and these include efficiency in the delivery of the messages, discipline of not getting distracted 
while on errands and doing this as speedily as possible. This also involves displaying the 
intellectual virtues by displaying cognitive abilities to understand the main message, i.e., take 
in information and be able to impart it in such a way that the meaning is not lost. Another 
example helps to illustrate the same point with adults. This we find in the proverbs “mosali o 
tśoara thipa ka bohaleng” (a woman holds the knife at its sharpest end) and “marabe o jeoa 
ke bana” (The puff adder is eaten by its babies89) both which describe the ideal character of 
parents or qualities essential for one who occupies the role of a mother and a parent. The 
former describes a mother as someone who would do everything to protect her family including 
putting herself in dander if necessary. Similarly, with the latter which describes one who 
 
88 Lefura, refers to the fat part on the meat and in Sesotho this is regarded as the tastiest. So, the meaning here is 
that a good child stands to being sent to run errands, as a person’s appetite is to a tasty piece of meat. In other 
words, a good child is one who is good at running errands (Mokitimi 1997: 14, No119). 
89 This proverb is based on a believe Basotho have about the puff adder (marabe). According to Sekese (1994: 
66) with this proverb a parallel is being made with marabe, where it is said that when it gives birth it dies, and its 
young ones eats it. This proverb is thus an expression of solidarity with one who has little because they sacrificed 
all for the children, to the effect that it emphasises that this is what a good parent ‘ought to do”.  
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occupies the role of being a parent, prescribes that it is someone who will be prepared to go 
without for the sake of their children (Mokitimi 1997: 44).  
From this, we can now see why proverbs are such an integral part of the moral language of 
the Basotho. When proverbs are used to define social roles, they must be understood as an 
articulation of the function and purpose of a particular role and how that relates in part to the 
moral agent self-understanding i.e., in terms of one’s goals and ultimate purpose in life which 
is to be a good person in the respective roles that one occupies. And we can see this cannot 
be fully achieved without a person doing well in fulfilling the duties of the roles one occupies 
as part of living out their life. This understanding of being a motho i.e., in terms of having an 
ultimate function or purpose in life, is close to the Aristotelian idea of a telos, in that it is an 
expression of the functional understanding of man or motho in Sesotho. I use the term function 
here in the way MacIntyre (1981: 58) defines it where the “concept of man is understood as 
having an essential nature and an essential purpose or function”, which is the heart of ethics 
or morality. This is like the understanding of social roles, and in turn those who occupy them 
as found in traditional Sesotho speaking culture. According to this then, social roles are the 
main vehicles, not the only ones for motho to fulfil that essential purpose and function, and as 
we have seen this relates to being a good person. For Basotho this was defined in part by 
how well one fulfilled the obligations and duties of their social roles. This, in turn, was part of 
what was taken into consideration in making moral assessment whether one has succeeded 
or is making satisfactory progress in inculcating qualities of botho. 
It will also be noticed that social roles and this is particularly pronounced among blood relatives 
are often indistinguishable from the identity of the bearers. This is because social roles in part 
define who we are, because as we pointed out we are other people’s sons, fathers to some 
people, or mothers and sisters to others and relatives to some. These roles do not only exert 
normative authority upon us as individual members of our families but in the end, they are part 
of who we are and constitute our identity. Because of this intrinsic connection with social roles 
or role identification, it is not easy to separate our identities with them, and as such, they form 
part of our conception of who we are as moral agents and as members of families (Sciaraffa 
2011). In other words, as individuals, we carry with us our social roles as part of the definition 
of ourselves, even if we reject these (MacIntyre 1981: 27,172).  
What this analysis shows about the normative influence of institutions and roles on personal 
conduct, is that botho as an expression of specific way of being moral, cannot be fully 
understood without reference to social institutions as part of menu of ethical recourses and 
support structures that enable the practice of botho as an ethic in the community. The analysis 
also showed that social institutions like lenyalo (marriage), motse (village) or lelapa (family) 
and others not discussed here, themselves serve a function within a larger whole i.e., larger 
complexes of institutions and social roles that together fulfil some larger end or set of ends of 
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the society (Sciaraffa 2011: 109). In Sesotho culture this larger end and set of ends of a society 
manifests itself in the characteristic way of life found in their culture. It is these larger 
complexes in Sesotho culture constituting characteristics features of Basotho way of life, that 
provide the supportive and enabling environment conducive to botho ethics. In other words, 
there needs to be in place social conditions in the community to provide individuals with ethical 
resources, analogous to those available to traditional Basotho that made the practice of botho 
easy and possible as a way of live in their villages. It is this social context that I argue provided 
individuals with the necessary ethical conditions or social environment that made botho 
intelligible and possible in practice and sustained it in communal living. In the next section 
below, I examine these features and social conditions that characterise the Basotho way of 
life and under pinned ethics of botho in their culture.   
5.5  Characteristic Features of Basotho Way of Life that Underpins Botho Ethics  
 
Although Basotho culture is part of African culture and such share many common features 
with other cultures, Basotho culture does have many features that distinguish it as different, 
not least their language. As we know language is carrier of customs, beliefs, norms, and 
values of a particular culture. This means that in their culture there are certain social practices 
and ways of doing things peculiar to Basotho. These informed their understanding of ethics 
including ethics of botho as found in their practice and moral thought and also encouraged 
and made the practice of botho, as the central pillar of their morality easy to practice. Among 
these and worth mentioning are the common practices seahlolo (sharing), letsema (work 
party), and mafisa (livestock loaning) (Mofuoa 2014: 229) just to mention a few. Although 
many of these are unique to Basotho culture it is also the case some form of these may be 
found in other African cultures as well. This is because Africa as a continent, although 
inhabited by a diversity of people and as such is not a homogenous entity, like any society, 
whether its European, Chinese, American or Asian, there is unity in diversity that enable that 
which is being qualified to be recognisably as African and not European, Asian, Indian, 
Chinese or any other culture. This means that within the diversity of African moral traditions 
there is a recognisable unity, and commonality which distinguish moral traditions from this 
continent as African. As Hanna Kinoti explains: “although Africa is a vast continent” when it 
comes among other things to their moral traditions and basic moral assumptions “there is 
adequate evidence” of commonality “to generalise to a considerable extent" (1992: 76).  
The same is true of the of those central features of Basotho culture that will be analysed here 
as instrumental in supporting the practice of botho ethics in their culture. In many of these can 
be found commonalities that can be found transcending local differences. The features that 
will be discussed here while they may equally be found applicable and relevant to other African 
culture, the immediate context of their analysis is focused on Basotho people and their culture. 
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As such even though this section will not make strong distinction made between Basotho 
culture and African culture, it will place emphasis of the experience and perspective of 
Basotho. Of relevance, though will the commonness of ontological assumptions, such as the 
significance of religious belief and spirituality, the centrality of community life and unity of life 
or holism, all which underpin Basotho culture and African culture as well. What this means for 
the argument about botho that this study makes is that to fully appreciate its relevance and 
value for today’s context, it is imperative to understand the underlying ontological assumptions 
upon which this concept is grounded but also informs its practice in specific context. This also 
includes knowing the salient features of the traditional setting of Basotho culture or context 
within which this ethic is at home. This is because it is pointless to study a polysemic moral 
ideal like botho in isolation or invitro without taking into consideration the particular sociology 
of knowledge by which it came into being and by which it is perpetuated (van Binsbergen 
2001: 59). In Sesotho speaking cultures, it is this awareness of the particularity of sociology 
of knowledge of Basotho implied in their indigenous knowledge system, which informs the 
practical interpretation and application of botho and is of relevance to ethics in general. Such 
an approach in analysing this concept will provide us today with an insight into the larger 
totality of moral thought and practice of Sesotho culture in which botho, as a normative concept 
enjoyed a role and function supplied by this context (MacIntyre 1981: 10).  In turn, we will be 
able to identify those elements that make the practice of botho possible as found in the cultural 
milieu from which botho was practiced as predominant ethic (van Niekerk 2013: x). From this 
we can also transplant botho from its cultural origin and its ethical imperatives authentically 
and apply its dictates appropriately as well in today’s context and other cultural context. 
The following characteristic features of the African culture which feature prominently in 
Sesotho culture show common features that underlie ethics in African culture. They also 
underscore the importance of understanding ontological assumptions that underpin ethics and 
the practice of botho in Sesotho speaking cultures.  
 
5.5.1  The Significance of Religious Belief to Ethics in Sesotho Culture  
 
Much of the analysis of botho thus far in this study may have unwittingly given an impression 
of ethics in Sesotho culture as a secular morality. This is because the religious dimension of 
ethics which is always integral to the African understanding of morality, has not been 
highlighted and given much prominence. The reason is in part because the religious 
dimension of ethics in African culture is a given, and as such there is no need to explicitly state 
this. But in the context of discussion of modern ethics which presents itself as secular, it 
becomes necessary to highlight the difference here.  It is therefore important to realise that in 
Sesotho speaking cultures the practice of botho ethics implied cognisance of its religious 
dimensions or what I referred to as the spirituality of botho (Mphetolang 2009: 22). It is the 
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consciousness of the sacred found in Sesotho culture that cannot be separate from life and 
under lies the outlook of how Basotho approached life especially the moral life. In other words, 
as anyone familiar with African culture knows, religion is never too far from life, nor is it 
separate from the rest of social life. 
In Sesotho culture, like most African cultures there is an intrinsic connection between the 
secular and religious, the profane and sacred. This is because according to traditional thought 
and believe, “there is only one world, which is not first profane and then religious” (Bujo 2001: 
96).  The religious character of African life is well-documented subject in African theology and 
its imperatives on social life. This must be understood as central to moral life as well. 
Therefore, in Sesotho culture the practice of ethics of botho functioned as part of a larger 
ancient system of belief, a belief that was deeply religious. This means that botho as moral 
concept operated in the context of a worldview and moral outlook, where there was an 
inextricable connection between the natural and social realms of humans with the supernatural 
(spirits) and spiritual realm of balimo (ancestors) and Molimo (deity/divinity) as the guardian 
of culture (Manyeli 1992: 30-48,  Molefe 2015:64, Manda 2009: 2, Setiloane 1978: 32-34).  
The moral scheme within which botho was invoked to assess conduct, must thus be 
understood as part of an ancient religious belief of the Basotho and a moral culture that is 
deeply religious. This, in turn, implies a spirituality i.e., a noticeable consciousness of the 
supreme being or the divine that the moral code of the culture presupposes. This is because 
in this culture one of the predominating ideas influencing behaviour and personal ethics is a 
belief in ancestors. This is always an important consideration at the back of the mind of the 
moral agent’s life and existence. As Mkhize (2008: 37) explains ancestors are understood as 
“examples of good conduct” on whom good conduct is modelled and is valued in part because 
it ensures good relations with them. In turn, the continued cherishing of their superior moral 
qualities become a normative standard that an ethically fit moral subject90 or a proper motho 
seeks to emulate  i.e., by making present the ethical experience of the ancestors and attempts 
to shape his or her actions accordingly (Bujo 2001: 34). This means that if the conception of 
botho as a normative concept is to be properly theorised, this cannot be done without 
reference to the spirituality that underpins it. In other words, it is not possible to give a complete 
account of the experience of botho in Sesotho culture without a good understanding of the 
role that religious belief plays and occupies in Sesotho culture. This is because within this 
culture the notion of secular morality, i.e., morality independent or separate from religious 
belief, which is a common notion today, does not exist. As such a conception of ethics purely 
in secular terms would be unintelligible. In this sense, traditional morality of Basotho bears 
close resemblance to many other pre-modern cultures, where this separation of ethics and 
religion was non-existent. The prevalence of this dichotomy in many societies is thus a recent 
 
90 The term ethically fit or active is borrowed from Prozesky (2007: 20) 
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development. In places like modern European society, which is one example, this moral 
tradition has progressively been repudiated in large part due to the influence of enlightenment 
project on ethics. This project as already pointed out did not only abandoned traditional 
morality of Europe but changed key tenets of its tradition, including “the moral unity of 
Aristotelianism, whether in its ancient or medieval forms” (MacIntyre 1981: 156). By contrast 
at about the same time on the opposite side of the globe in 18th century Sesotho speaking 
culture of Southern Africa, we find a similar moral tradition not only being embraced by some 
of the great figures of the time like the great Chief Mohlomi, but also being propelled as the 
cornerstone of social and moral life. In this part of the world, this moral tradition is part of a 
vibrant pre-modern moral culture of Basotho in which the ethic of botho was later to be its 
greatest asset. Central to this moral scheme is a certain sense of spirituality reflected in the 
key religious terms of the Sesotho language of Molimo (God or the supreme being) and 
ancestors, balimo. Like other African culture, it is these religious tenets that characterise 
Basotho culture and traditional African moral and ethical systems as deeply religious as well 
(Mkhize 2008: 36).   
In Sesotho culture this notion of the divine, can be found in all manner of places including for 
instance in the ancient prayers of Basotho. Here one finds reference to the notion of divinity 
in Molimo, (God) singular, balimo and melimo (gods) plural form, and molingoana, a diminutive 
form suggestive of degrees of godliness (Manyeli 1992: 31- 43). It shall be noted that the 
nature of divinity as recounted here is varied, which suggests the presence of religious belief 
in the whole of life, not just the sacred, or religious or spiritual realms covering all. This 
underlines African spirituality, which begins with the recognition of God as the omnipotent 
source of life (Mkhize 2008: 36), hence the reference to the spirituality of botho made in this 
entry, which is important dimension not to forget in the analysis of this concept. The unity of 
life stressed here points to another important religious feature in Sesotho culture the ethic of 
Basotho presupposes, and that is the concept of holism or cosmic unity. I will therefore argue 
that the religious foundation of Africa ethics is nowhere better articulated than in the notion of 
holism or cosmic unity which expresses itself in social harmony and social and environmental 
equilibrium (Kasenene 1994: 142). 
Cosmic unity or holism as a spirituality, prioritises interconnectedness of existence and the 
unity of life as of supreme importance. This belief and spirituality of the unity of life rejects all 
forms of dualistic tendencies and conceptions. As such in the way they live Africans, makes 
no distinctions between the natural and social realms of humans, which is inextricably bound 
with the supernatural (spirits) and spiritual realm of balimo (ancestors) and Molimo 
(deity/divinity) as the guardian of culture (Molefe 2015: 64, Manda 2009: 2, Setiloane 1978: 
32-34). This view is supported by many studies that show that African culture is deeply 
religious in orientation and that religion permeates all aspects of life (Chitando 2008: 47).  The 
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notion of an “all-pervading Supreme Being who controls the universe and social 
relationships,...[who] is interested in the way people relate to one another” (Kasenene 1994: 
140) is the underlying assumption that gives meaning to taboos, regulations and prohibitions 
many of which are imbued with deep religious undertones. These guide behaviour and moral 
conduct, and hence this is the soul of African ethics. This centrality of the spiritual realm to 
daily social life may in part explain the continuing interest in religion in African even today 
despite the highly modernised and globalised environment, that now characterised much of 
sub-Saharan Africa as can be seen in the growing number of new churches91. This is in sharp 
contrast to other places where the religious appeal is diminishing, which support the view that 
religious belief and spirituality that underpins morality among Africans is still an important 
reality in the life of many Africans, including those urban elites that are supposed to have 
embraced secular Western culture and morality.   
The African experience of religious belief and ethics is quite different to the claims of 
secularisation of secular morality of the West and modern ethics, where there is a break in the 
realm of morals with traditional authority specifically religious authority (Shutte 2001:43). By 
contrast the unity of life and wholeness of human experience espoused by African religious 
belief permeates all aspects of life including the moral life. Within African culture, the 
dichotomy that Western ethics insists on between religion and ethics is not only foreign but is 
also in conflict with the African worldview where “morality” is not separate “from the rest of 
African social life” (Richardson 2009: 131) and emphasis is on the wholeness of life. Mkhize 
(2008: 36) reiterating this unity of life as reflected in the African conception of a hierarchy of 
beings, states that “traditional African moral and ethical systems can be said to be religious” 
because “they begin with the recognition of God as the source of life”. What this means for a 
moral concept like botho and how its values and the virtues it encapsulated should be 
understood is that “there exists a cosmic order which dictates the place of each virtue in a total 
harmonious scheme of human life” and that truth in the moral sphere consists in the  
conformity of moral judgment to the order of this scheme (MacIntyre 1981: 143). The same 
applies to the current botho discourse and its analysis of the values and virtues expressed in 
botho, i.e., these must be interpreted and applied in conformity to holism or cosmic unity that 
 
91 Many of these new churches can be described as prosperity gospel churches with some taking on 
local African features but what they all share in common is theologically conservative Christianity that 
emphasizes believers’ abilities to transcend poverty and/or illness and to gain blessings through 
devotion and positive confession (https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/prosperity-gospel). These churches 





permeates African culture. In other words, the religious sentiments of African culture, such as 
those found win Sesotho speaking culture must be part of the social support structures, or 
ethical resources that supported individuals to be ethical. Another such important resource is 
the community. 
 
5.5.2 Significance of Community and the Common Good in African Culture  
 
The importance and status of the community in African culture, is recognised as one the most 
admirable features of African culture which contemporary societies can learn lessons from 
about the practice of the ethic of botho, even in a globalised and complex context that is now 
much of sub-Saharan Africa. So unique is this that Westerners often remark about how strong 
the sense of community is and how fascinated with this idea many Africans seems to be. At 
the heart of community spirit, is the strong concern with one another’s welfare and wellbeing 
so noticeable and important in many African culture as a way of life. This is the traditionally 
value of the common good characteristic many pre-modern cultures such as that of Basotho.  
If one looks at the Basotho culture, the idea of common good is the edifice underlying much 
of the social and moral life of Basotho. It is social and moral wheel around which all of life 
revolved. In this sense it can be described as the primary underlying consideration that 
informed their way of life and the rationale behind the high regard of many of the practices 
they practiced such as sharing, solidarity and a sense of responsibility and accountability for 
other. It is because of the concern with the common good or welfare of the other that we find 
that in Sesotho culture every Mosotho felt obligated and responsible for their neighbour” and 
why one would be punished for any crime of their neighbour, and the whole village was 
collectively responsible for each one of its inhabitants (Bujo 2001: 86, Ellenberger (1912: 268). 
This is true of many African culture, the community is key, because this is the expression of 
what it means to be a person, and this extends to the moral sphere. The understanding here 
is the individual motho is the embodiment of his or her community of its moral ideals. This is 
because in African culture the understanding is that “ethical living” is a task “incumbent upon 
the entire community” and that the “community gives expression of itself” morally “through” its 
members (Bujo 2001: 28). Because of this status of the community in African culture, much 
has been written in the literature about its significance and relevance to botho ethics is well 
recognized (Metz 2007, Mabovula 2011, Letseka 2013b). Thus, we find that in Mabovula 
(2011: 38) the community described as “a kinship-oriented social order, which is informed by 
an ethic of reciprocity”, or as ongoing dynamic association where people “have a special 
commitment to one another and have developed a distinct sense of their common life. It is the 
embodiment of the common good in which “one comes to see one’s interests as being bound 
up with the interests of the group over a great number of issues of life and well-being”. The 
common idea expressed here is the traditional value of the common good. I will argue that it 
 244 
is the notion of the common good implied in botho that manifests itself as African 
communalism. This is another feature of society that is conducive to botho as an ethic. This 
consciousness of the common good is thus underscored by the emphasis the African culture 
makes of harmony in relationships between persons as the apex of created beings (Mkhize 
2008: 37).  This is because according to African culture, society is morally significant and the 
relations that obtain between individuals in a society are not incidental to ethical living. Instead 
they are essential to being moral and development of good character (Richardson 2009: 140).  
It is in this sense that Metz (2007: 334) is correct to point out that in African culture “certain 
relationships” as opposed to others “are constitutive of the common good that a moral agent 
ought to promote”. According to this then the common good is fundamentally bound up with 
how one relates to others, hence these relationships are morally important. What we have 
here therefore is a spirituality that requires a particular outlook of life, in which being moral is 
seen essentially as a network of interdependent social relationships all aimed at safeguarding 
and maintaining natural equilibrium between the individual and the community, and between 
the community and the environment as the ultimate good i.e., the common good to which all 
have a duty towards.   
What we see therefore is that central to the African way of life, is a deep concern with common 
welfare as such it follows that this is going to be one of the ideals and underlying foundation 
of African ethics and a governing principle which underpins much of African culture. It is the 
foundation upon which ethical imperatives for the way life in general is lived are anchored and 
for the understanding of moral goodness. This is because this consciousness permeates the 
entire African social life culminating in the requirement where relatedness of persons, not 
separateness, is a decisive issue and the aim of social life (Bujo 2001: 3). It is the basis for 
the norm informing the fostering of particular type of human relationships including the 
rejection of dualistic conceptions of life as well as the separation between the individual and 
the community. What this means is that the “good “is defined and understood in terms of its 
unity i.e., the relationships within the group, not the individual. For this reason, African culture 
places primacy on the common good where welfare of the individual is inextricably intertwined 
with that of the community (Shutte 2008: 33).  
It is often difficult for most people to conceptualise and find personal moral justification or 
grounding for the aspirations of the common good i.e., link between common good and ethics. 
But as Prozesky (2007: 105) points out, moral goodness, which is the sole function of ethics 
i.e., to help moral agents attain moral goodness, means caring about the good of others as 
well of taking care of our own legitimate interest”. What is clear from all this is that the idea of 
the common good is consistent with two central ideals underpinning the African way of life. 
These are based on the belief that the individual's existence is intertwined with that of the 
community in the context of botho, and that a wrong done to the individual is a wrong inflicted 
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on his/her whole community (Gaie 2002: 277).  When understood this way the common good 
thus permeates the spirit and attitudes, both social and moral that characterises the traditional 
African idea of community and its practical application in daily living. Here the adherence to 
its dictates entails treating others as ‘another self, with no distinction between their good and 
one’s own’ (Shutte 2009: 97). In this sense the common good underscores the African 
understanding and conception of a community as more than just “a mere collection of 
individuals but as “people conspiring together, con-spiring in the basic Latin sense, united 
among themselves in a common and shared goals even to the very centre of their being” 
(Shutte 2008: 27). Because of this, communal life in African culture is always a priority and 
the community, in turn, is a unity with a religious and moral obligation (Kasenene 1994: 141). 
That obligation is encapsulated in harmonious relationships and the preservation of life as the 
highest principle of ethical conduct through communal solidarity. 
We can see here how the principle of harmony and balance conflicts with modern ethics and 
contemporarily moral attitudes. This is because here the focus of modern ethics as seen in 
chapter two leans towards extreme individualism, concern with the autonomy of the individual 
and attainment of what is good for them (Bujo 2001: 77). It follows then that this holistic 
conception of life in relation to community relationships as reflected in African culture, will 
equally apply to what is regarded as “good”. In other words, such conception of what is good 
for the individual in African culture cannot be opposed to the good of all i.e., the common good 
which is understood in terms of their well fare and wellbeing.  We see this in Sesotho culture 
for instance in the approach and attitude to material possessions. According to custom, “leruo” 
-wealth or material possessions are not solely for private use by those who have it. Tradition, 
or the rule of conduct as codified in the rules of etiquette dictated that such possessions be 
made available when others are in need (Richardson 2009:136). These loosely designed 
codes of ethics of botho among the Basotho, although only regarded as etiquette than a norm 
or law were faithfully observed and adhered to (Ellenberger 1912: 292).  
It is in terms of this practice that possession of botho is associated with generosity and sharing, 
which for Basotho is one of the most explicit manifestations of botho and a sign of the virtue 
of kindness. As such this desire to be generous became one of the deepest sensibilities of 
Basotho and found expression in all sorts of ways within their communities. These range from 
sharing items such as ploughing implements, to having seahlolo -sharing ploughing fields, to 
mafisa, extended lending of cattle. In other words, in African culture one finds that there is 
generally accepted and known prescription, for a way of conduct in which material possession 
or personal assets, where their possession and ownership precludes their use in common and 
for use for the common good (Murove 2008:86). 
All this was part of the radical social ethic of the common good ethics which governed relations 
and personal ethics in the community. It is within this context and setting of communal living 
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understood in terms this intense inner feeling, to care about the welfare of others, that the 
understanding and analysis of botho must be found.  The understanding here is that even 
though individuals may indeed possess assets, in practice this functioned more like the right 
of administration, and as such this is not devoid of the sense of common good ethics, since 
this right always take into account the members of the family fellowship as a whole (Bujo 2008: 
7, Richardson 2009:136) or the common good of the community. It is for this reason that one 
who deprived the community of access to such possession i.e., through selfishness was 
regarded as not a good person and had a poor moral standing in the community, something 
that sounds foreign in today’s context. Basotho would say of such a person ‘o pelo e thata,’ 
meaning they have a hard heart. This because is such conduct it shows one who is without 
kindness and compassion. This is because such conduct fundamentally undermines the basic 
tenets of botho and corresponding sensibilities of way of life which is informed by high regard 
and priority of the common good. 
 
5.5.3  Community Membership and the Significance of Social Identity 
 
Among the features that underpin the Basotho understanding of ethics and in turn relevant to 
the current botho discourse to consider, is their conception of the self or the social identity of 
the moral agent enshrined in African culture. In terms of this understanding our self-
understanding of who we are is understood primarily in terms of social identity. This social and 
communal approach to identity is thus opposed to an individualistic notion of self. In other 
words, like in many pre-modern, traditional societies, in Sesotho culture, it is through 
membership i.e., in lelapa, leloko, the village and many other social groups that as moral 
agents we identify ourselves.  This is because as moral agent  
“I am brother, cousin and grandson, member of this household, that village, this 
tribe” and “these are not characteristics that belong to human beings accidentally, 
to be stripped away in order to discover 'the real me'. They are pan of my 
substance, defining partially at least and sometimes wholly my obligations and 
my duties” (MacIntyre 1981: 33). 
 
The relevance of this is that this conception of the self underscores the significance of one’s 
social identity which cannot be fully grasped without cognisance of the roles one occupies, 
many of which are permanent part of one’s identity and who we are.  But even more significant 
is that this understating of the identity of the motho (person) has implications that determines 
and shapes behaviour of a person as a moral agent.  This is because in African ethics, ethical 
conduct i.e., moral goodness or what is good for the individual,  
“means that the individual does not consider himself to be the only one 
involved in his actions….[because] there is a “circumincessory” relationship 
between the individual and the community in its three dimensions (the 
unborn, the living, and the dead) so that without the community, correct 
ethical decisions and acts of virtue are impossible” (Bujo 2001: 29). 
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In other words, membership of the community is not only an important requirement or a matter 
of choice, but also an essential part of the understanding of one’s identity. This is part of the 
understanding that would inform and influence moral agency including the application of and 
practice of botho by the individual.  It is in this sense that social identity is related to personal 
conduct and can be regarded as regulating and influencing personal ethics and conduct. Of 
course, this does not mean that some individuals do not try to reject their social identity, and 
when they do, they cannot remain as part of the community literally and metaphorically. 
Traditionally those who do, i.e.,  by their conduct and way of life, they would be shunned and 
be banished and the honour along with the corresponding set of duties and privileges due to 
them is withdrawn. Earlier we saw how in Sesotho culture this unenviable status rendered one 
to be called a manner less person and someone of bad character and behaviour” that every 
Mosotho who considered themselves a proper Mosotho person wanted to avoid (Ellengberger 
1912: 293).  In the community, therefore this sense of belonging and is indissolubly linked with 
the social roles, through which belonging is reaffirmed in the honour i.e., the embodiment 
regard by others that the individual gets from the community. This is because here honour is 
that which is due to everyone by virtue of their role and belonging in a community (MacIntyre 
1981: 116). 
The concept of honour and community belonging requires explanation because it is not a 
common concept in modern society least of all as core concept defining relationships in 
traditional societies like Basotho culture. In its simplest definition honour is the recognition the 
individual gets understood as what is due to them, “by reason of their having their due place 
in the social order” (Ibid, p116) or the role that the individual inhabits and fulfilling the duties 
of that role in an exemplary way.  In other words, honour is something one gets on account of 
their role, because it is in our social roles that we each have our place in the community and 
the honour that come with that (Berger 1984: 154). We see this clearly in the Sesotho speaking 
culture, where “every individual is the superior or inferior of his neighbour” and it was believed 
that “each person is born into his place in the world and knows it” (Ellenberger 1912: 281). In 
other words, as individual members of the community we inherit a particular space in the 
ongoing narrative i.e., moral story of our moral particularity enacted within an “interlocking set 
of social relationships” in the community. It is in this story that our responsibilities and 
obligations are to be found, but also our dues and what we are owed, and this include honour 
where it is earned. 
What we find here then is that personal identity in African culture is understood in terms of the 
broader community membership which is defined in large part by the various roles one 
inhabits.  This means that community membership i.e., through our roles is not “inseparable 
 248 
from understanding ourselves as particular persons and who we are” because this means that 
“to some I owe” certain dues   
“more than justice requires or even permits, not by reason of agreements I 
have made but instead in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments 
and commitments which taken together partly define the person I am” 
(Sandel 1984:172) 
 
The centrality of social roles to the African conception of the self thus cannot be 
overemphasised here, because according to this understanding no individual exists just as an 
individual. Every person is defined by others and self-defines themselves in relation to the 
community specifically in terms of their role within that community whether as “a neighbour, a 
friend, a relative, a clansman, a member of a tribe or of nation and so on” (Munyaka and 
Motlhabi 2009: 68). Moreover, this self-identification of the individual extends outwards in ever 
expanding network of relationships. It is important to note here that community belonging in 
this way is not a matter of choice, it is the given of our lives because  
“The story of our lives is always embedded in the story of the community. 
We are born with a past, which becomes part of who we are, and to try to 
cut ourselves off from it through an individualistic account of our identity is 
to deform our present relationships” (MacIntyre 1981: 205).  
 
Any attempt to reject community membership and social identity, as some modern people try 
to, is an illusion that is at one’s own peril. This also cannot happen without a serious existential 
crisis and confusion to the meaning of our lives and a crisis of identity and belonging. It is this 
conception of the self that underpins botho and must inform the current botho discourse as 
moral qualification of motho, best captured in African moral thought in the idea of the moral 
ideal of personhood (Molefe 2017A: 217). It is in this sense that in African word view, personal 
identity is inextricably bound with our relations with others and it is in this interconnectedness 
of person that the manifestation of botho occur (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009: 68). 
 
5.5.4  Community as the Custodian of Moral Traditions and Moral Formation 
 
The significance of community as a prominent feature of the African way of life, based on 
common mind and common heart, is well acknowledged in the literature and current botho 
discourse (Shutte 2001:26). This is true in Sesotho culture, where the community or more 
correctly motse (the village) was an important social institution with a unique function to play 
in the moral life of its members. This does not only distinguish African idea of community from 
collectivism where there is necessarily no common interest but reveals the social function of 
the community as an institution.  As a social institution the community has a social role, and it 
performs this through other social institutions within it especially the individual members who 
are the bearers of the community’s social roles. We have already seen that one of these was 
the preservation of the common good. The community also has an ethical role as the social 
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embodiment of a set of norms, and specific configuration of values and virtues, and as a 
guardian of morality and custodian of the moral life (Mkhize 2008: 37). That means it keeps 
the existing moral tradition but also continuously adds and reviews this tradition through 
various forms of internal processes delineating new moral parameters of what in this 
community is permissible and acceptable (Mokolatsie 1997: 58). I use the term tradition in 
relation to the community as an institution in the sense MacIntyre (1981: 222) defines it, as it 
relates to institutions, as bearers of tradition this entails continuous argument as to what such 
an institution ought to be. Similarly, I borrow the term palaver from Bujo (2001: 45 -55). This 
normative significance of social roles embodied in the community’s social intuitions, is a 
feature of the community life very much at the heart of ethics as a joint enterprise. It is in the 
social institutions and social roles within the community that much of the day-to-day rules of 
conduct for behaviour reside.  
One of the important functions of the community in African culture as a social institution was 
to be the primary context within which moral goodness i.e., the practice of virtue was first 
learned, defined and then lived and assessed. As such community in an African traditional 
setting resembled the form of traditional morality expressed in Aristotelian ethics where there 
could be “no way of judging the goodness or otherwise of the person without reference to the 
community in which the person belongs”. What this means is that in this context then, “that 
which is good must be understood, and the moral decision that follows must be calculated 
according to the describable nature of each community” (Richardson 1994: 93).   What we get 
here is two important points about the community and its significance and relevance to African 
ethics and ethics in general. First that the ethical approach that appears and is informed by 
the communal life as a priority cannot be abstract and individualistic. Within this framework 
the modern idea where ethics is essentially a matter of individual choice and legislation by 
abstract, solitary moral agent (Mkhize 2008: 36) is incompatible with African ethics. Second 
that the community takes on a morally normative dimension and function, whereby it is 
invested with the responsibility for moral guidance. This it does by specifying, interpreting and 
defining what is acceptable behaviour and what is not. It is an arena where norms come into 
being through a reciprocal relationship between community members (Bujo 2001:2).  
The normative function of the community is also found in its role in character formation and 
development of its members, especially in the early formative years and later in life through 
participation in the community informed continually by a living tradition. The key role in this 
regard is the community’s role as a school for character. This means the community is where 
training in character occurs and a place where, as a moral agent one learns and practices the 
virtues of botho. We must recall that  
“African communities believe that their future depends on the ethical conduct 
of their members [as such] education in the ethical conduct that promotes 
the good of the community plays a decisive role” (Bujo 2001: 24).  
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So moral development and formation was a key part of the ethical function of the community. 
By way of analogy, an example of a football team captures this function of better, and its role 
in the individual’s pursuit of moral excellence in the practice of virtues. Like in a football team 
where each player has unique talents and skills, but each player knows that they are part of 
the team, where team success is the goal and there is no contradiction between that and the 
individual player’s good. So, it is with ethics and relationship of the moral agent and the 
community. It is in this sense that the community is not only important for shaping and forming 
character but also as a school for character, i.e., the practical setting where like a player in a 
football team, the individual receives guidance and advice. At the same time, it perfects the 
art of moral goodness through practices of habits of moral goodness, in which success or 
progress they make regard determines how well one is doing towards moral goodness i.e., 
possession of botho.  In terms of moral conduct, in Sesotho culture the community can 
therefore be regarded as the necessary enabling environment for moral excellence, a 
communal social space to practice good manners and learn good character forming habits of 
botho. Members of the community in the reciprocal process of ethical reflection on their moral 
tradition engage in moral discernment and enrichment of one another in the light of their 
tradition and challenges of current experience. In other words, in terms of the normative 
function of the community, ethical conduct is not based only on the individual but is realised 
primarily by the relational network in the community (Bujo 2001:6, MacIntyre 1981:31).  
As we have just noted one of the key functions of the community as a social institution 
therefore is teaching virtues and support individuals to cultivate qualities of character. And one 
of the key instruments in this regard is the family, itself also a social institution, whose role and 
function within the community is as the primary school for character (Dandala 2009: 262). The 
family here must be understood by its most profound and inclusive sense extending beyond 
extended family and those related by blood (Shutte 2008: 28). As it will have been seen the 
family is therefore, one of the most significant social institutions that played a huge role in the 
community, towards inculcating moral virtues for today’s context. The role and status of the 
family therefore whether in its narrow sense as it is understood today or the more inclusive 
understanding it was understood as in traditional African village community, it played an 
important part within the community in furthering the institutional function of the community as 
a school for character. Today the institution of the family as a building block for community is 
one of the few remaining traditional support structures available to the community and 
individuals to help contemporary moral agents to be ethical.  
 




The chapter analysed the ethical significance of social institutions and social roles and how 
these influences the personal conduct contextualising the analysis within the Basotho culture. 
It argued that the traditional institutions found in Sesotho culture and associated social roles 
form an important social context and environment that supported the practice of botho and 
sustained it as a popular ethos characteristic of the traditional moral culture of Basotho. These 
provided a traditional Mosotho with the necessary ethical resources and infrastructure 
essential for moral agents to be ethical and to respond well to training in character through 
traditional forms of education, formal and non-formal. The chapter thus argues that that social 
institutions and social roles are important in ethical reflection including that of current botho 
discourse on botho. This is because understanding the social influence of these on personal 
ethics allows ethical reflection to understand how social institutions and roles in society are 
essential instruments by which social norms and moral traditions in a culture are preserved 
and made intelligible. This is true of ethics of botho. We saw that as such we gain a better 
insight into the moral traditions of a culture by understanding the normative influence of these 
institutions and roles in a culture.  
The chapter first analyses social institutions and social role to underscore their significance in 
regulating behaviour and personal conduct. The analysis in the chapter showed that 
institutions are created for a reason, and that these reasons are linked to the ultimate goods 
and ends of a society. These  envisioned and shared ends is what underpins the social norms 
that in turn places certain expectations and obligations of what is permissible and what is not 
on individual members of a society. This regulation of behaviour of moral agents in this way 
is part of the pursuit of fundamental goods of the wellbeing of the society or the common good. 
This is in part what ethics in that society will reflect, and hence why analysis of institutions and 
roles is relevant for current botho discourse and its theorisation about botho. The chapter 
showed that social institutions are relevant to ethics because they form part of the moral 
agents’ self-understanding and identity and the latter plays an important role in determining 
conduct. The chapter therefore argued that, if a better understanding botho is to be achieved, 
the current botho discourse must take into consideration the larger social conditions that made 
ethics of botho possible, specifically the role and function played by traditional social 
institutions. This is because it is in part by unpacking how these influenced personal ethics 
and supported ethical imperatives of botho, that we can learn further the social conditions 
required to make botho a living ethic. This means that it is important to recognise that ethics 
of botho, as the habitual practice of certain values and virtues, is promoted by certain types of 
social institutions and endangered by others. As an ethic, the chapter argued that botho thus 
requires a specific type of social order to grow. Thus, the chapter argued that it is therefore 
hard to imagine an ethic like botho, becoming a predominant feature of way of life within the 
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cultures it was popular, without certain types of social institutions supporting and sustaining 
its existence.  
The chapter showed that because social institutions fulfil certain intended functions and 
purposes, they achieve these through individuals as role bearers. In other words, it is 
individuals in their role as occupiers of social roles that to carry out the intended aims and 
goals that institutions are created.  The analysis of traditional social roles thus showed that 
these have inbuilt widely agreed performance standards and obligations that apply to each 
role occupier.  It also showed that as moral agents the social roles we inhabit and adhere to 
are not morally neutral. Many come with well-defined role-specific obligations, requirements 
and constraints which influence and determine the role occupier’s actions and behaviour 
normatively.  What this chapter also showed is that the relationship between social institutions 
and social roles is one of mutual presupposition, and that as such talking about one implies 
the other. The chapter thus argued that it is this interdependency of social institutions and 
social role in traditional societies or pre-modern culture of Basotho that in part played a key 
role in their moral life. This is because together these have a double binding effect on us 
agents in terms of adherence to basic social norms. This in turn enhanced the self-policing 
role moral agents have about living lives consistent with ethical imperatives of botho. But also, 
together these provide individuals with a vital continuing back-up of an ethically strong, 
supportive context to become moral. What this tells us is that the context i.e., moral universe 
that moral agents inhabit matter, social institutions and social roles feature prominently in this 
universe. The chapter therefore argued that morally weak contexts undermine and weaken 
the moral character of agents even of good ones. Similarly, morally strong contexts i.e., social 
context can do the opposite.  
This complex web of relationship between institutions and roles the chapter has shown that it 
is relevant to ethical reflection including the current botho discourse. In the case of the latter, 
it showed that the implications or the failure to attend to this influence of social institutions that 
underpins and sustains the practice of virtues of botho as well as the character and actions of 
individuals who make it happen or role bearers, means such a reflection will be an 
impoverished one, always missing something essential to the understanding of the social 
requirements of botho.  The reason for this, is that social institutions do not work on their own 
but by our consent or acceptance as moral agents. So ethical reflection cannot, therefore, be 
done without reference to social roles because these bestow the society and individuals with 
some rights and responsibilities, and dues owed, all which must be understood from an ethical 
point of view.   
The chapter examined selected social institutions and social roles of the culture of Basotho 
starting with the institution of motse (village), its structure and organisation. It highlighted how 
traditional villages of Basotho were places where everything was done deliberately and in 
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good fellowship and revealed that this way of life is not an automatic thing, or come naturally, 
but that it is actively promoted, hence the importance of the village in this regard. The 
implications of this for the moral agent the chapter thus argued that this way of life is to be 
deliberately chosen, which brings it in the sphere of ethics. This is seen in how in a typical 
Basotho village, members regulated their conduct and relations with others in the light of the 
norms and standard that exist in the village. This is because within traditional villages of 
Basotho existed certain regularity in social behaviour to which all consent through custom and 
tradition and this specified acceptable conduct and behaviour. The chapter showed that 
adherence to these conducting influencing norms was often joint effort that is self-policed and 
also policed by other.  The Basotho village thus displayed a certain consensus of mainly self-
policing norms i.e., do’s and don’ts and more specifically the “ought to’s” about moral conduct. 
This gave the village, as a stable practical social system, a certain moral identity as an 
organisation with recognisable norms and social rules that guide conduct of its members.  
Further, we saw that this ensured social and moral equilibrium or balance which is important 
in African culture, but it also enhanced and protected the values and ideals of the village that 
made botho living a reality.  Because of this status they enjoyed, traditional Basotho villages 
enjoyed moral authority that entrenched certain behaviour and moral values, now integrated 
into the moral culture of the Basotho. This includes scrupulous reverence to rules and norms 
reflecting virtues of botho such politeness and respect for others found in litumeliso, (greeting 
of others) and hospitality and generosity towards including to visitors, i.e., outsiders or 
strangers, as codified in the doctrine of “O se re ho moroa, moroa toe”.  
The chapter highlighted how this deep sense of respect and solidarity codified in norms and 
customs about generosity and sharing, is linked to an intense sense of belonging, mutual care 
and responsibility towards others embedded in Sesotho culture. Here the chapter showed that 
traditionally every Mosotho felt obligated and responsible for their neighbour” and their 
wellbeing. This high regard for responsibility and accountability for one another in their villages 
meant that one was liable to be punished for any crime of his neighbour, and the village was 
collectively responsible for each one of its inhabitants. The chapter highlighted that it was this 
communal accountability and mutual responsibility found in Basotho villages and shared 
accountability for the welfare and conduct of others that ensured a high degree of generosity 
and hospitality as the hallmarks of their village living. This, in turn, played a key role in 
sustaining the practices and habitual acts botho by encouraging individuals to aspire towards 
inculcation and acquisition of virtues and dispositions of botho related to these values. Among 
these habitual acts the village used to assess one’s satisfactory progress in inculcating the 
values botho i.e., makhabane including virtues such as tlhompho, (deep respect and 
politeness) includes simple gestures such as litumeliso, greeting of others when you meet 
them.  So, the chapter showed that the practice of litumeliso as found in Basotho villages 
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expressed the deep respect Basotho valued of treating the other as a person, and this is at 
the heart of what botho means. For this reason, in Sesotho culture litumeliso as an expression 
of virtues of politeness and respect, is among the key indicators of measuring performance 
relating to botho. It was thus one of the common standards used in evaluating how welcoming 
a village is, how good its people are and how well brought its children are.  
The chapter also showed that as an institution the village is more than just its sociology but 
also an embodiment of a moral tradition which embraces certain norms and values peculiar 
and important to that village. As such a village is a custodian of a moral tradition, i.e., set of 
moral and ethical regularities, and behavioural norms that have emerged organically over 
time, which in turn inform and influence the behaviour of its members. When viewed this way, 
the village in Sesotho culture thus has a specific characteristic activity, which is the creation 
of batho bao e le batho, (creation of individual who are persons) and in doing so make it 
possible for the moral agent to live up to the imperatives and ideals of botho. 
Besides the village, the chapter analysed lelapa and leloko (the family) as another important 
social institution of Basotho. Here attention was drawn to the difficulties of translation the 
Sesotho concept of family as expressed in a network of relationships found in lelapa and 
leloko. Those relationships the chapter showed can be summed in the Sesotho expression 
“ho amana” which means relatedness, and that this encompassed a wide range of relations 
transcending normal family and blood relations to include those relationships one gains by 
liboko (tribal emblems/totems) or the main descent groupings of the Basotho or even place of 
origin. We saw that this intense sense towards being related and belonging found expression 
through a broad interpretation of “ho amana”  ranging from close inner circle as found in the 
family, extending ever outwards to the extended family, the clan, to one’s village. The chapter 
showed that the bond of belonging and social ties involved in lelapa and leloko stretched 
beyond the normal confines of family belonging as understood in the narrow sense of the term 
in the West. It instead encompasses many more sets of networks of belonging and 
relationships than ordinarily implied in families in the West. It also become clear that each of 
these relationships come with their own obligations and responsibility owed to others. These 
in turn heavily shaped and determined conduct and how individuals behaved towards one 
another but also how they live their lives. In other words, these relationships changed the way 
individuals as moral agents conducted themselves not just occasionally but as matter of how 
to conduct oneself as a way of life. This is because this deep sense of family solidarity and 
belonging required of family members to value and prioritise the bond of belonging, i.e., 
relatedness no matter how distant, as no less deserving of the moral agent’s time and 
nurturing as those relations with immediate family members. One of the implications to the 
individual is that it was therefore expected that the individual is to nurture these familial 
relationships, starting with knowing all of one’s relatives by name, both seniors and juniors 
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and wherever possible visit them. This practice can still be seen today in the common practice 
of going home annually for many Basotho outside Lesotho. Central to these visits is the 
expectation to visit all relatives. Failure to do this is often a source of many family frictions, 
some even leading to serious fall outs require serious interventions like a family meeting. 
The chapter showed that in Sesotho culture the family i.e., both the primary and extended 
families is always heavily loaded with customs and tradition, both of which have a binding 
effect that place normative obligations on individuals as moral agents.  This is particularly the 
case with many social roles found in the family, that place certain obligations on those who 
occupy those roles, not in the short term but for the rest of one’s life as the occupant of a 
particular social role within the family. This leads to one of the most ethically significant social 
institutions of Basotho, namely lenyalo (marriage).   
That chapter also analysed marriage (lenyalo) showing that among the institutions of Basotho 
none has so much impact on behaviour and personal ethics than this and through the complex 
network of obligatory relationships and social roles it introduces and confers on individuals as 
moral agents. We saw how with marriage a whole new set of familial obligations and duties is 
set in motion for a variety newly assumed social roles by a wide range of people, whom until 
then did not occupy many of these roles. We saw that with the bond of relationship of marriage 
in place, one becomes an in law to new families with a whole range of obligations, duties and 
social behaviour develop on account of this role. Similarly, with roles of daughters in laws or 
son in laws, and many other social roles that come with marriage, we see permanent and 
lasting expected behaviour that come into being formalised as expected i.e. normative way of 
conduct for those involved. This becomes from then onwards part of a way of live for those 
concerned and what they ought to do. Here we saw that no social institutions in Sesotho 
culture express better the value Basotho place on belonging and relatedness and bonds of 
friendship than in the social institution of lenyalo (marriage). This is because in it is the 
realisation of the extension of families ties and bond of belonging and friendship beyond blood 
relatives. In this sense lenyalo is no different from the family, because it is the inner most unit 
of the family. But it is nevertheless a distinct institution from the family because it comes with 
its own new parameters of obligations due to the addition of new members to the family i.e., 
the in-laws. This causes the review of existing family norms and obligations, duties, and rights 
that individuals have. So, as well as having its own norms and obligations internal to marriage 
as an agreement between two families, as an institution marriage therefore sets in motion a 
whole new set of relationships among family members and in laws. What the chapter showed 
is that all these relationships stipulated and conferred new social roles on individuals, and 
these come with their own obligations and responsibilities. They informed and shaped conduct 
as part individual’s personal ethics, hence their relevance to ethics and current discourse on 
botho ethics.  
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The chapter showed that marriage thus is a unique expansion of ho amana i.e.,  relatedness 
and belonging in Sesotho culture that founded fellowship and solidarity transcending blood 
relations, and that this come with certain duties and obligations that have influence on conduct 
and personal ethics, in terms what was now expected of one due to these new relationships. 
We saw that with marriage those in a bond of relationship on account marriage thus owed 
each other accountability about the status of that marriage. As such anyone involved could be 
held accountable to hold others to account if it is felt they are not living up their obligations by 
virtue of being related. This expanded network of relatedness thus enjoined individuals in a 
materially significant way where now they owe one another dues of family belonging and 
friendliness by marriage. The chapter showed that among Basotho this usually manifests itself 
in the exceptional moral weight freighted on the labyrinth of relationships typically around 
these institutions. Much of this moral weight is because of the newly created relationship of 
ho amana (relatedness) as well as new roles that individuals will now have to occupy all which 
come into existence when a marriage agreement is entered into. 
That chapter also showed that the complex set of relationships of ho amana in Sesotho culture 
can thus be understood as the explication of the associated and sometimes implicit social 
roles found in institutions such as marriage or the family and village. This is because these 
relationships denote a certain way those who bear these roles “ought” to conduct themselves 
vis-à-vis those they are related to. Here the chapter highlighted the variety of social roles found 
in Sesotho culture showing how often these are based of different social groupings and 
correlates with different institutions where they are often called upon. Among some of the 
common roles discussed includes motho e moholo (adult person), mohaisani (neighbour), Bo 
‘M’e or basali (mothers and adult women) and Bo-Ntate or banna (fathers and adult men), 
bana (children), in-laws or bakhotsi  and ngoan’e moholo, firstborn and “ngoana’ofela” ,last 
born.  
The chapter showed that as individuals our relationship with social institutions is never just 
qua individuals, but that such engagement is always as bearers of specific roles as given of 
life. It also showed that common to these roles is the expectations and obligations that they 
imply which in turn influence personal conduct and is taken into consideration in the 
assessment of one’s moral goodness and here we can include the possession of botho too.  
Here the chapter showed that in Sesotho culture many of their social roles imposed certain 
responsibilities and duties and that it is in the fulfilment of the duties of these roles that 
behaviour of moral agent is moderated and regulated. In this way social roles are interlinked 
with ethics because they influence conduct in certain ways which were meant to be consistent 
with values of botho.  It is for this reason that the argument of this chapter is that the influence 
of social roles on agents must be a consideration in the reflection on botho ethics and how the 
concept is analysed and understood. 
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 The chapter argued that the fulfilment of the duties of social roles in Basotho society in part 
created the necessary social conditions that regulated individual’s behaviour. This is also in 
part, responsible for the emergence and proliferation of many of the social practices and 
features that characterised Basotho culture such that it was fundamentally conducive and 
ideal for the practice of botho ethics as a way of life. This includes promotion of corresponding 
behaviours such as a deep sense of solidarity, concern with other’s wellbeing associated with 
community life, generosity, kindness, politeness accountability for one another and all the core 
elements that enable community living.  
The analysis made in the chapter also showed that these institutions and roles such as these 
found in Sesotho culture, are themselves part of a larger complexes of resources in a society 
that fulfil some larger end or set of ends of the society. In African culture the pursuit of this 
larger end and set of ends of a society manifests itself in what has come to be regarded as 
the characteristic way of life found in their culture. The chapter contended that it is these 
characteristics ways of living including of thinking about ethics that in Sesotho culture 
constitutes the social and cultural milieu and characteristics features of Basotho way of life, 
that provided traditional Mosotho a with supportive and enabling environment conducive to 
botho ethics.  The chapter gave an account of this analysing their manifestation within the 
context of Sesotho culture, even though these are also found in other African cultures as well. 
It highlighted key features of a selected number of these in the Basotho way of life showing 
how they were regarded as important because among other things they under pinned ethics 
and understanding of personal conduct in Sesotho culture. Among these key features the 
chapter discussed the religious dimension of ethics in Sesotho culture as one such important 
feature. It showed how the consciousness of the sacred, i.e., the strong religious belief, which 
is common in African culture, played a key role in Sesotho culture as part of their moral culture. 
The chapter showed that in Sesotho culture like many pre-modern cultures, the notion of a 
secular morality or a conception of ethics purely in secular terms does not exist and that such 
a concept would be unintelligible. In this sense, traditional moral culture of Basotho bears 
close resemblance to many pre-modern cultures where this separation of ethics and religion 
was non-existent.  
Another feature that the chapter looked at is the priority of the common good and the 
community. Here the analysis showed that in the culture of Basotho the idea of the common 
good is the edifice around which social and moral wheel of Basotho culture revolved. Thus, 
we saw that this is the underlying consideration that informed the way Basotho lived and in 
turn the rationale behind the high regard of many of the practices they practiced. Of particular 
significance here are practices in their culture that encouraged sharing, solidarity and a sense 
of responsibility and accountability for others. The chapter thus argued that it is because of 
the concern with the common good that we find that every Mosotho felt obligated and 
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responsible morally and socially for their neighbour” and why one would be punished for any 
crime of their neighbour, and the whole village was collectively responsible for each one of its 
inhabitants. It is this intense sense of oneness that also inform the understanding of a person 
in Sesotho culture, which is defined in terms of social identity.  
The chapter examine the understanding of person identity as another important characteristic 
way of life in Sesotho culture. It showed that like many pre-modern cultures, in Sesotho 
culture, moral agents identified themselves through membership including that of lelapa, 
leloko and the village.  In other words, personal identity of the moral agent in Sesotho culture 
the chapter showed that this was understood primarily in terms of a person’s social identity 
and membership of the family and the village i.e., community belonging. The chapter 
discussed how social identity understood in this way is part of the understanding that informed 
and influenced personal conduct and ethics and that this includes the application and practice 
of botho by the individual. The chapter thus argued that any attempt to reject social identity 
i.e., social belonging or community membership, as some modern people try, is not only an 
illusion that is at one’s own peril, but to do this is a serious existential crisis and confusion to 
the meaning of our lives and a crisis of identity and belonging. Here the chapter argue that 
this conception of the self-underpins botho and must inform the current botho discourse as 
moral qualification of motho, best captured in African moral thought in the idea of the morally 
ideal person. Thus the central argument of this chapter is that the conception of botho as a 
normative concept in Sesotho culture cannot be properly theorised, without reference to the 
social support structures in the community that supports and making it easier for individuals 
with the ontological assumptions and underlying basic assumptions with Sesotho culture that 
inform social and moral life. This the chapter argues is a challenge that needs serious 
consideration in current botho discourse. This leads to the general considerations and 
recommendation that this study is making in its conclusions which is the focus of the next and 













CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
6.1  Conclusion  
 
In this thesis I have foreground botho as an undervalued quality of character in the current 
botho discourse and challenged the dominance of Afro-communitarianism as one specific 
reading of botho over other equally justified, interpretations of this concept. I argued that botho 
is a polysemic moral concept that cannot be explicated in just one way. I also challenged the 
over reliance of this dominant interpretation on the use of proverb “motho ke motho ka batho” 
to explain the ideals enshrined in botho. I have questioned Afro-communitarianism 
interpretation of botho where this concept and this proverb are often (sloppily) treated as 
synonyms and disposed the association of this proverb with botho, as flawed unsubstantiated 
exceptionalism not supported by evidence.  I have in turn pursuit a redefinition of botho based 
on its usage and meaning as found in Sesotho culture where it is used as moral term 
describing good and morally admirable person, more specifically their moral character. I 
showed the authenticity of this formulation as grounded in its consistency with the earlier pre-
1990s usage of this word in Southern Africa where it is used exclusively to describe admirable 
character of a person. This is also an account that validates the reinstatement of character in 
ethics, which has seen a growing resurgence in recent years which this study is advocating 
for in current botho discourse. The study has shown that the neglect of questions of moral 
character of persons in the analysis of botho in current botho discourse, echoes similar trend 
in modern ethics, where until recently character as a vital moral concept was relegated to the 
periphery of ethical reflection and discourse.  
In this study I have shown that when botho is understood in terms of descriptions of moral 
character, it means it is in part the sort of thing that motho (person) works towards and 
acquires as part of training in character through moral formation and growth. It will also be 
clear that as such this concept must be understood as a description of the moral quality of a 
person reflecting who the person is morally. When understood this way the concept thus 
expresses a moral statement, assessing the satisfactory progress a person is therefore 
making or not making in inculcating values and virtues regarded as morally admirable and in 
turn essential for a personhood i.e., for a person to be considered motho (person). It is in this 
sense that in Sesotho culture this moral term is always used to describe a process of 
maturation by motho towards personhood (botho)  and inculcation of makhabane or virtues of 
botho. 
Since botho as moral term is fundamentally evoked in the context of moral assessment 
describing an acceptable progress made by a person in accumulating good moral qualities, it 
is important to recognise that these qualities are an essential part of what is regarded as a 
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person’s character, specifically the roundedness of character i.e., overall excellence in 
inculcating ‘makhabane a botho’ (virtues of botho). This is why in Sesotho culture botho is 
always connected to admirable moral character. It is also important to realise that the proper 
foundation of the communitarian orientation of botho, is grounded in character. This is 
because morally admirable character entails inculcation, as part of one’s character, good 
moral qualities which in turn shape and influence behaviour. A closer look at many of the 
qualities shows that they are communal in nature and not individualistic. In this sense I argue 
that the character centric account of botho advocated her is the most attractive account of 
botho as an ethic of virtue because it articulates both the personal dimension of botho i.e., in 
terms of inculcation of admirable moral qualities of character at a personal level, which speak 
to the personal dimension of botho, and communal dimensions of botho i.e., in terms of the 
communal orientation of these qualities to be inculcated and displayed in relation to conduct 
towards others. The study argues that this reimagined interpretation of botho advocated is 
best understood through a more systematic analysis of the moral term ‘bophoofolo’ and the 
moral statement ‘ha se motho’ along with other key moral terms in Sesotho culture. These two 
express a negative description of botho, which is another important way of elucidating the 
meaning of the concept. Among the other key moral terms relevant in the analysis and better 
understanding of botho, the study specifically highlights the key moral term setho which in 
Sesotho culture is essential for grasping the meaning of botho. The study has thus shown that 
this approach to the analysis of botho gives a new insight namely that a proper way to 
approach the analysis of botho is in terms of an understanding of the virtues it encourages 
and vices it discourages.  
While the immediate focus of the study is the critique and appraisal of current botho discourse, 
it is mindful of the broader context expressing concerns with inadequacies of modern Western 
ethics, concerns which this study also shares. This is the focus of chapter one and two of the 
study. But as it will have become clear the study is also a critical appraisal of the approach of 
current botho discourse in the light of the need for reinstalment of character as represented in 
the reimagined character centric account of botho the study is advocating for. This account is 
presented in this study thus as an approach worthy of serious consideration by current botho 
discourse. The study contends that this approach is a promising alternative offering great 
potential to broadening existing discourse, because it opens up new insights on ethical 
reflection of botho from a specific cultural perspective of one of the cultures from which this 
concept applied and derives.   Chapter one of the study is therefore the elaboration of this 
argument and hypothesis of the study. It serves as the foregrounding of the substantive 
argument for the redefinition of botho that this study proposes. It also gives the broad outlines 
of the central argument behind this study which includes the critique of current botho 
discourse, debunking the unsubstantiated claims emanating from the exceptionalism 
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conferred on motho ke motho ka batho (MKKB)and its association with botho. It highlights the 
problem in the tendency of the current discourse to treat botho and this proverb as if one 
presupposes the other or the two are synonymous. It also challenges the tendency to describe 
this proverb as the summation of African communalism and therefore quintessential 
expression of traditional values encapsulated by botho.  
The chapter presents the study as counter argument to prevailing views in current botho 
discourse using the experience of Basotho culture and the authors knowledge of Sesotho 
culture including of the use of Sesotho narratives which are important vehicles for moral 
education into virtue. It calls for a proper and more authentic use and analysis of this proverb 
as part of the unity African narratives arguing for adherence to rules of interpretation internal 
and applicable to narratives. It further contends that a closer analysis of this proverb will thus 
show that the ethical imperatives it implies are fundamentally concerned with mutual aid, 
mutual care, communal solidarity and concern with the wellbeing of the other. This theme is 
consistent with many similar proverbs and narratives in Sesotho culture, and often enacted in 
many of their social practices. The chapter thus challenges the predominant reading of this 
proverb primarily as a statement about personhood and or humanity. This we have suggested 
is an academic invention, inspired possible by close association of this proverb with the slogan 
‘I am because we are”. When this slogan is read against the Cartesian dictum “I think, 
therefore I am”, which is intentionally a response to, the difference is evident with motho ke 
motho ka batho ,whose primary focus is mutual aid in communal living. 
The chapter thus reframes afresh the key question in the current discourse from focus on 
characterisations of what is meant by botho, to a consideration of questions of character. It 
shifts attention to the question: if botho is a moral description of motho, as the central claim of 
this thesis implies, what exactly in a motho is botho referring to? The chapter gives a preview 
of the answer which is discussed in detailed in chapter five by suggesting that the answer to 
this question is to be found in the direction of qualities of moral character, specifically 
descriptions of motho and about admirable character of person. The chapter lays the 
foundation for the substantive argument about the primacy of character found in chapter four 
as reflected in the statement  ‘ke motho ea nang le botho’, meaning a person who possess 
qualities required by botho. 
In the context of current botho discourse, this emphasis and formulation of botho is an 
important contribution that broadens the discourse. This is because it introduces an important 
dimension and articulation of botho that focus on persons and specifically on personal goal of 
wholeness of character.  Compared to current discourse, which emphasis an impersonal goal 
of relationships, this study is therefore not only an interesting approach to the subject, but also 
a different formulation of botho. It is an approach that cast botho in new light as a polysemic 
moral ideal and pinnacle of virtues, whose expression as found in the moral thought and 
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practice of Sesotho speaking culture should be understood primarily in terms of training in 
character. The reimagined interpretation of botho it advances, which focuses on the character 
of motho, expresses an important moral ideal in Sesotho culture and that is the notion of 
makhabane, i.e., cultivation of good qualities of character. This, in Sesotho culture is central 
to an understanding of ethics including botho and is presented here as a better alternative 
account of botho, because it makes this description of botho a more personal attribute 
compared to the current descriptions that place emphasis on communal relations. The 
attractiveness and uniqueness of this formulation is thus in its ability to better capture and 
express the personal dimension of botho which is found in its emphasis on training in character 
it implies. This is personal dimension of botho is not emphasised much in the current discourse 
and yet the nature of botho is such that it is a as much a personal ethic as it is a communal 
ethic. These two basic dimensions presupposes each other and the over emphasis of one 
over the other is an injustice to the uniqueness of botho and diminishes its value. 
In chapter two the study analyses contemporary moral environment, as the dominant moral 
culture today influencing ethical approaches including contemporary moral attitude in Africa. 
The chapter gives a critical overview and critique of the moral culture of modern societies and 
the predominant influences informing contemporary moral attitudes. It is an overview of 
concerns with modern ethical approaches and the inadequacies associated with modern 
Western ethics including Christian ethics. It analyses the nature and character of modern 
Western ethics showing that both in its secular and religious forms i.e., Western Christian 
ethics and Western ethics, modern ethics still bears the hallmarks of European culture and 
first world culture from where it originates. The chapter thus showed that modern ethics has 
not changed its individualistic and globalising orientation, even as it becomes the predominant 
ethos in other cultures including in many African cultures today. In many post traditional 
societies, such as that of Sesotho speaking culture now the feature of many communities in 
Southern Africa, this has created moral challenges and a crisis of values many are now 
worried about. This is mainly because of its values of First World culture it embodies most 
profoundly in its liberal ethics and individualism, where choice is given moral priority. We saw 
that this is increasingly experienced by many of these post-traditional communities as a 
catalyst to the sense of moral vacuum and perceived decay in the moral fibre of their cultures. 
Among most African cultures, contemporary moral culture is so unsatisfactory that it is 
characterized by some a worrying moral predicament, that has left individuals and 
communities alike morally uncertain, confused, and unsure of what values to hold. Among 
those cultures of Southern African traditionally associated with botho ethics, the emergence 
of the autonomous moral sovereign individual who is accountable to no one except by choice, 
that has come with modern ethics , has created a dilution of common moral frame of reference 
and chaos of moral values as each person can now pursue their own idea of what it is good.  
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In societies like that of the Basotho the influence and introduction of western values and beliefs 
through Christianity and modernity, has torn apart traditional morality which engendered a 
sense of shared values and objective moral authority. This has made living out many of the 
traditional values associated with botho ethics much more difficult if not impossible. The 
growing embracing of inherent individualism of Western ethics, which over-emphasizes what 
differentiates people more than what they have in common has thus left some who know 
African culture well deeply concern at the direction contemporary ethics is taking and the effect 
of this on communities and African society. Of particular concern is the emphasis on 
separateness of people through the promotion of individual autonomy and choice that modern 
ethics endorses. This has placed at the foreground of ethical reflection what differentiates us 
as moral agents in way that is detrimental to having  a shared set of values presupposed by 
botho ethics. This is one of the reasons behind the growing concerns among some African 
scholars about the moral crisis African societies are facing as result of such influences on 
personal ethics and conduct in Africa today. Among some of these concerns is the continued 
lack of emphasis on questions of the cultivation of good qualities of character, as essential for 
the creation of good people and members of community, in favour of individual autonomy and 
choice.  
Against this, the chapter has shown that there is now a strong argument for a change in 
thinking in the understanding of ethics. That change requires ethical reflection that transcends 
the current focus on rules and principles of right and wrong, and actions of individuals of 
modern ethical approaches. Instead ethics and here scholars of botho can play a leading role, 
should focus on individuals as moral agents and specifically on the quality of their character 
and how society and communities can support individual in being ethical. For those advocating 
this approach and change, it means attention of ethics should be on the formation of personal 
character and moral identity of individuals as moral agents. This is not only because that is 
what ethics is all about, i.e., who we are and what we ought to be, but also because as moral 
agents we approach moral decisions i.e., answer questions of right and wrong in terms of the 
persons we are and our social identity as moral agents and hence  the argument that this 
should be the preoccupation of ethics.   
The central contention of this study implied in this chapter is therefore that it is time that ethical 
reflection especially in Africa, transcends the confines of moral tradition of the Western ethical 
approaches. The reason is because there is every indication that the moral tradition of that 
culture like all moral cultures is not perfect and the signs are in some important respect it is 
ethically impoverished. This has led to growing moral disquiet about the inadequacies of 
modern ethics and concerns with the weaknesses of its approach to moral. This is seen not 
only in Africa but elsewhere as well. In Africa thus we see the consequences of this in the new 
movement revisiting element of traditional morality. It is within this context the current botho 
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discourse must interpreted. From the perspective of African ethics, the renewed interest in 
traditional ethic of ethics of botho in recent years is the vanguard of this movement and focus 
of this shift in southern African where in recent years there is renewed interest in revisiting the 
traditional moral ideal of botho.  
In chapter three this study underscores the relevance and currency of botho highlighting the 
vast material being produce on this topic as evidence. The chapter thus suggested this show 
that it can now be said with a confidence that it is not yet the end for botho project or industry 
but indeed “it’s just the beginning”. The chapter analyses the current understanding and 
articulation of botho in the current discourse and the ethos it stands. It gives a critical but not 
exhaustive appraisal of current botho discourse, giving an account of the current debates 
found around this botho. It showed that while these debates underline the enthusiasm around 
botho they are also a reflection that there is still lack of consensus around the concept. There 
are those who are enthusiastic about botho and there are those that either are sceptical or not 
in agreement with the predominant view of botho as represented by its main protagonists 
leading the current botho discourse. The analysis of these debates shows that there are those 
scholars who interpreted botho primarily of in terms of a phenomenon and those that see it as 
moral quality of person. We saw that the former, especially its Afro-communitarian formulation 
is currently the dominant view and as such it is the focus of the critique of this chapter but also 
of this study.  
As an interpretation of botho Afro-communitarianism we saw that it can be described as an 
account of botho grounded on an understanding of botho in terms of its communal dimension 
with emphasis on harmonious relationships. This formulation we saw that it is premised on the 
unsubstantiated and mistaken connection of botho to the proverb motho ke motho ka batho 
ba bang, and the interpretation of this proverb thereof. Thus according to this account this 
proverb now exclusively translated as “a person is person through other person” is similarly 
interpreted as enjoining the individual to be a better person or find their true self through 
participation in these relationships with others. The chapter argued that current botho 
discourse including  Afro-communitarianism has thus not offered any clearer definition of the 
meaning of  “botho” itself as a concept and moral term. Instead the discourse is satisfied to 
continue to invoke this concept from the safety of its three-pronged safety net: first that by 
claiming that botho and ubuntu mean the same thing, second that this concept is difficult to 
translate into English, and finally that it features in the proverb motho ke motho ka botho. 
The chapter showed the danger of reducing the meaning of botho as a moral ideal to an 
interpretation and analysis of one single proverb. The problem with this approach the chapter 
pointed out, is that even if the connection was justifiable, which it is not, this would still be just 
one way of elucidating values of botho, not the only one. This is because the explanation and 
meaning of such a complex polysemic ideal as botho cannot be reduced to one explanation 
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in the way this proverb is being used to. The chapter demonstrated that this amounts to 
equating botho to this proverb, which is incorrect. But it is also to misunderstand the nature of 
botho as polysemic moral ideal. The chapter showed that such ideals are best described in 
multiplicity of ways and approaches, hence their refusal to be confined to reductionist 
definitions. The chapter further pointed that the unsubstantiated exceptionalism of this proverb 
in the current discourse is also a problem because it suggests poor knowledge of African 
narratives and their use thereof in unity,  which offers a rich resource for moral education that 
is ideal for explicating botho. In addition, such exceptionalism gives this proverb a false 
independence from how narratives are used and interpreted. This leaves this proverb open to 
uncontextual usage where it can easily be analysed in abstract by being theorised apart from 
its natural context found in its unity with other proverbs and narratives. The problem with this, 
the argued is that this further entrenches the tendency to use this proverb together with botho 
resulting among other things in a situation where this proverb now somehow ends up being 
understood as having something to do with personhood. We have seen that in Sesotho culture 
from which this proverb originates, the articulation of personhood, expressed in this proverb 
is in fact articulated in the moral statement ‘ha se motho ea nang le botho’ meaning a person 
who has no botho. It is also the preserve of the moral term ‘bophoofolo’ which we explained 
describe a behaviour befitting a beast not a person. We argued that it is in these that the 
explanation of botho in terms of personhood is properly found in its clearest way than in motho 
ke motho ka batho.  
The chapter is also a challenge on current botho discourse and that is the claim commonly 
made that there are other similar terms and ideas like botho in other African cultures in sub-
Saharan Africa that express the same meaning as botho. While there is the case that there 
are many commonalities in African culture, it is important nevertheless to be cautious not to 
draw parallels that are too close on these different terms in the different cultures. This is 
because as we showed in the case of botho in Sesotho culture that although the concept 
probably expresses the same general idea with ubuntu in Zulu culture, the story of both 
cultures i.e., historical and local context and experience out of which they emerged and thrived 
are different, and that as such it is not unlikely that the nuance of meaning and local application 
and emphasis in meaning is going to differ as well.  The chapter argued that in their original 
cultural milieu or social settings of their respective cultures, these terms reflect a nuance in 
meaning in response to the unique context that provoke their usage and invocation. All this is 
context dependent as such it’s unlikely the two words will have the same meaning in terms of 
practical application in a specific context. Thus this study has argued that such claims of 
equivalency should be made with care and caution should be exercised in treating these terms 
as having the same meaning. It is for this reason, that in this study the preference is made for 
 266 
Sesotho moral term botho which denotes good behaviour specifically morally admirable 
character.  
Chapter four of the study advocates for a redefinition of botho, to address both inadequacy of 
contemporary moral culture and modern Western ethics and the resultant moral disquiet 
behind calls for a revisiting of elements of traditional African morality as a solution. The chapter 
present this interpretation of botho primarily described in terms of the traditional understanding 
of the term as moral quality of a person as can be found in the moral thought and practice of 
Basotho where the primacy of character features prominently in their moral culture. The 
chapter uses the moral experience of Basotho culture as a case study and shows that this 
reimagined account of botho is consistent with how this concept was used traditionally in 
Southern Africa, prior to its current and more recent usage. Thus, we see in the analysis of 
this chapter how the preoccupation with good character permeates all aspect of the social and 
moral life of traditional Basotho. The chapter thus showed that one of the most explicit ways 
in which Basotho emphasised the importance of character to moral life is found in many of 
their ceremonies and social practices marking key life events and stages of a person. To 
understand the significance of the character in the moral culture of Basotho chapter gave an 
account of the social practices of Basotho the reflect priority of character in moral education. 
These social practices are better summarised here if recounted in a linear fashion of a journey 
to personhood from childhood to adulthood.   
One of the insights into Basotho culture that we get in this study, which cast light on botho and 
its connection to character, is how primacy of character is the focal point of moral formation 
from very early on in the life of a person. As a result, this features prominently in many of these 
rituals starting with kuruetso rituals during childhood to lebollo when a person enters 
adulthood. The central theme of these ceremonies and practices is to secure good with good 
character of their members. So, we see that in those in those rituals performed for new-born 
babies, that having a good moral character was celebrated and promoted as a central part of 
the ceremony or ritual. Here the chapter showed that the choice of lead person in many of 
these was based on their good character. The individual chosen to lead the baby in these 
activities the chapter showed that it had to be someone of great moral standing and adjudged 
to have all rounded moral character. The symbolism behind this was that the child would take 
after that person’s character as well and in turn become a good person in adulthood. According 
to customary belief here good character and in turn botho therefore understood as something 
that can be moulded onto to the character of the baby. So, what see here through these rituals 
is how essential they are regarded as part of moral formation and as shown for Basotho is 
focused primarily on development of good character.   
This showed the Basotho’s understanding of moral formation where we find that the goal is 
training in character i.e., creation of ‘batho bao e leng batho’, -individuals who are going to be 
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good members of the community in the future. The analysis showed that moral education and 
formation in Sesotho culture was done both through formal and non-formal education means. 
For the latter we find that the preferred vehicle of choice for carrying out teaching and training 
in character was through narratives in addition to community moral exemplars. Of importance 
here the chapter highlighted are a stock of stories in Sesotho narratives called litśomo 
(folktales). The chapter analysed a selected litśomo to illustrate the use of these in moral 
education with focus on training in character formation. What the chapter also showed is that 
in addition, stories are still the best means of moral education into virtues of botho. This is 
because story more than any other medium of education far outweighs any methods in 
illuminating the inexhaustibility of values and virtues of botho. Their utility as vehicles for 
clearly explaining botho as an ethical ideal, in different contexts that vary in terms of culture 
and background is highlighted in the chapter as one of the strengths of litśomo and story-
telling. The chapter thus argued that they  are thus ideal for explaining botho including beyond 
the borders of its cultural origins and context from which the concept derives. Here I argued 
that the relevance and significance of the narrative dimension to education in the virtues 
implied in botho and African ethics so far appear to have attracted little or no interest of botho 
scholars in spite of this being recognised as an obvious necessity and their suitability as ideal 
vehicles to explicate the ideals of botho because of its polysemic nature as a moral ideal. 
The chapter showed that the prominence of character in ethics in Sesotho speaking culture is 
further corroborated by the analysis of key moral terms in their moral language and the 
traditional moral scheme of Basotho. What this analysis showed is that in Sesotho culture 
virtues are understood in the light of the vices that a person must avoid as part of their 
character formation and development. Similarly, we find that when Basotho speak of botho 
there is always implied reference to what it is not i.e., failure to make good progress in 
acquiring botho. The chapter explains that in  Sesotho culture this is often expressed in two 
ways; in the moral term “bophoofolo” and the statement ‘ha se motho ea nang le botho; often 
found in its shorter version the discourse as “ha se motho” (is not a person). In these 
descriptions the reference is to the failure to inculcate qualities of botho or makhabane 
(virtues). Here I have argued that the understanding is that the possession of these qualities, 
typically reveals themselves in who we are as moral agents and that this is more specifically 
in found in our character.   
Another important insight we gained from this chapter about the understanding of botho in 
Sesotho culture is that botho is unintelligible without related key moral term of setho. This is 
because according to the traditional moral scheme of Basotho, botho is the fruits of setho in 
a motho. The analysis of the meaning of this concept showed that setho denotes the state of 
being human and that the is understood essentially in terms of human nature, but also that it 
has strong connections to cultural formation and socialisation in its meaning. The chapter 
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showed that in Sesotho culture setho thus denotes the person’s origins, understood in terms 
of their cultural background and moral upbringing, where the latter is about character formation 
and development of the person. According to this setho is then the agency whose 
manifestation in motho is botho. In Sesotho culture this is typically understood in terms of 
personhood and is connected to and achieved through the inculcation of ‘makhabane a botho’ 
(values and virtues of botho) where the aim is for these to be an integral part of the character 
of the person.   
This chapter contextualises the importance of analysing botho from the cultural perspective of 
one of the cultures from which the term derives. Here Sesotho culture as such culture, is thus 
cast as one of the cultures that authentically can be invoked for finding an explanation of what 
botho means. The discussion on the experience of botho in Sesotho culture thus showed that 
the understanding of this concept i.e., in terms of good behaviour or manners, foreshadows 
the current prevailing interpretation of this concept in the discourse. It also shows that when 
they describe and defined botho, Basotho used moral language that denotes habitual conduct 
or behaviour. These includes statements like ‘boitśoaro bo botle’ which connotes good moral 
behaviour, or ‘liketso tse ntle’ meaning good and morally admirable or commendable conduct. 
As this chapter has argued when behaviour and conduct is described and assessed with the 
view of the long term such as that implied in development of habits, that is when it refers to 
character i.e.,how a person behaves in the light of their moral formation and development. It 
is in this sense that the chapter argues that the morality of Basotho is character centric and 
since botho is the whole point of moral formation i.e., accumulating qualities of botho, how it 
is understood will be connected to good character as well. This does not mean botho means 
good character, but that good character is a pathway to acquiring botho i.e., personhood. 
Implied in the above redefinition of botho, is reference to moral formation as key to Basotho 
culture in terms of ensuring their members acquire good moral character.   
The significance of moral formation in Sesotho culture the chapter argues points to another 
important insight namely that for individuals to thrive in inculcating good admirable qualities of 
character, which botho presupposes, they require a particular social order or enabling social 
environment. This is the focus of chapter five where the analysis focuses on normative 
significance of social institutions and social roles to moral life in traditional Basotho culture. 
The central argument of this chapter is that social institutions have a moral influence on us as 
moral agents and that they dictate what we can and can’t do. This they do by virtue of the 
social roles we occupy. The chapter thus argues that these institutions and roles that 
individuals occupy are relevant to ethics as part of the social order that support ethics i.e., 
regulating behaviour of individuals. The chapter contextualises this analysis by focusing on 
Sesotho culture showing that in Sesotho culture these institutions and roles supported the 
practice of botho and sustained its existence in the village and society at large. In other words, 
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they provided a traditional Mosotho with the necessary ethical resources and support 
infrastructure i.e., environment essential for moral agents to be ethical and to respond well to 
the process of training in character and morel development. What this means for botho 
discourse is recognition that morally weak contexts undermine and weaken the moral 
character of agents even of good ones. Similarly, morally strong contexts i.e., social context 
can do the opposite. For this reason, the ethical significance of social institutions and social 
roles is a necessity in any future discourse on botho.  
The chapter thus analysed selected key institutions of Basotho along with their corresponding 
social roles. It showed how this network of relationships implied by institutions and roles has 
inherent obligations on individuals and that these obligations influence and shape personal 
conduct in similar ways as ethics. The key social institutions analysed included the traditional 
Basotho village (motse), lelapa and leloko, both which are translated as family and extended 
family, and lenyalo (marriage). All these institutions have explicit and implicit obligations and 
responsibility for individuals who are members based of the nature of the relationships they 
have with others. Common to all these we can mention the deep sense of solidarity and 
belonging required of anyone involved in these relationships. Individuals were expected to 
value, hence the high priority Basotho place of the bond of belonging, i.e., relatedness no 
matter how distant, and no less deserving of the moral agent’s time and nurturing as those 
relations with immediate family members. We saw that this solidarity with others in Sesotho 
culture extended from the inner most circle of members in the institutions of marriage to the 
outer most circles the community of the village and beyond to include visitors and travellers 
or strangers. Here we saw how Basotho adhered scrupulously to rules and norms of 
politeness, hospitality and generosity towards others, especially outsiders or strangers, as 
codified in the doctrine of “o se re ho moroa, moroa toe”. 
The chapter emphasised how as individual moral agents our relationship with social 
institutions is therefore never just qua individuals. Rather that we all engage with these and 
with one another as bearers of specific roles and how these roles constitute the given of our 
life. It showed that all social roles have in common is the expectations and obligations they 
impose on role occupiers and this in turn influence personal conduct. It also showed that in 
Sesotho culture many social roles enforce certain responsibilities and duties and that it is in 
the fulfilment of the duties of these roles that the behaviour of moral agent is moderated and 
regulated. In this way social roles are interlinked with ethics because they influence conduct 
in certain ways.  We thus saw that it is in this sense that fulfilment of the duties of social roles 
e.g. social role of mohaisane (neighbour), that it is in part taken into consideration in the 
assessment of one’s moral goodness i.e., in deciding if the person is a good neighbour or not. 
This is in turn become part of the consideration in the assessment of a person regarding 
whether they possess botho.  
 270 
Another important insight gained from the analysis of the ethical significance of social roles 
and institutions in Sesotho culture, is that they are themselves part of a larger complexes of 
social support structures and resources in a society that fulfil some larger end or set of ends 
of the society. We saw that in many African cultures the pursuit of this shaped the character 
of African societies creating what is now often regard as the characteristic way of life found in 
African culture. This is the case with Basotho culture. Their way of life including day to day 
conduct was lived in the light of this larger end i.e., certain conception of a possible shared 
future, a future in which certain ways of living are already excluded while some seem 
inevitable. The chapter argued that in Sesotho culture this is what made their culture to be the 
way it is, to have the social context or socio-cultural milieu that it did and develop the 
characteristic features of Basotho way of life that they have. In turn this social setting provided 
traditional Mosotho with a supportive and enabling environment conducive to the practice of 
botho ethics. The chapter thus argued that it is in part on account of this that we find in Sesotho 
culture that many of the social practices and features of their life, are fundamentally in harmony 
with and are ideal for the practice of botho ethics as a way of life. Here we saw how features 
such the deep sense of solidarity, concern with other’s wellbeing associated with the African 
community, generosity, kindness, politeness and mutual accountability for one another and all 
the core elements that enable community living, together provided the individual mosotho with 
the necessary social setting to find it easy to practice values and virtues associated with botho. 
It is this that in Sesotho culture constitutes the social and cultural milieu and characteristics 
features of Basotho way of life, that provided traditional Mosotho a with supportive and 
enabling environment conducive to botho ethics.  
The chapter gave a brief account of selected features in Sesotho culture considered conducive 
and necessary support to the practice of botho. These included social identity and community 
membership, the religious underpinning of life in African culture, the community as the 
custodian of moral formation and traditions of the culture, and the high regard of the common 
good. These ideals and features, which were central to the traditional life of Basotho provided 
the necessary communal and social support to the individual as amoral agent to be ethical 
i.e., find it easy to practice values of botho. They all had the joint effect of supporting the social 
and moral life of the individual especially in training in character and development of good 
admirable character, which in turn is essential for practice of botho ethics as the predominant 
ethical approach in Sesotho culture.  
The investigation of botho in the experience and moral life of traditional Basotho that this study 
has done, has shown in their culture the botho is understood as the encapsulation of virtues. 
The study has in turn argued that the proper arena of the virtues and vices is character. In this 
sense the study is a validation of description of botho in terms of character. This account of 
botho, as we saw is not only consistent with traditional usage of the word in Southern Africa 
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but also underscores the case for the reinstatement a character to the centre of discourse 
about botho. The study thus makes a general case for moral character as an important 
consideration in assessing the moral standing of an individual. This is because this is what is 
meant when we say a person has botho i.e., they have shown excellence in cultivating good 
admirable qualities, qualities which as explained are always understood as the reflection of 
moral character.  It is for this reason that this study concludes that questions of character must 
be brought back to the centre of botho discourse if our understanding of botho is to become a 
reality with practical application to personal conduct and moral life of individuals today.   
6.2 Recommendations 
 
One of the contributions that this study makes to current discourse is in expanding current 
conception of botho as not only a moral concept but also that as a moral concept botho is 
highly polysemic moral ideal. Although material on this topic is constantly being produced, this 
must not be construed as suggesting that the project of scholarly inquiry into the depth of 
botho as moral idea is now complete. As moral ideal botho is inexhaustibly rich as an 
articulation of values and virtues and so are the cultures from which it is traditionally associated 
with.  
 
6.2.1  On the Ethical Significance of Moral Particularities 
 
To deepen and broaden existing knowledge on this concept this study recommends further 
studies on this topic and the adoption a similar approach taken here i.e., conducting of 
research focusing on the articulation and elucidation of the ethical imperatives of botho, from 
the moral particularity and perspective of a specific culture, in the case of this study the 
Sesotho culture. Of particular interest here are the moral traditions of the various Sesotho 
language speaking cultures and their Nguni counterparts in Southern African. It is the 
contention of this study that the approach of the current discourse, which starts the  
theorisation of this concept from the general and advance from there apply this universally on 
botho as a concept, needs the complementary approach provided by the particularity of its 
articulation and interpretation in concrete contexts unique to the various cultures that botho is 
traditionally associated with.  This is because within the unique diversity of these cultures from 
which botho is practiced, is a wealth of insights about botho buried deep in the uniqueness of 
each culture. And like a newly found rich archaeological site, each of these cultures are a 
deposit of archaeological significance requiring the discourse to careful and patiently excavate 
the deposit of botho embedded in them, attentive to each detail of nuance and fragment of 
meaning that is found within the culture. There is therefore a need for further research to 
excavate nuances of meaning of “botho”, of  “ubuntu”  and many other similar terms or 
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concepts in other cultures to “map out the entire landscape of ideas” and views about what 
these terms mean in their respective context and moral particularities of each individual culture 
which this concept is traditionally associated with. 
Of relevance here is research on botho from the perspective of many of the communities from 
some of the cultures north of the Limpopo river, such as the Shona or Ndebele people in 
Zimbabwe, or the Lozi people of Zambia whose language share common heritage with that of 
Basotho. This will enable research to be more contextual and to articulate in-depth the moral 
views and ideas which “botho” or its equivalents terms represent in other cultures thus 
broadening current knowledge base and providing the discourse with even better 
understanding of the concept. 
 
6.2.2  On the Social Order Presupposed by Botho  
 
As suggested in this study much has been written about botho in the literature but as it has 
already been acknowledged by others, scholarly inquiry into this topic is just getting started. 
And nowhere is this more so than on the question of the ethical significance of the social order 
that is presupposed by botho. The significance of this is that it tells us that, in the pursuit of 
eternal moral aim of having in a society “batho bao e leng batho (individuals who are good 
people) or ‘batho ba nang le botho” (individuals who possess qualities of botho), the strength 
and quality of character of the motho (individual) alone, although necessary is not sufficient. 
For this goal to be achieved i.e., for motho to attaining the status of “being a good person” 
morally, requires sound ethical support structures, societal resources to support and reinforce 
the dispositions of character of the moral agent in his or her life and intentions towards the 
achievement of moral goodness and to make this possible. In societies like that of the Basotho, 
that social support system is realised in their social institutions and social roles within a culture, 
where these played a vital role in providing moral agents with much-needed enabling and 
supportive structures and resources to be ethical. 
The implication of this for future studies is more research on the significance of social 
institutions and social roles to the practice of botho as a new area of interest for botho 
discourse. This is because as we have seen in this study ethics of botho presuppose a 
particular type of society or social order as well as corresponding institutions to make botho a 
reality and thrive. Therefore, more research is still needed focusing on this aspect of African 
culture, to find what type of social institutions and roles are conducive to and support botho 
and how these can be created for today’s context.  Without a rigorous analysis of the of the 
social conditions that made botho ethics possible the seeming impracticality and illusiveness 
of botho as a living ethos, and questions of its suitability for today’s context will remain. 
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6.2.3  On the Significance of Narratives to Botho Discourse  
 
There is no aspect of the analysis of the articulation of botho examined in this study that is 
desperately in need of more research than significance of narratives as vehicles of moral 
education into values of botho and the crucial role they can play in explaining and articulating 
the values and virtues of botho. This study has shown the rich moral heritage of African culture 
embedded in narratives especially folk tales and proverbs and the power they possess to 
expound botho as polysemic moral ideal. The importance of the narrative dimension of virtue 
as expressed this study in relation to elucidation of botho is that it underscores the argument 
made in this study a full explanation of this concept in current botho discourse will remain an 
impoverished one until the discourse is able to giving a more systematic account of how this 
concept is described and explained in African narratives in their diversity and extensiveness 
as part of the analysis of this concept.   Many of the cultures traditionally associated with botho 
have a wealth of narratives including their own stories such as like litśomo among the Basotho 
These stories are laden with invaluable moral ideas and views of these cultures reflection 
about what is considered acceptable admirable and unacceptable ways of conduct within a 
culture. In turn this constitutes that which is encouraged and taught to members as essential 
to possession of botho. In other words, if we want to deepen current knowledge about botho,  
there is no better way of excavation the rich deposits of nuance of meaning and understanding 
of botho in the different cultures in southern African than investigating many narratives found 
in these cultures. In most of these narratives we find valuable and innumerable ways of 
defining and articulating the values and virtues encapsulated in botho. These insights are 
currently inaccessible to scholarship because so far, the discourse has not taken narratives 
as essential sources for illuminating knowledge on botho and the values represented. This 
study has shown that narratives are highly rich deposits of what values and virtues botho 
enshrines. It has also shown that they are valuable ethical resources for moral teaching 
especially for articulating the ethical imperatives of botho not only to contemporary Africans 
today but to the wider of audience beyond.   
 
6.2.4  On Mafisa as a Reflection and Manifestation of Personal Character  
 
Anyone interested in current botho discourse and African ethics will be aware of the 
significance of mafisa, the traditional practice commonly referred to as long term loaning of 
livestock, often referred to in the discourse as the quintessential expression of botho, and the 
embodiment of African communalism as one of its distinctive virtues. What is often missed 
about mafisa is the extent to which it is a testament of the moral character of individuals 
involved in, especially the expression of kindness, intense sense of caring and compassion, 
of altruism and unconditional generosity and sharing of wealth to help those in need that this 
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practice implies. So far there is no systematic analysis of this practice in terms character and 
the attitude to material possession and sharing of wealth in order in help others who are in 
need. In other words, it is important for this practice to be studied as an expression and 
manifestation of the moral character of motho as a moral agent, especially the moral character 
of those with material possessions. A closer analysis of this practice particularly in specific 
contexts and social milieu such as that of Basotho people cannot be separated from its intrinsic 
connection to questions of the moral character and basic attitude to wealth. This I believe is 
where the moral radicalness of mafisa as critique of contemporary attitudes to sharing of 
wealth is found as a prophetic message about moral character of those who are wealthy like 
the founder of Basotho nation, King Moshoeshoe I, who is renowned for practicing mafisa,  
not only as a political tool but also as an expression of sharing, giving, kind and humane 
character and fellow feeling towards others. This is because at its heart mafisa is a moral 
choice, a choice to do good with one’s material possession especially wealth, with no 
expectation of anything in return. It is therefore fundamentally an ethical act that reflects a 
noble character of motho, in which a deep desire to help others is a moral choice reflective of 
the agent’s character. 
 
6.2.5  On botho and Character Based Ethical Approaches  
 
It is often remarked explicitly and implicitly in the discourse how similar the ethical approach 
underpinning botho has with the moral tradition of the virtues or virtue ethics, especially with 
regards to primacy of character. These similarities and parallels can be detected in the 
proposed formulation of botho that this study advances as well.  And as has already been said 
so far in the discourse interest on the ethical reflection on botho in the light of character ethics 
or virtue ethics and their basic approach is still lacking behind. What this study has shown in 
this regard, underscores this as unexplored area of research with great potential to really make 
a big contribution to existing knowledge on botho.  Moreover, such a dialogue between and 
with virtues ethics, even more importantly is that in the current climate in ethics, i.e., of 
developing a truly global ethic, the theorisation of botho where emphasis is on the primacy of 
character, offers African ethics with a good springboard from which to make a unique 
contribution. This can help in turn with the development of the required minimum set of 
common values, to overcome the crisis of values orientation now generally a problem not just 





6.3. Concluding Remarks and Significance of the study 
 
The significance of this study and the character-based articulation of botho it proposes, is that 
this is the first inquiry of its kind to revisit botho in the moral thought and practice of a specific 
moral tradition and culture, namely the Sesotho speaking culture and moral tradition of 
Basotho. Although Sesotho culture is one of the indigenous cultures that is home to botho, 
and as such it is a natural candidate for exploring within it how the practice of botho informed 
their morality, there is surprising very little by way of in-depth scholarly inquiry and research 
by scholars of botho that is specific to Sesotho culture in current discourse and literature. This 
study thus is an important contribution to the discourse, because while it builds on existing 
body of knowledge, it is also a fresh approach to the subject compared to common approaches 
of current botho discourse. This is because this is the first study of its kind to investigate in a 
systematic way the experience of botho in Sesotho culture and unpack how this term is used 
and applied in that context, from which lessons for today’s context can be learnt.   
This approach is, therefore, not only important as a different approach to the understanding 
botho, it is also important in terms of the contribution it makes to the discourse of opening a 
new area for further research and interest on botho, on which not much is known about now 
in the discourse.  The study and hence its importance and the contribution it makes, is the 
introduction and articulation of botho and its connection to centrality of character that it makes 
in the current botho discourse. The significance of this study is thus best understood if it is 
viewed as a new voice in the current discourse and African ethics in general, representing a 
lesser-known moral tradition in ethics with a wealth of ethical resources to share and from 
which lessons can be learned. This is because this study is a voice representing, one of the 
cultures historically associated with botho. It reflects views and ideas of a moral tradition and 
culture authentic to Southern Africa and a long history of a unique approach to ethics 
underpinned by certain principles of personal and social existence grounded on botho ethics. 
It is a perspective that is now accredited with making the Basotho people and culture one of 
the peaceful cultures of their time.   
The main contribution of the study can thus be regarded as one of deepening and broadening 
existing body of knowledge on botho, with insights from the moral particularity and tradition of 
Basotho people, by developing and introducing a particular and different account of botho. At 
the centre of this account and formulation of botho, which in Sesotho culture is also the basis 
of one’s relationships with others, is to be found certain fundamental claims which are not only 
at the heart of traditional moral scheme of Basotho people, but also forms the parameters 
within which botho is defined in this study. Chief among them and worth mentioning here is 
that botho presupposes setho in a motho, and that for motho to be able to practice botho 
similarly presuppose the existence of a particular social order or social setting compatible with 
practicing virtues and values of botho, without which possession of botho becomes not only 
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difficult but almost impossible. The attractiveness of this account is that it is not married nor 
dependent on the proverb ‘motho ke motho ka batho’. But it is an independent alternative 
account of botho grounded on the significance of character as the true arena of morality in 
African ethics and the exact locus where virtues and vices play out in a person. In terms of 
this characterisation of botho, the possession of virtue makes one a motho, because - ke botho 
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